1. 1 Managing the Gemini Project Matt Mountain - Director Jim Oschmann -Project Manager Background Project Management approach Results Final Thoughts National Science Board Committee on Programs & Plans 15 th November, 2001

2. 2 Jim Oschmann Experience 20 years experience working in optics industries –Defense R&D in High Energy Lasers, Laser Communications, Laser Radar & IR systems TRW, Hughes, Sensis Corp (Optical Systems Engineer and Systems Engineer) –Commercial Optical Industrial experience Phase Shift Technology (Manager of Optical Systems) –With Gemini for nine years Systems Engineer in 1992 Acting Project Manager 1993 Systems Engineering Manager 1994-1997 Project Manager 1998 to present Optical Systems Systems Engineering Project Management Education in Optical Sciences –University of Rochester and University of Arizona

3. 3 The Gemini Scientific Mission “The main themes of the science programs are concerned with observing and understanding the origins and evolution of stars and planetary systems, of galaxies, and of the Universe itself. The telescopes will be used to observe objects ranging in distance from within own our Solar System to within 10% of the observable horizon of the Universe” Gemini Science Requirements, 1991

4. 4 International Agreement and Gemini Board defined “Gemini” Construction –Two 8m telescopes, on Mauna Kea and Cerro Pachon –Superb image quality, infrared optimized configuration –Initial instrument complement Operations –Operations infrastructure at Hilo and La Serena –Build up and training of operations staff –Enable and support community access and exploitation of the Gemini telescopes to undertake forefront astrophysical research Development –On-going Instrumentation Program –Upgrades and enhancements of existing instruments –Facilities development Laser Guide Star Adaptive Optics Detector development Internet-II infrastructure

5. 5 Gemini Schedule 19922002 Construction Operations Development $184M 1997 Science Requirements & Implementation Plan accepted International Agreement signed Australia joins$8M Telescope “first light” $68M $31M

6. 6 Site Construction

7. 7 Completed Telescopes

8. 8 Gemini Construction Schedule 1991Initial Hiring of Central Project Team - Concept Design Begins 1992Primary Mirror Blanks Procured (long lead item) 1993International Agreement Signed 1994Construction Activities Begin (polishing, enclosure, & site construction) 1995Telescope Structures Contract 1996 Mauna Kea & Cerro Pachon Foundations Complete 1997 First Primary Mirror Completed & Telescope Structure Delivered to GN 1998 Telescope Installed with Primary Mirror (GN), Telescope Structure Delivered to GS, GS Primary Mirror Completed 1999 Engineering First Light on Gemini North 2000Initial Science Observations from Gemini North Engineering First Light on Gemini South 2001Initial Science Observations from Gemini South 2002Construction Close-out Science Observing and Instrument Commissioning

9. 9 Construction Project Australia Joins +$9.2M

10. 10 Both Gemini Telescopes Completed Mauna Kea, Hawaii and on Cerro Pachon, Chile Gemini North - Mauna KeaGemini South - Cerro Pachon Budget = $184M + $0M - $0.3M Schedule - 3 months Both Observatories in limited science observations ‘punch list’ construction and commissioning activities in full swing

11. 11 Features of the Gemini Construction Project AURA Managed –Dedicated division set up to concentrate on Gemini –Oversight committee including senior engineering manager input JPL Chief Engineer Lockheed Martin Engineering Manager Carried out as one unified project –Two construction sites –Limited initial instrument complement Partner funding provided when required –NSF worked with partners to ensure project not limited by cash flow concerns Partners took responsibility timely funding for transition to operations and for continued development

12. 12 Features of the Gemini Construction Project Science objectives defined and prioritized –Cost fixed, so constant ‘tension’ built into process –Effort to get most for the money Central single management of effort –Contingency funds managed centrally –Product Oriented Work Breakdown Organization matches WBS Subcontractors managed rigorously –Project Scientist part of design team Partner with Project Management Instrument Management was the exception –Initially had more control at the partner level

13. 13 Gemini Construction Project Organization

14. 14 Design Process Establish science requirements Perform conceptual design and analysis –Design requirements Flow down through error budgeting process System breakdown and major interfaces defined Initial integration plan established early Schedule reworked from bottom up Trades in concepts –Cost, risk, and science trades –Hard choices made early –Long lead items designed and procured early Minimizing schedule risk Focuses remaining design effort

15. 15 Systems and subsystem reviews Science and engineering reviews –Major cost trades performed early Systems reviews –Science representatives from all partners –High level plan and trades presented and discussed Conceptual, preliminary, and critical design reviews for major subsystems –Mix of internal and external reviewers »Brought in specialists as required –Several science working groups for specific reviews and trades –Vendor reviews in some cases

16. 16 Cost Estimates Cost estimates reviewed consistent with reviews –Bottoms up cost estimates Drove major trades and risks Trade of budget across WBS to solve problems –Systems Engineering involvement »Cost, schedule and technical trades –Cost progress reviewed on monthly basis Problems identified early Competitive bidding where possible –Some partner work altered to full international bidding –Goal was producing the most science for the money –Major exception was instrumentation »Partners took on cost risk for this freedom »Instrument costs “ring-fenced”

17. 17 Schedule Schedule was structured from bottoms up –Driven by Systems Engineering Sub system organization Integration & Test planning for flow of assembly Schedule –Options, trades, feedback into Integration & Test planning –Major elements followed WBS –Progress reviewed monthly along with budget

18. 18 Development of systems plan: Defining Interfaces Gemini Example: Science Instruments Internal Interfaces

19. 19 System I&T Plan

20. 20 Schedule based upon flow diagram Gemini overall example (details too numerous to present)

21. 21 Design Smooth Transition to Operations (Gemini Example)

22. 22 Contingency Planning A Key to Risk mitigation –Hold budget in project office for contingency (<10% for Gemini) –Need to prioritize this with science goals No time to re-do this at end of design phase »Exception are items easily cut or defined as future additions »Design with mind toward achieving all goals, but in modular fashion if money is limited –Establish Time contingency in project schedule Allowing time and money for recovery from problems Establish key dates for decisions, early Stick to them Most projects need financial and functional contingency Options for future upgrades considered if financial limits are exceeded

23. 23 Gemini Telescopes “designed to cost” - key scientific capabilities not compromised Change orders < 5%

24. 24 Meetings & Reporting –Weekly Internal managers meeting Weekly engineering group meetings Conference and video meetings for extended groups –Monthly Schedule and budget reviews –PM, PS, Director, Systems Engineer, each engineering manager Partner manager meetings Project scientist meetings with partner scientist representatives Contract progress reports –2-3 times per year Partner meetings for overall progress & issues Oversight committee Gemini Finance Committee Gemini Board

25. 25 Rigorous subcontract management –Project central contracts manager –Strong technical leads Active Gemini Board involvement –Partner issues and trades –Cash flow issues –Science issues and trades Taking Gemini Science Committee and Project input Always focused on success of project –Timely and consistent help from NSF and Gemini Board –Partner issues secondary to partnership success Two way flow of information and help Provide the best facilities for partners to use scientifically Other Techniques

26. 26 “Lessons Learned” on Gemini Cost was the constraint Develop Science Requirements and Goals Integrated Approach International Partnership “buy-in” essential

27. 27 Summary NSF provided the single point of contact between AURA and the NSF (as Executive Agency for the International Partnership) and delegated full Project Management responsibilities to AURA ensuring considerable: –Autonomy –Authority –Responsibility –Accountability Performance Instruments where another matter….

28. 28 Matt Mountain Experience 20 years building and observing with forefront astronomical groundbased instrumentation –Research interests: Starformation and starformation systems in galaxies (including our own), infrared instrumentation, capabilities of “second generation telescopes”. 15 years experience with managing groundbased programs in the UK and US –With Gemini for nine years Project Scientist in 1992 Project & Observatory Director 1994 Research astronomer Project Scientist Director For my entire career, astronomy has been an exhilarating, international and cost constrained experience –A useful background for managing a complex program within the NSF- Gemini Partnership environment

29. 29 International Agreement Annex A – Project Description Defined what was to be delivered within $176M (modified to $184M) Mauna KeaCerro Pachon Infrared optimized 8m telescope Multiple instrument mount Actively ventilated enclosure Summit support buildings Access roads, power and water 8m multi-layer coating facilityUpgraded 8m coating facility Construction camp Computer infrastructure & remote observing capability Computer infrastructure & remote observing capability Low order adaptive optics Infrared camera (+ spec.) Infrared spectrometer High res. optical spectrograph X High Multi-Object Spec. + Imager + $300K

30. 30 Gemini North Data from 2000-2001 semesters 2000B:33 programs (Quick Start Programs) –51 CDs of science; 66 CDs of calibration data sent to PIs 2001A:25 programs –85 CDs sent to PIs 2001B: 12 programs to date –50 CDs sent to PIs so far Total: 252 CDs, 70 programs to date N.B. several 10s of CDs of SV data to be released Gemini South Observations just begun

31. 31 First results with facility IR Imager Star forming Region AFGL 2591 NIRI f/6 2’ x 2’ J, K bands FWHM=0.35’’ Gemini North

32. 32 Gemini-South IR (4 micron) Commissioning Images of Galactic Center - IR optimization at work… Gemini South + ABU + fast tip/tilt Brackett  FWHM ~ 0.35” 1 minute integration Simons & Becklin 1992 IRTF (3.6m) - L’ 16,000 images shift/add An entire night….

33. 33 Two ultracool companions to the young star HD130948 Potter et al. 2001 submitted Pair has same proper motion as primary (7 month basis 148 mas/yr (or 4.3 H/Q pixels) Gravitationally bound pair Very low mass ultracool objects –Pair separation = 0.134+/-0.002” Primary < 1 Gyr Mars orbit at 17pc

34. 34 NGC 628 (Messier 74) 32 Mega pixels/frame Gemini Multi-Object Spectrograph – Optical Imaging

35. 35 Final thoughts on managing international projects within the NSF International Projects are more complex Requires clear definition and agreement of requirements and goals International stakeholders are partners not sub- contractors The NSF approach to international programs has (to date) worked well –There is real value-added from the Gemini partnership –“The whole is greater than the sum of the parts”

36. 36 International Partnership Cost vs. Benefit Financial structures and accountability undoubtedly more complex –4 different financial years and accounting principles –several overhead structures –being subject to seven different Science Agencies budget cycles can introduce cash flow uncertainties However, this does allow considerable financial flexibility – Use the UK’s, Canada’s and Australia’s 5 year financial planning cycle to make cash commitments beyond the annual US appropriations –Makes available enormous effective cash reserves to do the project correctly

37. 37 International Partnership Cost vs. Benefit Governance, and Advisory structures undoubtedly more complex –Spent approx. year building consensus on approach (~$4M) –30% ~ 50% of travel costs can attributed to “international issues” (~$150K-$200K/year) –Internationalization does not mean national committees go away –Cost ~3% of $184M program However, this does introduce considerable international awareness and competition –consideration of alternative approaches –national communities, even “premier organizations” have to compete Management and Science Team consensus: this has clearly led to a better “product”

38. 38 With the NSF approach to international projects, innovation and risk management not inhibited In construction both Gemini telescopes were required to deliver exceptional (and unprecedented) performance within a fixed budget –0.1 arcseconds image quality –4% infrared emissivity –$184M fixed capital budget In Operations partnership is experimenting with an “adaptive operations model” –Implement “adaptive queue scheduling” to match observations with optimum conditions, and complete highly ranked programs –Using new technologies, support both telescopes separated by continents using a single engineering team –Queue and classical observations synchronized to be “out of phase” on Gemini North and South to optimize support costs, while maximizing scientific return In the Gemini case, NSF has supported the taking of risks –National Science Board concluded that the Gemini operational approach was a “worthwhile experiment”

39. 39 What the NSF got right in the Gemini Partnership Clear agreement on the scientific priorities, requirements, goals and expectations at the outset of the Gemini Project Insisting on a single management entity with the responsibility and accountability for: –Science requirements change control –System architecture and system engineering [happened late in Gemini] –Total program budget The NSF’s willingness to “go the extra mile” to maintain partnership –showing flexibility when partners hit financial troubles, pump-priming initiatives (PIO, Internet-II) –Note: How America Does It, Foreign Affairs, 1997, Sept/Oct., p.13-27 “Great powers remain great if they promote their own interests by serving those of others”

40. 40 Current and Future Challenges Groundbased projects are increasingly more complex and expensive –Capital investment in ESO-VLT ~ $1.2Billion DM’s –Capital investment in ALMA will be ~ $700M - $800M –30m GSMT will require ~ $500M capital, ~ $40M/year operations –100m OWL will require ~ $1,000M capital, ~ $80M/year operations These are the required ‘particle accelerators’, and ‘space missions’ of modern groundbased astronomy Numbers of this scale require ‘a project culture’ at the NSF –Responding to global challenges of this scale cannot be “PI driven” –Requires long-term budgetary and program plans (and inter-Agency coordination) –Requires strategic leadership However NSF is gaining considerable experience with complex international partnerships and larger projects….