1. The contextualistic root metaphor. - When we come to contextualism, we pass from analytical into a synthetic type of theory. It is characteristic of the synthetic theories that their root metaphors cannot satisfactorily be denoted even to a first approximation by well- known common-sense concepts such as similarity, the artifact, or the machine.
We are too likely to be misunderstood at start, even though the basic synthetic concepts do originate in common sense or are, at least, discoverable there. The best term out of commonsense to suggest the point of origin of contextualism is probably the historic event. And this we shall accordingly call the root metaphor of this theory.
By historic event, however, the contextualist does not mean primarily a past event, one that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed. He means the event alive in its present. What we ordinarily mean by history, he says, is an attempt to re-present events. to make them in some way alive again..
The real historic event, the event in its actuality, is when it is going on now, the dynamic dramatic active event. We may call it an "act," if we like, and if we take care of our use of the term. But it is not an act conceived as alone or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and with its setting; an act in its context
To give instances of this root metaphor in our language with the minimum risk of misunderstanding, we should use only verbs. It is doing, and enduring, and enjoying: making a boat, running a race, laughing at a joke, persuading an assembly, unraveling a mystery, solving a problem, removing an obstacle, exploring a country, communicating with a friend, creating a poem, re-creating a poem.
These acts or events are all intrinsically complex, composed of interconnected activities with continuously changing patterns. They are like incidents in the plot of a novel or drama. They are literally the incidents of life.
The contextualist find that everything in the world consists of such incidents. When we catch the idea, it seems very obvious. For this reason, it is sometimes easy to confuse the historic event of contexutalism with common sense fact, and some contextualists have encouraged the confusion. But there are lots of things in common sense that are not events.
Common sense is full of animistic, formistic, and mechanistic substances. But contextualism hold tight to the changing present event. This event itself, once we note it, is obvious enough, but the tightness of the contextualists' hold upon it is not usual. It is this hold that makes contextualism a distinctive philosophic attitude and a world theory. For the tightness of this grip is obtained through the set of categories derivative from the historic event as a root metaphor.
- Figures are decomposed by technology Pure technology makes a form.
The jet ascends and falling fills The marble basin circling round; The second in such plenty lives, This, veiling itself over, spills Into a second basin’s ground. And each at once receives and gives And streams and rests. Its bubbling flood a third invests, - To continue to present events(montage)
To look like a traditional Korean village but to be different from it.
A total Given Event Techology What is an event ? ‘Act’
1. What is the most important keyword in contextualism? - Answer: historic event 2.There are two kinds of architecture in my presentation. What is the name of each architecture according to my presentation? - Answer: The architecture of re-presentation and architecture of presentation A question and a answer about the most critical part.
- Answer : Changing present event. 3. What is an act or event? 4. What does contextualism hold tight to? -Answer : all intrinsically complex, composed of interconnected - activities with continuously changing patterns. A question and a answer about the most critical part.
Question: what do we means by the real historic event? 5. What we ordinarily means by history, a contextualist says, is an attempt to re-present events, to make them some way alive again. The event in its actuality, when it is going on now, is the real historic event, the dynamic dramatic active event. Question: what do we means by history? A question and a answer about the most critical part. Answer: re-present events. Answer: the event in its actuality.
Derivation of the contextualistic categories. – The contextualistic categories are derived from what we may call the total given event. Since any event is a rich concrete thing, in which features interpenetrate, there is a degree of arbitrariness in selecting one feature rather than another, or so much of one feature against so little of another..
Since any event is a rich concrete thing, in which features interpenetrate, there is a degree of arbitrariness in selecting one feature rather than another, or so much of one feature against so little of another..
To complicate matters, novelty is a not uncommon feature of these events, so that many virtually categorial features are not universal. The principle that nothing can come from nothing is not accepted by contextualism, so that one given event may have predominant and permeating structural features that another lacks.
There is an orderliness about such theories. Even formism has it, dispersive as it is in categorial structure. But so to speak, disorder is a categorial feature of contextualism, and so radically so that it must not even exclude order.
That is, the categories must be so framed as not to exclude from the world any degree of order it may be found to have, nor to deny that this order may have come out of disorder and may return into disorder again - order being defined in any way you please, so long as it does not deny the possibility of disorder or another order in nature also. This italicized restriction is the forcible one in contextualism, and amounts to the assertion that change is categorial and not derivative in any degree at all.
So long as it does not deny the possibility of disorder or another order in nature also.
Change in this radical sense is denied by all other world theories. If such radical change is not a feature of the world, If such radical change is not feature of the world, if there are unchangeable structures in nature like the forms of formism or the space-time structure of mechanism, then contextualism is false.
Contextualism is constantly threatened with evidences for permanent structures in nature. It is constantly on the verge of falling back upon underlying mechanistic structures, or of resolving into the overarching implicit integrations of organicism.
Its recourse in these emergencies is always to hurry back to the given event, and to emphasize the change and novelty that is immediately felt there, so that sometimes it seems to be headed for an utter skepticism. But it avoids this impasse by vigorously asserting the reality of structure of the given event, the historic event as it actually goes on. The whole universe, it asserts, is such as this event is, whatever this is.
The events of our epoch seem to exhibit a structure which may be regarded as relatively uniform, and the basic concepts for this structure may be taken as quality and texture. We shall therefore regard quality and texture as the basic categories of contextualism for our epoch. That is, they will be regarded as the basic categories subject to the general proviso above mentioned regarding change and novelty.
A question and a answer about the most critical part. 1. The principle that nothing can come from nothing is not accepted by ( ) so that ( ) may have predominant and permeating structural features that another lacks. 2. But, so to speak ( ) is a categorial feature of contextualism and so radically so that it must be so that it must no even exclude ( ). contextualismone given event disorder order
A question and a answer about the most critical part. 3. The ineradicable contextualistic categories may thus ve said to vi change and novelty. When these, however, are further specified in terms of given events of the sort with which we are acquainted in the present epoch of our uni-verse, these ineradicable categories are exhibited as de-tails within other categories which it is convenient to place first. I shall call these other categories ( ) and ( ). 4. Our procedure in developing the categories of contex-tualism will be as follows : First, to point out that in this theory nothing shall be construed as denying that anything may happen in the world. Thus ( ) and ( ) ac-cepted in the most radical sense will be regarded as the fundamental presuppositions of thes theory. qualitytexture change novelty
A question and a answer about the most critical part. 5. But, second, to note that we have to deal with the world as we meet it, and we meet it and in the events of the epoch in which we are living. The events of our epoch seem to exhibit a structure which mat be regarded as relatively uniform, and the basic concepts for this structure may be taken as quality and texture. We shall therefore regard ( ) and ( ) as the basic categories of contextualism for our epoch. That is, they will be regarded as the basic categories subject to the general proviso above mentioned regarding change and novelty. texture quality