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Authenticated Encryption and Cryptographic Network Protocols David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University.

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Presentation on theme: "Authenticated Encryption and Cryptographic Network Protocols David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University."— Presentation transcript:

1 Authenticated Encryption and Cryptographic Network Protocols David Brumley Carnegie Mellon University

2 Some Straw Men 2

3 TCP/IP (highly abstracted) packet Destination Machine TCP/IP Stack Webserver (port = 80) dest=80data Bob (port = 25) 3 Source

4 Encrypted with CBC and random IV encrypted packets with key k Destination Machine Webserver (port = 80) dest=80msg a Bob (port = 25) msg b k k IV 1, dest=25msg b IV 2, 4 Source

5 Example Tampering Attack Encrypted with CBC and random IV encrypted packets with key k Destination Machine Webserver (port = 80) dest=80msg a Eve (port = 25) msg b k IV 1, dest=25msg a IV 2, Eve can change destination (easy with CBC and rand IV) 5 k Source

6 Example Tampering Attack Encrypted with CBC and random IV encrypted packets with key k Destination Machine Webserver (port = 80) dest=80msg a Eve (port = 25) msg b k IV 1, dest=1026msg a IV 2, Active Attacker Eve can change destination (easy with CBC and rand IV) 6 k Source

7 How? 7 dest=80msg a IV 1, dest=1026msg a IV 2, CBC encryption: D(k, c[0]) ⨁ IV 1 = “dest=80” Attack: IV 2 = IV 1 ⨁ ⨁ xor out “80” and xor in “1026” Eve

8 An Attack Using Only Network Access 8 Example: Remote terminal app where each keystroke encrypted with CTR mode IP HdrTCP Hdrcd Alice Bob 16 bit checksum keystroke ack if valid checksum, else nothing Answer: Homework Problem

9 The Story So Far Confidentiality: semantic security against a CPA attack – Examples: Using CBC with a PRP, AES Integrity: security against existential forgery – Examples: CBC-MAC, NMAC, PMAC, HMAC Now: security against tampering – Integrity + Confidentiality! 9

10 The lesson CPA security cannot guarantee security under active attacks. Integrity Only ✓ Secure MAC Integrity + Secrecy ✗ Secure MAC + Secure Cipher Integrity + Secrecy ✓ Authenticated Encryption 10

11 Motivating Question: Which is Best? E(k E, m||tag) S(k I, m) m Encryption Key = k E ; MAC key = k I Option 1: SSL (MAC-then-encrypt) mtagm S(k I, c)E(k E, m) m Option 2: IPsec (Encrypt-then-MAC) mmtag S(k I, m)E(k E, m) m Option 3: SSH (Encrypt-and-MAC) mmtag 11

12 Authenticated Encryption 12

13 An authenticated encryption system (E,D) is a cipher where As usual: E: K × M × N ⟶ C but D: K × C × N ⟶ M ∪{ ⊥ } Security: the system must provide – Semantic security under CPA attack, and – ciphertext integrity. The attacker cannot create a new ciphertext that decrypts properly. reject ciphertext as invalid 13

14 Chal.Adv A. kKkK c m 1  M c 1  E(k,m 1 ) b=1 if D(k,c) ≠ ⊥ and c  { c 1, …, c q } b=0 otherwise b m2m2, …, m q c2c2, …, c q Def: (E,D) has ciphertext integrity iff for all “ efficient ” A: Adv CI [A,I] = Pr [Chal. outputs 1] < ε 14 Ciphertext Integrity For b ={0,1}, define EXP(0) and EXP(1) as:

15 Authenticated Encryption Def: cipher (E,D) provides authenticated encryption (AE) if it is (1) semantically secure under CPA, and (2) has ciphertext integrity Counter-example: CBC with rand. IV does not provide AE – D(k, ⋅ ) never outputs ⊥, hence adv. always wins ciphertext integrity game 15

16 Implication 1: Authenticity Attacker cannot fool Bob into thinking a message was sent from Alice AliceBob k k m 1, …, m q c i = E(k, m i ) c Cannot create valid c ∉ { c 1, …, c q } ⇒ if D(k,c) ≠ ⊥ Bob guaranteed message is from someone who knows k (but could be a replay) Eve 16

17 Implication 2 Authenticated encryption ⇒ Security against chosen ciphertext attack 17

18 Chosen Ciphertext Attacks 18

19 Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Def: A CCA adversary has the capability to get ciphertexts of their choosing decrypted. 19 AliceBob k Eve k VPN c = E(k,m) m Eve sees c and m c’ m’ Don’t want them to learn m’... or even just whether an ACK occurred.

20 The Lunchtime CCA Attack 20 Alice’s Computer Encryption Program k Encrypted File 1 It’s Lunchtime! Encrypted File 2

21 The Lunchtime CCA Attack 21 Alice’s Computer Encryption Program k Eve’s Encrypted File 1 Eve’s Encrypted File 2 Encrypted File 1 Encrypted File 2 Eve

22 802.11b WEP: how not to do it k k m CRC(m) PRG( IV || k ) ciphertext IV 22 Answer: Homework

23 Chosen Ciphertext Security Adversaries Power: both CPA and CCA – Can obtain the encryption of arbitrary messages – Can decrypt ciphertexts of his choice Adversaries Goal: break semantic security 23

24 CCA Game Definition 24 Let ENC = (E,D) over (K,M,C). For b = {0,1}, define EXP(0) and EXP(1) b Chal. k  K Adv. b’  {0,1} m i,0, m i,1  M : |m i,0 | = |m i,1 | c i  E(k, m i,b ) for i=1,…,q: (1) CPA query: c i  C : c i ∉ {c 1, …, c i-1 } m i  D(k, c i ) (2) CCA query: Ex: could query a changed c i

25 CCA Game Definition 25 Let ENC = (E,D) over (K,M,C). For b = {0,1}, define EXP(0) and EXP(1) b Chal. k  K Adv. b’  {0,1} m i,0, m i,1  M : |m i,0 | = |m i,1 | c i  E(k, m i,b ) for i=1,…,q: (1) CPA query: c i  C : c i ∉ {c 1, …, c i-1 } m i  D(k, c i ) (2) CCA query: ENC = (E,D) is CCA secure iff the Adversary does not do statistically better than guessing.

26 Example: CBC is not CCA Secure 26 Chal. k  K b Adv. m 0, m 1 : |m 0 | = |m 1 |=1 c  E(k, m b ) = (IV, c[0]) c’ = (IV⨁1, c[0]) D(k, c’) = m b ⨁1 b learns b

27 Thm: Let (E,D) be a cipher that provides AE. Then (E,D) is CCA secure. 27 AE implies CCA security!

28 So What? Authenticated encryption assures security against: – A passive adversary (CPA security) – An active adversary that can even decrypt some ciphertexts (CCA security) Limitations: – Does not protect against replay – Assumes no other information other than message/ciphertext pairs can be learned. Timing attacks out of scope Power attacks out of scope... 28

29 AE Constructions Cipher + MAC = security 29

30 History Pre 2000: Crypto API’s provide separate MAC and encrypt primitives – Example: Microsoft Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (MS-CAPI) provided HMAC and CBC + IV – Every project had to combine primitives in their own way 2000: Authenticated Encryption – Bellare and Namprempre in Crypto, 2000 – Katz and Yung in FSE,

31 Motivating Question: Which is Best? Encryption Key = k E ; MAC key = k I E(k E, m||tag) S(k I, m) m Option 1: SSL (MAC-then-encrypt) mtagm S(k I, c)E(k E, m) m Option 2: IPsec (Encrypt-then-MAC) mmtag S(k I, m)E(k E, m) m Option 3: SSH (Encrypt-and-MAC) mmtag ✓ Always Correct 31

32 Theorems Let (E,D) by a CPA secure cipher and (S,V) a MAC secure against existential forgery. Then: 1.Encrypt-then-MAC always provides authenticated encryption 2.MAC-then-encrypt may be insecure against CCA attacks – however, when (E,D) is rand-CTR mode or rand- CBC, MAC-then-encrypt provides authenticated encryption 32

33 Standards GCM:CTR mode encryption then CW-MAC CCM:CBC-MAC then CTR mode (802.11i) EAX:CTR mode encryption then CMAC All are nonce-based. All support Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). 33 Associated Data Encrypted Data Authenticated

34 An example API (OpenSSL) int AES_GCM_Init(AES_GCM_CTX *ain, unsigned char * nonce, unsigned long noncelen, unsigned char * key, unsigned int klen ) int AES_GCM_EncryptUpdate(AES_GCM_CTX *a, unsigned char * aad, unsigned long aadlen, unsigned char * data, unsigned long datalen, unsigned char * out, unsigned long *outlen) 34

35 MAC Security -- an explanation Recall: MAC security required an attacker given (m, t) couldn’t find a different t’ such that (m,t’) is a valid MAC Why? Suppose not: (m, t) ⟶ (m, t’) Then Encrypt-then-MAC would not have Ciphertext Integrity !! Chal. k  K b Adv. m 0, m 1 c  E(k, m b ) = (c 0, t) c’ = (c 0, t’ ) ≠ c D(k, c’ ) = m b b (c 0, t) (c 0, t’) 35

36 Performance AE CipherCode SizeSpeed (MB/sec) Raw CipherRaw Speed AES/GCMLarge108AES/CTR139 AES/CCMsmaller61AES/CBC109 AES/EAXsmaller61AES/CMAC109 AES/OCB*small129HMAC/SHA * OCB mode may have patent issues. Speed extrapolated from Ted Kravitz’s results. From Crypto [Wei Dai]

37 Summary Encrypt-then-MAC Provides integrity of CT Plaintext integrity If cipher is malleable, we detect invalid CT MAC provides no information about PT since it’s over the encryption MAC-then-Encrypt No integrity of CT Plaintext integrity If cipher is malleable, can change message w/o detection MAC provides no information on PT since encrypted 37 Encrypt-and-MAC No integrity on CT Integrity of PT can be verified If cipher is malleable, contents of CT can be altered; should detect at PT level May reveal info about PT in the MAC (e.g., MAC of same messages are the same)

38 Wrapup Authenticated Encryption – Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) and CCA-secure ciphers – AE game = CCA + CPA secure Encrypt-then-MAC always right – Don’t roll your own 38


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