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© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Chapter 16.

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Presentation on theme: "© Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Chapter 16."— Presentation transcript:

1 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Chapter 16

2 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Chapter 16 The European Monetary System

3 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition The EMS: Past and Present EMS originally a solution to the end of the Bretton Woods System. Over the years it became a kind of DM area, with the Bundesbank very much in command. This, and the speculative crisis of 1993, made the monetary union option attractive. Now the EMS is mostly the entry point for future monetary union members. 3

4 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition A fine distinction: EMS vs. ERM EMS = European Monetary System –all EU members are part of it ERM = Exchange Rate Mechanism –Grid of agreed bilateral exchange rates, mutual support, joint realignment decisions, ECU The UK and Sweden do not want ERM membership All the others will adopt ERM and Euro sooner or later 4

5 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Preview: The Four Incarnations of the EMS : ERM-1 with narrow bands of fluctuation (  2.25%) and symmetric : ERM-1 centered on the DM, shunning realignments : ERM-1 with wide bands (  15%) : ERM-2, asymmetric, on the way to euro area. 5

6 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition The ECU A basket of all EU currencies. 6

7 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition The ERM: Interpretation and Assessment Improving on the Snake to stabilise intra-European exchange rates: –mutual support –realignment unanimity rule. Respecting the EU equalitarian approach: –no centre currency –bilateral interventions by strong and weak currency central banks. No role for the US dollar: Europe on its own. 7

8 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition The ERM: Interpretation and Assessment Is monetary policy independence lost? The Impossible trinity: –widespread capital controls to preserve at least the ability to have different inflation rates. Fixed Exchange Rate Monetary union Free float EMS Full Capital Mobility Monetary Independence 8

9 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Agreeing to disagree Plan A: Dedicate monetary policy to exchange rate pegs. This requires similar inflation rates, otherwise high inflation countries will lose competitiveness Plan B: Accept different inflation rates and adjust exchange rates as frequently as needed to avoid competitiveness problems and trade imbalances 9

10 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone Plan B was chosen first: –different inflation rates: long run monetary policy independence –frequent realignments. 10

11 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition EMS before the Euro (DM/FrF in ERM) 11

12 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone Realignments and inflation in between with real appreciation 12

13 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Evolution: From Symmetry to DM Zone Realignments –barely compensated accumulated inflation differences –were easy to guess by markets –put weak currency/high inflation countries on the spot: Continuing current account deficits Speculative attacks. The symmetry was broken de facto. The Bundesbank became the example to follow. What shadowing the Bundesbank required: –giving up much what was left of monetary policy independence –aiming at a low German-style inflation rate –avoiding realignments to gain credibility. 13

14 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Black Wednesday In politics and economics, Black Wednesday refers to the events of 16 September 1992 when the British Government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from ERM after they were unable to keep it above its agreed lower limit. George Soros, the most high profile of the currency market investors, made over US$1 billion profit by short selling sterling. 14

15 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Breakdown of the DM zone Bad design: –full capital mobility established in 1990: ERM in contradiction with impossible trinity Bad luck: –German unification: a big shock that called for very tight monetary policy –the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. A wave of speculative attacks in The ERM should be made even more cohesive – monetary union is the way to go 15

16 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition ERM-2 ERM-1 ceased to exist on 1 January 1999 with the launch of the Euro. ERM-2 was created to: –host currencies of existing EU members who cannot/don’t want to join euro area: Denmark and the UK have a derogation, but Denmark has adopted the new ERM Sweden has no derogation but has declined to adopt the new ERM 16

17 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition How Does ERM-2 Differ From ERM-1? 17

18 © Baldwin&Wyplosz 2009 The Economics of European Integration, 3 rd Edition Current ERM II membership 18


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