G ENERAL Q UESTION What is the association between energy resources and conflicts?
G ENERAL Q UESTION What is the association between energy resources and conflicts? Problems with the question:
G ENERAL Q UESTION What is the association between energy resources and conflicts? Problems with the question: Energy? “What” of energy? Conflict? Association? Direction of the causality (endogeneity)?
M ORE S PECIFIC Q UESTION Does oil and natural gas dependence bring about militarized domestic and international conflicts? If so, what are the possible causal mechanisms?
L ITERATURE The questions above are parts of the larger question: the association between primary commodities and conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler 1998) Most of the literature: natural resources in general domestic conflicts/civil wars
E NERGY AND D OMESTIC C ONFLICT Which hydrocarbon resource? Oil has the most robust association with civil wars among all natural resources (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2003; de Soysa 2002) – both quantitative and qualitative studies This is valid even when controlling for the Middle East, Africa and Muslim population. The only component among natural resources? Yet mainly oil exporter dummies and production. Reserves tend to be insignificant.
T WO M AIN C AUSAL L INKAGES 1. Direct Effect Motive/Control/Capture/Prize/Greed
T WO M AIN C AUSAL L INKAGES 1. Direct Effect Motive/Control/Capture/Prize/Greed The presence of such resources increases the value of controlling the state (Le Billon 2001; Fearon & Laitin 2003) or the reward of secession Azerbaijan in the early 1990s
C HARACTERISTICS OF E NERGY R ESOURCES AND T YPES OF C IVIL W AR (L E B ILLON 2001) Distance to the Capital City Spatial Distributi on ProximatePoint DistantDiffuse
C HARACTERISTICS OF E NERGY R ESOURCES AND T YPES OF C IVIL W AR (L E B ILLON 2001) POINT & PROXIMATE POINT & DISTANT
C HARACTERISTICS OF E NERGY R ESOURCES AND T YPES OF C IVIL W AR (L E B ILLON 2001) POINT & PROXIMATE POINT & DIFFUSE State Control Or Coup D’etat Secession Algeria (gas) Angola (oil) Chad (oil) Congo–Brazzaville (oil) Iraq (oil) Iran (oil) Angola/Cabinda 1975 (oil) Indonesia/Aceh 1975 (oil and gas) Nigeria/Biafra 1967 (oil) Sudan – South 1983 (oil)
T WO M AIN C AUSAL L INKAGES 2. Indirect Effect: resource curse or grievance based explanations slow economic growth (Sachs & Warner 2001) poverty (Ross, 2003) corruption (Collier & Gunning 1999) authoritarianism(Ross 2001) weak institutions All these, besides inequality, price shocks, etc. could create grievances and result in internal disturbances and possibly civil war.
There are increasingly more and more qualifications of the resource – civil war linkage. Smith (2004) shows that energy resource dependence leads to neither internal disturbances nor regime failures What could be the reason?
A N O BSERVATION Why Warlordism (of Afghanistan) and Failed States are not common in oil-rich countries? Physical concentration: high value per square meter (compared to agricultural products) Capital Intensive-Need for FDI: sovereignty matters (Northern Iraq) Oil and gas could be considered as “unlootable”
Q UESTION 2: How do natural resources influence the likelihood of international conflict (if at all)? What about mechanisms?
R EFERENCES, E VENTS AND C OMMON S ENSE References: Renner et al. (1991); Galtung (1982); Westing (1986); Gleditsch (1998) Events: Iran-Iraq War, Iraq-Kuwait War, U.S.-Iraq Wars.. (must be about oil!)
E NERGY AND I NTERNATIONAL C ONFLICT Beyond anecdotal evidence there have been few empirical studies (see Diehl and Gleditsch 2001) with “little systematic evidence” (Gleditsch 1998). Examples : Westing (1986); Klare (2001); Solem and Sclanlan (1986); Giordano et al. (2005).
W HY ? C OULD THE E NVIRONMENTAL /M ALTHUSIAN A PPROACH BE PART OF THE PROBLEM ? population growth/high resource consumption per capita deteriorated environmental conditions increasing resource scarcity harsher resource competition greater risk of violence
W HAT ARE THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL THEORY AND WHAT ARE THE SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS ? 1. Do we really fight over scarcity (Giordano et al. 2005)? What about disputes between Iran and Iraq, Iran and Qatar, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan? Are these countries resource-poor?
P ROBLEMS IN THE L ITERATURE ( CONTINUED ) 2. Lumping together nonrenewable and renewable natural resources Diamond vs. Timber Oil vs. Water Value/Volume Ratio Windfall Potential Ease of Export and Capture
A LTERNATIVE S OLUTION ? R ESOURCE C URSE Resource curse is a loose collection of arguments highlighting counter-intuitively negative consequences of resource richness. Negative effects on economic growth, democracy, domestic conflict, etc (Sachs and Warner 1995; Ross 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2005).
1. G REEDY O UTSIDERS M ECHANISM : A DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT Coined by Humphreys (2005) Capture of the state or the region belonging to that state increases the “prize” value of the act (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englebert and Ron 2004; Fearon 2005). Smith (2004) mentions “greed-driven neighbors” targeting oil rich states (243).
G REEDY O UTSIDERS M ECHANISM : H YPOTHESES H1: States richer in terms of natural resource endowments are more likely to be attacked H1.1: States richer in terms of natural resource endowments are more likely to be attacked by major powers
V ARIABLES AND R ESEARCH D ESIGN D EPENDENT V ARIABLE Force Use Onset taken from Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) Dataset (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).
M AIN I NDEPENDENT V ARIABLES Hamilton and Clemens (1999), annually updated by the World Bank (2006). Energy Rent : the product of unit resource rents and the physical quantities of energy extracted. It covers crude oil, natural gas, and coal,” and is measured as the percentage of GNI. Oil Production (Humphreys 2005)
Time series cross sectional models Period: 1970-2002 Up to 144 countries and about 3500 country years Logit XTGEE Y X 1 X 2 …X N PEACEYEARS SPLINE1 SPLINE2 SPLINE3, PA ROBUST
E MPIRICAL T ESTS : T ABLE 1: R ESOURCE R ENT AND F ORCE U SE O NSET : D IRECT G REEDY O UTSIDERS M ECHANISM DV: Force Use Onset (1)(2)(3)(4) InvolvementTargetTargeted by Neighbor Targeted by Major Power Energy Rent0.014***0.016**0.026***0.027* (0.005)(0.007) (0.015) Mineral Rent-0.0040.0140.0150.028 (0.018)(0.020)(0.018)(0.109) Trade-0.006** -0.008***-0.013** (0.003) (0.006) Level of Income-0.019-0.072-0.411***0.275 (0.136)(0.130)(0.156)(0.204) GDP Growth-0.0020.0060.013-0.013 (0.008)(0.009)(0.010)(0.023) Democracy-0.0070.0030.0040.016 (0.010)(0.011)(0.012)(0.030) Peace Years-0.331***-0.050-0.132-0.390*** (0.116)(0.110)(0.090)(0.144) Constant-0.629***-1.261***-1.253***-1.589*** (0.191)(0.211)(0.248)(0.512) Observations3511 3387 Countries144 Model Chi Sqr89.6829.2581.97
I NDIRECT L INKAGE BETWEEN O IL AND I NTERNATIONAL W ARS 1. Autonomous/Adventurous Governments 2. Weak Institutions/Internal Disturbances Military Expenditures
Figure 4: A Model of Significant Linkages between Energy Rent and Force Use Onset Energy Rent Force Use Onset Military Expenditu re Direct Effect
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