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Loss Prevention Loss prevention in chemical industries involve: –Identification and assessment of major hazards –Control of hazards by containment, substitution,

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Presentation on theme: "Loss Prevention Loss prevention in chemical industries involve: –Identification and assessment of major hazards –Control of hazards by containment, substitution,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Loss Prevention Loss prevention in chemical industries involve: –Identification and assessment of major hazards –Control of hazards by containment, substitution, improved maintenance –Control of process by utilizing automatic control, relief system, interlock, alarm –Limitation of loss when accident happens

2 Loss Prevention The major formalized techniques are: –Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) –Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) –Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA) –Safety indexes –Safety audit

3 What is HAZOP? Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and OPerating problems A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or operability problems HAZOP is basically for safety Considerable engineering insight is involved

4 3 HAZOP study are applied during : Normal operation Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation Provision for failure of plant services, e. g. steam, electricity, cooling water Provision for maintenance. HAZOP Study

5 HAZOP Team Team Leader Team Secretary Process Engineer Mechanical Engineer Commissioning/Operations Engineer/Manager Instrument Engineer HAZOP studies are carried out using a `brainstorming' approach by a team, chaired and coordinated by a qualified person experienced in HAZOPs:

6 5 HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible. It gives good identification of cause and excellent identification of critical deviations. The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to participate. HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for studying large plant in a specific manner. Strength of HAZOP

7 6 HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency for boredom for analysts. It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the technique should be amenable to human error application. HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits many scenarios. Weakness of HAZOP

8 7 NONE /Noe.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve closed or jammed : REVERSE Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure MORE Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp, LESS Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp, As Well AsQualitative increase, e.g. impurity. PART OF Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or low concentration of mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other location ; feed change. Other thanNothing of the intent happen, completely different occurs Guide Words

9 HAZOP Steps These guide words are applied to flow, temperature, pressure, liquid level and composition. Deviation of these variables from normal operation is considered The consequences of these deviations on the process is then assessed. The measures needed to correct these consequences are then established This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both hazards and potential operational problems

10

11 10 HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM TITLE : Sheet 1 of LINE 1 : DEVIATION CAUSESCONSEQUENCESEXISTING PROVISIONSACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS HAZOP Study Form

12 Storage Tank

13 HAZOP Table - level ActionSafe guardConsequencesDeviationCause Level Estimate release quantityLIAPotential fireReagent release1. Rupture discharge line Less Estimate release quantityLIAPotential fireReagent release2. V3 open or broken V1 protectionLIAPotential fireReagent release3. V1 open or broken What external event cause tank rupture LIAPotential fireReagent release4. Tank rupture Does RV1 allow for liquid release? Consider high level alarm shutoff LIAReagent release via RV1 Overfill5. Too much truck unload More Consider check valve at pump discharge Consider high level alarm shutoff at feed LIAReagent release via RV1 Overfill6. Reverse flow from process Same as lessNO

14 HAZOP Table - pressure Pressure Consider independent PLA PICAPotential fireReagent release9. Break in nitrogen or flare line Less Consider vacuum break valve PICAReagent releaseTank implode10. Lose nitrogen Consider PALPICAReagent releaseTank implodes11. PV2 fails closed Tank not designed for vacuum Reagent releaseTank implodes12. PICA fails, closing PV2 What PV1 and RV1 capacity PICATank rupture if RV1 fails Reagent release via RV1 13. PICA fails, closing PV1 More Consider independent PAH PICATank rupture if RV1 fails Reagent release via RV1 14. PV1 fails closed Is V7 locked openPICATank rupture if RV1 fails Reagent release via RV1 15. V7 closed Consider second high level shutoff PICATank rupture if RV1 fails Truck unload16. Overfill tank What prevent high temp of feed Consider PAH PICATank rupture if RV1 fails Reagent release in RV1 17. Temperature of inlet higher than normal Consider PAH Consider sampling before unloading PICATank rupture if RV1 fails Reagent release in RV1 18. Volatile impurities in feed

15 Hazop Table - composition ActionSafe guardConsequencesDeviationCause Composition Consider sampling before unload Tank rupturePossible reaction7. Wrong reagentOther than Are other material delivered in tank Are unloading connection different Problem in reactor8. Impurities in reagent As well as

16 HAZOP Table - Temperature Temperature What are temp limits of tank Thermal stress on tankPossible vacuum19. Temperature of inlet cooler than usual Less What are pressure limits of tank Thermal stress on tankSee Low tank pressure What are temp limits on tank Thermal stress on tankSee temperature of inlet is higher than usual High What could cause external fire What are fire protection capabilities Is fire protection adequate Reagent releaseTank fails22. external fire

17 16 Preliminary HAZOP Example TCTC Cooling Coils Monomer Feed Cooling Water to Sewer Cooling Water In Thermocouple Refer to reactor system shown. The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is provided to remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event of cooling function is lost, the temperature of reactor would increase. This would lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to additional energy release. The result could be a runaway reaction with pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the reactor. The temperature within the reactor is measured and is used to control the cooling water flow rate by a valve. Perform HAZOP Study

18 17 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor Guide WordDeviationCausesConsequencesAction NONo cooling Cooling water valve malfunction Temperature increase in reactor Install high temperature alarm (TAH) REVERSEReverse cooling flow Failure of water source resulting in backward flow Less cooling, possible runaway reaction Install check valve MOREMore cooling flow Control valve failure, operator fails to take action on alarm Too much cooling, reactor cool Instruct operators on procedures AS WELL ASReactor product in coils More pressure in reactorOff-spec product Check maintenance procedures and schedules OTHER THANAnother material besides cooling water Water source contaminated May be cooling inefffective and effect on the reaction If less cooling, TAH will detect. If detected, isolate water source. Back up water source?

19 18 Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube heat exchanger Process fluid Cooling water

20 19 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger Guide WordDeviationCausesConsequencesAction NONENo cooling water flowFailure of inlet cooling water valve to open Process fluid temperature is not lowered accordingly Install Temperature indicator before and after the process fluid line Install TAH MOREMore cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling water valve to close Output of Process fluid temperature too low Install Temperature indicator before and after process fluid line Install TAL LESSLess cooling waterPipe leakageProcess fluid temperature too low Installation of flow meter REVERSEReverse process fluid flow Failure of process fluid inlet valve Product off set Install check valve (whether it is crucial have to check?) CONTAMINATIONProcess fluid contamination Contamination in cooling water Outlet temperature too low Proper maintenance and operator alert

21 Documents needed for HAZOP Study For Preliminary HAZOP – Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD ) – Description of the Process For Detailed HAZOP – Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID ) – Process Calculations – Process Data Sheets – Instrument Data Sheets – Interlock Schedules – Layout Requirements – Hazardous Area Classification – Description of the Process

22 Planning for HAZOP Additional required information: Safety procedures documents Relief/venting philosophy Chemical involved Piping specifications Previous HAZOP report

23 Planning for HAZOP Carry out the study Record the results (may need a secretary) Follow-up of actions noted – final report contain resolution of all recommended actions – must appoint someone as leader to check progress of action – team may meet again if answers to questions do not simply lead to an action – team may meet again if significant design changes in interim report

24 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members HAZOP leader Plan sessions and timetable Control discussion Limit discussion Encourage team to draw conclusion Ensure secretary has time for taking note Keep team in focus Encourage imagination of team members Motivate members Discourage recriminations Judge importance issues

25 HAZOP Secretary Take adequate notes Record documentations Inform leader if more time required in taking notes If unclear, check wording before writing Produce interim lists of recommendations Produce draft report of study Check progress of chase action Produce final report Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

26 Process Engineer Provide a simple description Provide design intention for each process unit Provide information on process conditions and design conditions Provide a simple description Provide design intention for each process unit Provide information on process conditions and design conditions Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

27 Mechanical Design Engineer Provide specification details Provide vendor package details Provide equipment and piping layout information Instrument Engineer Provide details of control philosophy Provide interlock and alarm details Provide info on shutdown, safety features Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

28 Plant Engineer or Manager Provide information on compatibility with any existing adjacent plant Provide details of site utilities and services Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on maintenance access and modifications Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an operating experience view point Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant stability at the specified control parameters Provide information on experienced operability deviations of hazard potential Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

29 Chemist Provide details of process chemistry Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations, byproducts, corrosion etc) Project Engineer Provide details of cost and time estimation and also budget constraints. Ensure rapid approval if required Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members


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