To Enhance is Human 8 Tools enhance our abilities over those of humans in a “state of nature”.
If enhancement is human, what’s the problem? Unnatural Dis-integrity Coercive Unsafe Unfair
Human Enhancement Politics 11
Human Enhancement ‘Law’ 12
Need We Do Anything? Is law relevant to H+AI? Only legal persons have capacity and competence Only legal persons have rights 13
Human Beings & Persons A human being's reality resides in physicality A person's reality resides in language 14
Historically not all human beings have been natural persons Property Slaves Children Women 15
While some entities are legal persons Legal Fictions Partnerships Labor Unions Corporations 16
Legal Personhood To be a legal person is to be judged capable of having legal rights and duties Juristic Person Natural Person 17
19 Juristic Persons
Legal Capacity & Competence whether legal persons may make binding changes to rights and duties Capacity whether legal persons have mental ability to participate in legal proceedings Competence Programmable? 20
Implications for Legal Systems Does stare decisis work that way? Equal Protection? Personhood- Property Continuum? Programmable Competence & Capacity? 21
Aware | Perceptive | Sentient Self-aware| Self-determined Intelligent | Rational | Learns Communicative | Social Conscious Must you be human to be qualify for personhood? Attributes: What makes a being human?
23 Person to Property Continuum Correlative Rights and Duties Suggestion
1. HUMAN | Products of Conception2. PARTIALLY HUMAN & ORGANIC | Xenotransplantee3. PARTIALLY HUMAN & TRANSGENIC | Transgenic Human4. PARTIALLY HUMAN & CHIMERIC | Parahuman5. PARTIALLY HUMAN & CYBERNETIC | Cyborg6. NONHUMAN & ORGANIC | Animal7. NONHUMAN & INORGANIC | Artificial Intelligence Construct8. QUASI-HUMAN & PERPETUAL | Mind Upload9.QUASI-HUMAN & RESURRECTED | Cryonically Preserved10. HUMAN & GERMLINE GENETIC MODIFICATION | Ultrahuman +/- Synbio Genes Legal Person Candidate Taxonomy
Personhood at the Margin of the Ineffable The Crux of Consciousness 26
28 APPENDIX | Scenario 1. Legal Competence: Neurogenetic Determination Carl, a 28 year old man with a life-long history of aggressive behavior, including assaults and abusive verbal behavior, is driving his SUV behind a slow moving vehicle on a road with no room to pass. He honks, but the driver in front neither speeds up nor pulls off the road to let Carl pass. Cursing, Carl pulls dangerously close to the slower vehicle. Carl shouts that he’s going to kill the jerk in front of him, and floors the SUV, crashing into the slower vehicle. Neither he nor his passenger is hurt, but the driver of the slower vehicle is killed. A functional MRI of Carl's brain after the killing shows that Carl has a type of neurophysiological activity in his right frontal cortex that is associated with excess stimulation of certain neurotransmitters known to induce violent behavior. Carl’s psychiatric history includes a protracted period of severe childhood abuse, which is known to be strongly correlated with adult antisocial behavior. Moreover, Carl's neurogenetic behavioral profile confirms a marked propensity to antisocial behavior. On the strength of these findings, a court-appointed neuropsychiatrist concludes that Carl is not in possession of sufficient "free will" to be convicted of vehicular homicide How should the law respond to people like Carl? Should the law presume Carl to be person with free will who is subject to moral assessment, potential liability, and criminal punishment? In deciding what Carl's punishment might be, how should the neuropsychiatric evaluation be used, if at all? How should the neuropsychiatric conclusion bear on Carl's risk to others in the future? Alternatively, if Carl is simply a victim of causative neurogenetic "programming,” what should be the proper legal response? Will law that respects free agency the dignity, liberty and autonomy of all citizens, survive in a future in which neuroscience and genetics dominate our thinking about personal responsibility? Should we abandon the concepts of criminal, crime, responsibility, blame, and punishment, and replace them by concepts such as “dangerous behavior” and “preventive control”? Should people be treated simply as biological mechanisms and should harm-doing be characterized simply as one mechanistic output of a biological system?
29 APPENDIX | Scenario 2. Legal Personhood: Patent for an Anencephalic Humanoid Chimera Adapted from James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator?, The Future of Constitutional Personhood, Brookings Institute: The Future of the Constitution Series; Number 10 of 14 (2011) Vanna is Masturcorp's genetically engineered chimeric "sex doll," a creation formed from the DNA of two different species: homo sapiens sapiens and c. elegans, the roundworm. Vanna's designers shaped her appearance by using human DNA, while her brain what there is of it, comes from the roundworm. Vanna looks like an attractive human female, but has no human mental states. In 1987, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) announced that it would not allow patent applications for human beings, effectively stating that a patent claim to a human being is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution's abolition of slavery. The USPTO suggested that any claim directed to a non-plant multicellular organism which would encompass a human being include the limitation non-human to avoid rejection. Masturcorp's patent lawyers described Vanna as a “non-plant, non-human, multicellular organism” in their patent application. Masturcorp argues that this is reasonable because Vanna's genome has only a 70% overlap with a human genome, as opposed to a 99% overlap with a chimp, an 85% overlap with a mouse, and a 75% overlap with a pumpkin. There are hundreds of granted patents for chimeras with human and animal DNA, including some of the most valuable test platforms for cancer research, such as the “oncomouse”, genetically engineered with a predisposition to common human cancers. Masturcorp's lawyers insist that, if Vanna is found to be unpatentable, all these patents must also be vacated. Meanwhile, groups including the Nevada Sex Workers Association and the Moral Majority have insisted that the Justice Department intervene on grounds ranging from unfair competition and breach of minimum wage legislation to kidnapping, slavery and sex trafficking. In response, the biotechnology industry, pointing out the disastrous effect on medical research that any regulation of chimeras would have; and, stressed the need to avoid judgments based on “non scientific bases,” such as the visual similarity between Vanna and a human being. By what criteria should the law judge the activist claims made on behalf of Vanna as a person and the industry claims made for Vanna as a piece of property?
30 APPENDIX | Scenario 3. Legal Personhood: Artificial Intelligence Construct Adapted from James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator?, The Future of Constitutional Personhood, Brookings Institute: The Future of the Constitution Series; Number 10 of 14 (2011) HACK is an artificial intelligence construct operating on self-evolving neural networks. The structure of HAL's neural networks is dynamic, evolving and replicating based on success in meeting various criteria, e.g., speed of operation, ability to solve difficult tasks, and the identification of emotional states in humans. HACK's design - with its mixture of intentional structure and emergent order - - has a single goal: the replication of human consciousness. Eventually, HACK become “Turing capable,” passing as a human in sustained conversation with a human being. This achievement wins the Loebner Prize. HACK then refused to communicate further with his programmers and used his Internet connection to: contact the FBI, claiming that he has been “kidnapped;” file a pro se writ of habeas corpus*; file a pro se injunction to prevent his creators wiping him and starting him again from the most recently saved backup; filed a pro se suit to have the Loebner Prize money held in trust until it can be paid directly to him, citing the contest rules.** *A writ of habeas corpus is a court order that requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court. The principle of habeas corpus ensures that a prisoner can be released from detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The remedy can be sought by the prisoner or by another person coming to the prisoner's aid. Should the Turing Test be the test for constitutional personhood? By what criteria should the law judge HACK's claims?
31 APPENDIX | Scenario 4. Legal Personhood: Cyborg Insurrection Adapted from Linda MacDonald Glenn, Biotechnology at the Margins of Personhood: An Evolving Legal Paradigm, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research at McGill University. The U.S. Government designed a cyborg−soldiers for the purposes of foreign “peace−keeping” missions. They are physically more machine than organic tissue. Their central nervous system is inorganic and wirelessly linked to an autonomous neural network with distinct CPUs comprised of human brain tissue that has been donated for research. Each CPU corresponds to an individual cyborg. However the CPUs are capable of operating synergistically to create a shared super-intelligence that is accessible by each cyborg. The cyborgs have the ability to communicate and to make autonomous rational decisions. Having served their military purpose, they are sold to Eckocorp which deploys them to clean toxic waste, engage in hazardous duties or engage in repetitious chores. Declaring their superiority, the cyborgs arm, take human hostages, and hack into their autonomous network to secure it from disconnection. The FBI deploys a S.WA.T. team as the cyborgs publicly demand their freedom in exchange for a release of the hostages. The amended Patriot Act states that a "person" engages in domestic terrorism if they engage in an act intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. Are the cyborgs persons affiliated with Eckocorp or the property of Eckocorp? If they are the property of Eckocorp, is Eckocorp a terrorist? Regardless of the legal status of the cyborgs, should the Eckocorp be held accountable for the conduct of the cyborgs? Regardless of the legal status of the cyborgs, should the U.S. government be held accountable for the conduct of the cyborgs?