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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B Regional.

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Presentation on theme: "IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B Regional."— Presentation transcript:

1 IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010

2 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 2 Session Outline Limitations under CSAs The Additional Protocol Information on mines and concentration plants Information on imports/exports Information on future plans

3 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 3 Limitations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

4 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 4 Objective of Safeguards Provide Assurances on the Correctness and Completeness of a State’s nuclear material declarations

5 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 5 What kind of assurances? Under a CSA alone, only credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material can be provided More information and access is required to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole

6 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 6 Some of the limitations under CSAs Focuses on declared materials at strategic points in declared facilities (access limited) Covers only partially the nuclear fuel cycle No assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities (completeness)

7 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 7 Political changes in Dissolution of the former Soviet Union South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme DPRK Indefinite extension of NPT

8 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 8 IAEA Board of Governors (March 1995) “…the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities”

9 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 9 Strengthening Programme June 1995 Programme 93+2 measures divided into Part I (within existing authority) and Part II (new authority needed) June 1996 An open-ended committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate the legal instrument for additional authority

10 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 10 The Additional Protocol

11 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 11 The Model Additional Protocol New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540) Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement

12 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 12 O bjective Provide the IAEA with better tools for verifying the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations

13 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 13 Measures of the additional protocol State’s provision of extended declaration Inspector’s broader access rights Better administrative arrangements, e.g. visas

14 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 14 Coverage under a CSA Waste Storag e CSA

15 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 15 Expanded coverage with an AP CSAAP Waste Storag e

16 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 16 Extended declaration on nuclear material Domestically produced source material Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes Locations and uses of exempted material Waste containing terminated nuclear material

17 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 17 Extended declaration on nuclear-related facilities and activities Co-located nuclear infrastructure Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated) Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material State’s future plans

18 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 18 Example RBA, RURITANIA 1 APRIL 2001 (Training Map – Artificial Information)

19 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 19 Broader access rights All places in nuclear installations or on sites All other places where nuclear material is located Decommissioned facilities Some locations where nuclear-related activities are conducted Other locations, under certain circumstances

20 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 20 Better administrative arrangements Simpler inspector designation No visas or multi-year multiple entry visas Modern communications capabilities

21 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 21 Information on mines and concentration plants

22 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page Mining U and Th naturally occurring Uniformly distributed on Earth in rock forming minerals, sands Various techniques: Open Pit Underground In-situ leach Tails reworking

23 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page Open Pit Mine Arlit mine, Niger

24 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page Underground Mine Shaft head frame at Dolní Rožínka, Czech Republic Underground at MacArthur River, Canada

25 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 25 In-situ Leach 25 Upper Aquifer Impermeable Zone Mineralized Aquifer Impermeable Zone Evaporation ponds Thickeners Yellowcake drying and packaging * Acid or alkaline depending on chemistry of Uranium layers Reagent Supplies * Control room Monitoring wells Well house Injection well Recovery well Uranium deposit Uranium Extraction

26 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page Tailings reworking

27 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 27 Reporting of mining materials and activities Safeguards activities are currently limited Nuclear material accountancy is not applied to uranium ore concentrates (UOC) but exports are reported Mine and mills sites annual production are declared under an additional protocol.

28 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 28 Information required under Article 2.a.(v) Location, operational status, and production capacity Approximate annual production for the State as a whole Annual production for individual mines or plants if requested by the Agency

29 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 29 Information on imports / exports

30 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 30 Information required under Article 2.a.(ix) - Exports of Annex II Items Annex II lists “nuclear use” equipment and non-nuclear material in 7 major categories Information required about the identity, quantity, location of intended use for each export of Annex II equipment or material Agency may request confirmation by importing State Reporting on a quarterly basis

31 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 31 2.a.(ix) – Reactor Components

32 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 32 2.a.(ix) – Non-Nuclear Material

33 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 33 2.a.(ix) – Reprocessing

34 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 34 2.a.(ix) – Fuel Fabrication

35 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 35 2.a.(ix) – Enrichment

36 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 36 2.a.(ix) – Heavy Water Production

37 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 37 2.a.(ix) – Uranium Conversion Plants

38 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 38 Information on State’s future plans

39 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 39 Information required under Article 2.a.(x) - Fuel Cycle Plans Information required: Government approved plans for nuclear fuel cycle Fuel cycle R&D specifically included For next 10-years

40 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 40 Conclusion

41 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 41 The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the strengthened safeguards system The Additional Protocol increases Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities

42 IAEA RTC SSAC Jordan / Sess. 3.1/Overview of AP /M.Derrough / Page 42 The tools of additional protocol allows the Agency to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a pre-requisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards Close cooperation with SSACs is necessary


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