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Security Definitions in Computational Cryptography Anupam Datta CMU Fall 2009 18739A: Foundations of Security and Privacy.

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Presentation on theme: "Security Definitions in Computational Cryptography Anupam Datta CMU Fall 2009 18739A: Foundations of Security and Privacy."— Presentation transcript:

1 Security Definitions in Computational Cryptography Anupam Datta CMU Fall A: Foundations of Security and Privacy

2 Cryptographic Concepts  Signature scheme  Symmetric encryption scheme

3 Signature Scheme  Key generation algorithm  Input: security parameter n  Output: a private signing & public verification key pair  Algorithm to sign data  Algorithm to verify signature  Correctness:  Message signed with a signing key verifies with the corresponding verification key verify(m,sign(m,sk(A)), pk(A)) = ok  Symbolic Security:  A signature cannot be produced without access to the private signing key

4 UF-CMA Security A sign(mi, sk(C)) mi UF-CMA security:  PPT attackers A  negligible function f  n0  security parameters n ≥ n0 Prob [m ≠mi | A plays by the rules] <= f(n) C sign(m, sk(C))

5 Symmetric Encryption Scheme  Key generation algorithm  Input: security parameter n  Output: a key that is used for encryption and decryption  Algorithm to encrypt a message  Algorithm to decrypt a ciphertext  Correctness:  Decrypting a ciphertext obtained by encrypting message m with the corresponding key k returns m dec(enc(m,k),k) = m

6 What is a secure encryption scheme?  List of possible properties  Given a list of message, ciphertext pairs, it should not be possible to recover the key  Given ciphertext, it should not be possible recover plaintext  Given ciphertext, it should not be possible to recover 1 st bit of plaintext  All of the above, but what else?  Given ciphertext, adversary should have no information about underlying plaintext (not true because of apriori information) 6

7 IND-EAV security definition (eavesdropping attacks) C A enc(k, mb) m0, m1 d k, b IND-EAV security:  PPT attackers A  negligible function f  n0  security parameters n ≥ n0 Prob [d = b | A plays by the rules] <= ½ + f(n)

8 Example  General sends an encrypted message where the plaintext is either “attack” or “don’t attack”.  Adversary should not be able to figure out what the plaintext is although she knows that it is one of these two values. 8

9 IND-CPA security definition (chosen-plaintext attacks) C A enc(k, mb) m0, m1 d k, b IND-CPA security:  PPT attackers A  negligible function f  n0  security parameters n ≥ n0 Prob [d = b | A plays by the rules] <= ½ + f(n) enc(k, mi) mi enc(k, mi) mi

10 Example  US Navy cryptanalysts received a ciphertext containing the word “AF” that they believed corresponded to “Midway island” (May, 1942)  Concluded that Japan was planning to attack Midway island, but could not convince top brass  Sent out a message saying Midway island was low on water supply  Japanese intercepted this message and sent out a message saying “AF” was running low on water supply 10

11 IND-CCA secure encryption (chosen-ciphertext attacks) C A enc(k, mb) m0, m1 d k, b IND-CCA security:  PPT attackers A  negligible function f  n0  security parameters n ≥ n0 Prob [d = b | A plays by the rules] <= ½ + f(n) enc(k, mi) or dec(k,ci) mi or ci A cannot submit enc(k,mb) to the decryption oracle mi or ci enc(k, mi) or dec(k,ci)

12 Example (public-key version)  Network protocols Q1 and Q2  QI C B: enc(pk(B), secret, Q1)  Q2 A B: enc(pk(B),nonce, Q2) B A: nonce  Adversary A has access to B’s decryption oracle, but should still not be able to learn additional information about C’s secret (e.g., cannot tell whether it is “attack” or “don’t attack”) 12

13 Questions?


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