Presentation on theme: "Conflict resolution and rural Cambodia. A way of thinking about an ideal, peaceful state A device for exploring how close we are to ‘peace’ A way of appreciating."— Presentation transcript:
looking back to 1992-3 UN intervention impact of privileging state development a wealthy, exploitative elite culture of impunity suppression of the poor and the weak is this what we planned and paid for?
poorest country in SE Asia 70% of population in rural 30% of them very poor many marginalised: women, landless, indigenous people
An incumbent government (SOC) was being asked to surrender power, an armed insurgency…was being asked to disarm itself, and both were being asked to take part in what for most Cambodians were novel democratic processes.
All of this was to be overseen by 16,000 troops and 7,000 civilian personnel from more than 100 countries (34 troop providers) estimated $3 billion…
Demobilize 200,000 soldiers in 650 locations (with 250,000 militia in almost every village) begin clearing 6 to 10 million landmines repatriate 360,000 refugees supervise the existing administration to ensure `free and fair elections', register 4.7 million voters, oversee elections at 1,400 polling stations, instil civic values and a respect for human rights begin ‘the enormous task of reconstruction and rehabilitation’ (Doyle, 1995, 45).
Many of these were new undertakings for the UN, and all had to be accomplished within an 18-month period. It is not surprising, then, that, in retrospect, Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister and one of the main initiators of the peace plan, should describe the mandate as `overly ambitious and in some respects clearly not achievable' (1994, 27). from Miall, H., O. Ramsbotham, et al. (1999). Contemporary conflict resolution : the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. Malden, Mass., Polity Press. P 192-193
sought to solve the macro international conflict ignored history / culture / traditions lack of background research primitive awareness of conflict default: rebuild the state
result: another version of traditional extractive elite failed to establish legal protections – despite structures re-opened country to regional and global economic forces
one party state – Cambodian Peoples party (CPP longest-serving strongman neo-patrimonialism creating a favour network beyond state structures
CPP needs largesse to distribute selling the country / ‘rents’ legal impunity impacts on poor /development CPP success at elections
UNDP / World Bank (WB) programs hundreds / thousands of intergovernmental program local / supported NGOs
Development theory now extensive local research critical nature of justice (J4P) / poverty traps / migration / importance of health importance of dispute resolution in addressing issues in all of this
stable ‘government’ / CPP contradictions - national processes that derail local progress creating instabilit y / conflict across the country
UNDP persistent role in local structural development good level of satisfaction with new decision-making power greater awareness of rights appreciation of stability (old)
now (again) functional conflict resolution at grass roots dysfunctional conflict resolution at national level despite structures in place problems when they meet