Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

An Assessment of Toshiba HIDE Technology against the ARDG Attribute List Oct. 22, 2003 TOSHIBA Corporation.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "An Assessment of Toshiba HIDE Technology against the ARDG Attribute List Oct. 22, 2003 TOSHIBA Corporation."— Presentation transcript:

1 An Assessment of Toshiba HIDE Technology against the ARDG Attribute List Oct. 22, 2003 TOSHIBA Corporation

2 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG2 0.Attributes, Criteria and Considerations The scheme is a video watermarking technology that is called HIDE (Human eye Insensitive Digitally Embedded watermark) and that works in baseband domain. The basic principle of HIDE consists of embedding a signal which carries rights signaling information into the video signal.

3 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG3 Features of HIDE  Robust against various kinds of operations and attacks  Especially, robust against scaling and filtering  Low false positive error rate  Good transparency  Sufficient capacity for copy control usage  Baseband detection, independent from the compression methods and formats

4 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG4 1.ARDG Goals Because the watermark signal is not affected by the conversion of a content from digital to analog format and reconversion to digital format, the rights signaling information persists throughout such conversion and reconversion. The foregoing makes it possible for a device to detect the watermark from the content signal and protect the security of the content by implementing playback and/or record control according to applicable compliance rules based on rights signaling information expressed in the watermark signal.

5 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG5 2. Capacity of the Scheme HIDE can carry up to 7 bits. Supports CCI states for remarking. A content protection scheme can define as its own discretion how many bits and states are actually used and what meaning is attributed to each of such states. 2.1 What states does and can the scheme carry?

6 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG6 2.2 In the analog space, how are the rights carried? 2.3 What is the technical mechanism by which the rights signaling insertion technology determines the appropriate rights states to apply to the content? 2.4 To what extent does the rights signaling scheme have the capacity to replicate the rights states of the protected digital content?

7 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG7 Reference: Analog Reconversion Reference Architecture by Brad Hunt CTO, MPAA Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) A Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) B Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) D Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Analog) E Possible Rights Signaling Insertion Points Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) C Rights Signaling Detection Point (Analog) W Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) X Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) Y Possible Rights Signaling Detection Points Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) Z Digital Content Master Digital Source Device with Analog Output (Trusted Environment) Copy Control Information Digital Content Link Protected Digital Output with CCI Digital Processing (decryption, decoding, etc.) Protected Digital Content Delivery with Copy Control Information (CCI) Digital Sink Device with Analog Input (Trusted Environment) Rights Information Digital Content Secure Digital Video Record Function (CCI = Rights) Secure Digital Output Function (CCI = Rights) Record Control Redistribution Control Protected Digital Output with CCI Protected Digital Recording with CCI Analog Output with Rights Signaling Digital -to- Analog Video Converter (Rights = CCI) Analog Output with Rights Signaling Protected Digital Output with CCI Digital Processing (encoding, encryption, etc.) Digital Content CCI Link Protected Digital Input with CCI Analog -to- Digital Video Converter WM insertion by content provider

8 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG8 2.5 Is a mandate required for the content usage rights signaling, detection and interpretation? We believe that contractual/licensing obligations accompanied with reasonable enforcement activities should provide the required protection of the content. However, should one think that a more stringent control through official authority is required for the intended goal, a governmental mandate may be preferable.

9 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG9 2.6 Does the scheme require an anticircumvention mandate in order to be reasonably effective? Because HIDE technology provides sufficient survivability against the normal processing including conversion from digital to analog, reconversion from analog to digital, noise reduction and transformation, we think that an anticircumvention mandate is not necessarily required. However, should one think that a more stringent control through official authority is required for the intended goal, a governmental mandate may be preferable.

10 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Is protection consistent across IT and CE platforms? Yes. HIDE works across IT and CE platform in a non- discriminatory manner.

11 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG "What is the reliability of the scheme under ideal conditions?" The reliability of HIDE is 100% under ideal condition. Under normal operating conditions, it is more than 50% for a unit of detection window period and it increases towards 100% by extending the detection window. HIDE is reliable against normal attacks such as transformations and removal of known analog copy protection signals.

12 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG In what form or aspect is the scheme itself upgradeable and/or renewable? The scheme is upgradable by changing embedding pattern of the watermark. The function, performance and robustness of HIDE remain unchanged by an upgrade. The watermark detector would be still usable if the upgraded embedding pattern is implemented in advance. 3.2 What is the upgradeability/renewability mechanism? 3. Robustness

13 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What is the mechanism and cost (dollars, cpu cycles, gates, etc.) of known circumvention? For HIDE technology, there is no known circumvention method that preserves enjoyable video quality. 3.5 How does the system address known circumventions?

14 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG14 Robustness/Survivability HIDE technology is robust against various kinds of attacks:  Vertical and/or horizontal scaling  MPEG2/MPEG4 compression and decompression  VHS recording  D/A and A/D conversions  Random noise addition  Gamma correction  Jitter attack  Rotation attack  Stirmark attack

15 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Have the specifications been published and/or reviewed? If so, where? The technology has been offered to and reviewed by DVD- CCA.

16 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG To what extent, considered purely as a technical matter, and considered apart from rights-allocation choices made by the content owner or distributor does the scheme create side effects in the use of material? As the basic principle of HIDE consists of embedding a signal which carries rights signaling information into the video signal and such embedding results in changing intensity values for some pixels, there is some picture quality degradation in principle. However such degradation is comparable with the degradation resulting from the MPEG-2 compression used for DVD-Video and is not distinguishable by an average user. 4. Side Effects

17 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Does the scheme have a mechanism apart from the rights signaling method to convey the rules and conditions to the consumer? The HIDE technology itself does not contain such mechanism.

18 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Will the scheme have a mechanism for indicating to the consumer when improper behavior is attempted? The HIDE technology itself does not contain such mechanism for indicating to the consumer when improper behavior is attempted. However, it would be easy for a product that incorporate the HIDE technology to implement such mechanism.

19 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Extent to which the scheme's effects are perceptable to consumer, such as visibility and audibility of the scheme. As the basic principle of HIDE consists of embedding a signal which carries rights signaling information into the video signal, there is some picture quality degradation in principle, however such degradation is comparable with the degradation resulting from the MPEG-2 compression used for DVD-Video and is not distinguishable by an average user.

20 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Does the scheme increase the exposure to malicious attacks of systems owned by the consumer? E.g. Disable equipment, harm to media, denial of service, etc. There is no identified malicious attack that will be encouraged by the introduction of HIDE technology.

21 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG21 4.6/4.7 Does the scheme increase the cost and/or complexity of a digital broadcast system or a content mastering/creation system serving as the source for the content? Yes, the scheme increase the cost of a digital broadcast system or a content mastering/creation system serving as the source for the content by adding a watermark embedder. However it does not increase complexity because the watermark embedder is just simply placed after the source or the content mastering/creation system.

22 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG22 4.8/4.9 Does the scheme increase the cost and/or complexity of digital broadcast operations or content mastering/creation operations serving as the source for the content? No, though it is required to input the rights signaling information for the watermark, those operations are anyway required when the content is marked with a rights signaling information.

23 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Does any aspect of the scheme inhibit the end user's equipment or network from playing or recording audio or video content for which copy protection was not asserted Because there is no watermark in a content for which copy protection is not asserted, the scheme does not inhibit playback or recording of such content. 5. Impact on Legacy Devices or on Material Not Protected by the Scheme

24 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What is the impact of the scheme on legacy devices (new content and new devices on or with legacy devices)? As legacy device does not detect or react to the watermark, there is no impact on behavior of legacy device. 5.3 What is the impact of the scheme on the use of legacy content with new devices? As legacy content does not contain the watermark, there is no impact on treatment of the legacy content.

25 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG To what extent does the scheme require the disclosure of personally identifiable information from a user to the service or content provider(s)? The HIDE technology has nothing to do with any personally identifiable information. 6. Privacy

26 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Is the specification for the scheme complete enough as to meet generally accepted requirements for a submission to standards bodies? The documentation of specification has not reached sufficient completion level. It will be completed when required. 7. Scheme Documentation

27 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Does the scheme embody IP which requires a license? If so, what are the terms of the license for the use of this technology in this application? Does anything in the license effect the availability of the technology in this application? Toshiba's HIDE technology consists of copyrights and trade secrets embodied in a technical specification and other inventions protected by patents or patent applications. Toshiba is prepared to grant license rights, on a per application basis and under reasonable and non- discriminatory terms and conditions, under all claims of such patents/patent applications whether now existing or existing in the future, any trademarks, and all copyrights and trade secrets that is either owned by Toshiba or licensable by Toshiba, that cover the HIDE technology. 8. Contractual Requirements

28 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Are the contractual requirements affecting the technical aspects of the proposal, if any, completely described a priori in non-confidential documents? Toshiba is prepared to offering its HIDE technology for licensing for its application to appropriate content protection schemes. Contractual requirements with respect to both technical aspects of implementation of the technology and usage rules do remain yet to be set by the applicable content protection scheme. However, we expect that such requirements would include, without limitation, robustness rules of a reasonable level as well as certain compliance rules/usage rules.

29 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What mechanisms, if any, are there for contractual change of technical requirements? Toshiba is prepared to offering its HIDE technology for licensing for its application to appropriate content protection schemes. Mechanisms for contractual change of technical requirements yet remain to be set by the applicable content protection scheme.

30 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG To what extent, if any, is the solution available solely for the purposes set forth in 1.1 (as opposed to part of a package with other rights and obligations)? The HIDE technology itself does not contain any mechanism limiting the use of the technology solely for the purposes set forth in 1.1. Meanwhile, Toshiba anticipates that it will offer its HIDE technology for licensing on a per embedding field of use basis to be determined from time to time by Toshiba.

31 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What is the maturity of the scheme? Toshiba HIDE technology has been evaluated by DVD- CCA and their contracted evaluator and has remained as a candidate for video watermark for protecting DVD-Video contents. 9. Current and Future Capability 9.2 Is the scheme of sufficient maturity that the function, efficacy, and resource requirements have been confirmed by field trials or other appropriate testing?

32 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Have the results been shown to be reproducible by entities other than the scheme developers? Yes, the evaluation results by DVD-CCA show well-similar results with ours.

33 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG "How will the scheme adapt to future content formats (codecs, scan rates, etc)?" As the HIDE technology works in a baseband domain, it is independent from codecs, scan rates or resolutions. 9.5 To which existing analog video standards (e.g. 1080i, VGA, 525i, 525p, 625i etc.) is the scheme applicable? As the HIDE technology is independent from scan rates or resolutions, it is applicable to any existing or future analog video standards.

34 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Is the scheme technically capable of interoperation with or use in connection with other systems? As the HIDE technology works on a new concept and does not have any conflict with existing technology, it can interoperate with any existing scheme.

35 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Does the scheme stand on its own as a solution to the issues set forth in 1.1, or is it part of a content protection solution that requires adopting additional technology? Yes, Toshiba HIDE technology provides a complete solution as a scheme to convey rights as defined by the ARDG Goals.

36 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What is the estimated gate count and/or CPU resources required to implement the scheme, including the gate count and/or CPU resource changes in other system functions required to support the scheme's operation? With off-chip memory W/o off-chip memory 38kB 8kB 83k gates 12kBOn-chip memory Instruction ROM Random 10. Performance/Cost

37 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG What are the costs as a percentage of total resources? Assuming that "total resources" means the entirety of an end-user DVD player product, the cost of implementing HIDE technology is less than 1% and therefore it is negligible What other system costs are associated with the scheme? As Toshiba HIDE technology provides a complete solution as a scheme to convey rights as defined by the ARDG Goals, there is no other system costs associated with the scheme.

38 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG38 Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) A Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) B Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) D Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Analog) E Possible Rights Signaling Insertion Points Rights Signaling Insertion Point (Digital) C Rights Signaling Detection Point (Analog) W Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) X Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) Y Possible Rights Signaling Detection Points Rights Signaling Detection Point (Digital) Z Digital Content Master Digital Source Device with Analog Output (Trusted Environment) Copy Control Information Digital Content Link Protected Digital Output with CCI Digital Processing (decryption, decoding, etc.) Protected Digital Content Delivery with Copy Control Information (CCI) Digital Sink Device with Analog Input (Trusted Environment) Rights Information Digital Content Secure Digital Video Record Function (CCI = Rights) Secure Digital Output Function (CCI = Rights) Record Control Redistribution Control Protected Digital Output with CCI Protected Digital Recording with CCI Analog Output with Rights Signaling Digital -to- Analog Video Converter (Rights = CCI) Analog Output with Rights Signaling Protected Digital Output with CCI Digital Processing (encoding, encryption, etc.) Digital Content CCI Link Protected Digital Input with CCI Analog -to- Digital Video Converter 10.4 Does the scheme require implementation in multiple locations within the system? WM insertion WM detection WM detection / remarking

39 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Is the implementation cost comparable across IT and CE platforms? If not, please explain. Yes, the implementation cost is comparable given that other conditions such as resolution etc. are same.

40 Oct. 22, 2003ARDG Are there certification requirements? If so, what are they? Toshiba HIDE technology does not require any certification; however Toshiba is prepared to offering its HIDE technology for licensing for application to appropriate content protection schemes, that may wish to provide for certification obligations. 11. Certification


Download ppt "An Assessment of Toshiba HIDE Technology against the ARDG Attribute List Oct. 22, 2003 TOSHIBA Corporation."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google