Presentation on theme: "German Identity and European Integration Thomas Banchoff Georgetown University Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko."— Presentation transcript:
German Identity and European Integration Thomas Banchoff Georgetown University Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko
SUMMARY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Collective identity shapes state interests and determines the course of state action State identity can be internal (domestic norms) and external (international institutions) There are four specifications to state identity: Identity ought to be defined /determination of the content of state identity Identity ought to be illuminated /political elite articulation of policies public discourse Identity ought to analyzed /descriptive and narrative discourse/ /reduces the complexity of international arena, by making some states and institutions more salient than others/ / historic examples, “where we have been”, serves to define “who we are”/ Identity ought to persistent /NATO = Cold War, détente, end of Cold War/ State actions consist of two main components: Communicative /political speeches/ Each component subsequently consist of two tasks Descriptive dimension /describing a state’s position with respect to other state or institution, political leaders endow some interstate relationships with more salience than others/ Narrative dimension /historic narratives not only constitute state identity, but articulate state interests/ Behavioral /regulate tariffs, build weapons, control borders/ Each component subsequently consist of two tasks Congruence test /state identity should not contradict state behavior/ Incongruence test
Focus theory: GERMAN IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY THOMAS BANCHOFF Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Supporting theory: TAMED POWER: GERMANY IN EUROPE BY PETER J. KATZENSTEIN Opposing theory: UNIPOLAR POLITICS: REALISM AND STATE STRATEGIE AFTER THE COLD WAR BY ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN AND MICHAEL MASTANDUNO
Question 1 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…Constructivism, while attentive to the material context of state action and the existence of external constraints, contends that collective identity shapes the content of state interests and the course of state actions…” pp. 262 “…The constructivist argument is not that German EU policy in the 1990s contradicted German material interests. Good material reasons existed to pursue a single currency and closer political integration. The argument is rather that a supranational European identity, articulated across the political spectrum, influenced the German approach to questions of wealth and power in the EU context…” pp. 282 Does state identity constitute state action? Peter J. Katzenstein – yes “…Norms and identities typically have two effects. They constitute actors and thus shape their interests. And they constrain actor preferences…” pp. 3 “…This is not to argue that German policy reflected idealist motives in the 1980s or 1990s. It did not. It reflected German interests. But those interests, pursued through power and bargaining, were fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe and the Europeanization of the identity of the German state that had taken place in the preceding decades…” pp. 15
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “Descriptive discourse reduces the complexity of the international arena by making some states and institutions more salient than others. It delineates allies and enemies and defines the institutional norms. […] On the other hand, leaders often narrate the history of a state’s interaction with its external environment. The description of relationships with states and institutions tends to be flanked by a narrative relating the origins of those relationships and their present configuration. The articulation of collective memory, of ‘where we have been’, serves to define ‘who we are’ in greater detail…” pp. 270 Do collective memories shape state identities? Peter J. Katzenstein – yes “…History is an objective process, factual and impartial. Memories are contemporary experiences, interpretations, and reinterpretations of history. By their very nature, collective memories are both intersubjective and contested. Political leaders can mobilize such interpretations instrumentally to achieve current political objectives. Or they can be moved interpretations that are institutionalized, for example, in history books, school and university curricula, or the content of media. As a rule, collective memory gets deployed instrumentally in institutionalized settings. Analytical traditions that neglect the effects of collective memory, as variants of realism and liberalism often do, miss crucial determinants of Germany’s stance toward Europe…” pp. 296 Question 2 - THEORY
Question 3 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Peter J. Katzenstein – yes “…State identities are primary external; they describe the actions of governments in a society of states. National identities are internal; they describe the processes by which mass publics acquire, modify, and forget their collective identities. While national identities in Europe probably not decreased during the last decades, to date they have not posed an insurmountable barrier to European integration. The permissive consensus among national mass public is reinforced by the gradual growth of ambiguous and contested collective European identities that are beginning to complement national identities among some social strata…” pp. 268 Thomas Banchoff – yes “…For states like other social groups, identity has both an internal and external dimension – it is what binds the group together and what situates it with respect to others. In the state context, the internal dimension is often labeled “national” identity…[…] State identities “are primary external”, referring to the self-placement of the polity within specific international contexts. Those contexts consist mainly of the constellations of states, international institutions and historical experiences within which a state is embedded…” pp. 268 “…Their [German political elite] embrace of Europe did not involve exchanging a national identity for a European one. German leaders insisted on the continued importance of a robust national identity rooted in shared values and traditions – and of resilient regional and local identities below the national level…” pp. 276 Does national identity compliment European identity?
Question 4 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…analysis of particular discourse within and across parties fits constructivism’s analytical concern with intersubjective meaning. State identity pinpointed in political discourse is primary a matter of public communication, not private conviction. It reflects ideas espoused the political spectrum that frame the struggle over state power and policy, not the aggregate believe of a set of individuals. Such collective ideas are never monolithic. Any national policy discourse includes some contrasting normative and historical perspective. For a given state identity to be of analytical use, however, it must be shared within and across the parties vying for state power…” pp. 269 “…the four debates revealed a remarkable consensus around a supranational European identity – a view of the Federal Republic irrevocable bound within an emergent supranational community. The leaders of the governing CDU/CFU-FDP coalition and SPD did not describe Germany as an independent actor within an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states. They depicted the FRG instead as a partner within a developing union in which norms of cooperation and shared sovereignty were paramount…” pp. 282 Was there a consensus on the part of German political elite as to acceptance of supranational European identity?
Question 4 - DATA Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Was there a consensus on the part of German political elite as to acceptance of supranational European identity? On December 2, 1992 Bundestag approved the Maastricht Treaty by 543 votes against 8 and 14 abstentions […] The Bundesrat followed on December 18, 1992 and approved the Treaty unanimously […] Finally in October 1993, the German Federal Constitutional Court issued its Maastricht decision which both upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht and paved the way for Germany’s participation in the future of European integration. Source: BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993)(hereinafter Maastricht). For an unofficial translation, see 33 I.L.M. 395 (1994). Comparing Ratification Processes within EU Member States: The Identification of Real Veto Players Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties Solution Concepts Interparliamentary Union (1986), Parliaments of the World; A Reference Compendium. London: Macmillan
Question 5 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…Constructivism has a clear observable implication – state behavior should not contradict state identity […] The claim […] is not that identity is the only source of state behavior, or even that it overrides the pursuit of material interests. It is rather that a shared conception of state identity, publicly articulated within state institutions, can channel the pursuit of wealth and power in a particular direction. By making some policies more justifiable than others, state identity tends to rule in and rule out certain courses of state behavior…” pp. 278 Is there a link between state identity and state behavior?
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Is there a link between state identity and state behavior? Source: Eurobarometer website http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htmhttp://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm DIHT Report, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 23 March 1998 Hans Teitmeyer International Herald Tribune 1998 Question 5 - DATA
Question 6 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…national party leaders – the actual and, in the case of democratic opposition, potential representatives of the state at home and abroad – articulate the conceptions of state identity with the greatest salience. Before national and international audiences, they identify particular states as friends and foes; specific institutional norms as salient and binding; and particular collective memories as backdrops for present policies...” pp. 269 “…Party leaders address foreign policy issues in very different settings, from speeches and press conferences to television commercials. In the democratic context, debates in the national legislature often provide the most reliable evidence of state identity…” pp. 270 Is political leadership important in specifying state identity?
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Is political leadership important in specifying state identity? Source: Eurobarometer: Top decision makers survey 1996 Eurobarometer 47: Images of Germany January- February 1997 Question 6 - DATA
Question 7 – OPPOSING THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…by definition, identity is enduring – it situates an actor not only in time, but through time. For a constructivist argument to have force, it must show identity to have some permanence or rootedness. Where patterns of descriptive and narrative discourse do not have deep historical foundations, they do not constitute an enduring state identity […] In order to make a strong case for the persistence of identity, it is not enough to simple trace a particular state identity back through time. One must also demonstrate its resilience in the face of intervening structural changes” pp. 270-271 Does persistence of state identity influence state action? Ethan B. Kapstein & Michael Mastanduno – no “…states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use offensive military capability against the first.[…] There are many possible causes for aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainly is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability…” (www.ciaonet.org)
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…for a constructivist approach to foreign policy, “illocutionary force” – what is done in words – is crucial. Analysis must show how state identity constrains the public construction of state interests – the particular foreign policy goals adopted and articulated within a given international context…” pp. 276 “…constructivists […] insist on the openness and contingency of interest formation in particular normative and historic context. They analyze the endogenous determination of interests – how collective actors consider, accept and reject different reasonable ways to conceive and pursue security, prosperity and other goals within the same international context…” pp. 277 Does communicative component of state identity important in determining state action? Ethan B. Kapstein & Michael Mastanduno – no “…states rely on the use of force (or the threat of the use of force) to protect their interests and enhance their security. War is always a possibility in the international system. […] Human reason cannot transcend the fundamentally conflictual nature of international politics. This assumption distinguishes realism from both the domestic and the international variants of liberalism. […] It is not surprising, therefore, that most realists have little confidence in ability of international institutions to facilitate cooperation on the fundamental issues of peace and war…” (www.ciaonet.org) Question 8 – OPPOSING THEORY
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…with the end of the Cold War and reunification, German leaders confronted both an ongoing West European integration process and the emergence of new would-be EU members to the East. This policy focus makes the European component of German state identity most salient. It highlights the importance of Germany’s immediate European neighbors, East and West. It brings the EU’s complex institutional mix, with its multilevel overlapping intergovernmental and supranational arrangements into analytical focus…” pp. 272 Was supranational identity a primary reason for Germany’s integration into EU? Ethan B. Kapstein & Michael Mastanduno – no “…realists also recognize that states sometimes operate thought institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self interest based primary on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships…” (www.ciaonet.org) Question 9 – OPPOSING THEORY
Question 10 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…the end of the Cold war and reunification clearly led to an increase in German power in both absolute and relative terms. The addition of the population and potential of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] widened the economic distance between the Federal Republic and its two main West European partners, France and Britain…” pp. 263 “…the end of the Cold War and reunification marked a decisive shift in the structural constraints facing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The addition of East German resources and withdrawal of all Russian and most United States forces left FRG the most powerful country in Europe…” pp. 259 Did Germany’s power increased vis-à-vis other European powers after the reunification?
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Did Germany’s power increased vis-à-vis other European powers after the reunification? Source: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/ The 28th edition of "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers" (WMEAT), released on February 6, 2003 www.state.govwww.state.gov Question 10 – OPPOSING DATA
Question 11 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…The enduring strength of the pro-European consensus was evident over subsequent decades. Broad shifts in the context of German European policy took place. On the one hand, East-West relations went from Cold War to détente and back to Cold War. On the other hand, EEC embarked on an ambitious program of expansion in the 1970s and 1980s, welcoming six new members. Through those changes, German leaders across the political spectrum continued to conceive of the Federal Republic as irrevocable bound within and emergent political union. At the next crucial constitutional juncture in the integration process, the mid-1980s, supranational identity remained an object of broad domestic consensus…” pp. 259 Did Germany support deeper European integration over more assertive foreign policy?
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Did Germany support deeper European integration over more assertive foreign policy? Source: Allied Contribution to the Common Defense Report, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2003/http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2003/ Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, http://www.germany-info.org/UN/peace/council/position.htmlhttp://www.germany-info.org/UN/peace/council/position.html German Constitutional Court, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ Question 11 – OPPOSING DATA
Question 12 - THEORY Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Thomas Banchoff – yes “…If behavior at odds with identity provokes no outcry, and a pattern of violations continues, state identity is shown to have little explanatory value. However, where domestic and international actors attack policies for their non- conformity to broadly shared conceptions of state identity – and those policies are not subsequently repeated – the case for the political effects of state identity is strong…Cases where incongruence sparks criticism and a return to congruence policies, support the claim that state identity shapes the direction of state behavior…” pp. 279 Does behavioral component of state identity can determine the course of state action?
Presented by: Gennadiy Velichko Does behavioral component of state identity can determine the course of state action? Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47 Mar-Apr 1997 Rand Corporation – www.rand.org International Herald Tribune – April 1999 - http://www.iacenter.org/yugdemo2.htm Question 12 – OPPOSING DATA Only 20 percent were sympathetic to the idea of German forces participating in collective security actions such as Operation Desert Storm. A 1994 follow-up study by the Rand Corporation found increasing support in German public opinion for a German defense role beyond the country's borders. But data also reflected uncertainty about what that role should entail. Demonstrations against the NATO military action in Yugoslavia took place in a number of German cities last Saturday. In Stuttgart a 3,000-strong demonstration, predominantly Serbs, marched through the city centre carrying placards denouncing the role of the German, European and Clinton governments in supporting the bombing in Yugoslavia. A total of 800,000 Serbs live today in the German republic. In the southern German city of Nuremberg 1,500 took part in a five-hour rally in the city centre. In the capital city of Berlin up to 5,000 took part in a rally called by the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism, successor to the ruling Stalinist party [SED] in the former German Democratic Republic [GDR--East Germany]), the only party in the German parliament to oppose the military aggression. Groups of Serb workers with their families and Yugoslavian youth took part in the rally, some of them bearing placards proclaiming "No to war in Kosovo" and "Unite Europe without weapons". Other placards at the demonstration denounced the German SPD and Green governing parties for their leading role in involving German military forces in their first active engagement since the Second World War.