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人格同一 (2) 單元 24 哲學概論 1 授課教師:王榮麟 【本著作除另有註明外,採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2003 多媒體藝廊,依據.

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Presentation on theme: "人格同一 (2) 單元 24 哲學概論 1 授課教師:王榮麟 【本著作除另有註明外,採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2003 多媒體藝廊,依據."— Presentation transcript:

1 人格同一 (2) 單元 24 哲學概論 1 授課教師:王榮麟 【本著作除另有註明外,採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】創用 CC 「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2003 多媒體藝廊,依據 Microsoft 服務 合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用 Microsoft 服務 合約

2 Accounts of Our Identity Through Time psychological (1) The psychological approach somatic (2) The somatic approach 2

3 The Psychological Approach psychological inherits Some psychological relation is necessary or sufficient (or both) for one to persist. You are that future being that in some sense inherits its mental features—beliefs, memories, preferences, the capacity for rational thought, that sort of thing—from you; and you are that past being whose mental features you have inherited in this way. 3

4 The Psychological Approach There is disagreement about what mental features need to be inherited. Memory Criterion But most philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century have endorsed some version of the Psychological Approach. The Memory Criterion mentioned earlier is an example. 4

5 The Somatic Approach physical Our identity through time consists in some brute physical relation. You are that past or future being that has your body, or that is the same biological organism as you are, or the like. Whether you survive or perish has nothing to do with psychological facts. 5

6 6 The Somatic Approach exists continuously as long as I live I am the same being as long as I have the same body—not that the body must look the same as it did years ago, but that there is a body, which I was born with and which exists continuously as long as I live. There was not a moment during all that time in which this body did not exist. 不管我的外表、習慣、性情如何改變,只要我與生俱 來的身體持續存在,我還是原來的我。

7 A test case Imagine that your brain is transplanted into my head. Two beings result: the person who ends up with your cerebrum and most of your mental features, and the empty-headed being left behind, which may perhaps be biologically alive but will have no mental features. Those who say that you would be the one who gets your brain usually say so because they believe that some relation involving psychology suffices for you to persist: they accept the Psychological Approach. Those who say that you would be the empty-headed vegetable say so because they take your identity to consist in something entirely non- psychological, as the Somatic Approach has it. 7

8 心理派或身體派? 殺死情婦後的名醫還是原來的名醫嗎? 歷經「學識英博」之改變後的呂蒙還是昔日吳下阿蒙嗎? 失憶後的人還是原來的他嗎? 人格驟變後的人還是原來的他嗎? 植物人還是原來的他嗎? 你是當初在你媽媽子宮裡的那個受精卵嗎? 踏出傳輸機器後的人還是原來的他嗎? 借屍還魂後的 Mr. Jordan 還是原來的他嗎? 一早醒來身體遽變的人還是原來的他嗎? 被醫生救回來的人是辛先生或是申先生? 8

9 Support for the psychological approach: the brain-transplant case Most people feel immediately drawn to the Psychological Approach. It seems obvious that you would go along with your brain if it were transplanted, and that this is so because that organ would carry with it your memories and other mental features. This would lead the recipient to believe that he or she was you This would lead the recipient to believe that he or she was you. And why should this belief be mistaken? This makes it easy to suppose that our identity over time has something to do with psychology. 9

10 Still, the question remains… It is notoriously difficult, however, to get from this conviction to a plausible answer to the Persistence Question: psychological relation What psychological relation might our identity through time consist in? 10

11 The Memory Criterion Let’s consider the memory criterion: a past or future being might be you if and only if you can now remember an experience she had then, or vice versa. 11

12 Objections to the memory criterion This proposal faces two objections, discovered in the 18th century by Seargeant and Berkeley, but more famously discussed by Reid and Butler. 12

13 The first objection First, suppose a young student is fined for overdue library books. Later, as a middle-aged lawyer, she remembers paying the fine. Later still, in her dotage, she remembers her law career, but has entirely forgotten not only paying the fine but everything else she did in her youth. Identity is transitive; memory continuity is not. According to the Memory Criterion the young student is the middle-aged lawyer, the lawyer is the old woman, but the old woman is not the young student. This is an impossible result: if x and y are one and y and z are one, x and z cannot be two. Identity is transitive; memory continuity is not. 13

14 The second objection 你即為其經驗可被你記起的人,這種說法是 trivial and uninformative 。 理由如下: your own yourself It seems to belong to the very idea of remembering that you can remember only your own experiences. To remember paying a fine (or the experience of paying) is to remember yourself paying. (我所記得的經驗就只能是我自己的經驗,我不可 能回想起他人曾經歷過的經驗) trivialuninformative That makes it trivial and uninformative to say that you are the person whose experiences you can remember—that is, that memory continuity is sufficient for personal identity. genuinely It is uninformative because you cannot know whether someone genuinely remembers a past experience without already knowing whether he is the one who had it. 14

15 The second objection genuine Suppose we want to know whether 今先生, who exists now, is the same as 古先生, whom we know to have existed at some time in the past. The Memory Criterion tells us that 今先生 is 古先生 if 今先生 can now remember an experience of 古先生 that occurred at that past time. But 今先生 ‘s seeming to remember one of 古先生 ’s experiences from that time counts as genuine memory only if 今先生 actually is 古先生. So we should already have to know whether 今先 生 is 古先生 before we could apply the principle that is supposed to tell us whether she is. 15

16 A more challenging problem The Memory Criteria face a more obvious problem: there are many times in my past that I can't remember at all. I have never existed at any time when I was completely unconscious For instance, there is no time when I could recall anything that happened to me while I was dreamlessly sleeping last night. The Memory Criterion has the absurd implication that I have never existed at any time when I was completely unconscious. The man sleeping in my bed last night was someone else. 16

17 Causal dependency to the rescue causal dependence A solution appeals to causal dependence (Shoemaker 1984, 89ff.). We can define two notions, psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. psychologically connected because of A being is psychologically connected, at some future time, with me as I am now just if he is in the psychological states he is in then in large part because of the psychological states I am in now. Having a current memory of an earlier experience is one sort of psychological connection—the experience causes the memory of it—but there are others. 17

18 Psychologically continuous when one was unconscious Importantly, one's current mental states can be caused in part by mental states one was in at times when one was unconscious. For example, most of my current beliefs are the same ones I had while I slept last night: those beliefs have caused themselves to continue existing. psychologically continuous We can then define the second notion thus: I am now psychologically continuous with a past or future being just if some of my current mental states relate to those he is in then by a chain of psychological connections. 18

19 Psychologically continuous psychologically continuous Now suppose that a person x who exists at one time is identical with something y existing at another time if and only if x is, at the one time, psychologically continuous with y as it is at the other time. This avoids the most obvious objections to the Memory Criterion. 19

20 Fission: a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach two Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. If your cerebrum—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—were transplanted, the recipient would be psychologically continuous with you by anyone's lights (even if there would also be important psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you. 20

21 半腦切除術案例 有位小女孩患有慢性局部腦炎( Rasmussen Syndrome )。癲癇導致她右半身癱瘓,並且嚴 重影響其語言技能。於是醫生在她三歲時施行 了半腦切除術。當她七歲時,小女孩仍然能夠 流利地說雙語(土耳其語和荷蘭語)。甚至半 身癱瘓的狀況也已部份復原,只有左手和左腳 有輕微痙攣現象。除此之外,她與正常人生活 幾乎無異。 21

22 Fission: a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What if we did both at once, destroying one hemisphere and transplanting the other? Then too, the one who got the transplanted hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach would be you. 22

23 both But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. (We needn't pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) The two recipients—call them Lefty and Righty—will each be psychologically continuous with you. The Psychological Approach implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. contradiction But that cannot be: Lefty and Righty are two, and one thing cannot be numerically identical with two things. Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn't. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren't. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: a contradiction. 23 Fission: a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach

24 Two solutions to the fission problem Friends of the Psychological Approach have proposed two different solutions to this problem: the “multiple-occupancy view” and the “non- branching view”. 24

25 The multiple-occupancy view really two The multiple-occupancy view says that if there is fission in your future, then there are two of you, so to speak, even now. What we think of as you is really two people, who are now exactly similar and located in the same place, doing the same things and thinking the same thoughts. The surgeons merely separate them. 25

26 The multiple-occupancy view The multiple-occupancy view is almost invariably combined with the general metaphysical claim that people and other persisting things are made up of temporal parts. For each person, there is such a thing as her first half: an entity just like the person only briefer, like the first half of a race. On this account, the multiple-occupancy view is that Lefty and Righty coincide before the operation by sharing their pre-operative temporal parts, and diverge later by having different temporal parts located afterwards. 26

27 The multiple-occupancy view Lefty and Righty are like two roads that coincide for a stretch and then fork, sharing some of their spatial parts but not others. At the places where the roads overlap, they are just like one road. Likewise, the idea goes, at the times before the operation when Lefty and Righty share their temporal parts, they are just like one person. Even they themselves can't tell that they are two. Whether people really are made up of temporal parts, however, is disputed. 27

28 The non-branching view no other being The other solution to the fission problem abandons the intuitive claim that psychological continuity by itself suffices for one to persist. It says, rather, that you are identical with a past or future being only if she is then psychologically continuous with you and no other being is. 28

29 This means that neither Lefty nor Righty is you. They both come into existence when your cerebrum is divided. If both your cerebral hemispheres are transplanted, you cease to exist—though you would survive if only one were transplanted and the other destroyed. 29

30 A surprising consequence of the non-branching view The non-branching view has the surprising consequence that if your brain is divided, you will survive if only one half is preserved, but you will die if both halves are. Fission is death. That is just the opposite of what most of us expect: if your survival depends on the functioning of your brain (because that is what underlies psychological continuity), then the more of that organ we preserve, the greater ought to be your chance of surviving. 30

31 A surprising consequence of the non-branching view In fact the non-branching view implies that you would perish if one of your hemispheres were transplanted and the other left in place: you can survive hemispherectomy only if the excised hemisphere is immediately destroyed. And if brain-state transfer is a case of psychological continuity, you would cease to exist if your total brain state were copied onto another brain without erasing your own brain. 31

32 A surprising consequence of the non-branching view Faced with the prospect of having one of your hemispheres transplanted, there would seem to be no reason to prefer that the other be destroyed. Most of us would rather have both preserved, even if they go into different heads. Yet on the non-branching view that is to prefer death over continued existence. 如果是進行手術的人是你,你會不會關心手術後那兩個人的前途、 福禍與榮辱,如同你關心你自己未來的前途、福禍與榮辱一樣? 若是會,你為什麼會呢?既然那兩個人都已不再是你。 若是不會,這未免也太怪異了。 32

33 Parfit’s solution ought Parfit, among others, tries to explain why we ought to prefer death over our own continued existence: whether or not he is me Insofar as we are rational, we don't want to continue existing. Or at least we don't want it for its own sake. What I really want is for there to be someone in the future who is psychologically continuous with me, whether or not he is me. 33

34 Parfit’s solution The usual way to achieve this is to continue existing; but the fission story shows that I could have it without continuing to exist. Likewise, even the most selfish person has a reason to care about the welfare of the beings who would result from her undergoing fission, even if, as the non-branching view implies, neither would be her. 34

35 Personal identity question has no practical importance In the fission case, the sorts of practical concerns you ordinarily have for yourself seem to apply to someone who isn't strictly you. no practical importance This suggests more generally that facts about who is numerically identical with whom have no practical importance. All that matters practically is who is psychologically continuous with whom. 35

36 We may not persist by virtue of psychological continuity This may cast doubt on the principal argument for the Psychological Approach. even if she would not be you Suppose you would care about the welfare of your two fission offshoots in just the way that you ordinarily care about your own welfare, even though neither offshoot would be you. Then you would care about what happened to the person who got your whole brain in the original transplant case, even if she would not be you. 36

37 We may not persist by virtue of psychological continuity was Even if you would regard that person as yourself for all practical purposes—if you would anticipate her experiences just as you anticipate yours, for instance—that would in no way support the claim that she was you. So our reactions to the brain-transplant case may not support the view that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, but only the claim that psychological continuity is what matters practically, which is compatible with other accounts of our persistence. In that case we may wonder whether we have any reason to accept the Psychological Approach. 37

38 Another Worry for the Psychological Approach Imagine a three-dimensional duplicating machine. When you step into the “in” box, it reads off your information and assembles a perfect duplicate of you in the “out” box. The process causes temporary unconsciousness but is otherwise harmless. Two beings wake up, one in each box. The boxes are indistinguishable. Because each being will have the same apparent memories and perceive identical surroundings, each will think that he or she is you, and will have the same evidence for this belief. But only one will be right. If this actually happened to you, it is hard to see how you could ever know, afterwards, whether you were the original or the duplicate. (Suppose the technicians who work the machine are sworn to secrecy and immune to bribes.) You would think, “Who am I? Am I who I think I am? Did I do the things I seem to remember doing? Or did I come into being only a moment ago, complete with false memories of someone else's life?” And you would have no way of answering these questions. 38

39 問題 若 non-branching view 成立,則連續殺人 犯在被定罪之前只須趕快進行兩個半腦 同時移植手術,一旦成功便可逃避究責 問題。這樣合理嗎? 39

40 40 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 1-46 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2003 多媒體藝廊,依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用 Microsoft 服務合約 2 (1) The psychological...... somatic approach Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 3 Some psychological...... inherited in this way. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 4 There is disagreement...... earlier is an example. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 5 Our identity through......psych ological facts. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

41 41 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 7 Imagine that your brain is....Somatic Approach has it Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 9 Most people feel......do with psychology. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 10 It is notoriously......ti me consist in? Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 11 Let’s consider the...... or vice versa. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 12 This proposal faces...... by Reid and Butler. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

42 42 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 13 First, suppose a young......transit ive; memory continuity is not. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 14 It seems to belong to......he is the one who had it. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 15 Suppose we want to know......is supposed to tell us whether she is. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 16 The Memory Criteria...... night was someone else. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 17 A solution appeals to causal......it—but there are others. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

43 43 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 18 Importantly, one's current mental......conn ections Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 19 Now suppose that a...... the Memory Criterion. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 20 Whatever psychological...... that she would be you. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 22 If we destroyed one......Approach would be you. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 23 But now suppose that......hungry at once: a contradiction. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

44 44 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 24 Friends of the Psychological......branching view”. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 25 The multiple- occupancy......me rely separate them. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 26 The multiple- occupancy view......parts afterwards. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 27 Lefty and Righty......parts, however, is disputed. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 28 The other solution...... no other being is. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

45 45 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 29 This means that neither......other destroyed. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 30 The non- branching......be your chance of surviving. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 31 In fact the......erasing your own brain. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 32 Faced with the prospect of......continued existence. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 33 Parfit, among others......whether or not he is me. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明

46 46 頁碼作品版權標示作者/來源 34 The usual way to achieve......neit her would be her. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 35 In the fission case, the......continuou s with whom. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 36 This may cast doubt......would not be you. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 37 Even if......the Psychological Approach. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ 38 Imagine a three- dimensional......a nswering these questions. Eric T. Olson , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,瀏覽日期: 2014/05/05 , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ ,依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/版權聲明


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