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Implementation of Network Centric Systems Success, Challenges, and Lessons Learned.

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1 Implementation of Network Centric Systems Success, Challenges, and Lessons Learned

2 Main objective is to develop insights regarding the implementation of Network Centric Warfare systems and technologies by examining three discrete case studies One case study focusing on a system that was canceled One case study focusing on a qualified success One case study on a more robust success

3 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Challenges Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

4 It is very difficult to progress at equal speed on development for all equipment necessary to achieve a fully network centric system American Soldier Evolution Example Network Centric evolution’s pace is increasing with the leaps in capability becoming more dramatic with each generation World War I Source: World War IIVietnam Gulf War IILand WarriorFuture Network Centric Soldier Source: Source: US Army Source: Source: Empics 191419441965 20032007? Source: Aimpoint Source: Source: Source: Thales Source: Source: Equipment Evolution Equipment Leap Source: Equipment Evolution Source: Full integration of communications and situational awareness systems Wearable Computers Source: Sistemi Compositi Source:

5 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Failures Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

6 Network Centricity is a continuously developing cycle that takes careful planning if militaries are to maximize potential benefits to address strategic objectives Network Centric Cycle Maintaining the proper order of approach on network centric development is critical to ensure programs remain on schedule and within budget Con. Ops & Mission Capabilities Force Multiplication Situational Awareness Command and Control Rapid Response Joint Operations Sustainability Strategic ObjectivesNetwork Centric Elements Communication Connectivity Integration Systems Precision Capabilities International Interoperability Battle Management Systems Blue Force Tracking National Defense Defense Industrial Development and Sustainment Homeland Security Interoperability Force Transformation Flexible Response Government Requirements Defense Industry Response

7 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

8 Land Warrior is a 1 st generation, modular, integrated fighting system for all types of individual infantrymen For all forms of infantry: Ranger, Airborne, Light, Mechanized, Air Assault Latest, cutting edge Soldier System Includes everything a dismounted soldier wears and carries integrated into a close combat fighting system that: –Enhances tactical awareness, lethality and survivability –Connects individual soldiers into the broader battlefield Network

9 Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview Spin off efforts of the Land Warrior concept included the XM-8, a cancelled assault rifle, and the earlier OCIW integrated weapon, another cancelled network centric effort Source: Weapon Subsystem Built around the M-4 Carbine The Weapon Sub-system includes video-camera and laser range-finder / digital compass (LRF/DC) When LRF / DC is coupled with GPS, soldier can call in accurate indirect fire In conjunction with camera, soldier can fire around corners Protective Clothing & Individual Equipment Consisted of a frame designed on automotive racing technologies and bends to soldiers natural movements The LW body armor is supposed to provide improved ballistic protection at a reduced weight Includes a modular upgrade plate to protect soldiers against small arms threat

10 Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview Integrated Helmet System Was designed to provide ballistic protection at less weight Helmet-mounted display allows soldier to view computer generated graphical data, maps, intelligence, troop locations and imagery from weapon-mounted thermal weapon sight (TWS) and video camera Computer / Radio Sub-system Attached to soldiers load- bearing frame, 400 Mhz A hand-grip wired to the pack and attached to the chest acts as a computer mouse and allows wearer to change screens, key on the radio, change frequencies and send digital information. Two types of sub-system Leader: two radios and a flat panel display Soldiers: one radio

11 Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview Software Subsystem Addresses the soldier’s core battlefield functions, display management, and mission equipment and supply Includes tactical and mission support modules, maps and tactical overlays, and the ability to capture and display video images Also contains a power management module Highlights Head’s up display facilitates Blue Force Tracking Radio-headsets and noise-canceling, over- the-ear headphones that fit into each helmet Body armor contains a transmitter for wireless network, capable of transmitting encrypted data for up to a KM Also includes a lithium-ion battery pack and a GPS transponder System operated from a gun-grip shaped controller or buttons on the M-4

12 Land Warrior was initially envisioned to provide a transformational leap ahead system that would dramatically enhance infantry capabilities Land Warrior Program History: Development Program Origins: Requirement stated in August 1994 Contract awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company (later Raytheon) Plans formed to develop two blocs: IOC = LW Block 1 Stryker Interoperable = LW Block 2 Program Troubles Program costs soared to $85,000 / unit System weight reached 40 lbs / unit) Intense program to replace military equipment with COTS technologies in order to lower cost and weight System found too fragile in testing in early 2000s

13 Land Warrior has struggled to deliver optimal results that match the level of investment the US Army has committed to the program Land Warrior Program History: Development New Leadership: In June 2002, Program Executive Office (PEO) established to provide centralized management for equipping the “soldier as system” rather than a piecemeal approach February 2003: General Dynamics awarded a $60 million contract to enhance Block 1 capability ~ late 2002 – 2003, program re-scoped to focus on providing some level of enhanced capability to Stryker brigades either training for or deployed to Iraq Elements of the system provided to commanders individually Field Trials and Deployment 2006 – 2007 extensive field trials at Ft. Lewis, WA 2006 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 2007 – 230 of the 440 produced systems are deployed with 4-9 infantry in Iraq Full systems provided only to squad commanders Sgts, Lts, Cpts have full systems while Pvts and Cpls have blue force tracking beacons to relay positions to commanders Program Troubles Program costs soared to $85,000 / unit System weight reached 40 lbs / unit) Intense program to replace military equipment with COTS technologies in order to lower cost and weight System found too fragile in testing in early 2000s

14 Mixed Reviews for Land Warrior Response to Land Warrior InsightsNegative “ “We see (Land Warrior) as a plus, but we also know that we’ve got to lighten the load on the soldier” --Gen. Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff “Its just a bunch of stuff we don’t use, taking the place of useful stuff, like guns... It makes you a slower, heavier target.” -- Sgt. James Young, M-240 gunner training with LW at Ft. Lewis “We have pretty much removed most of the funding for the Land Warrior program. Land Warrior along the way, really had some problems” --Lt. Gen. David Melcher, Deputy Chief of Staff for Army G-8 Land Warrior was seeking to provide revolutionary capabilities when the soldiers really needed evolutionary capabilities that will work on the battlefield Key concerns: Weight: Some reports have weight down to 7 – 10 lbs Unclear how much capability it retain Cost: between $85K USD and $101K USD per system Power sources: Can power up in vehicles, but soldiers need to carry several replacement batteries into battle

15 Mixed reviews for Land Warrior Response to Land Warrior “If given the choice I would not go outside the wire without it (Land Warrior” --US Army Sergeant Daniel Garza, 4-9 Infantry Stryker Battalion “It provides a sense of comfort in reducing the fratricide potential … Everyone knows where everyone else is on the battlefield and everyone knows where everyone else’s direct fire is” --US Army Capt. Mike Williams, Company A Commander, 4- 9 Infantry Stryker Battalion “(Land Warrior) has preformed above my expectations over here” “Now is the time to actually reinforce success so we don’t drag this out again” -- Lt. Col. Brian Cummings, Land Warrior Product Manager “Let’s not start over … Let’s build on our successes with Land Warrior -- Col. Richard Hansen, Land Warrior Project Manager arguing for the continuation of the program Positive Insights Certain elements of Land Warriors suite of technologies have been well- received Scaling back of Land Warrior and distributing the entirety of the system only to squad leaders appears to have increased the effectiveness of the system

16 Despite multiple setbacks and challenges within the Land Warrior development the program did yield some successful technologies and some beneficial insights about soldier systems and NCW Enhanced Soldier Situational Awareness Enhanced Soldier lethality from concealment Provide increased communications Access to Boomerang anti-sniper system Allowed for improved unit cohesion in clutteredurban environments Benefits System remains too heavy despite significantweight savings Development of the system failed to lower systemcost to acceptable levels Despite spending $2+ billion on R&D only 13 ofthe 19 identified capabilities gaps were addressed Drawbacks Land Warrior Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward Early combat reports validated that there is merit in the Land Warrior network centric concept even if the program overreached current capabilities Paths Forward Field a smallnumber of units,less than 500, toforces in Iraq tocontinue gainingbattlefield insights Gather what information can be extracted from the cancelled LandWarrior system Continue the Rapid Fielding Initiatives to provide troops in the fieldsolutions Wait for Future Combat Systems maturity in 2013 (?) beforeattempting a second Future Soldier System

17 Land Warrior will act as a springboard for future efforts in network centric soldier systems but the program failed to achieve its highly ambitious goals that were laid out in 1996 Land Warrior Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution Land Warrior’s goals were ambitious and had to be scaled back –Future Network Centric efforts need to keep budget in mind as well as capability enhancement –Budget needs to be considered comprehensively for research and development, procurement, and sustainment making life cycle cost assessments critical for appropriate planning Balancing desire for revolutionary systems and capabilities with the need for immediately effective and field-able evolutionary enhancements of capabilities Capable technology does not ensure that a military is well positioned to adapt that technology Land Warrior, a program that, despite offering potential benefits, did not provide enough of a network centric advantage to justify its spiraling cost Does every soldier need to be wired?

18 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems: Bowman Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

19 Bowman is a radio and communications system linking vehicles throughout the UK military—land, sea and air Bowman Components and System Architecture Overview Once completed Bowman with create a network centric system that incorporates a maximum of 30,000 platforms including ships, aircraft, and land vehicles Principle Capability Categories System Architecture Secure Voice Bowman is an open architecture system design to utilize software growth to adapt hardware solutions The software design is intend to be backwards compatible and completely network scalable Source: National Audit Office Source: CD Bowman Component Pieces Situational Awareness Messaging and data transfer Battlefield Applications Source: ITT Source:

20 The critical need for Bowman is evident when considering it was created to replace the Clansman radios that were fielded in the 1970s with expected 15 year life and were in service well into the late 1990s Land Warrior Program History: Development Program Origins: Requirement stated in 1989 General Staff Requirement seeking a replacement to ageing Clansman radio system GSR later modified to incorporate the changing post-Cold War security environment Contract awarded to Archer Program Troubles Original contract resulted in failure in 2000 Archer failed to deliver the requirement within budget and time MoD cessation of contract

21 Bowman System is a fundamental part of the UK digitalization process Land Warrior Program History: Development New Leadership: Re-bidding process won by CDC Systems UK Ltd, now General Dynamics UK New contracts involves 48,000 radios, 30,000 computers being installed on more than 30,000 platforms as well as training Field Trials and Deployment March 2003, initial technical field trials with 40 Land-Rover-borne installations July 2003, training for the initial battalion begins March 2004, first Brigade operational field trial conducted using two mechanized battle groups and a brigade HQ (245 vehicles and over 2000 personnel) Declared in service on 26 March 2004 By January 2007, 7000 vehicles had been converted (all services)

22 Bowman has had a number of key successes and is still a key element of the UK MoD’s communications and NWC plan Bowman Program History: Development Key Successes: Bowman signals an improvement over Clansman, particularly by: Providing secure communications over greater ranges Enhanced situational awareness, though not down to individual platform level But it has been plagued by a series of significant technological, training and deployment issues

23 Still, Bowman’s development and deployment has been a very difficult process and is still troubled by a range of types of key concerns Bowman Program History: Development Key Issues and Concerns: Concerns over the software applications (ComBAT Infrastructure and Platform software) BCIP Planning for data transmission “involves unacceptably lengthy processes intolerant to even trivial errors and may only be undertaken by experts.” Sustainability / power supply UK National Audit Office Report in Mid-2006: A number of key functions, including the system’s ability to transmit data, to handle large quantities of data in headquarters, the ability of system managers to manage the network effectively, and the ability to interchange data with other nations’ forces and with other UK communications systems were rated as having “very limited capability at this stage.”

24 Bowman Program History: Development Key Issues and Concerns: Training: System is hard to use 2004 radiation burns Weight: System is too heavy in nearly all configurations Expectations: Set by “military specifiers denied hands-on experience of battlefield digitization systems Mid-2005: Program Re-cast Increased funding allocation (GBP 121 million) and extended timescale to late-2007 have been granted in order to achieve expected capability Also a decision to triple training facilities (from 21 to 71) Add another 24 million GBP of cost and an estimated 204 million GBP in operating costs over 25 years Total funding now over 2.5 billion GBP A 3 rd operational field trial will be conducted at the end of 2007.

25 Bowman began as a program to replace the outdated Clansman radio and was evolved to become a fully network centric solution to address the operational requirements of the 21 st century battle space Bowman Program History Unforeseen challenges in bridging the legacy fleet and integrating force wide communications were the principle reasons for the long delays and budget creep of the Bowman program Bowman feasibility studies launched Initial Planned Service Entry Date 1988 Development Production 19932000199619971998199919941995 Expected development and initial manufacturing period Termination of Original Bowman program New Bowman contract for supply and support Continuing challenges prompt the decision to field Bowman in increments and recompete the contract 2001 2007 2002 200320042005 2006 General Dynamics UK selected as Prime Contractor Bowman 6 years overdue Bowman expanded to a full ComBAT management system known as CIP 1 st unit begins Bowman conversion 1 st Field Trials Bowman without CIP declared In Service Bowman deployed to Iraq CIP declared In Service Air, Land, and Sea systems conversion continuing

26 Bowman has not lived up to its billing, however it has provided the capability enhancements that the British military required Response to Bowman “We’re delighted to have delivered the 10,000 th vehicle” --Navy Commodore Jay Hart, commenting on Bowman instillation at General Dynamics UK facility Bowman is providing “more robust tactical Internet, greater ability to interconnect in the field, planning tools and additional hardware such as the Tactical Network-level Gateway (TNG)." --David Jarrett, prime contractor General Dynamics “Vehicle User Data Terminals are being returned at a rate of 90 a month compared to our predictions of 25 a month” -- Ministry of Defence response over concerns of Bowman repair rates and reflective of the overall improvements in the program PositiveNegative “Bowman equipment is under a three year warranty which means our troops cannot fix it if something breaks” -- Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, Head of the Army, British Military “MPs recently criticized the MoD for spending £2.4 billion on Bowman radios that soldiers said were too heavy to carry and could not communicate with the radios of their allies in Iraq” --Reports out of London carried in the The Times, on September 25, 2007 “Bowman was better than Clansman, but was too heavy and so complicated that it required a substantial amount of training” -- Soldiers reviews out of Basra and operations in Iraq “(MOD) seriously under-estimated the challenges involved in both delivering it and sustaining it” --Public Accounts Committee

27 Bowman has overcome a large number of challenges to reach fielding and is continuing to undergo adjustments Not currently synchronized with internationalallied systems Does not currently satisfy soldier demands for alighter system Program remains significantly behind scheduledespite improvements in the delivery timetable Drawbacks Currently providing improved battlefield co-ordination in Iraq Provides encrypted communications capable ofboth data and voice transmissions Provides full spectrum joint interoperability Benefits Paths Forward Fielding of Bowman is proceeding despite soldier concerns due to the age of the legacysystem and the requirement to field a new solution immediately Though not perfect the Bowman system has met enough of the Ministry of Defense’snetwork centric requirements that it is being applied to all land vehicles Further refinements of the system are expected to continue, especially in regards to man packs where technology evolution should improve the system over time Bowman Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward Determination to succeed and effective program re-scoping allowed the British military to save the Bowman program from failure and provide a network centric bridge to future systems

28 Bowman, despite its shortcomings, is a success in bridging the legacy system of the British military with the digital network centric solutions of the future Bowman Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution The Ministry of Defense’s flexibility and understanding of the critical nature of Bowman provided the program the long term support necessary for success As understandings of the challenges facing a “bridge” system became clearer the Bowman program was re-aligned to provide technology increments in order to address gaps in legacy systems –Re-alignment took time and money but allowed the program to remain within feasibility and still provide a network centric capability that had not been present before Fielding an imperfect solution does not necessarily mean that a program was a failure –Do not sacrifice “good” solutions in pursuit of “perfect” solutions that may not be realistic Re-scoping programs in mid development should not be seen as a failure of understanding the Network Centric process, but rather as a necessary step to contain program creep and meet requirements –Bowman illustrates how critical initial planning can be and how important firmly limiting the goals of a program are in regards to the program’s ability to succeed

29 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems: Bowman Network Centric Program Successes: Infanterist der Zukunft Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

30 IdZ is one of the more robust soldier systems in development and has been successfully deployed in a limited scope to German troops in both Kosovo and Afghanistan IdZ Overview The System The IdZ equipment is designed to enhance soldier mobility, protection and performance significantly, particularly during night operations Being developed by EADS. Follow-up system being developed by Rheinmetall It also enables individual combat troops to connect with network-based operational command and control systems Kits focused on squad capability rather than individual capability.

31 IdZ Overview The System (cont) The systems included two sets of ten kits for each squad commander plus nine squad members. Each kit comprises: A Heckler & Koch G36 5.56 mm rifle A NavICom, C4I system developed by Thales A Thales Angenieux Lucie image intensifying helmet-mounted night vision goggles An Oerlikon Contraves weapon mounted laser system together with eye protection glasses and an ear protection sub-system NBC Protection subsystem A ballistic and stab protection vest And a load-carrying vest. Kits also include mini / micro UAVs, MP7 PDW, Anti-tank rocket launcher, MG4 light machine gun, KM2000 knife.

32 Germany intends to incorporate a helmet mounted heads up display in the next generation of the Infanterist der Zukunft Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Components and System Architecture Overview Germany’s two tiered approach kept both budgets and technology in mind during planning, allowing the military to take network centric steps while still modernizing other equipment Principle Components System Architecture IdZ was never intended to replace all systems in the military and as such was created with an open architecture that facilitated integration Two tier approach with commanders and critical forces equipped with the IdZ system and less critical ones with the reduced Soldat im Einsatz Computer/Radio Sub system Protective Clothing and Individual Equip. Weapon Subsystem Source: EADS Source: H&K Source:

33 IdZ Overview The System (cont).

34 IdZ Overview The Program December 2004, EADS awarded contract to deliver 196 kits (69.7 million Euros), which would service ~ 2,000 soldiers ESB prototype trialed in Kosovo in 2002 EADS awarded a follow-up contract (10 million Euros) to produce 150 systems to meet an urgent operational requirement in Afghanistan IdZ Version 1 delivered to Special Operations Unit between 2005 and 2007 IdZ Version 2 prototype to be delivered in Q2 of 2008

35 Though perhaps not the most robust network centric solution, the German approach has provided both near term capability and a springboard for future system integration Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Program History Germany’s IdZ program has relied heavily on COTS solutions allowing the Bundeswher to limit budget risk in early stages of the program 1,600 version one models order for delivery and testing 1 st system handed over to the Army inspectorate at Hammelburg Infantry School 2002 Development 200320092006200720042005 Rheinmetall Defence issued a contract to begin development of the second version of IdZ Initial concept trials conducted at Prizren in Kosovo Two IdZ-ES (version two) demonstrators are to be handed over for testing Initial production of version two IdZ Production 2008

36 Performance by the German military utilizing IdZ has been positive with plans in the works to proceed on a second generation Response to IDz “It is well ahead of any other European project in terms of maturity” --US Army, Electronic Warfare and Sensors Directorate “The ‘infantryman of the future’ is an integrated system-oriented approach to the aspects of self-protection, communication, guidance, navigation, and armaments….IDZ demonstrates the performance gains of new technology in networked operations for the protection of soldiers” --Bernhard Gerwert, Head of EADS Defense Electronics “We’re convinced that the Future Soldier system (IdZ) order lays the groundwork for long-term, intensive cooperation in equipping the hard- hitting, fast moving forces that are going to play a key role in future crisis” -- Klaus Eberhardt, Chairman of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall AG PositiveNegative “They had too many (electronic/software devices). You can’t force the soldier to do things he doesn’t think are important, because he’s going to turn it right off” -- Statement by Arne Lamberth Coordinator for the Swedish Markus program, in reference to tests on the IdZ system “The main problem is weight, as you increase capability you add both power and weight problems” --Dr. Karl-Heinz Rippert, IdZ Project Manageer for the German Federal Office for Defence Technology and Procurement

37 German forces are currently using the mountain version of the IdZ to improve capabilities in Afghanistan Does not provide a networkcentric evolution for the entireforce May cause interoperabilitychallenges that are not currentlypresent for the legacy systems Drawbacks Approached the program as a group of soldiers and did notoverburden every soldier Elite forces can be equipped with more advanced solutions thatcan be spiraled out as these systems mature Provides systems immediately as opposed an indefinite time in the future Benefits IDz Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward For the capabilities provided the IdZ program has experienced very few drawbacks reflecting how beneficial the network centric process can be when properly managed Paths Forward Germany is continuing development work on the successful IdZ system Gradual fielding has allowed Germany to appropriately tailor its systems to soldierrequirements that are arising from the modern battlefield To address challenges of weight and power, Germany has chosen to scale back thesystem and wait for technology developments to catch up to military requirements

38 Though small in scale the IdZ provides a solid example of how the Network Centric process can be managed to produce both near and long term benefits IDz Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution Adaptation of a gradual approach to Network Centric warfare allows for both incorporation of current technologies and appropriate positioning for long term applications Network Centric capabilities can be achieved in the most critical areas without creating an entirely network centric force Basing Network Centric solutions around a group of platforms (soldiers in this case) may be a more efficient means of creating sustainable networks –In the case of the IdZ, by utilizing a ten man team as opposed to a “soldier as a system” concept the Germans are able to limit the negative aspects of the system, such as weight By limiting the scope on initial efforts the German military was able to confirm which COTS systems were most beneficial, which systems needed improvement, and which should be removed without expending inordinate amounts of resources –The IdZ program also forms an excellent test bed for doctrine evolution as it approached change in steps instead of leaps Finally, the IdZ program was envisioned in spirals that would allow improvement on the system without forcing the German military to commit to a long term program whose rewards are not yet clear

39 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Failures Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

40 Malaysia entered its 9 th Defense Plan 2006-2010 with developing network centric capability as a key component of overall modernization efforts: prior communications were handled by an outdated phone system Malaysian Network Centric Activities – PX2000 PX2000 was envisioned, from the beginning, as a component of the broader Malaysian strategic network that would grow to encompass tactical requirements to create a network centric force PX2000 Background PX2000 integrates all Services, the Joint HQ and Intelligence Agencies at the Strategic level –System linked all air stations, capital ships and battalion CPs into the network Implementation occurred during 2001 to 2004 and enhancements will continue in the future To date the PX2000 has network Malaysia’s Joint Force structure, Early Warning System, Air Defense System, and Air Mission Planning and Management System PX2000 linked not only terrestrial systems but also integrated satellite solutions into the network Continuing work will begin to integrate low level commanders, non-military security agencies, and potentially friendly militaries (within security limitations) Principle Components Radio Systems Satellite Terminals Battle Management System SINCGARS Key Features Software based operator interfaces Based on COTS and Windows OS Real-time system alerts Integrated browsing for remote access Integrated Geographical Information System (GIS) Automatic Data escalation and dissemination Designed to be locally supportable System still in development

41 Malaysia’s success implementing the PX2000 system was what facilitated the planning for the next step Malaysian Network Centric Activities – PX2000 Rapidly evolving from a strategic concept, to a strategic application, to a tactical widespread network reflects the benefits of properly approaching the network centric process PX2000 System Architecture -FuturePX2000 System Architecture - Present Joint HQ Navy HQAir Force HQArmy HQ Airbases Intelligence HQ ? Air Ops Center Fleet Ops Command 3 HQ Areas 4 Divisions 13 Brigades Bases/ Ships Battalion Command Posts Joint HQ Navy HQAir Force HQArmy HQ Airbases Intelligence HQ ? Air Ops Center Fleet Ops Command 3 HQ Areas 4 Divisions 13 Brigades Bases/ Ships Battalion Command Posts Company Command Cars Platoon Commanders Mid-Small Vessels Aircraft Battle Management System

42 While not prefect, and still under continuing refinement, the PX2000 undertaking helped Malaysia significantly advance into the network centric era Network Centric Leap Ahead Conclusions – Malaysian Example By approaching the entire process with a well developed plan Malaysia was able to avoid the pitfalls usually associated with efforts to skip generational developments Malaysia remained focused on achieving the strategic objectives of the their Network Centric efforts 1 By keeping objectives constrained by good planning, the process of converting to a network centric force has faced fewer delays and challenges 2 By utilizing COTS solutions Malaysia has been able to rapidly leap forward without bankrupting their budget For nation’s to skip steps in the Network Centric process it becomes critical to customize existing solutions rather than develop unique alternatives Malaysian Market DriverLesson Learned 3 Strategically, Malaysia views joint capabilities as the most critical and has centered efforts on these systems Prioritizing network centric capabilities has ensured that critical programs are not undermined by “nice to have” systems 4 Once planning had been completed Malaysia relied on industry to provide the leap ahead technologies At times it may be necessary to scale back the initial presence of domestic firms until these firms are truly ready support a nation’s network centric efforts

43 Agenda Network Centric Evolution Overview Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown Network Centric Program Failures Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Network Centric Program Successes Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

44 Conclusions

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