Presentation on theme: "IDS In Depth Search: Ideas, Descriptions, and Solutions Presentation by Marshall Washburn November 30 th, 2010 CPSC 420/620 w/ Dr. Grossman."— Presentation transcript:
IDS In Depth Search: Ideas, Descriptions, and Solutions Presentation by Marshall Washburn November 30 th, 2010 CPSC 420/620 w/ Dr. Grossman
Introduction and Layout What is an IDS? – How it works – NIDS vs. HIDS (vs. NNIDS) Different uses of an IDS – Passive vs. Aggressive (IDPS) – Anomaly vs. Signature Supplements and Add-ons – Logging – Honeypots Gotchas – False Positives – False Negatives Closer look – Snort – Info – Modes – Rules & Features Conclusion
What is an IDS? IDS – Intrusion Detection System – Analyzes network traffic – Reports problems Three types of IDS – Network-based Intrusion Detection – Host-based Intrusion Detection – Network Node-based Intrusion Detection
Types of IDS Network-IDS – Typical view of IDS – Watches a subnet – Typically a perimeter defense Host-based IDS – Watches host computers, involves software – Looks for system calls and registry changes – Typically an internal defense Network-Node IDS – Specific host traffic – Kind of specialized NIDS (ex: VPN device)
Types of IDS
Different uses of an IDS How should the system react? Passive system – Scans packets, traffic, or system – Takes notes – Sends alerts Active system (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System) – Passive system + barrel rolls – Kills connections or modifies firewalls Pros and Cons: Passive vs. Active – Less maintenance and lack of painful false alarms vs. More maintenance but avoid disasters
Different uses of an IDS What should the system look for? Anomaly-based IDS – Samples network traffic – Checks against predefined ‘ideal’ traffic Signature-based IDS – Polar opposite of anomaly – Samples network traffic – Checks against predefined virus patterns Pros and Cons: Anomaly vs. Signature – Hard to pin down ‘normal’ network traffic, especially when updating or migrating a system – Virus patterns are only as good as the updated list
Supplements and Add-ons IDS: Good by themselves, great on a team – External Logging – Honeypots
IDS Logging IDS typically logs traffic locally – Can become unorganized – Hard to search through External Logging Databases (ex: ACIDBASE) – Categorize suspected attacks – IP traffic – Port traffic – Latest virus information – Stealthy logging
Honeypots IDS can be used on production or development systems Honeypots lure attacker in (ex: Honeyd) – Network decoys to distract away from vulnerable machines – Typically virtual machines that simulate real networks – Honeypots capture the attacks, IDS analyzes, your system stays secure.
A Few Gotchas Every rose has its thorn… False Positives – Normal traffic suspected to be malicious False Negatives – Some attack is flagged to be normal or non-malicious Not software flaws, usually configuration flaws – Encrypted traffic can cause false positives, and mutated worms or viruses can mismatch an attack pattern and cause false negatives.
Quick Case Study: Snort Originally released in 1998 by Sourcefire founder and CTO Martin Roesch Combines signature and anomaly techniques Ready out of the box Updated rule sets Three primary modes – Sniffer mode – Packet-logger mode – Network IDS mode
Snort Rules Can specify what IP subnet to look at and types of traffic in ‘snort.conf’ file Sample rule – alert tcp any any -> / \ (content:"| a5|"; msg:"mountd access";) Easy to customize with many different features – Logging, passing, dropping, custom – TCP and/or UDP, ICMP, IP – Traffic direction – Content, raw bytes, offsets
Conclusions Useful tool to keep a network safe There are many different styles to a detection system Snort incorporates many of the capabilities of intrusion detection systems – multiple detection techniques – ability to customize simple rules
Works Cited Bauer, Mick. “Stealthful Sniffing, Intrusion Detection and Logging October, 2002http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6222 Innella, Paul. “The Evolution of Intrusion Detection Systems” detection-systemshttp://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/evolution-intrusion- detection-systems November 16th, 2001 Mattord, Verma (2008). Principles of Information Security. Course Technology. pp. 290–301 Provos, Niels. “A Virtual Honeypot Network” l/ Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium. August, l/ Timm, Kevin. “Strategies to Reduce False Positives and False Negatives in NIDS” false-positives-and-false-negatives-nids September, 2001http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/strategies-reduce- false-positives-and-false-negatives-nids The Snort Team. SNORT Users Manual September, Wikipedia.