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1 Presented at Central University of Finance and Economics 中央财经大学 Beijing by 卜若柏 Robert Blohm Chinese Economics and Management Academy 中国经济与管理研究院

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1 1 Presented at Central University of Finance and Economics 中央财经大学 Beijing by 卜若柏 Robert Blohm Chinese Economics and Management Academy 中国经济与管理研究院 June 29 & July 6, 13, 16, 20, 23, 25, & 27, 年 6 月 29 日和 7 月 6 日和 13 日和 16 日和 20 日 23 日和 25 日和 27 日 Modern Philosophy since the Pre-Enlightenment

2 2 Contents  Hobbes  Descartes  Spinoza  Leibniz  Liberalism  Locke  English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism  Berkeley  Hume  Romanticism  Rousseau  The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism  Kant  19th Century: German/British (Ir)rationalism, French Creativism & US Pragmatism  Hegel  Byron  Schopenhauer  Nietzsche  The Utilitarians  Marx  Bergson  James  Dewey  20th Century Scientific Philosophy

3 3 Hobbes  He was an empiricist admirer of mathematical method  He was inspired more by Galileo than Bacon was  English empiricism was little influenced by mathematics compared to the Continent and, so, had the wrong conception of scientific method. But not Hobbes.  He was impatient with subtleties  He proposed logical solutions but omitted awkward facts.  He was vigorous but crude

4 4 Hobbes (cont.d)  His theory of the state was the most modern of its time  His father was an ill-tempered and uneducated vicar who lost his job. Hobbes was raised by his uncle  He had a good knowledge of the classics  He translated Greek classic poetry into Latin  He studied scholastic philosophy & Aristotle at Oxford

5 5 Hobbes (cont.d)  He was unhappy with universities: he constantly criticized them in his writings  He made the grand tour as a tutor to an English nobleman  He became familiar with Galileo and Kepler  After his patron died he lived in Paris where he began to study Euclid  He tutored his patron’s son and visited Galileo  He wrote Leviathan. It is royalist to the extreme, to show the evils of democracy

6 6 Hobbes (cont.d)  He published a translation of Thucydides to show the evils of democracy when Parliament drew up the Petition of Rights  The English Civil War strengthened his opinions  He commented on Descartes’ Meditations before they were published, & Descartes published the comments and his answers to the comments  While living in Paris, he was welcomed by many leading mathematicians and men of science had associated with a large company of English Royalist refugees taught mathematics for two years to the future King Charles II of England

7 7 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan’s  rationalism offended most of the Royalist refugees  attacks on the Catholic Church offended the French government  He consequently fled to England where he  made submission to Cromwell  abstained from all political activity  He overestimated his capacities as a geometer by imagining he had discovered how to square the circle  After the Restoration the King hung Hobbes’ portrait on his walls

8 8 Hobbes (cont.d)  The King forgot to pay the pension he awarded to Hobbes  Legislators were shocked by the favor shown to a man suspected of atheism  After the Plague and the Great Fire of London, the House of Commons conducted an official inquiry into atheistic writings, specifically Hobbes’. He was not allowed to publish.  He had to publish abroad Behemoth, his history of the Long Parliament which had revolted in civil war against the monarchy, beheading Catholic King Charles I.  He had a bigger reputation abroad  At 84 years old he wrote his autobiography in Latin verse. At 87 he published a translation of Homer.

9 9 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan  It’s materialist  Leviathan is civil society pictured as an artificial man composed of men  Sovereignty embodied in Leviathan is an artificial soul  Pacts and covenants are the act of creation of the Leviathan  Life is motion of limbs. Automata have an artificial life.  Sensation is caused by pressure/motions of objects: colors, sounds, etc. are not in the objects but in the perceiver

10 10 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  “First law of motion”: imagination is a decaying sense/motion consisting in  dreaming when asleep  religions resulting from confusing dreams with waking life  heathen creation of gods by human fear  our God as the first mover  prophetic content of dreams which is delusional  Psychological determinism: the succession of our thoughts is not arbitrary but governed by laws  sometimes of association  sometimes depending upon a purpose in our thinking

11 11 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Hobbes is a nominalist: only names are universal  because we cannot conceive of general ideas without words, and  because truth and falsehood are attributes of ”speech“, but  he confuses propositions (objects) with sentences (names)  Geometry is the one true science  Philosophy is inclined to self-contradictory notions in definitions, for example “incorporeal substance” which God cannot be  because God is not the subject of philosophy, and  despite many philosophers’ conception of God as corporeal

12 12 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  The error of general propositions is due to self- contradiction  for example free will, accidents of bread inhering in a sub- stance that is not bread.  Objection: this is too strong a criterion of error for ignoring factual error which is empirical and a weaker form of error.  He disputes Plato’s view that reason is innate: reason is developed by effort  Passions are motions directed toward (in desire) or away from (in aversion) something (good when desired, bad when being avoided). There is  no objectivity to passions;  no resolution to conflicts of passion between men

13 13 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Hobbes defines passions in terms of competition:  Laughter is sudden glory  Religion is  fear of invisible power when religion is allowed by the legislature, or  superstition when religion is not allowed by the legislature  Felicity is continual progress, prospering. No happiness is static.  Will is the dominant passion among people in a conflict  Despotic government is defended by an “explanatory myth”  In a state of nature all men are naturally equal  Self-preservation drives men both to seek to preserve their own liberty, and to acquire dominion over others.  The contradiction drives a war of all against all where  there is no justice or injustice  force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues

14 14 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Despotic government is defended by an “explanatory myth” (cont.d)  To end the universal war, men combine in communities subject to a central authority. Under a social contract among themselves they choose a sovereign or sovereign body to exercise authority over them  A covenant  without power of enforcement by one man or one assembly is ineffective,  is made by citizens with each other to obey the majority’s choice of ruler, not between citizens and the ruling power per Locke or Rousseau. Once a ruler is chosen, citizens have no more power, and  confers no right of rebellion because  the ruler is not bound by any contract unlike the citizens,  rebellion usually fails and, if it succeeds, sets a bad example

15 15 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Leviathan is the multitude so united, into a mortal God.  Hobbes is thereby the first philosopher to express the “holism/individualism” problem and the problem of “social choice”: is group behavior a mere aggregate of individual behavior (methodological individualism) or is individual behavior determined by the individual’s place (role) in a social structure and group behavior something more than the aggregation of individual behaviors (and choices as in Condorcet’s later “paradox of voting” where the outcome is not majority rule)?

16 16 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Hobbes solves the holism/individualism problem in his usual rash way by simply having the group appoint an individual to act independently in their place without accountability or consultation, collapsing the group into an actual individual. By this administrative device of conferring individual agency on a social group by having the group cede its decision-making to the person of the arbitrarily acting individual sovereign, Hobbes avoids explicitly making a conceptual “levels” mistake: confusion of an individual person’s behavior with social behavior by a group of individuals

17 17 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Monarchy is the best form of “sovereign” or supreme authority (conceived of as agency by an all-powerful representative individual), who is not limited by any legal rights of other bodies, and who  has the right of censorship over all expression of opinion, but will not suppress truth, for only a false doctrine can be repugnant to peace, and  disposes of all property because it was  created by government  is non-existent in a state of nature  if despotic, is better than anarchy

18 18 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Monarchy is the best form of “sovereign” or supreme authority (conceived of as agency by an all-powerful representative individual) who is not limited by any legal rights of other bodies, and who (cont.d)  is better than an assembly like the Grand Council of Venice or the House of Lords (assuming no periodic elections that could curb or accelerate sacrifice of the public interest) which  will follow its private interest if it conflicts with the public interest, just as a monarch will  will have favorites of each member, but many more in total than a monarch  can hear advice publicly, but only from its own members, while a monarch can hear advice from anyone and privately  can reflect a suddenly different majority due to a chance absence of some members, unlike a monarch  can be divided against itself, and result in civil war, unlike a monarch.

19 19 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  The interest of the sovereign is identical with the people’s  He is richer if they are richer  He is safer if they are law-abiding.  Power cannot be shared between a King and Parliament  This is the antithesis of Locke’s and Montesquieu’s view of division of powers  Such sharing between King, Lords, and Commons caused the English Civil War  Rejection of Aristotle’s distinction between tyranny and monarchy. Tyranny is just a monarchy the speaker dislikes.

20 20 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Democracy was conceived in Antiquity as the direct participation of every citizen in legislation and administration  Succession is determined by the sovereign  as in the Roman Empire when mutinies did not interfere, &  who will choose one of his own children or a near relative if he has no children.  Liberty  is absence of external impediments to motion  is consistent with necessity of movement when there are no impediments to it  All volitions and movements have causes and are therefore necessary  A man is necessitated to do what God wills

21 21 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Liberty (cont.d)  may be constrained by laws as the sovereign decides but  of the sovereign is constrained by the laws of God, and not by contract with his subjects.  as praised by ancient authors  has led men to favor tumults and seditions  but should be interpreted as the sovereign’s liberty from foreign domination  St. Ambrose had no right to excommunicate Emperor Theodosius for the massacre at Thessalonica  The Pope should not have deposed the last of the Merovingians in favor of Pepin.  includes an absolute right to self-preservation even against a monarch  including the right to refuse to fight when called by the government to do so  but not including the right of resistance in defense of another party

22 22 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Liberty (cont.d)  Includes the right not to obey a sovereign with no power to protect you, for example, in Hobbes’ submission to Cromwell while Charles II was in exile.  No political parties or trade unions are allowed  Teachers teach only what the sovereign deems useful  Property rights exist only against other subjects, not against the sovereign  The Sovereign has the right to regulate foreign trade  The Sovereign is not subject to civil law.  The Sovereign’s right to punish derives from the transfer to him of the liberty that all men had in the state of nature to inflict injury on one another

23 23 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Reasons for dissolving a Commonwealth  Giving too little power to the Sovereign  Allowing private judgment in subjects  The theory that everything against conscience is a sin  Belief in inspiration  Doctrine that the sovereign is subject to civil laws  Recognition of absolute private property  Division of the sovereign power  Imitation of the Greeks and Romans  Separation of temporal and spiritual powers  Refusing the power of taxation to the Sovereign  Popularity of potent subjects  Liberty of disputing with the Sovereign

24 24 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  The duty of submission is no harder to learn than the teachings of Christianity  Days should be set aside for it  Right teaching of it at universities should be supervised  Worship should be uniformly according to the religion of the Sovereign  The book was intended to inspire a sovereign to make himself absolute. This was more realistic than Plato’s objective to make a sovereign into a philosopher.

25 25 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  There is no universal Church because it must depend on a civil government  In each country the king must be head of the church.  The Pope has no overlordship or infallibility  A Christian subject of a non-Christian sovereign should yield outwardly. (Like Greek philosophers who practiced the State religion.)  The Church of Rome vainly places the spiritual power above the temporal. That’s vain philosophy. Aristotle represents vain philosophy.

26 26 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Central dogma: sovereign absolutism  developed in the Renaissance and the Reformation  Feudal nobility were reduced in stature by strong monarchs in France, England and Spain  The Reformation increased the power  of the state over the Church in England until the Puritans, but  in France, of the Protestant churches who had grown at the monarch’s expense  of the monarchy over the Assembly in Spain.  is justified by the opposite danger: anarchy  Governments need fear of rebellion to limit the tendency of government to tyranny  Governments try to make themselves irremovable  Officials try to enrich themselves  Governments try to suppress every new doctrine or discovery that menaces their power  Governments run the opposite risk, of ossification and injustice.

27 27 Hobbes (cont.d)  Leviathan (cont.d)  Central dogma: sovereign absolutism (cont.d)  is offset by the doctrine of just division of powers, checks and balances (subsequently proposed by Liberal philosophers to avoid the two extremes of anarchy or despotism)  in England between King and Parliament  in the US, among the President, Congress and the Supreme Court.  Russell expected government to become more centralized and powerful after WWII  He was superior to predecessors by  being free from superstition and the Bible  being clear and logical  being, after Machiavelli, the first modern writer on political theory  by making errors because of oversimplification, not because of unreal or fantastic assumptions

28 28 Hobbes (cont.d)  Two wrong assumptions. Exclusively concentrates on national interest by assuming that:  the major interests of all citizens are the same & iden- tical to the monarch’s--true only in wartime--, & by  unlike Marx, ignoring internal class conflict as a generator of social change, and by  overlooking that power sharing may be the only way to avert civil war, like the US Civil War between the industrial North and the no-wage agrarian South the relation between states is international anarchy: a state of nature, of war and conquest, war of all against all, where  improving the fighting ability of states leads to universal destruction and, so, where  only inefficiency can improve the human race

29 29 Descartes  was the first high-capacity philosopher profoundly affected by the new physics and the new astronomy  used a scholastic reasoning style but not scholastic foundations  constructs a complete philosophical edifice de novo  reflects the new self-confidence resulting from the progress of science  was unlike all previous philosophers who were teachers of prior wisdom, not discoverers and explorers.

30 30 Descartes (cont.d)  was son of a counselor of the Parliament of Brittany with a moderate amount of landed property  was educated by the Jesuits, who gave a better grounding in mathematics than you could get at most universities

31 31 Descartes (cont.d)  contemplated geometry in Paris, then for more quiet, joined the army of Holland at peace at the time, subsequently the Bavarian army where he meditated in an oven and emerged with his philosophy half finished: “half baked”. Returned to Paris but, to escape the distraction by friends, joined the army seige of the Protestant Hugenots. Then moved to Holland possibly to escape persecution. Holland was the only 17 th century country with freedom of speculation  Hobbes published his books there  Locke took refuge there  Bayle and Spinoza lived there, but  Descartes was nearly persecuted by Protestants claiming that his views led to atheism.

32 32 Descartes (cont.d)  was timid and a practicing Catholic  but shared Galileo’s heresies and, so  declined to publish Le Monde containing two heretical doctrines:  earth’s rotation  infinity of the universe  associated with Jesuits whom he sought to convince to persuade the Church to be less hostile to modern science  corresponded with the Swedish Queen who commissioned him to give her lessons at 5 AM, and died from cold 5 months later

33 33 Descartes (cont.d)  worked short hours and read little. Great concentration during short periods.  in Principia philosphiae, formulated his scientific theories. There he  invented coordinate geometry (positioning a point in a plane by reference to its distance from two fixed lines), and thereby  practiced the analytic method of reasoning: supposing the problem solved, you examine what are the consequences.  in Essaies philosophiques, dealt with optics as well as geometry

34 34 Descartes (cont.d)  in De la formation du foetus  welcomed Harvey’s discovery of blood circulation  hoped to make a medical discovery  regarded animal and human bodies as machines (ignoring growth)  Animals are automata governed entirely by laws of physics devoid of consciousness and feelings  Men have a soul in the pineal gland where it comes into contact with the “vital spirits” and thereby soul and body interact  Total quantity of motion is constant  so the soul can’t affect it, only the direction of the motion of the vital spirits and hence of other parts of the body  but this doctrine was abandoned by his school, including Malebranche and Spinoza  Since physicists discovered the conservation of momentum (not motion) whereby motion in any given direction is constant wherein change in motion is met by a counter change (action = reaction)

35 35 Descartes (cont.d)  in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)  regarded animal and human bodies as machines (ignoring growth) cont.d  Total quantity of motion is constant (cont.d)  but this doctrine was abandoned by his school, including Malebranche and Spinoza (cont.d)  The Cartesian school assumes all physical action is of the nature of impact, with dynamical laws --sufficient to determine the motions of matter, and therefore --leaving no room for the influence of mind  Problem: how does a mental phenomenon (my will) affect a physical phenomenon?  Guelincx’s (Descartes’ student’s) theory of the “two clocks”: one points; the other chimes. One does not cause the other: God keeps both coordinated by means of a “dictionary” of correspondences so that --on occasion of your volition, purely physical laws cause your arm to move, but --your will has not really acted on your body --This is called a Deus ex machina solution, by invoking divine intervention to cross an apparently unbridgeable gap, also used by Berkeley to explain conformity of the world as mental impressions with physical laws

36 36 Descartes (cont.d)  in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)  regarded animal and human bodies as machines (ignoring growth) cont.d  Total quantity of motion is constant (cont.d)  Problem: how does a mental phenomenon (my will) affect a physical phenomenon? (cont.d)  Guelincx’s (Descartes’ student’s) theory of the “two clocks”: one points; the other chimes. One does not cause the other: God keeps both coordinated by means of a “dictionary” of correspondences so that (cont.d) --New Problem: the mental series is as deterministic as the physical series, by “translation” of the physical series through the “dictionary” of correspondences. So, how to reconcile with free will and punishment for sin? --Advantages ----It made the soul independent of the body ----Two substances, mind and matter, did not interact.

37 37 Descartes (cont.d)  in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)  regarded animal and human bodies as machines (ignoring growth) cont.d  He accepted the first law of motion (inertia): constant velocity in a straight line, but the soul could change it as in a body’s momentum exchange with another, and  He adopted reductionist mechanicism: he ignored emergence and levels of physical reality, reduced chemistry and biology to physics, and so rejected  action at a distance  all interaction not of the nature of an impact  So only one of Aristotle’s three souls is needed and exists, the rational soul, in man

38 38 Descartes (cont.d)  developed a theory of the physical movement of the world: a vortex in a plenum around the sun carries the planets  This does not explain elliptical orbits  This became the generally accepted theory in France only gradually ousted by Newton’s Principia philosophiae. Newton’s Principia’s first edition said  the vortex theory leads to atheism, while  Newton’s requires God to set the planets in motion in a direction not towards the sun.

39 39 Descartes (cont.d)  in the Discourse on Method and the Meditations which overlap, originated the method of “Cartesian doubt”  He regulates his conduct by certain rules to resolve doubts about practice  He is sceptical regarding the senses  Components of things in dreams represent real things  It’s their combination that’s fanciful  So, general features of physical nature, such as extension, magnitude, and number are less easy to question than particular configurations of things.  Accordingly, arithmetic and geometry, not concerned with particular things  are more certain than physics and astronomy  are true even of dream objects (20 th century abstract art violates this constraint on dreams)  but are nevertheless subject to persistent calculation or procedural error, perhaps prompted/led by an evil demon.

40 40 Descartes (cont.d)  in the Discourse on Method and the Meditations which overlap, originated the method of “Cartesian doubt” (cont.d)  An evil demon could not deceive me if I didn’t exist. So  I may have no body and this may be an illusion but  Thought is different  So, the I who wants to think everything false, must exist  “I think, therefore I am” (the cogito) is so solid as to serve as a first principle of philosophy  Originally advanced by St. Augustine, who didn’t give it prominence.  Descartes discovered its importance  Should be “there are thoughts”. “I” is unwarranted according to Russell.  It describes no datum  There is no basis, besides grammar, for thoughts to need a thinker.

41 41 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics.  Mind became more certain than matter  My mind became more certain than others’ minds  This prompted subjectivism insofar as matter became knowable by inference from what is known of mind.  Triumphantly in Continental idealism  Regretfully in British empiricism  Instrumentalism is a 20 th century attempt to escape subjectivism  Modern philosophy has accepted Descartes’ formulation of its problems, while not accepting his solutions.

42 42 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Rebuilt the edifice of knowledge  I am a substance whose whole nature, or soul, consists in thinking and who needs no place or material thing for its existence. So  The soul is  Wholly distinct from the body  Easier to know than the body, &  Would still be what it is if there were no body  The cogito is so evident because it is clear and distinct  All things conceived clearly and distinctly are true  Knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not the senses because knowledge of the senses is confused  A piece of wax loses its sensible qualities when melted  The wax is therefore a thing not sensible since it is  Involved in all the appearances but is  Perceived by a judgmental “inspection by the mind” from what I thought I saw with my eyes.

43 43 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Rebuilt the edifice of knowledge (cont.d)  By the “cogito” only my own existence follows with certainty from my seeing the wax  Ideas are not “like” outside things  Three kinds  Innate  Foreign and from without  Invented by me, possibly involuntarily as in dreams --supposed to be like outside objects because --come independently of the will (but so do dreams, so inconclusive), and --through them the foreign thing imprints its likeness on me  “Taught by nature” means  Being inclined to believe what could be false  Not seeing by a natural light  Of two different ideas of the same external object  The one which comes directly from experience must be the less likely of the two  Both cannot be true

44 44 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  “Deus ex machina” existence proof: scepticism of the existence of the external world is countered by scholastic proofs of God’s existence (best stated by Leibniz)  “Deus ex machina” proof of “correspondence” of the external world with perception: Once God’s existence is proved, then  We know he is good and will therefore not act like a deceitful demon  Bodies exist, since I have such a strong inclination to believe in bodies, and God would be deceitful if there were none.  I have a God-given ability to correct errors, by applying the principle that what is clear and distinct is true  Therefore I can know mathematics and physics, by the mind alone, not jointly with the body  Further construction is by unsubstantiated scholastic maxims of Plato, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, such as that no effect can have more perfection than its cause. Not self-evident.

45 45 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Important results  For logical and empirical knowledge you need  Indubitable facts  Descartes’ own thoughts  Regarding thoughts rather than external objects, as the prime empirical certainty, had a profound effect on subsequent philosophy.  Indubitable principles of inference  Brought to near completion the dualism of mind and matter which  Began with Plato and  Was developed by Christian philosophy for mainly religious reasons  Introduced “parallelism” versus “interactionism”, a new conception that the mind does not move the body and the  Possibility that the body does not move the mind

46 46 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Important results (cont.d)  Coordination of body and mind as two synchronous clocks created a religious drawback  “mechanicist” reversal of Aristotle’s teleological “organicism”  Rather than inanimate matter being guided by a soul or purpose  Organisms were machines the movement of whose parts were governed by mechanical laws. So, no soul was needed to explain the growth of organisms otherwise ignored, and still not explained, by Descartes.

47 47 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Important results (cont.d)  Coordination of body and mind as two synchronous clocks created a religious drawback (cont.d)  One exception was later dropped for violating the laws of mechanics: the human soul could alter the direction though not the quantity of motion of the vital spirits  Which was contrary to conservation of momentum  Rejecting the exception was detrimental to the concept of free will already weakened by the parallelism of mental events with movements of matter as determined by physical laws.  Simplified in the 18 th century to a consistent materialism of human not just animal automata.

48 48 Descartes (cont.d)  raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)  Important results (cont.d)  Descartes’ inconsistencies are a product of the encounter of contemporary science with the scholasticism taught to him by the Jesuits.  Consistency would have made him founder of a new Scholasticism  Inconsistency made him the source of two important but divergent schools of philosophy: idealism and materialism.

49 49 Spinoza  was the noblest & most lovable of the great philosophers. Ethically supreme  was considered wicked for a century  was excommunicated by the Jews. He was considered atheistic by orthodox Jews  was from a family that fled from Spain or Portugal to Holland to escape the Inquisition  received a Jewish education  was offered money to conceal his doubts & was the object of an assassination attempt  had a rare indifference to money. He polished lenses for a living in Amsterdam

50 50 Spinoza (cont.d)  sided in a political dispute against the ruling House of Orange  wrote the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Tractatus Politicus a combination of biblical criticism and political theory in which he correctly assigns much later dates to Old Testament books than those assigned by tradition, and in which he does scriptural interpretation compatible with a liberal theology

51 51 Spinoza (cont.d)  In the Tractatus Politicus the political theory is mainly derived from Hobbes there is no right or wrong in a state of nature the sovereign can do no wrong the Church should be subordinate to the State he opposes all rebellion, even against bad government the English civil war is seen as evidence of harm resulting from resistance to authority unlike Hobbes, he thinks democracy is the “most natural” form of government unlike Hobbes, he thinks subjects should not sacrifice all their rights to the sovereign gives importance to freedom of opinion, but says religious questions should be decided not by the Church but by the State which was much more tolerant than the Church in Holland.

52 52 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote a treatise on the rainbow  He wrote Ethics, published after his death in the axiomatic format of Euclid’s geometry  wherein the propositions are enough to read and  the proofs (of the unprovable) may be ignored, and which  reflected the logical & ethical duty to implement the demonstrability of all truth

53 53 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) in the axiomatic format of Euclid’s geometry (cont.d)  as a “unified theory”, which is a truth/category mistake of assuming that logic expresses all interconnection in the universe thereby discoverable by reason alone, while physical laws need observation to be discoverable all physical laws are not axiomatically combinable/derivable in a single theory, because  physical theories are partial pictures  not logically contradictory, but not logically interderivable either  they may be structurally similar by correspondence-principle dictionaries between their terms  they usually involve “primitive” (undefined) concepts not  found in or derived from another theory  this is the first attempt in philosophy to derive value from fact

54 54 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein, in his metaphysics  he modified Descartes, as Plotinus modified Plato Descartes was not burdened by moral earnestness Descartes’ proofs could have just as easily been used to support skeptics, as Carneades had used Plato Spinoza accepted Cartesian materialistic and deterministic physics, but Spinoza sought to find room for reverence and a life devoted to the good  as in Parmenides’ metaphysics there is only one substance, God or Nature: nothing finite is self- subsistent unlike Descartes’ 3 substances: God, mind and matter,  although God was the most substantial because of creating the other two  but mind and matter were  --independent apart from God’s omnipotence in deciding their  existence, and  --characterized by thought and extension

55 55 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein, in his metaphysics (cont.d)  thought and extension are attributes of God who has an infinite number of attributes unknown to us  individual souls and pieces of matter are “adjectival”: not things but merely aspects of the divine being  immortality is not personal (Christian), but consists in becoming one with God  determination is negation: determination of finite things is by boundaries, physical and logical, separating them from what they are not  Pantheism prevails: only one being is wholly positive, so must be absolutely infinite & omnipresent

56 56 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein, in his metaphysics (cont.d)  accordingly everything is ruled by an absolute logical necessity there is no free will in the mental sphere there is no chance in the physical world all events are a manifestation of God’s inscrutable nature there is only one possible world, contrary to Leibniz’s many possible a mystical concept of evil is proposed: evil is in the eye of the finite beholder. It is not evil in the wider context of the whole

57 57 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will  like Hobbes’  the human mind has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God  passions distract us and obscure our intellectual vision of the whole, which (I add) is “rationalization”, “explanation”  everything, in itself, endeavors to self-preservation—the fundamental motive of the passions—whence love, hate and strife. If the object of our hate is destroyed, we feel pleasure We try to prevent someone from possessing something that cannot be enjoyed by more than one person

58 58 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  hate is increased when reciprocated, but can be destroyed by love. This is the Jewish custom of giving kindness in return for a bad deed (unlike the Christian custom of turning the other cheek to receive another bad deed)  enlightened self-preservation realizes that what is real and positive in us is what unites us to the whole, not what preserves the appearance of separateness  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” we are in bondage to the extent that what happens to us is due to outside causes we are free to the extent we are self-determined

59 59 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) as Plato and Socrates hold, all wrong action is due to intellectual error. If you adequately understand your own circumstances, you  will act wisely  will be happy in the face of what is apparent misfortune no virtue is prior to self-preservation; so there is no appeal to unselfishness a wise man will perceive his self-interest differently than an ordinary egoist. For example appreciating the value of reputation: trustworthiness versus one-time cheating in a market the mind’s highest good is knowledge of God emotions are passions when they spring from inadequate ideas men living in obedience to reason will agree together

60 60 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) pleasure in itself is good  but hope and fear are bad, and humility and repentance are bad  repentance for an action is doubly bad (like the Stoics) time is unreal (not in the present) and reason is indifferent to it  so emotions about a future or past event are contrary to reason  so are emotions attached exclusively to the present even if embedded in a belief in progress. a wise man tries to see the world as God sees it, sub specie aeternitatis, under the aspect of eternity  so there is no need to prioritize the avoidable future  --because it is not really avoidable  --whence the futility & evil of hope & fear, which reflect lack of  wisdom  knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge  --God has no such knowledge  --Evil appears as such because of regarding parts of the  universe as if self-subsistent.

61 61 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) men can thus be liberated from the tyranny of death a free man thinks nothing of death Spinoza practiced the doctrines he preached, always courteous and reasonable in controversies, never in the anger that he condemned what is within (a person) is good; only what comes from without is bad what is bad for us  is not within ourselves  does not have man as its efficient cause, but  comes from without, and  cannot therefore happen to the universe as a whole which is not subject to external causes we follow the order of universal nature of which we are a part

62 62 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) we have a clear and distinct understanding of our part/place in universal nature. The better part of us will therefore acquiesce in what befalls us & we will endeavor to persist (self-preserve) but,  if man is unwillingly part of the larger whole, he is in bondage  if he has grasped the sole reality of the whole, he is free. His knowledge is (motivational & preparatory) power (in Francis Bacon’s words)

63 63 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) unlike for the Stoics, all emotions are not bad, namely those that are not passions  In passions we are in the power of outside forces  Passion ceases once we  --form a clear & distinct idea of the emotion &  --understand that all things are necessary  --ultimately achieve “intellectual love of God” which is wisdom,  a union of thought & emotion, which is  ----true thought, plus  ----joy (superior to pleasure) in the apprehension of truth, in  true thought, and  ----nothing negative, & therefore truly part of the whole, unlike  knowledge that is apparently bad because fragmented  --achieve intellectual love by the mind towards God that is  part of the infinite love by God of himself.

64 64 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind  because it is associated with all the modifications of the body, &  because a mental image referred to more objects is more frequent or more often vivid, &  because every increase in understanding what happens to us consists in referring events to the idea of God  --That referral is love of God  --When applied to all objects, the idea of God fully occupies  the mind  but not for moral reasons but because of how we acquire understanding

65 65 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) no one can hate God, but no one can expect God to reciprocate love. This is a logically necessary conclusion, not an ethical precept.  Goethe called this self-resignation, but  it is really a logical consequence of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Spinoza said “can” expect not “ought” to expect  --because God would be less of a God & that would cause  pain to the person, and to want his own pain is absurd, and  --God has  ----no passions, pleasures or pains, and therefore  ----loves or hates no one the great remedy against emotion is  clear and distinct ideas of their relation to external causes  the resulting love towards a thing immutable and eternal doesn’t have the turbulent & disquieting character of love for an object that is transient and changeable.

66 66 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein in the psychology of passions and the will (cont.d)  in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the power of the understanding” (cont.d) something in the human mind is eternal: it is the essence of the person as an idea in God where it is expressed under the form of eternity, the person’s impact on life. the wise man  is scarcely disturbed in spirit  by a certain eternal necessity never ceases to be wise, through consciousness of himself, of things, & of God, whereby he always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit  follows along a difficult path whereby all excellent things are necessarily difficult and therefore rare

67 67 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics  which is logical monism: the world as a single substance whose parts are logically incapable of existing alone a symptom since Parmenides of conferring on the world the subject- predicate structure of sentences, whereby the subject is a single Aristotelian substance in which qualities inhere and that neither science nor philosophy now accepts  suggesting that relations and plurality are illusory  making resignation to events easy if they are logically deduced from self-evident axioms but in which it is futile to try to deduce facts from reasoning alone without observation. We use empirically supported laws to derive the future.

68 68 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics (cont.d)  while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits of human power and supposes these limits are narrower than they are, but the maxims are probably the best possible  criticizes as slavery the fear of unavoidable death in general, while  supporting averting any particular disease  --but calmly, not in fear of death itself  --while our thoughts are directed to other matters

69 69 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics (cont.d)  while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits of human power (cont.d) counsels  consoling others in their misfortunes who should  --not be withdrawn in their sorrow, but  --see the misfortune in relation to its causes  --see the misfortune as part of the whole order of nature, and  thus “taking things ‘philosophically’”, & even  --avoid primitive reaction such as revenge  --that allows a man to judge his own case (action which Locke  avoids through civil society) and that would  ----usually prompt him to inflict more punishment than is  desirable (whereas the punishment should suit the crime),  and  ----so narrow his outlook as to preclude any kind of wisdom

70 70 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics (cont.d)  while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits of human power (cont.d) counsels (cont.d)  consoling others in their misfortunes who should (cont.d)  --overcome/destroy/transform hatred by love, not increase  hatred by reciprocating it, because  ----love can be stronger than the hatred that preceded it and  ----surprise at not being punished may have a reforming  effect  ----but, as Russell says, most wicked people will mistrust  your conciliatory action, so it won’t reduce their power  not the Christian practice of ardent love even toward the worst of men  not the Stoic practice of indifference to others’ suffering

71 71 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics (cont.d)  while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits of human power (cont.d) belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe prompts you to see your own misfortunes “in perspective”, as part of all the other misfortunes to all the other people in the universe which have been passing episodes in a movement to ultimate harmony. So  events should be evaluated for what they are and not diluted. Each act of cruelty is eternally a part of the universe. Nothing that happened later or before should make the act better.  --Can bad create conditions for the emergence of a greater  good?  --This shouldn’t be by design but only as a byproduct.  ----The end does not justify the means.  ----Kant’s maxim enjoins treating a person as an end in  himself or herself  ----The end can only “compensate” for the means, ex post  (by accident), not ex ante (by design)

72 72 Spinoza (cont.d)  He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d) wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of his metaphysics (cont.d)  while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits of human power (cont.d) belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe prompts you to see your own misfortunes “in perspective”, as part of all the other misfortunes to all the other people in the universe which have been passing episodes in a movement to ultimate harmony. So (cont.d)  Focusing on matters beyond your own grief may be a good way of enduring something worse than the ordinary lot of mankind  --and realizing that human life is an infinitesimal part of the  life of the universe  --and thereby keeping sanity or avoiding the paralysis of utter  despair.

73 73 Leibniz  was industrious, frugal, temperate, financially honest  was destitute of Spinoza’s philosophical virtues published to win the support of princes and princesses left his best results unpublished therefore created 2 systems  one optimistic, orthodox, fantastic, shallow “The best of all possible worlds”, to which F.H. Bradley added: “& everything in it is a necessary evil” He is Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss  the other profound, coherent, Spinozistic and logical

74 74 Leibniz (cont.d)  was destitute of Spinoza’s philosophical virtues(cont.d) was a dull writer who made German philosophy pedantic and arid. His disciple Christian Wolf dominated German universities until Kant. Wolf’s textbook was used in Quebec’s colleges, all Catholic, until the 1950s. had little influence outside Germany  Locke governed British philosophy  Descartes dominated in France until Voltaire made British empiricism fashionable  born in Leipzig  was son of a professor of moral philosophy

75 75 Leibniz (cont.d)  refused a professorship and served the Archbishop of Mainz who was fearful of Louis XIV. So For 4 years Leibniz lived in Paris to try persuading Louis XIV to invade Egypt instead of Germany  Paris was the philosophical & mathematical capital of the world  Leibniz invented the infinitesimal calculus there, published 3 years before Newton’s Louis XIV said war against infidels was out of fashion  abandoned the “trivial schools” of scholasticism, including the Aristotelianism he was taught

76 76 Leibniz (cont.d)  visited Spinoza with whom he spent a month in frequent discussions & from whom he received parts of the Ethics. Later he joined in decrying Spinoza when that became popular.  left Paris to serve the House of Hanover as librarian, but was not brought by George I to England when he became king, because Leibniz made England unfriendly to himself when he quarreled with Newton.  wrote Monadology, Principles of Nature & Grace, & Théodicée (the basis for his theological optimism)

77 77 Leibniz (cont.d)  like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy on the notion of substance They differed on the relation between mind and matter & on the number of substances: Descartes had 3 (God, mind, matter), Spinoza had one (God alone)

78 78 Leibniz (cont.d)  like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy on the notion of substance (cont.d) He claimed extension alone cannot be an attribute of a substance, contrary to Descartes (for whom extension was the essence of matter) & Spinoza (for whom extension & thought were the essence of God)  Extension involved plurality and could therefore belong only to an aggregate of substances  Each single substance must be unextended (like the infinitesimally small intervals in an integral in the infinitesimal calculus)  Accordingly, there is an infinity of substances, called “monads”  Each monad is a soul, which is the only possible remaining attribute of a substance because extension is rejected as such an attribute.

79 79 Leibniz (cont.d)  like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy on the notion of substance (cont.d) Accordingly he denied the reality of matter in favor of an infinite family of souls (monads) He retained from Descartes’ followers the non- interaction but coordination of different substances: no 2 monads can have a causal relation to each another: they are thus called “windowless” There is a pre-established harmony  between the change in different monads, as in Descartes’ two clocks, &  the harmony evidences God’s existence

80 80 Leibniz (cont.d)  specified a hierarchy of monads. The monads composing the human body are each immortal souls dominated by the monad consisting of the mind/soul of man for whose sake the changes/movements in/of a human body happen.

81 81 Leibniz (cont.d)  made a “monad” the mathematical “dual” of a property (attribute) A property is a class of objects which are the “extension” of the term denoting a property A = {a,d,q}, where A is an attribute & a,d,q are the objects having that attribute F = {a,g,p}, where F is an attribute & a,g,p are the objects having that attribute R = {a,e,n}, where R is an attribute & a,e,n are the objects having that attribute A monad (an object) is a class a of properties something has a = {A,F,R}, where A,F,R are the attributes of object a

82 82 Leibniz (cont.d)  made a “monad” the mathematical “dual” of a property (attribute) Physical laws represent relations between attributes. Accordingly each monad represents a world governed by scientific laws. The worlds are coordinated (under identical laws) by divine intervention.

83 83 Leibniz (cont.d)  declared space as it appears or is depicted is not real but has a real counterpart, namely the arrangement of the monads in a 3-dimensional order which specifies a unique position from which each monad mirrors the world the peculiar perspective of the world as seen by the monad is the monad’s spatial position. accordingly there is no vacuum: each possible point of view is filled by a monad, and (Identity of Indiscernables:) no two monads can be exactly alike. None can have exactly all the same properties, all measured to infinite precision. The properties will deviate at some degree of precision measurement, if not because of errors/deviations in the measurement process itself or the thing being measured.

84 84 Leibniz (cont.d)  was the first to use the logic of “implication” (premise implies conclusion) to allow more free will than Spinoza did. Principle of “sufficient” (vs “necessary”) reason: “Reasons incline without necessitating.” s 2  a  n, where “  ”  is logical implication  To take an action, a, I don’t need any one particular reason s n, among the many, s 1,s 2,s 3, that may bring about that action. action sufficient conditions necessary condition ability reasons objectives s1s1 s3s3

85 85 Leibniz (cont.d)  was the first to use the logic of “implication” (premise implies conclusion) to allow more free will than Spinoza did. (cont.d) Principle of “sufficient” (vs “necessary”) reason: “Reasons incline without necessitating.” (cont.d)  I am only inclined to take that action, a, if I have a choice of “which one” among several reasons s 1,s 2,s 3 and that choice is arbitrary or only possible. In other words, I am not forced by logical necessity to make that choice,  as Marx would later claim we are, for example, by economic class (by transformation from the “logical” necessity of Hegel into the “factual” necessity of empirical law, but derived by logic & not subject to testable scientific procedure).  In other words, Marx’s “laws” may serve as logical “axioms”  not subject to disciplined scientific test,  but instead to instrumentalist test in the practice of successful revolution & social transformation, proof “in practice”, in vivo, rather than under scientifically controlled conditions.

86 86 Leibniz (cont.d)  was the first to use the logic of “implication” (premise implies conclusion) to allow more free will than Spinoza did. (cont.d) attributed the same kind of freedom to God’s actions  God acts for the best  but by choice among sufficient actions not by logical necessity but not contrary to logic either (in agreement with Thomas Aquinas)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes God’s existence (at the end of a chain of reasoning) solved puzzles that prevent understanding the universe

87 87 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The ontological argument: Only of God does essence imply existence  [Leibniz’s innovation: the need first to examine a concept for consistency] But the idea of God needs to be proved “possible”, thus:  No two perfections are incompatible, perfection defined as “a simple positive and absolute quality expressing without any limits”  So a subject of all perfections can be conceived.  Kant correctly countered that existence is not a quality

88 88 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The ontological argument: Only of God does essence imply existence (cont.d)  But the “existence” Leibniz proves in the context of his philosophy is more like mathematical existence: not existence as a property, but existence in virtue of  the definition of most perfect as something having all perfections and  the modal logic definition of “best possible” as “existence” or “actuality”, since truth (which here is mathematical, normally tautological not physical)  is neither a quality nor “membership in a set”,  but a quality of qualities, as  --truth is a quality of a proposition, and

89 89 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The ontological argument: Only of God does essence imply existence (cont.d)  But the “existence” Leibniz proves in the context of his philosophy is more like mathematical existence: not existence as a property, but existence in virtue of (cont.)  the modal logic definition of “best possible” as “existence” or “actuality”, since truth (which here is mathematical, normally tautological not physical) cont.d  but a quality of qualities, as (cont.d)  --“membership” itself is a not a “defining” quality of  (members of) a set; in other words a set is not  allowed to be a “member” of itself, with  {{…}} = {…} = A  A considered to be perverse  notation not allowed by Russell’s Paradox.

90 90 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The cosmological argument: argument of “first cause” derived from Aristotle’s “unmoved mover”. It says the series of causes must be uncaused.  Objection: the series of proper fractions has no first term  Leibniz’s improved version: Everything is “contingent”: its non-existence is logically possible. So everything must have a “sufficient reason” The sufficient reason for the universe must therefore be outside the universe and that is God.  Only necessary propositions follow from the laws of logic while all propositions asserting existence are contingent except for the one asserting existence of God which is “necessary” (a necessary condition) in order for the universe to exist.

91 91 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The cosmological argument: argument of “first cause” derived from Aristotle’s “unmoved mover”. It says the series of causes must be uncaused. (cont.d)  Leibniz’s improved version: (cont.d) The sufficient reason for the universe must therefore be outside the universe and that is God. (cont.d)  Kant claimed this depends on the ontological argument: a “necessary being” is one whose essence involves existence  --but now, according to Leibniz, because the  universe’s existence depends on God’s existence,  not because God’s perfection requires his existence.  --But, in the concept of a being necessary even in  that sense, essence is still involving existence &  that is what enables us to determine the essence  independently of experience  --So, Leibniz’s “improvement” to the cosmological  argument may be somewhat deceptive. 

92 92 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The argument from eternal truths.  Statements about essence are always true or never true, unlike statements about existence.  Eternal truth must be part of the content of an eternal mind. This is like Plato’s deduction of immortality from the eternity of ideas.  For Leibniz the reason for the whole contingent world can’t be contingent & must be sought among eternal truths.

93 93 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The argument from eternal truths. (cont.d)  For Leibniz (cont.d) But a reason for what exists must itself exist; so, eternal truths must “exist” and can exist only as thoughts in the mind of God. Objection:  This is a category mistake of confusing a state of affairs with an object whose existence is inclusion in a set defining (extension of) the state/property. “Existence” of a state of affairs could be defined only as non-emptiness of that set.

94 94 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) The argument from eternal truths. (cont.d)  For Leibniz (cont.d) But a reason for what exists must itself exist; so, eternal truths must “exist” and can exist only as thoughts in the mind of God. Objection: (cont.d)  However it is not a category mistake in the “dual” logic of monadology, where existence of a state/property is the state’s/property’s inclusion in a class of properties defining an object.  But there is no practical such formal “dual” logic.  This is just another form of cosmological argument.

95 95 Leibniz (cont.d)  finalized into their best logical form the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics, including the ontological argument revived by Descartes (cont.d) Argument from pre-established harmony  assumes the monadology and concludes that  the coordination between the multitude of monad “models” of the universe without causal interaction is due to a simple outside cause.  Effectively it’s the argument from design: lawfulness of the universe is hard to explain as a product of blind natural forces  Russell finds no logical defect in this argument because it doesn’t specify metaphysical attributes of God.

96 96 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed the doctrine of many possible worlds “possible”, meaning not contradicting the laws of logic while possible worlds are infinite in number  all were contemplated by God before creating the actual one  Spinozistic: the one chosen as the best was chosen for having the greatest excess of good over evil, a world with less evil being not as good because Some great goods depend logically on some evils. Some pains (thirst) are considered worth enduring for the pleasure of their relief. Evil makes good possible.  It would be logically impossible for God to bestow free will while decreeing there should be no sin.  Objection: reverse argument is as conceivable. A Manichean god of evil could have created the worst of all possible worlds & allowed free will & good to make sin possible.

97 97 Probability Pascal and Fermat, through correspondence in 1654 on a problem in gambling, began the mathematical study of probability. The problem concerned the division of stakes between two gamblers who wished to leave the gambling table before either has scored the n points needed to win. The solution involved calculating the probability for all possible outcomes and the associated amount of the winnings. Pascal solved the problem for two players, but a solution that involved three or more players had to wait. Pascal also invented a mechanical calculator to help his father in collecting taxes. An unpublished piece by Pascal on gambling stimulated Dutch scientist Christiaan Huygens to publish a small work in 1657 on probabilities in dice games. Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli reprinted this work in his Ars Conjectandi (Art of Conjecturing) published in Both Bernoulli & French-English mathematician Abraham De Moivre, in his Doctrine of Chances (1718), applied the newly discovered calculus to probability. They thus made advances in probability theory, which by then had important applications in the rapidly developing insurance industry.

98 98 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that he believed would have made his doctrines less popular was published by Louis Couturat 2 centuries after Leibniz’s death was contained in Leibniz’s Letters to Arnaud, first recognized as important by Russell. Arnaud responded negatively. adopts (Aristotelian) substance (like Descartes and Spinoza)  derived from the grammatical category of subject or component in a relation  persisting through time  with all qualities predicated of a substance constituting the substance’s identity or essence

99 99 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) was the first to explicitly propose logic  as a basis for metaphysics, and  in a form of characteristica universalis that could resolve by calculation all philosophical argument  enabling reasoning in metaphysics and morals in the same way as in geometry and analysis did work on mathematical logic that  would have pioneered the field a century and a half sooner, but that  he declined to publish because he found evidence of error in Aristotle’s doctrine of the syllogism, and assumed the errors were his and not Aristotle’s

100 Leibniz’s Binary Calculus of Thought, and Subsequent Boolean Algebra, were reinforced by Chinese Philosophy Gottfried Leibniz laid the modern foundation of the movement from decimal to binary as far back as 1666 with his 'On the Art of Combination', laying out a method for reducing all logic to exact statements.decimal to binary Leibniz believed logic, or ‘the laws of thought’ could be moved from a verbal state - which was subject to the ambiguities of language, tone and circumstance - into an absolute mathematical condition: "A sort of universal language or script, but infinitely different from all those projected hitherto, for the symbols and even words in it would direct the reason, and errors, except for those of fact, would be mere mistakes in calculation. It would be very difficult to form or invent this language or characteristic, but very easy to understand it without any dictionaries." The concept was a bit high-flown for his time, and Leibniz' idea was ignored by the scientific community of his day. He let his proposition drop - until about ten years later when the Chinese 'Book of Changes', or 'Yi Ching', came his way. Leibniz found some sort of confirmation for his theories in the Yi Ching's depiction of the universe as a progression of contradicting dualities, a series of on-off, yes-no possibilities, such as dark-light and male-female, which formed the complex interaction of life and consciousness. He reasoned that, if life itself could be reduced to a series of straightforward propositions, so could thought, or logic. Heartened by his new insights, Leibniz set out to refine his rudimentary binary system, studiously transposing numerals into seemingly infinite rows of ones and zeros - even though he couldn't really find a use for them. Leibniz' stepped wheel calculator was built for decimal numbers. Although he apparently gave some thought over the years to another machine which would incorporate his beloved binary system, the long strings of binary numbers that replaced single decimal digits must have seemed daunting. Actually, they must have seemed overwhelming, because Leibniz seemed to lose the plot towards the end of his life, endowing his binary system with a kind of quasi-religious mysticism. Binary numbers, he came to believe, represented Creation. The number one portraying God; and zero depicting Void.binary systemstepped wheel calculator Leibniz died without achieving his dream of a universal mathematical/logical language, but leaving the fundamental idea of the binary yes-no/on-off principle for others to play with, including Ploucquet, Lambert and Castillon. George Boole picked up their combined efforts roughly 125 years later for another buff and polish. In molecular biology there are biologiocal switches inside proteins like DNA.George Boole 100

101 101 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises  the Law of Sufficient  Reason, which states  that all true propositions  are analytic. An  “analytic” proposition  expresses  “decomposition” of  union  (of intension) or of  intersection  (of extension) white man union  intersection  intension extension whiteman white thingsmen   “Lattice”

102 102 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises (cont.d)  the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. Extensional inclusion: the set of white men is included in (is the intersection of) the set W of white things and/or the set M of men Intensional inclusion (union): White Man = White + Man (W  M)  M (a  W  M)  (a  M) W M

103 103 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises (cont.d)  the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d) More & more detailed description reduces intersections to a unitary (infinitesimal) point, a monad, a “proper name”, a substance, a soul a world apart from everything but God, keeping in its substance traces of all that happened to it. () … () … That knowledge (perfectly possessed by God) is expressed by a calculus of characteristica universalis, where all propositions are analytic. This is the reduction of experience to logic. Factual becomes “necessary” by having been actualized into the best of possibles.

104 104 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises (cont.d)  the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d) Logical versus factual (empirical) existence  Logical existence  is an operator (function) from a name, n, to inclusion in a set (constituting the observable extension of a property, all the items having the property). That is standard extensional logic.   n   Leibnizian factual/necessary existence is a logical operator (function) from possible  (non-contradictory) propositions to actualized (necessary ) propositions discoverable by logical analysis. This is a kind of intensional logic.      The confirmation of “necessary that” is by logical analysis of concepts and propositions, not by observation. That is a prelude to Hegel and Marx.  possiblenecessary

105 105 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises (cont.d)  the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d) Alternative concept of “is” as identity, not inclusion.  “is” of set inclusion (  ): Western logic  “is” of identity (=) Chinese School of Names. “A White Horse is not a Horse”.  W  H = H  Narrowing “is” to identity rules out the extreme rationalism of Leibniz and opens the field to “practicalism”, “instrumentalism” and autonomy less constrained by logical rules. Accordingly, Chinese Marxism has been less constrained by the logical “necessity” of Western Marxism. W H

106 106 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) declared two logical premises (cont.d)  the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. Objections  The completeness of a monadic substance, in its identity (notion) including past and future, seemed to Leibniz’s correspondent Arnaud incompatible with the Christian doctrine of sin and free will. So Leibniz never pursued/published it.  Necessity is a logical not an empirical category. Necessity alone cannot imply physical existence. Physical existence is an empirical category discerned by observation. Only God can know existence as creation of the best of possible worlds. Knowledge of existence derives from knowledge of God’s goodness derived from necessity.  The exhaustive knowledge of properties required by Leibniz’s calculus performed on all true propositions as analytic is achievable only by God.

107 107 Leibniz (cont.d)  developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d) postulated a struggle for existence  Creation is a free act of God in Leibniz’s official philosophy. But  “Metaphysical perfection” requires that God create as much as possible. So Leibniz rejects a vacuum supposes it is better to exist than not to exist  Everything possible struggles to exist, but not all possibles are “compossible”. The largest group of compossibles wins  Existence of something is “defined” as “being compossible with more things than anything incompatible with it”. So Existence is decided by logic & should be discoverable by a sufficiently able logician. This provided a logical foundation for the theory of evolution and the Hegelian/Marxist dialectic of struggle.

108 108 Leibniz (cont.d)  in his private thinking was the best example of a philosopher using logic and syntax as a key to metaphysics & understanding the world, drawing inferences from linguistic to non-linguistic facts. History of this kind of philosophy  Began with Parmenides  Continued by Plato’s use of theory of ideas to prove extra- logical propositions  Manifest in Spinoza  Extended to Hegel.  Empiricism drove this approach into disrepute.

109 109 Leibniz (cont.d)  in his private thinking was the best example of a philosopher using logic and syntax as a key to metaphysics & understanding the world, drawing inferences from linguistic to non-linguistic facts. (cont.d) All such a priori philosophies have a defective logic, namely subject-predicate logic which ignores relations.  Leibniz achieves the reverse of Parmenides: he combines subject-predicate logic with pluralism rather than the monism of Spinoza or Parmenides  Leibniz is inconsistent because the statement “There are many monads” is not of subject-predicate form.  Leibniz rejected monism (staticism of unchanging substrate, subject) because of His interest in dynamics (incrementalism of the calculus) His argument that extension involves repetition and so cannot be the property of a single substance.

110 110 Liberalism  began in England and Holland as religious toleration by protestants While regarding wars of religion as silly  valued commerce & industry  favored rising middle class against monarchy & aristocracy  had immense respect for rights of property especially when accumulated by the labor of the owner  restricted hereditary rights: excluded divine right of kings attributed to every community a right to choose its own form of government

111 111 Liberalism (cont.d)  considered all men to be born equal & subsequent inequality as due to circumstances  emphasized education  was biased against government which was in the hands of kings or aristocracies who little understood commerce  was optimistic, energetic & philosophic because of representing forces likely to become victorious and bring benefits to mankind  opposed medieval theories supporting the Church, kings, persecution, & obstruction of science  opposed the modern fanaticisms of Calvinists & Anabaptists

112 112 Liberalism (cont.d)  aimed to end political strife to free energy for commerce & science  decreasingly feared Spanish power  was thwarted by the French Revolution, Napoleon, and the subsequent Holy Alliance  was individualist not communitarian like Greek philosophers down to & including Aristotle, and was like the individualists since loss of liberty under Alexander, namely the Cynics and Stoics  To Stoics social circumstances didn’t matter especially in the opposite backgrounds of (emperor) Marcus Aurelius and (slave) Epictetus  This was also the view of Christianity until it got control of the State

113 113 Liberalism (cont.d)  was individualist (cont.d) like the medieval mystics who kept alive the individualist trends in Christian ethics amid  the firm synthesis of dogma, law, & custom which gave control of beliefs & practical morality to the Church  the collective wisdom of Councils who substituted for solitary thought in ascertaining what was true & good  began with Protestants’ claim that General Councils may err whence determining the truth became an individual enterprise, not social strife resulted as religious disputes became settled by war

114 114 Liberalism (cont.d)  first sought to reconcile intellectual & ethical individualism with ordered social life  was furthered by Cartesianism’s implanting individualism into philosophy by making each person the starting point of his or her own existence, by introspection in the cogito & in clear & distinct ideas (intuitionism). In science a discoverer proposes a theory because it seems right to him, not in deference to authority persuades others by reference to generally received canons of truth does not clash with society for long: usually agreement is eventually reached like Galileo who represented individualism, politically constrained by the authority of Aristotle & the Church

115 115 Liberalism (cont.d)  was manifested in economic individualism  was not initially assertive emotionally or in ethics  ceased for a generation during the French Revolution  was reasserted in England in the Benthamites & the Manchester School in America until today, with no history of feudalism or state church  was opposed by Romanticism & nativism/nationalism which Rousseau inaugurated

116 116 Liberalism (cont.d)  was opposed by Romanticism & nativism/nationalism which (cont.d) was a self-refuting extension of individualism from intellect to the passions, including  anarchy between collectivities  cult of the hero developed by Carlyle & Nietzsche (who condemned Greek tragedy for the defeated moralism of the anti-hero)  rejection of the ugliness and cruelties of early industrialism combined with nostalgia for the pastoral Middle Ages joining Church, aristocracy & wage earners against the economic tyranny of industrialists  assertion of the right of rebellion in the name of nativist nationalism and the “liberty” of nations and the individual will of great men (Byron, Fichte, Carlyle & Nietzsche)  the despotism of the victorious hero who suppresses in others his own self-assertive ethic

117 117 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and departed from holistic rationalism that persisted in Hegel & Marx, and was first stated by Locke who  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where civil war between King and Parliament  gave Englishmen love of compromise & fear of pushing any theory to its logical conclusion  was prompted by the Long Parliament’s intention to  --abolish the king’s right to grant trade monopolies  --establish its exclusive right to impose taxation  --end the Church of England’s persecution of  opinions & practices  --end arbitrary arrest  --end subservience of judges to the king’s wishes but war against the King appeared to many as an act of treason & impiety

118 118 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where (cont.d) the king  had a martyr’s stubbornness about bishops  was defeated only by the Independents who constituted Cromwell’s New Model Army  refused to sign a treaty The victorious Independents abandoned democracy & parliamentary government  Cromwell purged the Independents of opponents &  achieved a parliamentary majority until he  dismissed Parliament altogether & replaced it by a military dictatorship

119 119 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where (cont.d) Restored (Catholic) King Charles II moderated (compared to his beheaded Catholic father Charles I) by  claiming no power to impose taxes not sanctioned by Parliament  consenting to Habeas Corpus, which deprived the Crown of the power of arbitrary arrest  consenting to most of the limitations sought on Charles I’s power  receiving subsidies from French King Louis XIV Kings were shown to be at risk of suffering at the hands of their subjects

120 120 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where (cont.d) (Catholic) King James II  became opposed by Anglicans & Nonconformists despite granting them toleration in defiance of Parliament  continued Stuart subservience to Spain (the leading colonial state) then France (the leading continental state) to avoid unpopular wartime taxation  alienated Englishmen when French King Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes that had given toleration to French protestants The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic Stuarts by the Dutch House of Orange  It was carried out peacefully by the aristocracy and big business  It secured the rights of Parliament

121 121 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where (cont.d) The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic Stuarts by the Dutch House of Orange (cont.d)  The monarchy was preserved but based  --not on divine right  --but on legislative sanction  The new king brought Dutch commercial and theological wisdom  National debt became a secure investment no longer subject to repudiation at the monarch’s whim.  The Act of Toleration disadvantaged both Catholics & Nonconformists, but ended persecution.  England became resolutely anti-French & remained so until Napoleon’s defeat

122 122 Liberalism (cont.d)  combined with empiricism, and was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)  only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in England where (cont.d) The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic Stuarts by the Dutch House of Orange (cont.d)  The French monarchy responded by supporting the American Revolution, in a policy not unlike the German monarchy’s support of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution which returned to haunt Germany & result in Hitler.  in France inspired opposition to the regime & to prevailing Cartesianism

123 123 Locke  He was the founder of philosophical liberalism  He was the founder of empiricism, the doctrine that our knowledge (except for logic & mathematics) is derived from experience  He was the apostle of the Glorious Revolution which was the most moderate & successful of revolutions had modest aims prompted the need for no subsequent revolution  His father was a puritan who fought on the side of Parliament in the Civil War

124 124 Locke (cont.d)  When under Oliver Cromwell Locke studied at Oxford, scholastic philosophy was still taught there  He disliked the scholasticism and fanaticism of the Independents in the Civil War  Influenced by Descartes, he became a physician  He fled to Holland with his patron before the Glorious Revolution  He published late in life, only after the Glorious Revolution when he worked at the Board of Trade for a few years.

125 125 Locke (cont.d)  The government shared Locke’s published opinions  Locke’s political doctrines, with development by Montesquieu, are embedded in the US constitution the French constitution of 1871 the British constitution until the 20 th century  Voltaire spent time in England and interpreted Locke in Lettres philosophiques French philosophes and moderate reformers followed Locke. They found an intimate connection between his theory of knowledge & his politics Extreme French revolutionaries followed Rousseau

126 126 Locke (cont.d)  In England Berkeley & Hume followed Locke but Berkeley was not philosophically engaged like Hobbes, Hume was not a reformer Kant followed Hume’s philosophy and  prompted German idealism to support conservative political positions, while  the radical Benthamites followed Locke’s tradition  His philosophical errors were useful in classical physics Primary qualities, defined as inseparable from a body (solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, & number) are actually in bodies, while Secondary qualities, defined as all other qualities (colors, sounds, smells) are only in the percipient

127 127 Locke (cont.d)  His philosophical errors were useful in classical physics (cont.d) Subsequent developments blurred the distinction:  Berkeley proved that primary qualities are also in the percipient, as 20 th century physics ultimately demonstrated (in Relativity Theory of position, time, and interchangeability of matter & energy & Quantum Mechanics’ Heisenberg Principle of the tradeoff in precision between position & momentum)  Meanwhile Locke’s view of the physical world as primary matter in motion was the basis of physical laws of the secondary qualities of sound, heat, light & electricity which the laws derived from primary qualities

128 128 Locke (cont.d)  His philosophical errors were useful in classical physics (cont.d) Subsequent developments blurred the distinction:  Berkeley proved that primary qualities are also in the percipient, as 20 th century physics ultimately demonstrated (in Relativity Theory of position, time, and interchangeability of matter & energy & Quantum Mechanics’ Heisenberg Principle of the tradeoff in precision between position & momentum)  Meanwhile Locke’s view of the physical world as primary matter in motion was the basis of physical laws of the secondary qualities of sound, heat, light & electricity which the laws derived from primary qualities

129 129 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book is always sensible, always willing to defer to logic rather than become paradoxical states general principles, capable of leading to strange consequences which Locke desists from drawing  Common sense (a form of “intuition”) makes our theoretical principles not quite correct  In this Locke displays the sound judgement of a practical man not the scruples of a logician. A principle may be  so nearly true to deserve theoretical respect  yet lead to absurd practical consequences

130 130 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) lacks dogmatism. It takes only a few certainties from predecessors: our own existence, existence of God, truth of mathematics. departs from predecessors where it concludes that the truth is hard to ascertain, and that a rational man will hold his opinions with a measure of doubt, as in  religious toleration  parliamentary democracy  laissez-faire economics  the whole system of liberal maxims hedges divine revelation with rational safeguards

131 131 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) states that “enthusiasm” (belief in divine revelation to a particular religious leader) is very different from love of truth.  “enthusiasm” is purely personal, because the multiplicity of personal revelations, all mutually inconsistent, robs enthusiasm of a social character; substitutes personal fancy for both reason & revelation  in melancholy or conceited men prone to communion with the deity  in the odd actions & opinions of lazy or ignorant men is opposite in attitude to Spinoza’s “equanimity”  love of truth is not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is derived by

132 132 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) states that reason  does not consist of syllogistic reasoning  consists of 2-fold inquiry into what we know for sure propositions it is wise to accept in practice, although they have only probability, defined as degree of conformity  with our own experience  with others’ experience (a limited consensus gentium)

133 133 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) says agreement  with any proposition should be in proportion to grounds in its favor  based on probability which is often the only basis for needed action should not entail renouncing with blind resignation  our own former truths  the opinions of others we are tying to convince  --who should be allowed leave at their leisure to  ----go over the account again  ----examine the particulars &  ----see on which side the advantage lies

134 134 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) says agreement (cont.d)  based on probability which (cont.d) should not entail renouncing with blind resignation (cont.d)  the opinions of others we are tying to convince (cont.d)  --who cannot be expected to  ----give up tenets so settled in their mind by time &  custom to be self-evident or impressions received  from God Himself,  ----give them up to  new opinions taken on mere trust  or arguments or authority of a stranger or  adversary, especially if there is suspicion of  interest or design

135 135 Locke (cont.d)  His Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his most important book (cont.d) says agreement (cont.d)  based on probability which (cont.d) should accordingly prompt endeavoring to remove mutual ignorance  in gentle & fair ways of information  not by denouncing others as obstinate or perverse  --for not renouncing their opinion & adopting ours  --when we are likely as obstinate for not adopting their  opinion  and should be reached by being busier and more careful to inform ourselves than to restrain others, because if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others

136 136 Locke (cont.d)  He is contemptuous of Leibnizian metaphysics because the concept of substance then dominant in metaphysics, was vague & not useful to Locke but he doesn’t reject it entirely Locke allows the validity of metaphysical arguments for God’s existence, but he doesn’t dwell on them & seems uncomfortable with them Locke conceives new ideas in terms of concrete detail, not large abstractions. Locke’s philosophy is piecemeal, not statuesque & all of one piece

137 137 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding There are no innate ideas or principles, contrary to Plato’s Theatetus (where knowledge is not perception), Descartes & Leibniz (for whom the most valuable knowledge did not come from experience) & the scholastics  The mind is a blank sheet of paper  Ideas come from 2 sources of experience sensation perception of our own mind’s operations: “internal sense” (introspection)  Knowledge is thinking by means of ideas which come only from experience; so, no knowledge can precede experience

138 138 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding  Perception is the first step or degree toward knowledge Metaphysicians’ knowledge about the world is purely verbal  Locke is an extreme nominalist concerning universals: all existing things are particulars and general ideas representing many particulars are given names, but they are no more reality than the particulars  He refutes the scholastic notion of essence Essence is  purely verbal  is “defining”, is the mere definition we choose of a general term to denote a kind of thing

139 139 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Metaphysicians’ knowledge about the world is purely verbal (cont.d)  He refutes the scholastic notion of essence (cont.d) Species classification is  a fact not of nature but of language, rules of definition along boundaries set by men for sorting things. Objection:  --Different languages agree on definitions  --Similarities between particulars are not imagined  not always clear cut, as  --in the emergence & classification of mutants &  monstrosities  --explained by Darwin’s theory of evolution by  gradual change, through  ----mutation and  ----selection by environment & competition

140 140 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Objection: solipsism. Locke does not explain how we have knowledge of things  outside ourselves and  outside operations of our own minds. The immediate object of the mind is its own ideas. Knowledge is conversant only about the agreement or disagreement between our own ideas (cognitive dissonance/consonance); fundamental to programming the operation of computers: association by similarity or difference: “if …, then … ; otherwise … ”. Knowledge is agreement of ideas: “coherence” criterion of truth vs “paradox” criterion of truth, or “contradiction” or dialectical criterion of truth (in German philosophy since Hegel) We cannot know the existence of the physical world or of other people.

141 141 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Locke meets the objection by reductio ad absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification methodology of scientific proof)  He recognizes the absurdity of the conclusion and, so  He revises his premises There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence  intuitive knowledge of our own existence  demonstrative knowledge such as of God’s existence, by examining agreement or disagreement among ideas  sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the senses  --True ideas must agree with things & not just with  themselves  ----All simple ideas must agree with things  ----Simple ideas are the product of things operating  on the mind in a natural way  ----The mind cannot make by itself any simple ideas

142 142 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d  He revises his premises (cont.d) There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence (cont.d)  sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the senses (cont.d)  --Complex ideas of substances consist of simple  ideas found to coexist  --Sensations are “deemed” (hypothesized) to  ----have causes outside themselves [hypothesis  rejected by Hume who replaced it by “no idea  without an antecedent impression” (that would have an  external cause)] which

143 143 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d  He revises his premises (cont.d) There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence (cont.d)  sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the senses (cont.d)  --Sensations are “deemed” (hypothesized) to (cont.d)  ----resemble the sensations themselves. This useful  “correspondence” hypothesis or principle is held  on grounds wholly independent of experience  itself: on grounds of  common sense and possibly on grounds of  frequency of association

144 144 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d  To avoid the incredible conclusion of solipsism from a self- consistent set of philosophical tenets, Locke sacrificed self-[containedness] consistency for the common sense of knowability & conferring on agency by the external world, the status of mere hypothesis, nevertheless constraining on, if not inconsistent with, the otherwise unfettered agency of ideas and logic and their superiority and determination over my world.

145 145 Locke (cont.d)  Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (cont.d) Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d  Locke thereby established the impossibility of a metaphysics and epistemology at once credible [not requiring a hypothesis] (materially) and credible (in ideas). He emphasized credibility, leaving Russell to note still that A philosophy not self-consistent may not be wholly true but A self-consistent philosophy can nevertheless be wholly false.

146 146 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) Locke anticipates Bentham (utilitarianism of the greatest good for the greatest number) Like Bentham, he has a kindly feeling yet Locke believed that All men act to maximize their own happiness, reduced to pleasure & pain, and that Liberty  best enables pursuit of happiness  is limited by the necessity to control our passions  is best achieved by a belief in reward & punishment after death, prompting self-interested virtue by the prudent pleasure-seeker

147 147 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Virtue  is difficult to achieve without the belief that sin leads to hell  less effectively achieved if not self-regarding Bentham substituted the human lawgiver (not always wise, virtuous, or omniscient) for a Lockean God’s power of hell. The human lawgiver endeavors  to align incentives of public and private interests in such a way (incentive compatibility) as  to minister to the general happiness while pursuing your own.

148 148 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Men do not always act according to rational calculation.  Men value present pleasure over future. Pleasures and pains lose their effects the further away they are in time. This is a possible psychological foundation for the economics of discounting or its mathematical inverse, interest payment This is exemplified in the effect of postponement in creating greater (future) satisfaction for something than if it had been consumed normally.

149 149 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Men do not always act according to rational calculation. (cont.d)  Men value present pleasure over future. Pleasures and pains lose their effects the further away they are in time. (cont.d) But postponement doesn’t always produce its own natural reward in greater future pleasure. (Moreover satiation occurs whereby pleasure from adding a given (incremental) amount of consumption is greater now than it will be in the future.)  in that case the greater future reward should take the form of a future payment or a discount in the price.  Future consumption of a given quantity has a present value lower than the value of present consumption of the same quantity.  A lower future price also includes an incentive to consumers to spread consumption over time rather than overconsume in the present.

150 150 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Men do not always act according to rational calculation. (cont.d)  Men are accordingly more likely to act rationally the more they are engaged in the long run, where self-interest and the general will tend to coincide. Prudence is acting with the longer term (good) in mind:  Accordingly, every lapse from virtue is a failure of prudence for bringing with it a worse future. Prudence is  the paramount virtue of liberalism  connected with savings & investment behavior in capitalism: the poor are poor often because they spend foolishly & do not willingly postpone certain forms of piety, of virtue with a view to heaven, associated, under Protestantism, with saving for investment (as in Max Weber’s Protestantism and the Rise of Capitalism)

151 151 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Liberalism has always considered that public & private interests eventually harmonize  but on more than the theological basis Locke gave  Divine laws were enough for Locke if a community is pious & prudent in the liberty required for pursuit of happiness by the individual who self-controls passion, where no one escapes the divine magistrate. Otherwise, criminal laws are needed.

152 152 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Moral rules are capable of scientific demonstration as analytic (à la Leibnizian Characteristica universalis calculus) from the idea of an infinitely wise & good God & of ourselves as rational.  “Where there is no property, there is no justice” is as clearly demonstrable as any proposition in Euclid.  There is a need for minimal law because of no liberty in a lawless universe  “Prudence” is a sufficient virtue, as expressed in judgment governed by laws like discounting (which prompt reward deferment) and other long-term versus short-term considerations.

153 153 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Objection: men desire more than pleasure:  Pleasure attends fulfillment of any desire, that need not directly pursue that pleasure. For example masochism.  Pleasure of immediate fulfillment is greater than pleasure from postponed fulfillment. So discounting the present (the future) reward [e.g. the principal borrowed by you compared to the greater repayment by you] needs to be implemented (rejected) in the valuation of pleasure or discounting the present (the future) cost [e.g fixed-rate interest payments] needs to be rejected (implemented) in the valuation of pleasure  as a means of encouraging/compensating the postponement of pleasure as in the economic practice of frugality.

154 154 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Objection: men desire more than pleasure: (cont.d)  Locke dismisses the tendency to discount the future (reward) as an absurd conclusion from his ethical theory and dismisses it as vice in counterexample to his original assumption of proneness to virtue.  So, he modifies his theory to account for the counterexample/absurdity: this called “ad hoc” theorizing.  It is better to outright replace the theory/hypothesis. Locke neglected to postulate natural economic mechanisms to offset/discourage the vice.

155 155 Locke (cont.d)  Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act) cont.d Objection: men desire more than pleasure: (cont.d)  Irrationalism, bounded rationalism, and descriptivism  German philosophy enriches Leibnizian rationalism by accommodating “contradiction”. It dismisses falsification as in fact evidence for the truth of “contradiction”.  English empiricism follows Locke in recognizing falsification by experiential and logical evidence as a constraint or “limitation” on Leibnizian rationalism by forcing at least ad hoc revision of hypotheses if not their outright rejection/replacement.  Hume carries empiricism to the extreme of mere descriptivism (cataloging of descriptions of experience), and rejection of theorizing, explanation, or attempted prediction by scientific law.

156 156 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. They are based on the prior doctrine of the divine origin of natural law. So, natural law is given no independent logical basis. He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings.  Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings  said, like Hobbes, that the king alone makes laws proceeding solely from his will which is perfectly free from human control & unbound even by predecessors or logic

157 157 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)  said, unlike Hobbes, that God bestowed the kingly power on the first humans,  who were the natural ancestors/parents of the whole people &  from whom it descended to heirs.  said, the desire for liberty (from bad) was the cause of God’s punishment of the first humans in the Bible, and  thereby provided too strong a defense of the power of Charles I before the Civil War.  Previous defense of divine right of kings allowed for limitations derived from the will of the people  An English Jesuit (thinking of Protestant Queen Elizabeth) and a Scottish Calvinist (thinking of Catholic Mary Queen of Scots) agreed on nothing except that kings may be deposed by the people for misgovernment

158 158 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)  thereby provided too strong a defense of the power of Charles I before the Civil War. (cont.d)  Kingly power (based on armed force) had been limited by the pope’s (based on cleverness & sanctity) & the pope’s philosophical defenders.  --The people could claim the same rights (of self-government)  against the king as the pope had.  --St. Robert Bellarmine had said that the secular power was  bestowed by men, not God, and was “in the people unless  they bestow it on a prince”. So, God is the immediate author  of a democratic state.

159 159 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)  said that instead the king derives power entirely from the authority of a father over his children. A similar theory prevailed in Japan since the Meiji Revolution, & in ancient Egypt & the ancient Inca & Aztec civilizations in America.  Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons:  multiplicity of religions  Church of England versus Nonconformists  --The Church of England attempted to be a compromise  between the Catholics & the Presbyterians (Calvinists who  battled in the Civil War)  --But the power of the 3rd party Nonconformists was  increasing among rich merchants & bankers.

160 160 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons: (cont.d)  multiplicity of religions (cont.)  The English king was head of the Church of England (which had bishops & rejected Calvinism). The King’s profession of two religions at once militated against  --religious zeal and  --religious claims by the king

161 161 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons: (cont.)  conflict between king, aristocracy & merchants.  In the Renaissance king & middle class combined against the feudal aristocracy  In post-Reformation France king & aristocracy combined against the Protestant middle class.  In post-Reformation England the Catholic aristocracy & the Protestant middle class combined against the religious power of the authoritarian king.

162 162 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  Locke says  parental power is not homogeneous: the mother’s power should equal the father’s power  primogeniture is unjust &, so, cannot be a basis for monarchy  theories of divine right neither justify nor oppose usurpers  Paternal power is temporary and does not extend to life or property

163 163 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  In the early 20th century  according to Russell hereditary power was replaced by dictatorships in the absence of time to develop the thought habits needed for the successful practice of democracy  the Catholic Church is the sole ancient institution not developed from a hereditary element, and may serve as a model form of government for dictatorships  rejection of hereditary governance had almost no impact on economics where the hereditary principle is allowed, although decreasingly dominant

164 164 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) He separates politics from economics in his rejection of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right of kings. (cont.d)  The hereditary principle was easy to extend from the economic power over people’s lives to political power  The kingdom had been regarded as a landed estate whose owner can decide who lives there, and give title to land transferred to another owner (still called “Crown” lands in the UK, Canada & Australia).  So, Locke’s rejection of the hereditary principle in politics is an innovation.

165 165 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance)  In the state of nature (before all human government) any law is divine.  The law of nature is the same as in Thomas Aquinas, for whom it serves as the basis from which human laws should be derived.  Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.  Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them. --This is Leibnizian rationalist optimism.

166 166 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  In the state of nature (before all human government) any law is divine. (cont.d)  Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age. (cont.d)  Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them. (cont.d) --So, political power should be derived from this original natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason ----without depending on the will of another man ----in equality, where all power & jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another as creatures of the same species & rank

167 167 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little  originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  In the state of nature (before all human government) any  law is divine. (cont.d)  Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age. (cont.d)  Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them. (cont.d) --So, political power should be derived from this original natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason (cont.d) ----without liberty to destroy themselves or harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions, because we are all God’s property.

168 168 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  In the state of nature (before all human government) any law is divine. (cont.d)  Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age. (cont.d)  Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them. (cont.d) --So, political power should be derived from this original natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason (cont.) ----with a right to defend ourselves & our possessions, including private vengeance & the discretion to decide the proportionateness of the punishment to fit the crime.

169 169 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  In the state of nature (before all human government) any law is divine. (cont.d)  Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age. (cont.d)  The badness of the remote past became fundamental to the theory of evolution consistent with Hobbes’ version of the state of nature as war of all against all.  Dialectical logic enabled Marx to model his workers’ paradise on both the golden age (good past) and evolution (bad past) and may be interpreted as progress in revival of a golden age after successive negations.

170 170 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  Objection: in a state of nature each man is his own judge because he relies on himself to defend his rights  Locke says the remedy (but not a natural remedy) is a compact to create a government  But the state of nature continues among governments subject only to natural law & ethics in their relations  Locke recognizes the possibility of evil or a state of war that is not a tendency in man or in a state of nature.  Locke (as a prelude to Rousseau) looks at a state of nature as the biblical Paradise Lost, & is anti-Augustinian and anti- Calvinist in his optimism of man’s/nature’s tendency toward good.

171 171 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  Objection: in a state of nature each man is his own judge because he relies on himself to defend his rights (cont.d)  Locke recognizes the possibility of evil or a state of war that is not a tendency in man or in a state of nature. (cont.d)  Hobbes looks at a state of nature as war in punishment for sin, reflecting his pessimism of man’s/nature’s tendency toward bad.  Accordingly, progress as recognized by Marx is not nice, and uses the means of war (but not as enthusiastically as Hegel) to channel & direct toward progress men’s bad tendencies.

172 172 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil government and constituted emergence from a state of nature, still bases its laws on nature  Recording & guarantee of property rights is the main role of government  Legal rights & remedies should be derived from natural law, with remedies decided & performed by the State.  The Church was a landowner & landowners borrowed money.  So “usury” or lending money at interest was deemed contrary to the law of nature.  Calvinists came from the rich middle class who were lenders and so viewed usury as compatible with natural law.  Laissez-faire and the rights of man originated in Puritanism where they were derived from natural law

173 173 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil government and constituted emergence from a state of nature, still bases its laws on nature (cont.d)  Property was due to free exercise of one’s industry & therefore inheritable.  Captives in a just war are slaves by the law of nature  Objection: But there is no longer a clear basis for judgment of the conformity of laws with moral rules & natural law once no longer viewed as laid down by God in the Bible.  Utilitarianism. Secular attempts to develop a doctrine of inalienable rights resulted in utilitarianism  --which defines acts as good on the basis of their effects,  namely those acts which do most to promote the general  welfare.  --So, utilitarianism may be compatible with natural law, but  only because of the good effects of natural law.

174 174 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil government and constituted emergence from a state of nature, still bases its laws on nature (cont.)  Objection: But there is no longer a clear basis for judgement of the conformity of laws with moral rules & natural law once no longer viewed as laid down by God in the Bible. (cont.)  Methodological individualism. This makes natural law provide its own partial solution to the problem by calling for a minimal set of laws. --It is a natural law that everyone will do that which makes for his greatest advantage --The advancement of private persons will be the advantage of the public because ----Individual rights enable actions to bring order, equilibrium. ----There is no conflict between individual goals and the goals of a group

175 175 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract  The government may be resisted if it fails to perform its obligations under the contract  Citizens are only those with property (with women excluded from property ownership) because  the primary purpose of government is maintenance of property rights  property is the physical embodiment/history of the individual’s moral virtue/prudence, certainly in keeping with Calvinist doctrine that worldly success indicates predestined favor by God  otherwise propertiless citizens can use the government to appropriate the property of other citizens  for the common good, government --makes (by the legislature) & executes (by the executive) laws --sets & enforces penalties (by the judiciary) --defends the commonwealth from foreign injury.

176 176 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract  If the government is party to a dispute  it is harder for it to be both defendant and judge if it is a monarchy of one man because  there is no neutral authority to decide the dispute, &  accordingly governments should be “civil” & not absolute & should therefore be separated into independent executive and judicial branches. Civil/politic society --is the product of a social contract between government and the governed ----It’s origin predates recorded history except among the Jews ----The contract is not hereditary, so is renewed by each generation ----The US constitution is such a contract

177 177 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural law (as the basis for governance) cont.d  The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract (cont.d)  If the government is party to a dispute (cont.d)  accordingly governments should be “civil” & not absolute & should therefore be separated into independent executive and judicial branches. Civil/politic society (cont.d) --is ruled by majority unless a greater number is agreed ----Caution: Condorcet’s paradox of non-majority social preference produced by voting ----Majorities may be tyrannical, and Locke agrees in his Letters on Toleration that no believer in God should be penalized on account of his religious opinions.

178 178 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Property  Urban production was by craftsmen who owned their tools  Locke believed in peasant proprietorship of as much land as one can till, but not more  But land was owned by aristocrats  who received rent (cash in England) often in the form of half the produce (in France & Italy), or  who owned the services of serfs attached to the land (in Prussia & Russia)  & aristocrats lost their rights when  The French Revolution & Napoleon --ended aristocratic land ownership in France, Italy & Germany, & --abolished serfdom in Prussia

179 179 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Property (cont.d)  Locke believed in peasant proprietorship of as much land as one can till, but not more (cont.d)  & aristocrats lost their rights when (cont.d)  while Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War ended serfdom in Russia, &  aristocratic land ownership ended --in Russia when the Bolshevik Revolution established collective farming, & --in Prussia only during WWII.  heavy taxation in 19th century England forced most aristocrats to give up their land after 18th & 19th century enclosure for private ownership of the common land in English towns used by rural laborers to grow their own food since the Middle Ages.

180 180 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Property (cont.d)  Locke formulated a labor theory of value (later attributed to Ricardo & Marx)  suggested as early as by Thomas Aquinas in support of Church landholding to minimize charges by usurer money-lenders (mostly Jews) for borrowing by rural landowners to plant crops before sale  in condemnation of the role of traders & speculators (who play a coordinating, risk-taking, and search role not yet then understood). Objection:  labor was a physical not a mental basis for valuation  The mental basis is willingness to apply labor  Locke limited his consideration of property to  --agriculture in keeping with the Feudal agricultural  perspective of scholastics,  --not capital-intensive mining & energy resources not  amenable to small-scale ownership.

181 181 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Property (cont.d)  Locke formulated a labor theory of value (later attributed to Ricardo & Marx) cont.d  Ricardo promoted labor-value in opposition to protectionist factor- immobile (labor-immobile and capital-immobile) landowners (land- property is “immobilier” in French) opposed to labor mobility and the comparative advantage/benefits of trade.  Marx promoted labor-value in opposition to attributing value to capital [know-how (configuration) whose value reflects not labor input but productive usefulness/contribution of a unit of labor input]  Locke appreciated the imperishable character of precious metals & regarded it as the source of money, namely its ability to store value, and therefore  maintain inequality of fortune  which Locke didn’t regret and saw  as the source of gains to civilization.

182 182 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Checks and Balances in Government  This doctrine originated in England  in opposition to the Scottish Catholic Stuart heirs to the English monarchy  to prevent abuse of power  by establishing a legislature having power independent from & equal to the king’s  The legislature is virtuous while the executive is usually wicked  The legislature must be removable by the community, and should be elected  This is inconsistent with the roles of King & House of Lords in the legislature of modern England  The king who governs without summoning the legislature, as Charles I did for 12 years before the Civil War, is at war with the people

183 183 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) Checks and Balances in Government (cont.d)  The legislature is virtuous while the executive is usually wicked (cont.d)  Objection: judgment of just & lawful use of force by one branch of government at the expense of another branch  is often decided by power, not by justice & law.  When there is no judge under heaven to decide it, it is assumed Heaven will give victory in civil war to the better cause.  Accordingly, checks & balances require compromise & common sense to avoid civil war. These are habits of mind not embedded in the constitution.  The judiciary is not mentioned.  Until the Glorious Revolution, the king could dismiss judges. Consequently judges convicted the king’s enemies and acquitted his friends.  Judges became irremovable afterward. The most powerful independent judiciary is the US Supreme Court.

184 184 Locke (cont.d)  His Treatises on Government have little originality. (cont.d) In England the executive became increasingly dependent on the legislature, & eventually came from the ruling members of the legislature. The French legislative Assembly came to have less power than the English Parliament but still more than the executive. The principle of checks & balances is best embodied in the American political system that Locke inspired.  The US Supreme Court’s powers are limited to interpreting the constitutionality of laws and this makes political criticism of them difficult  The legislature can always reenact a law adjusted to meet those criticisms.

185 185 Locke (cont.d)  Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until the Industrial Revolution when it became unable to address corporate power while the State’s role, for example in education, increased enormously nationalism combined political & economic power (beginning with German Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck), making war the primary means of competition.

186 186 Locke (cont.d)  Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until the Industrial Revolution when (cont.d) the individual citizen lost the power & independence Locke attributed to him, and got displaced by “organization”, in  Augustin Cournot’s mid 19th-century claim that “administration” replaces politics and marks the end of history, and  James Burnham’s mid 20th-century book, The Managerial Revolution, and the concept of “organization man”

187 187 Locke (cont.d)  Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until the Industrial Revolution when (cont.d) at least until the Information Technology revolution of the late 20 th -century reversed the rise of mass and passive media. a state of nature still existed between states, calling for an international social contract reflected in the emergence of multiple post WW-II international institutions.

188 188 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism  Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which dominated philosophy in England & in the French Enlightenment for a century before the French Revolution, because of Newton, and the inferiority of Descartes’ theory of vortices to Newton’s law of gravitation in explaining the solar system, and the incapability of Descartes’ theory to explain any motion in a system of 2 bodies admiration of England by France’s rebellious intellectuals  for its freedom &  for Locke’s political doctrines

189 189 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which dominated philosophy in England & in the French Enlightenment for a century before the French Revolution, because of (cont.d) Hume’s diplomatic posting in France & acquaintance with many of the leading intellectuals Voltaire’s  sojourn in England and acquaintance with many there, and  role as chief transmitter of English influence to France

190 190 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which dominated philosophy in England & in the French Enlightenment for a century before the French Revolution, because of (cont.d) the American & French revolutions when England began to take interest in Locke’s political doctrines  Berkeley had little interest in politics  Hume was a Tory skeptical of government  Locke influenced Shelley’s Necessity of Atheism for which Shelley was expelled from Oxford

191 191 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  Kant salvaged the constructionist idealism pioneered by Descartes & brought to its highest development by Leibniz, and this dominated in Germany because subsequent English- empiricist-inspired French-Enlightenment “deconstructionist” or “critical” philosophies were blamed at German universities for the excesses of the French Revolution because of their secularism & tolerance. Germans sought their own alternative to British empiricism and French-Enlightenment philosophy.

192 192 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  Kant salvaged,,, constructionist idealism…, and this dominated in Germany … (cont.d) Kant provided a constructionist alternative to critical French Enlightenment philosophy,  especially, strong protection against moral anarchy, by picking up the interrupted Cartesian & Leibnizian trend. Kant was a democrat, liberal & pacifist but  his philosophy prompted 2 divergent philosophical trends in both England & on the Continent (but had no influence in America where political institutions remain today as in Locke)  techno-rationalist: Bentham, Ricardo & Marx  literary-emotionalist: Fichte, Byron, Carlyle & Nietzsche. Coleridge lamented the French Revolution for being atheism inspired

193 193 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy British philosophy is more detailed & developed piecemeal. General principles are not hypothesized and proven, but derived inductively by examining applications.  Hume  seeks counterexample: imagining a color never seen between two colors seen before  then makes a modest generalization inductively from the facts. Subsequent criticism triggers modification without total collapse, while.  Leibniz  analyzes that a single component can’t be extended, so can’t be material and  from that single logical premise deduces/erects an entire edifice. Criticism makes the entire structure unstable.

194 194 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) British since Hume have rejected metaphysics as an attempt to discover truths about the world exclusively by deductive reasoning. British since Locke tended to be personally benevolent & therefore regarded pleasure/happiness as good, not ignoble, while Continentals who tended to be less personally benevolent founded ethics on non-utilitarian principles, including heroism.  For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for the sake of moral law.  However the good should not suffer/cause pain.

195 195 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) British since Locke…regarded happiness as good… while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism (cont.d)  For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for the sake of moral law. (cont.d)  Since good often does, God is needed to assure justice after death.  This is Kant’s unique new “practical” proof of God’s existence.  As an American pragmatist said: if God doesn’t exist, He needs to be invented.  Indeed, Locke implicitly makes such a proof by insisting on the need for belief in God to drive “prudent” (civil) behavior.

196 196 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) British since Locke…regarded happiness as good… while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism (cont.d)  For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for the sake of moral law. (cont.d)  This is Kant’s unique new “practical” proof of God’s existence. (cont.d)  Furthermore, natural law implies another “practical proof” for (positing) God’s existence: self-subjection by human institutions to a divine judge/lawgiver, which  --limits their power to do wrong  --or serves as a justification from intervening to do right in  some natural conflict.

197 197 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) British since Locke…regarded happiness as good… while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism (cont.d)  For other Continentals, contempt for happiness is accompanied by praise for  heroism (often as a disguise for impulse to power, & even to cruelty as, for example, in the unexamplary behavior of Byron’s heros)  strong emotion, even if hatred or revenge In politics  Locke’s followers were tentative,  willing to leave every question to be decided by free discussion  believers in gradual reform (even in socialist revolution, witness the Fabian (Fabius Cunctor, the procrastinator) Socialists of George Bernard Shaw who founded today’s governing British Labour Party)  experimental in dealing with problems one at a time rather than by big programs cut out of one block.

198 198 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) In politics (cont.d)  Continentals as revolutionaries or defenders of established authority  attempted to grasp things entire (by intuition)  were willing in turn to shatter it to pieces  reconstruct all from scratch  use violence  condemn peace-loving as ignoble.

199 199 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) Locke’s support of property  recognized & motivated the rising commercial class,  in opposition to the landed aristocracy to whom property accumulation was both “ignoble” & threatening  while middle-class writers denounced the commercial class and  the inarticulate peasantry rebelled against the aristocracy in France & Russia. The literary-emotionalist opponents of Locke (driven by hatred, envy & love of power) admired war (militarism) & self-sacrifice for  being heroic and  implementing their contempt for comfort & ease

200 200 English Analytic Empiricism vs Conti- nental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)  British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d) The techno-rationalist utilitarians were opposed to the literary-emotionalists & allied with merchants in regarding war as  folly & an  interference in trade that capitalism has prioritized for the last 2 centuries,  elevated enlightened self-interest to where it was  more conducive to the general interest than the literary- emotionalists’ goals & methods, &  mitigated within the system the horrors of early industrialism.

201 201 Berkeley  denied the existence of matter  said material objects exist only through being perceived. Once not perceived, they don’t exist  “Not perceived” can mean “not being perceived” now by someone somewhere,  But continuity in perceiving is assured by God’s perceiving everything always  This is a new argument for God’s existence, now by divine coordination of perceptions between  the world at instants of time, besides between  different “substances” at any given moment of time,  the mental and the physical for Descartes, or  The infinitely numerous monads for Leibniz

202 202 Berkeley (cont.d)  “Not perceived” can mean (cont.d) or “not being perceivable including now” because no one exists any more  This is a nonsense question: Will mathematics continue to exist in the absence of human beings? What happens if no humans exist is useless when there is no one to benefit from the answer.  Nonsense like all “what if” questions about the past which cannot be revisited, unless being asked not for nostalgia but as evidence for or against present decisions.  He was an Irishman and fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, at an early age

203 203 Berkeley (cont.d)  He was presented at the English Court by Jonathan Swift, whose wife bequeathed half her property to Berkeley  He was the first philosopher to visit America. He lived in Rhode Island for 3 years developing a scheme for a college in Bermuda which he abandoned  Berkeley, California, was named after him because he said (like Hegel said after him of the movement of world history) the expansion of empire is Westward.

204 204 Berkeley (cont.d)  He abandoned philosophy later in life to develop tar-water for its medicinal properties and cheerful effect.  He wrote his most important work when he was young & in a charming style  He wrote The Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous which contains his most persuasive argument against matter. But the argument proves a conclusion different from the one intended: Intended conclusion: all reality is mental Actual conclusion:  We perceive qualities, not things  Qualities are relative to the percipient

205 205 Berkeley (cont.d)  Hylas represents scientifically educated common sense, and Philonous is Berkeley Hylas faults Philonous for denying the reality of matter Philonous replies that we do not perceive the causes of perceptions (an arch-denial of substance). By the senses we have (relational) perceptions  But there is no “thing” of which those perceptions are a quality (whence Leibniz’s “dual” of propositional logic: the thing is the class of “concrete” things which, in this case, are perceptions of qualities.)  The thing (substance) is nothing but a combination of sensible qualities  The reality (“thing”) being perceived is some quality.

206 206 Berkeley (cont.d)  Hylas represents scientifically educated common sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d) Hylas distinguishes existence from being perceived.  Logically (thanks to Leibniz’s dual logic) existing means a quality is a member of a class constituting a thing  Especially now, existence is of properties; so existence itself cannot be a property. Leibniz’s dual logic accordingly provides the strongest illustration of how existence cannot be a property (essence). Hylas’ argument does not therefore contradict Philonous, but only demolishes the traditional Ontological Argument

207 207 Berkeley (cont.d)  Hylas represents scientifically educated common sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d) If Hylas means existence of a substance in which qualities inhere, then  Philonous’ response is that the “substance” of perception is mental  Philonous cites as evidence  the case of lukewarm water which feels hot if your hand is cold, & cold if your hand is hot, & Hylas acquiesces.  the pleasantness or unpleasantness of flavors & odors  that the sound we hear is not identically the motion in air of something  that the colors of clouds disappear on closer inspection  that the microscope reveals a perception completely different than what the naked eye reveals  Hylas maintains that primary qualities of figure or motion should inhere in external unthinking substances

208 208 Berkeley (cont.d)  Hylas represents scientifically educated common sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d) If Hylas means existence of a substance in which qualities inhere, then (cont.d)  Philonous replies that even figure & motion are qualities relative to the perceiver: things look big to people near them & small to people far off, and movement may seem quick to one man & slow to another.  Hylas then distinguishes object from sensation, with object having a real existence in some unthinking substance, without the mind.  Berkeley’s logical argument is We perceive colors, sounds, etc. which there is no reason to believe inhere in a single “thing” together or over time (a correct claim according to Russell), &

209 209 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d) these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “non- material” is lacking/needed according to Russell). Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot exist outside the mind  He assumes a subject-predicate relation between thought/mind (subject) & perception (predicate) with no thing “in” the mind but only things “before” the mind

210 210 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d) these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “non- material” is lacking/needed according to Russell). Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot exist outside the mind (cont.d)  He disputes the need to distinguish between the act of perceiving, which is mental, and an object perceived which is not mental by saying that stating any such object should exist in a non-thinking substance is as logically contradictory as saying that a nephew can exist without an uncle. This is too strong an argument according to Russell: coexistence as both a substance before the mind, & only as a non-thinking substance when not being an object of the senses, is not logically impossible

211 211 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d) these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “non- material” is lacking/needed according to Russell). Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot exist outside the mind (cont.d)  He commits the same fallacy when countering Hylas’ valid argument that a house that no one perceives is conceivable (not self-contradictory) as for example the existence of a product (from the multiplication) of 2 integers not performed yet by anybody among the infinity of possible products. (This is mathematical existence which is, at least, conceivable but, by Berkeley’s reasoning, impossible, at least until Berkeley postulates God’s thinking of it (deus ex machina).

212 212 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d) Sensible objects must be sensible. This is an analytic, tautological statement from which Berkeley mistakenly derives necessary existence. [See next slide.] Philonous says distance appears in dreams; so, distance is not perceived by sight but judged as a result of experience (in anticipation of Kant’s postulation of space & time as apriori organizing principles of experience intrinsic to the mind but the result of experience acquired by succeeding generations of humans over biological history).

213 213  Berkeley’s fallacy of “necessity” of sensibility (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) or [Ox: “x is an object”; Sx: “x is sensible”] (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ are necessity and they mean “it is necessary that”: ‘ ’ is logical necessity by standard propositional calculus, and it’s opposite is ‘  ’ “not necessarily” ‘ ’ is “modal” necessity in modal logic[, as distinguished from ‘  ’ “possibility” which is related to ‘ ’ by “impossible that”   ( )     ( ) “necessarily not that”. Standard propositional logic has no such operator as ‘  ’.] Berkeley commits the fallacy of “moving the operator to the wrong scope (to within the brackets)” from : (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) or (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) to: (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) or (  x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) in other words from logical necessity to factual necessity. The correct conversion is (  x)( (Ox & Sx)  Sx) or (  x)( (Ox & Sx)  Sx) Any factual necessity is conditional on factual necessity. No factual necessity is unconditional absolute necessity. For example, a sensible object may, or may not, be being sensed at a given time. It is not necessary for it to be being sensed, Sx [necessarily ( ) as Leibnizian actualization of possibles (  )], for it to be a sensible object (Sx   Sx) T T TT T T T T

214 214 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments: Heat is painful and therefore cannot be in an unperceiving thing  It’s unclear if pain is a sensation being caused  by a substance (fire)  which is an unnecessary assumption, but  which Berkeley now has a compelling reason to call the mind,  or by another sensation (heat). In that case  there is no call for a causal substance at all since  the cause is just another quality, and Berkeley’s argument is not applicable.  The same argument applies to pleasantness of odors.

215 215 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d) Philonous’ argument about hot or cold hands in lukewarm water demonstrates just that it is “difference” in temperature, not absolute temperature, that is being perceived.  Differences are naturally relative (subjective) while  absolute temperatures are not proved here to be relative. Hylas’ argument that sound as motions of air is a non-relational definition of sound  relative to source alone, impact of an object on air,  while Berkeley’s definition is also non-relational, but relative to sink (recipient) alone, and this is more correct.

216 216 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d) In Philonous’ dismissal of Hylas’ appeal to the primary qualities of extension & motion as inhering in an external substance, Berkeley mistakenly affirms the mental subjectivity of perceived space, instead of the relativity (objective subjectivity), or inter- subjectivity, of perceived space. While Philonous claims the possibility of knowing spirits, knowing them or others’ ideas should be as impossible as to know matter.

217 217 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims.  The concept of thing, while maybe useful for getting along in the world, adds nothing to the perceived qualities and Berkeley is right to reject it.  Berkeley never defines “perceive”. So, it is a “primitive”, (which means undefined) concept in Berkeley’s philosophy, rather than a “substance”, which is a (useless) (meta)physical counterpart for a place/role in a conceptual (theoretical) system.  Einstein made matter & energy interchangeable/interconvertible under the primitive concept of “event”. An impact on the senses is (part of) an event

218 218 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). Berkeley’s rejection of the substantial ego as agent underlying a percept was a rejection of the Cartesian cogito Accordingly a percept is an occurrence, an equivalence between “being real” and “being perceived”. This is consistent with Leibnizian existence as actualization (occurrence, happening, rather than persisting as a static substrate). But Berkeley held that some real spiritual substances also exist unperceived, but he would hold they are readily perceived by a spiritual God as guarantor of their existence.

219 219 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). (cont.d) Recollection is mental & connected with habit. So being perceived and occurring tend to differ: being perceived is remembered while occurring is not. But physical processes, too, have memory, as materials do when they revert to their previous shape after being bent.

220 220 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). (cont.d) A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from our own percepts:  Egocentrism or conjecturalism. So memory enables logical deduction  --in my own biography of events from my memory of  events/percepts, but  --not of events in the world outside of my biography.  Instead we postulate events & derive other events in the  world from them.

221 221 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). (cont.d) A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from our own percepts: (cont.)  Solipsism. I can infer events only in my biography and from my percepts.  --But we do in fact make assumptions about continuity of  events, & therefore in inferences about the continuity of  particular events,  --before & after we have noticed them. It is common human  practice to infer unreflectingly from what we  observe.

222 222 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). (cont.d) A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from our own percepts: (cont.)  Eddington. We can make inferences to other events  --analogous to those in our own experience, for example to  perceptions by others like ours  --but we have no use/right inferring events experienced by no  one & not forming part of any “mind”, because they are not  sufficiently analogous to my data.

223 223 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d) Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible qualities that experience has guided us in assuming belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)  Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s conceptology). (cont.d) A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from our own percepts: (cont.)  Common sense & traditional physics. There are events which no one experiences & which are still determined by causal laws. A train doesn’t have wheels just inside the station.  Applying probability theory to an investigation of non- demonstrative inference is needed to decide among the 4 preceding alternatives

224 224 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley (like Hegel) believes logic alone can prove that only minds & mental events can exist That is much too strong a conclusion: Percepts are just a certain kind of event. Logical positivism. Verifiability (by percepts), or falsifiability, criteria of meaning confine us to the first (egocentrism/conjecturalism) interpretation of how we can infer other events from (or confirm them by) our own percepts. The 4th interpretation may be defended by the assumption of a causality that is a priori (objectivism, realism, not Kantian in the sense of organizing principle a priori to experience) & impossible without unperceived events. All 4 interpretations are defensible. For some people there is no practical difference between the 4 interpretations.

225 225 Berkeley (cont.d)  Berkeley’s general argument If we reject substance as cause/source of perceptions, we reject matter. That leaves (our) mind as the unique (mental) substance, and all that we can know By defective logic nothing can be (a product of) both substances: Berkeley does not make a strong- enough rejection of substance, mental & material. Berkeley makes a logical syntax mistake to demonstrate that sensibility is a factually necessary property.

226 226 Berkeley (cont.d)  Russell considers “matter” as what satisfies the equations of physics. Without “substance”, matter is therefore a “logical construction”, actually a “primitive” undefined concept used to explain or describe in a certain way, for example by Russell’s “equations of physics”. “mind” without substance is just a grouping of events of a certain kind we call “mental” which is another “primitive”, undefined concept. Among such relations is memory:  a mental event could be one which remembers or is remembered, and  “mind” the total interconnection by all memory chains, backwards & forwards.

227 227 Berkeley (cont.d)  Russell considers (cont.d) “mind” & “matter” are two kinds of groupings of events. Empirical (psychological) inquiry may show that mind/matter dualism may be neither  exhaustive nor  exclusive.

228 228 Hume  He took empiricism from Locke & Berkeley to its logical conclusion  He made empiricism “consistent”, “self- contained”, but a dead end from where to go no further  German metaphysicians failed to refute him  He wrote one important philosophical book and wrote philosophical essays afterward  He failed to obtain a professorship at Edinburgh.  He became tutor to a lunatic, secretary to a general, & a diplomat.

229 229 Hume (cont.d)  He had a famous quarrel with Rousseau who suffered persecution mania & insisted on a violent breach while Hume behaved with forbearance  He published posthumously on religion & miracles, for which he said there can never be adequate evidence.  His History of England was very partisan to loyalists & Scotsmen.

230 230 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. According to it there are two kinds of perceptions: “impressions” & “ideas”  Impressions have more force & violence  Ideas are the faint images of impressions in thinking & reasoning. Every simple idea  resembles/corresponds to an impression, & vice versa, but  is fainter than the corresponding impression

231 231 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) According to it there are two kinds of perceptions: “impressions” & “ideas” (cont.d)  Ideas are the faint images of impressions in thinking & reasoning. (cont.d) Complex ideas need not resemble impressions. But their components must derive from impressions. This is  Modified intuitionism (pioneered by Descartes’ “clearness & distinctness”): the structure of reasoning is not necessarily pictorial/”representational” (versus “abstract”, as in art), contrary to intuitionism. But atomic parts are pictorial.  This may also be a version of empirical rationalism: theory & hypothesis (including their terminology) are general but (should) have observable consequences, instances, “components”.

232 232 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) Section “On Abstract Ideas” begins by agreeing with Berkeley’s doctrine:  All general ideas are particular ones annexed to a certain term that makes us recall similar particular ideas.  Abstract ideas are in themselves individual in their being produced/generated; however they may become general in their representation.

233 233 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological  Logical: we apply a common name to several things when there is “resemblance” (tantamount to “quality” or class membership). Objection: But a common name, while concrete for being a name, is just as “unreal” as a universal quality or property is, for being “general”. In other words, the theory applies particularism to things, by representing properties as “words”, but not to words themselves by applying a unique “proper name” to each individual thing.

234 234 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: If two colors are sufficiently close, any image you form will equally apply to both of them, or any shade in between that you may never have specifically “seen”.

235 235 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics.  There is no impression of self, therefore no idea of self.  When I enter into myself, I never catch myself without a perception & observe only the perception. The self is nothing but a bundle or “collection” of different perceptions [collections of properties (not things) you do have as would a Leibnizian monad].

236 236 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 1: an idea of your own brain  --It is complex & a summary or composition by simple ideas  representing particular impressions.

237 237 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)  --Otherwise the idea is not complex but “innate”. This is  Kant’s idea of space-time, and maybe “self”, as an  “organizing principle” for ordering/arranging/structuring  impressions.

238 238 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)  --Accordingly we can know empirically a priori by composition  or relation of perceptions without introducing any  unperceived things as occurrences/properties. You don’t  perceive an “average” but you can decompose the average  into perceivables.

239 239 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)  --This introduces a new concept of “relation” or “structure” or  composition “arrangement”.  ----So self is more than a mere aggregate but a configuration  or arrangement & that arrangement may be the  distinguishing, unique element in the self (& of “capital” in  economics, in addition to the labor inputs, or “atoms” or  “substance”) in addition to the mere composition.

240 240 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)  --This introduces a new concept of “relation” or “structure” or  composition “arrangement”. (cont.d)  ----The quality/type of arrangement is certainly a measure of  mental health or illness

241 241 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 2: Limits of “reductionism” or “atomism”. Reduction does not explain internal structure, including arrangement of or relations between the atoms  --Structure can be emergent at the entity’s particular “level” in  the hierarchy of complexity of reality, as Kant allowed for in  the formation of the individual consciousness. In  psychology the arrangement of the perceptions is “created”  at that level & internally, & may evolve as tentative  conjectures, modified (in child development for example) in  the process of interaction with the world.

242 242 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Objection 2: Limits of “reductionism” or “atomism”. Reduction does not explain internal structure, including arrangement of or relations between the atoms (cont.d)  --Humean reductionism may have prevented Marx from  understanding capital as configuration or arrangement of  labor inputs, and this may have resulted in Leninist  dismissal of capital as an illusory “substance” or as mere  mental (& economic) “speculation”.

243 243 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Self was the last bastion of “substance” in philosophy rescued/protected by Descartes  --Rejecting a substantial “self” meant rejecting the soul as  knowable (considered since Aristotle as a person’s identity).

244 244 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a modern form of nominalism (particularism, or reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2 defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)  Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d) Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from physics. (cont.d)  Self was the last bastion of “substance” in philosophy rescued/protected by Descartes (cont.d)  --Rejecting the self as substance also meant rejecting the  categories of subject/object & thing/property as no longer  fundamental to, or a driver in, metaphysics. This was an  advance on Berkeley who did not draw logical  consequences.

245 245 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume  considers as “probable” not consequences of applying probability theory or statistics, but  knowledge derived from empirical data by inferences not definitive or strictly determinative; that is, all knowledge based not on direct observation or on logic & mathematics. Such knowledge led Hume to conclusions still hard to refute.  Russell performs a standard confusion of metaphysics & epistemology by using the term “probable knowledge”. This term is incorrect: events are probable, not knowledge.

246 246 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms are assumed.  Objection: but so are algebra’s & arithmetic’s except that their assumptions are less “intuitive” or “visual”/pictorial (and therefore perception originated) than geometry’s & it is this aspect that Hume is trying to express.

247 247 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms are assumed. (cont.d)  Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics:  --Hume disagrees that the ideas of mathematics must be  understood by a pure & intellectual view of which only the  “superior faculties” of the soul are capable.

248 248 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms are assumed. (cont.d)  Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics: (cont.d)  --Hume believes that mathematical ideas, too, are “copies” of  impressions.

249 249 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms are assumed. (cont.d)  Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics: (cont.d)  --Objection: Hume is wrong. Mathematics provides a  “structure” or “relationships” between impressions.

250 250 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) depend not only on ideas.  Identity & spatio-temporal relations  --do not go beyond what is immediately present to the  senses,

251 251 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)  Identity & spatio-temporal relations (cont.d)  --are “invariant” to changes in the ideas/perceptions  themselves so related,

252 252 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)  Identity & spatio-temporal relations (cont.d)  --and spatio-temporal relations may themselves be perceived

253 253 Hume (cont.d)  His philosophical book A Treatise on Human Nature, was written in Paris at a young age, ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry into Human Understanding. (cont.d) In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)  Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality, or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea & that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) changeable without any change in the ideas and that give only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d) The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses

254 254 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --Causation enables us to infer (the existence of) some thing  or occurrence from (existence of) some other thing or  occurrence

255 255 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --In the subordination of metaphysics to logic by rationalist  philosophers from Leibniz down to Bergson, causal relation  has been misidentified with (logical, if…, then…)  implication (“  ”) between “antecedent” (sufficient condition)  and “consequent” (necessary condition), as if being a dog is  a “cause” of being an animal in (  x)(Dx  Ax).  Indeed, just this confusion generates/supports Leibniz’s  belief/dream of a thought-calculus to understand and drive  the world  ----No such causal laws occur in science. At best causation  can imply some logical implication (in a general law), but  logical implication does not imply causation.

256 256 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume was the first philosopher to point out the  misidentification of logical implication with causation.  ----The power by which one subject produces another is not  discoverable by reflection from the ideas of the two  objects: it is known only from experience.  ----By mere reflection on the objects, no object implies the  existence of another.

257 257 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----The experience revealing causality is constant  “conjunction”, i.e. repeated “association” (the “and”  operator “  ” in logic).  ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.  Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or  “conditioned reflex”  Factual “necessity”: Is this conditioning or expectation?  “The mind is determined by custom.” This necessity  can be a generalization by induction from (a summary  of) the association, or

258 258 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.  Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or  “conditioned reflex” (cont.d)  Factual “necessity”: Is this conditioning or expectation?  “The mind is determined by custom.” This necessity (cont.d)  can be a hypothesis by which the association can be  “explained” by being deducible from the hypothesis, &  is in the mind, not in objects. Objection: it can be  hypothesized of the objects themselves (as much as  between ideas or impressions) subject to confirmation  by impression, or refutation by failure or absence of an  associated impression.

259 259 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.  Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or  “conditioned reflex” (cont.d)  An additional inference or “hypothesis” is made about  the future: uniformity in nature.  Hume calls these expectations or hypotheses “beliefs”,  themselves directly “groundless” in experience.  They are better called “conjectures”  Experience provides only indirect experiential  confirmation or refutation, one experience at a time.  All experience cannot be aggregated into a single  experience. That is the human limitation of being a  particular.

260 260 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a  subjective part that conflict  Objective part: we have no right to say the causation  (sequential association) is “necessary”. Objection:  Necessity is lawfulness, the objective category for the  sequential association of perceptions.  It is a hypothesis  Statistics depicts associations, whose strength is  measured by frequency of occurrence in a sample.  Probability is the hypothesized lawfulness, a  propensity in an object to associate (as if by gravity),  confirmed or refuted by measuring statistics

261 261 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a  subjective part that conflict (cont.d)  Subjective part: The Law of Habit, a causal law.  The observed conjunction of impressions creates a  thought/brain habit that causes the impression of A to  cause the idea of the impression of B that is conjoined  to A.

262 262 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a  subjective part that conflict (cont.d)  Subjective part: The Law of Habit, a causal law. (cont.d)  Hume contradicts himself by being a causationist in  psychology, in conflict with his objective doctrine that  there is no such basis for “necessity” of association in  the objective world as there is for expectation of  association in psychology.  In law, the objective doctrine would make all evidence  “circumstantial”, or “coincidental”, not contributive to  any preponderance of “facts” to compel (concluding)  the performance of the unlawful act.  In law a judge or jury makes a judgment. As Hume  says, habit creates an expectation.

263 263 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by  enumeration” from frequency of association to causation  Empiricists have rejected induction by enumeration,  considered by Francis Bacon the weakest kind of  induction.  Induction by enumeration is verificationism in science  (championed by the 20 th -century Vienna School of  logical positivism), like “preponderance of facts” in law.  Sir Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism countered  verificationism by refutationism, which is the search for  a single counterexample to overturn/nullify  “preponderance of evidence”.

264 264 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  Induction by enumeration is verificationism in science  (championed by the 20 th -century Vienna Circle of logi-  cal positivism), like “preponderance of facts” in law.(cont.d)  Experimental science is not democratic in the sense on  needing only a majority (preponderance) of evidence  to prove something. Science requires  perfect 100 % of evidence to support hypotheses, or  absence of refuting evidence in the absence of  supporting evidence, provided the hypothesis is not  designed to be immune to empirical evidence.  This is the key difference between science and politics,  with law between science & politics.

265 265 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  Causation implies invariable, repeated sequence. But  invariable sequence only evidences, but does not entail  (prove), causation.  Hume maintains Descartes’ two-clocks separation  between regularity in the senses & regularity in the  world.  The (added) power & necessity (expectation) of  causation is felt by the soul but not perceived in the  bodies themselves.

266 266 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  Causation implies invariable, repeated sequence. But  invariable sequence only evidences, but does not entail  (prove), causation. (cont.d)  Hume maintains Descartes’ two-clocks separation  between regularity in the senses & regularity in the  world. (cont.d)  Causality is unique among the three philosophical  relations (that can change without the bodies’  changing) for taking us beyond sense impressions &  adding something (as acknowledged by Kant),  namely informing us about unperceived existences.  In other words, causality is a hypothesis.

267 267 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  The causal laws in science are so complex that no one  can suppose them given in perception: they are  elaborate inductions from observed courses of nature  In psychology volition or pain followed by action or a cry  seem more than invariable sequence. There are  intervening neurological processes; so,causation could  summarize a complex, sequential connectedness.

268 268 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in  nature (future causation)  requires (factually, probabilistically, not logically,  deterministically, because the course of nature can  change) likely similarity of instances we have not  experienced to those we have experienced.

269 269 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in  nature (future causation) cont.d  Objection: Hume is a Cartesian intuitionist: habit may  be the basis or form of such a hypothesis in everyday  personal behavior, but it is a deliberate, calculated  hypothesis in science not requiring the direct  evidentiary support (Cartesian intuition in “direct  experience” of “clearness & distinctness”) that Hume  was seeking.  All Hume finds as Cartesian “intuition” is “my feeling”  which he does not analyze down as expressing habit  created by repeated association of experiences.

270 270 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum-  eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)  The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in  nature (future causation) cont.d  Objection: Hume is a Cartesian intuitionist: habit may  be the basis or form of such a hypothesis in everyday  personal behavior, but it is a deliberate, calculated  hypothesis in science not requiring the direct  evidentiary support (Cartesian intuition in “direct  experience” of “clearness & distinctness”) that Hume  was seeking. (cont.d)  Hume is disappointed that the Cartesian “intuition”  boils down to an “act of the sensitive, not cognitive,  part of our natures”.

271 271 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit  in contrast to the objective of Hume’s Treatise of Human  Nature, subtitled “An attempt to introduce the  experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”.  The conclusion warranted by Hume is: hypothesis is just  a type of belief, namely one that subjects itself to  confirmation or refutation according to the experimental  method of science.

272 272 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the  grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,  namely intuition or feeling  Intuitions are not needed, except as the beliefs  supported thereby have bad consequences  So instead, as with scientific hypotheses, we can  evaluate the practical consequences of beliefs,

273 273 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the  grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,  namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)  as Kant endeavored to do in his Critique of Practical  Reason, by the Categorical Imperative to act as  though a rule describing your action were followed by  everyone.

274 274 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the  grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,  namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)  Kant thereby carried to completion the mission of  Hume’s Inquiry of applying scientific method of  reasoning to moral subjects.

275 275 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the  grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,  namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)  Hypotheses must just be “taken for granted” in Hume’s  words, because Hume tried vainly the ancient quest of  extending the chain of reasoning ever backward to a  “source” as a river would be traced.

276 276 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the  grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,  namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)  Hume’s inability to “defend” causation is just evidence  of that. All chains of reasoning begin somewhere, as if  arbitrarily, and proof or justification is not backward but  forward, in the consequences & their truth or  practicability (as necessary conditions).

277 277 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  We believe that fire warms or water refreshes only  “because it costs us too much pain to think otherwise”  not just daily practical pain, but pain in the sense of  logical inconsistency with the rest of science.  Hume ignored the issue of the demands of logical  consistency within science, clearly noticed &  developed by Kant & even Hegel. Logical consistency  both  expands the impact of innovation in science, and

278 278 Hume (cont.d)  His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d) In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” (cont.d)  …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d) The second kind of relations (cont.d)  Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses (cont.d)  --…causal relation has been misidentified with  implication (“  ”) cont.d  ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”  supported by habit (cont.d)  We believe that fire warms or water refreshes only “be-  cause it costs us too much pain to think otherwise” (cont.d)  Hume ignored the issue of the demands of logical  consistency within science, clearly noticed &  developed by Kant & even Hegel. Logical consistency  both (cont.d)  stifles innovation/discovery because of the cost of  revising the rest of scientific knowledge as a result of  discovery. This cost is outweighed by the greater  overall strength & effectiveness of science that results.

279 279 Hume (cont.d)  Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by 18th-century reasonableness Hume declared the death of philosophy, insofar as it was an attempt to arrive at ultimate principles driving a chain of reasoning yielding the rest of knowledge. Hume starts out like Locke, discounting & dismissing metaphysical claims Hume left less room for inconsistency or compromise than Locke.

280 280 Hume (cont.d)  Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by 18th-century reasonableness (cont.d) “Rational belief” is an oxymoron (contradiction in terms): there is no ultimate (intuitionist) logical ground for hypotheses like causality, other than our habit or feeling. Objection: but there is a recoverable rational basis, namely not apriori antecedents in a chain of logic, but competing hypotheses/conjectures with observable (aposteriori) consequences which can be compared for coherence with perception (verifiability & falsifiability) or practice (feasibility).

281 281 Hume (cont.d)  Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by 18th-century reasonableness (cont.d) Without an apriori basis for beliefs, all are equally tenable. So we have a “state of nature” among beliefs. This supports Rousseau’s romanticism of struggle. Hume contradicts himself  by saying religious errors are dangerous, but philosophical errors are only ridiculous. “Dangerous” is a causal word.  by being insincere in his skepticism which he can’t maintain in practice and this proves the legitimacy of habit or custom contrary to Hume’s hypothesis.

282 282 Hume (cont.d)  A great outburst of irrational faith led by Rousseau (who quarreled with Hume) complemented Hume’s apparent legitimization of faith (in particular faith in causality) by attempting to delegitimize rational faith. In fact Hume showed only that there was no deductive justification of faith from prior principles, or by “rational” (clear & distinct) Cartesian intuition (as abbreviation of reasoning, or pictorialism) Kant subsequently picked up from Hume and affirmed the possibility of aposteriori scientific justification for beliefs (in moral rules or scientific hypotheses)

283 283 Hume (cont.d)  A great outburst of irrational faith led by Rousseau (who quarreled with Hume) complemented Hume’s apparent legitimization of faith (in particular faith in causality) by attempting to delegitimize rational faith. (cont.d) Rousseau was mad but influential. Hume was sane but had no followers.  Rousseau claimed the heart (feeling, intuition) was superior to reason as a criterion of value, even if contrary to reason.  The result was growth of unreason in the philosophies of Nietzsche & Schopenhauer.

284 284 Hume (cont.d)  Hume rejected the very Principle of Induction, of formulating hypotheses stating likelihood evidenced in degree of statistical correlation. The Principle of Induction is not subject to itself. This is normal. Complete self-reference is normally a logical perversion, not a recursion (which is feeding back into a formula the value of the formula itself). So, pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for science. Science requires extra independent principles (methodological, metaphysical) not themselves based on experience. Those principles’ only justification can be the consequence of their absence: no science.

285 285 Romanticism  It was originally a political movement, a revolt against received value standards  It encouraged strong emotional feeling & expression, especially sympathy, and was admired by cultivated 18 th century Frenchmen  Temper was most admired when direct, violent & uninformed by thought  A temperamental man was moved to tears by the sight of a single destitute family, but cold to well thought-out schemes to improve the lot of peasants as a class  The poor were thought more virtuous than the rich

286 286 Romanticism (cont.)  The sage preferred the pleasures of the unambitious rural existence (like Stoic Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius did) to the corruption of courts  The poor were self-sufficient peasants, never in need of commerce and, until the 19 th century, never urban & never industrial  The movement was pioneered by Rousseau who was a democrat in his theories and in his tastes was for long periods a poor vagabond and had the tastes of a tramp had a contempt for convention, over the whole sphere of culture & morals

287 287 Romanticism (cont.)  Romantics made sharp & vehement moral judgments, in contrast to the restrained temperament of the time that  abhorred the religious & civil wars in France, England & Germany chaos & the anarchic tendencies of all strong passions subversive fanaticism barbarism  & admired safety & the sacrifices needed to achieve it intellect polished manners Newton’s orderly cosmos as an imaginative symbol of good governance

288 288 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantics made sharp & vehement moral judgments, in contrast to (cont.d) the boredom of safety & little excitement, which society definitely reverted to in the Holy Alliance reaction to the French Revolution & Napoleon. 19 th century revolt took 2 forms:  material revolt by industrialism, capitalist & proletarian, against monarchy & aristocracy. Untouched by Romanticism, this form reverted to the 18 th century & was represented by the Philosophical Radicals the free-trade movement Marxist socialism

289 289 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantics made sharp & vehement moral judgments, in contrast to (cont.d) the boredom of safety & little excitement, which society definitely reverted to in the Holy Alliance reaction to the French Revolution & Napoleon. 19 th century revolt took 2 forms: (cont.d)  Romantic revolt both reactionary & revolutionary in favor of  vigorous & passionate individual life, not peace & quiet  nationalism to free each nation’s corporate soul not free so long as boundaries of states (“Balkanized” in Europe) were different from those of nations, and in opposition to industrialism because  it was ugly & money grubbing was considered unworthy of an immortal soul  modern economic organizations interfered with individual freedom

290 290 Romanticism (cont.d)  It substituted aesthetic for utilitarian standards. Darwin praised the earthworm as a survivor. Blake praised the tiger. It preferred gothic architecture and the rural landscape to a busy downtown The countryside became admired for wild torrents, fearful precipices, pathless forests, thunderstorms & tempests at sea and other useless destructive & violent characteristics  In fashion it favored what was grand & remote, terrifying, medieval: ghosts, ancient decayed castles, the last melancholy descendants of once-great families, falling tyrants, pirates, practitioners of occult sciences

291 291 Romanticism (cont.d)  Originally promoted by young Germans, despite origins in Rousseau, who were Catholic but Protestant in their individualizing & the countries they influenced. Its influence extended to English literature in Blake & Coleridge (supported by Wedgwood China), then in Byron, Shelley & Keats, post-Restoration France down to Victor Hugo, & in American New-England literature in Melville, Thoreau, Emerson & Hawthorne.

292 292 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic psychology, captured in Dr. Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his creator because he is not loved, expressed admiration of strong passions, regardless of social consequences, since most are destructive: hate, resentment, jealousy, remorse, despair, outraged pride, fury of the unjustly oppressed, martial ardor & contempt for slaves & cowards. the Byronic hero: a violent, anti-social, anarchic rebel or conquering tyrant

293 293 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic psychology, captured in Dr. Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his creator because he is not loved, expressed admiration of (cont.d) the revolt of solitary instincts against social bonds  By self-interest man has been gregarious (social), but by instinct he is solitary. Religion & morality have reinforced (social) self-interest.  The passions resist the prudent restraint of foregoing present satisfaction for future advantages  Passions throw off the restraints in a new energy & sense of power from immediate temporary cessation of inner conflict.

294 294 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic psychology, captured in Dr. Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his creator because he is not loved, expressed admiration of (cont.d) the revolt of solitary instincts against social bonds (cont.d)  Godlike exaltation, known to the mystics, reasserts itself in becoming one with God, absolved from duty to your neighbor  Truth & duty, our subjection to matter & our neighbors, exist no more for the man become God  If we could live solitary without labor, we could enjoy this ecstasy of independence, available only to madmen & dictators.

295 295 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic obsession with solitary instincts de- rives from German philosophy since Kant which became solipsistic & made self-development the fundamental principle of ethics In order to survive, the self-assertive individual needs to submit to the ministrations of others, who should not impinge on his ego, best done if they are slaves. Passionate lovers in revolt against social trammels are admired, but  in real life the love relationship becomes a trammel, and the partner in love comes to be hated, more strongly if the love is strong enough to make the bond hard to break.  Hence love becomes a battle in which each is attempting to destroy the other by breaking through the protecting walls of the other’s ego.

296 296 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic obsession with solitary instincts de- rives from German philosophy since Kant which became solipsistic and made self-development the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d) The principle of nationality (Byron) became a means of self-fulfillment. Friendship becomes possible only if others can be a projection of one’s self, more easily done if blood-related, at least of the same race. This affected Byron in his love for his older sister, love between brother & sister in Wagner, and Nietzsche’s preference of his sister to all other women.

297 297 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic obsession with solitary instincts de- rives from German philosophy since Kant which became solipsistic and made self-development the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d) Blood-consciousness identified nation with race as Italians (Mazzini) and Germans asserted their “nationality” in quest of the unificatiion of their local administrations into a single government & nation Byron conferred on nations a mystical individuality  attributing to them the kind of anarchic greatness that other romantics sought in heroic men.  Liberty now applied to nations & became absolute & that made international cooperation impossible

298 298 Romanticism (cont.d)  Romantic obsession with solitary instincts de- rives from German philosophy since Kant which became solipsistic and made self-development the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d) The aristocratic blood & race origins of Romanticism made it contemptuous of commerce & finance  It was a reactionary aristocratic opposition to capitalism, to economic preoccupations, & Jews were perceived to benefit from and govern them.  It was not the socialist proletarian opposition to capitalism.

299 299 Romanticism (cont.d)  Christianity had succeeded in taming the ego, but Romantics brought the economic, political & intellectual revolt against the Church to morals by encouraging a new lawless ego that made social cooperation impossible & left anarchy or despotism as the only alternatives. When the search for parental tenderness made the egoist aware of other egos, the disappointment turned to hatred & violence. So long as social life survives, self-realization can’t be the supreme principle of ethics.

300 300 Rousseau  He was father of the Romantic movement and the philosopher of the French Revolution  His powerful influence was due to his appeal to the heart, called “sensibility”  He inferred non-human facts from human emotions.  He invented the philosophy of populist dictatorships in place of traditional absolute monarchies  Reformers followed Rousseau or Locke

301 301 Rousseau (cont.d)  Like St. Augustine’s, Rousseau’s Confessions depicted him as a great sinner destitute of all the ordinary virtues.  He considered his redeeming quality to be his warm heart, which never hindered him from base actions toward his friends  He was born in Geneva, educated as an orthodox Calvinist, & brought up by his aunt after his mother died.  He left school at age 12. At 16 he fled Geneva to Savoy where he sought conversion from a Catholic priest.

302 302 Rousseau (cont.d)  He unjustly blamed a maid who was wrongly punished for giving him a ribbon he had stolen from her dead mistress who had been Rousseau’s patron, on the basis that his affection for her was so great that she was the first person he thought to blame to protect himself.  He lived for 10 years with a wealthy lady convert from Protestantism  He spent periods as a vagabond. At one point he took advantage of a companion’s epileptic fit to abandon him.

303 303 Rousseau (cont.d)  He became secretary to the French Ambassador to Venice against whom Rousseau litigated to recover back pay whose delay turned him against the form of government in France.  An illiterate female servant at his hotel became his lifelong partner with whom he had five children & could feel superior.  Literary success came late in life after he won a prize for an essay claiming that science, letters & the arts are the worst enemies of morals and, by creating wants, are the sources of slavery.

304 304 Rousseau (cont.d)  He admired Sparta. He especially admired the life of Lycurgus (of Sparta). Rousseau took success in war as the test of merit.  He also admired the noble savage whom Europeans could defeat in war.  He held science to have an ignoble origin & to be incompatible with virtue. Astronomy came from the superstition of astrology Eloquence came from ambition Geometry came from avarice Ethics had its source in human pride Education & printing were deplored

305 305 Rousseau (cont.d)  In his second essay “Discourse on Inequality” he held Man is naturally good & made bad only by institutions. This was the opposite of the Church’s doctrine of original sin & salvation. The state of nature was just a standard to judge our present state. Natural law should be deduced from the state of nature, but is impossible to determine as long as we are ignorant of natural man. Private property is the origin of civil society & social inequalities, due to the first man who enclosed some land, called it his own, & found people simple enough to believe him.

306 306 Rousseau (cont.d)  In his second essay “Discourse on Inequality” he held (cont.d) A deplorable revolution introduced metallurgy & agriculture, grain being the symbol of misfortune Savage man, once he has dined, is at peace with all nature. Psychologist Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs would on that account be a product of socialization.  Rousseau reconverted to Calvinism to accept honors from his native city, Geneva, & resettle there where Voltaire had also settled.

307 307 Rousseau (cont.d)  Besides his dispute with Hume, he had a running dispute with Voltaire Voltaire treated Rousseau as a mischievous madman. Rousseau respected Voltaire’s genius but attacked him for impiety & disrespect. Rousseau supported Geneva’s Puritan ban on theatre, including Voltaire’s plays, on the basis that savages never act in plays, Plato disapproved of them, & the Catholic Church refused to marry or bury actors. Voltaire called the “Discourse on Inequality” a book “against the human race” written with never “such a cleverness used in the design of making us all stupid”.

308 308 Rousseau (cont.d)  Besides his dispute with Hume, he had a running dispute with Voltaire (cont.d) Rousseau attacked Voltaire for doubting Providential government of the world because of the Lisbon earthquake  Rousseau thought it good for large numbers of people to die suddenly from time to time.  Rousseau maintained that if people in Lisbon had lived dispersed in the woods, as people should be, they would have escaped uninjured.  Rousseau wrote Emile, a treatise on natural religion whose chapter “The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar” irritated Catholic & Protestant orthodoxy.

309 309 Rousseau (cont.d)  He write The Social Contract which advocated democracy & denied the divine right of kings.  He fled to the protection of Prussian King Frederick the Great after the governments of France & Geneva condemned his books & ordered his arrest.

310 310 Rousseau (cont.d)  Three years later he fled to England where Hume  assisted him until Rousseau became insane with persecution phobia  found Rousseau had a more acute feeling of pain than pleasure, “like a man who was stripped…of his skin”. King George III granted Rousseau a pension (because Rousseau was a destabilizing revolutionary force in France) Rousseau befriended Sir Edmond Burke until Burke could not bear Rousseau’s unprincipled vanity.  He died in great poverty in Paris, of suspected suicide.

311 311 Rousseau (cont.d)  He invented a “private” argument for religion that provides no ground to another person to believe in it: it is the defense (now adopted by most Protestant theologians) of religious belief on the basis of “feelings” (not intellectual arguments) emotions of awe or mystery the sense of right & wrong the feeling of aspiration

312 312 Rousseau (cont.d)  “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the voice of nature has revealed to a priest disgraced for seducing an unmarried woman. The priest rejects the wisdom of philosophers represented by Rousseau in not precise or logical form. After deciding God exists, the vicar considers rules of conduct which he finds written by nature “in the depths of my heart”, with “conscience” as his guide, and thus freed from the “terrible apparatus of philosophy” to be men “without being learned”,

313 313 Rousseau (cont.d)  “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the voice of nature has revealed to a priest dis- graced for seducing an unmarried woman. (cont.d) dispensed from “wasting our life in the study of morals”, with “at less cost a more assured guide”. Our natural feelings lead us to serve the common interest (no “Original” Sin) Our reason urges selfishness (for Locke pleasure maximizing that when considering the long run serves the common interest) So, we should follow feeling, not reason, to be virtuous (“genuine”).

314 314 Rousseau (cont.d)  “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the voice of nature has revealed to a priest dis- graced for seducing an unmarried woman. (cont.d) Natural religion needs no revelation  It is revealed directly to each one  Revelation only to certain men is known only by fallible human testimony If men listened only to conscience, there would have been only one religion Hell is probably not everlasting Since men like Voltaire were now using reason to reject religion, Rousseau tried to save religion by rejecting reason

315 315 Rousseau (cont.d)  “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the voice of nature has revealed to a priest dis- graced for seducing an unmarried woman. (cont.d) Rousseau’s fictitious savage was a good husband, a kind father, destitute of greed, and practiced natural kindliness Objection: the heart  says different things to different people  provides no evidence for the existence of anything outside our emotions including any better life hereafter  cannot be refuted

316 316 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution It supports a totalitarian state with some democratic aspects It prefers the city state of Geneva & Antiquity (especially Sparta) to large empires because it makes democracy more practicable Democracy is best in small states, aristocracy in middle ones, & monarchy in large ones. Democracy is direct participation by citizens. Representative democracy is “elective aristocracy” It seeks equality at the expense of liberty

317 317 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” “One man thinks himself master of others, but remains more a slave than they are.” His social contract is more like Hobbes’ than like Locke’s, with these characteristics:  Total alienation of each associate & his rights to the “general will” of the whole community.  Since conditions are the same for all, no one has an interest in making them burdensome to others.  Complete rejection of the rights of man.  If individuals retained certain rights, there would be no common superior to judge between them, & the public, once it became its own judge on these, would ask to be so on all

318 318 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) The sovereign is  the whole community in its legislative capacity  not the appointee of Hobbes  not the government which may become tyrannical Individuals are forced to obey the general will, “forced to be free”. This is the necessity of freedom.  Hegel defined freedom as the right to obey the police  It conflicts with the romanticism of the state of nature There is no private property (unlike in Hobbes & Locke): “the State is master of all [its members’] goods”.

319 319 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) There is no division of powers (unlike in Locke & Montesquieu). “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the quality of an individual personality applied to a group. The general will is not the will of all or a majority of citizens, but the will of the body politic as a whole regarded as a person, in this case figurative compared to the real one appointed in Hobbes’ theory.  The will of all becomes the general will (in which all individual differences cancel out) only if in a deliberation all have adequate information none communicates with another (each makes an independent decision as in China’s voting rules)

320 320 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the quality of an individual personality applied to a group. …. (cont.d)  Aggregation of wills into social choice. Every man’s political opinion is governed by self-interest (as in Hobbes, Spinoza & Locke) which has 2 parts: peculiar to the individual & common to members of the community. With no opportunity to bargain & compromise, divergent individual interests cancel out and the resultant will represents the common interest. Like terrestrial gravitation toward the center of the earth resulting from the cancelling out of “selfish” attractions by every particle in the earth towards itself. The general will represents the “largest” collective satisfaction of self-interest possible, the sum including the zero-sum in the differences, of the particular wills. Prelude to utilitarianism’s “greatest” good to the “greatest number”.

321 321 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the quality of an individual personality applied to a group. …. (cont.d)  Problem: existence of subordinate associations within the state complicates the aggregation problem.  The general will of each of these may conflict with the general will of the greater community as a whole. Now, not as many votes as men, but as many as there are associations. So, as in Sparta, there should be no partial society within the State and each citizen should think only his own thoughts. If there must be subordinate organizations then, the more there are, the better so they may neutralize each other.

322 322 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the quality of an individual personality applied to a group. …. (cont.d)  Critique of power. The government may have a general will of its own different from the community’s In a large state the government must be stronger than in a small one. So, in a large state there is more need of the Sovereign to restrain the government Each government member has 3 wills: his, the government’s, & the general will. Usually his individual will is strongest rather than weakest, reducing the sense of justice & reason of those in power.

323 323 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) His theory contributes nothing to solving the old problems of eluding tyranny, which remain  He repeats Montesquieu, or  He insists on the supremacy of the legislature which, if democratic, is the Sovereign  Direct democracy is not achievable because people cannot always be assembled & occupied with public affairs  Actual democracies are elective aristocracies, the best of all governments, but not suitable to all countries. Suitable to countries neither very hot nor very cold without surplus production & therefore without the evil of luxury, which should be confined to a monarch & his court & not spread.

324 324 Rousseau (cont.d)  Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders of the French Revolution (cont.d) It reintroduced the habit of metaphysical abstraction among the theorists of democracy Doctrine of the general will made possible the mystic identification of a leader with his people. Hegel praises Rousseau for this doctrine, and the distinction between general will & will of all.

325 325 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism  British empiricists: their temper was social, in favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy was subjective, following a tendency from St. Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s windowless monads. Inconsistency Despite subjectivism, they cared about what was happening in the world. For Locke knowledge is perception only of agreement or disagreement between ideas. But the real existence of things “present” to the senses could be known in simple ideas which are the product of the operation of things on the mind.

326 326 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism (cont.d)  British empiricists: their temper was social, in favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy was subjective, following a tendency from St. Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d) Berkeley abolished the physical world altogether, even as a hypothesis. But he did not deny knowledge of God whose action substituted in perceptions for the missing regularity in the physical world.

327 327 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism (cont.d)  British empiricists: their temper was social, in favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy was subjective, following a tendency from St. Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d) Hume denied any role for hypotheses although his philosophy leaves an opportunity for such a role. He denied the self and any basis for induction (general statements about perceptions) or causation, including God’s action retained by Berkeley as a basis. Because including external “cause” in the definition of an impression distinguishes it from an idea, Hume rejected any difference between between impression & idea. So he abolished any basis besides degree of logical consistency for distinguishing between rational belief & credulity.

328 328 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism (cont.d)  British empiricists: their temper was social, in favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy was subjective, following a tendency from St. Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d) Locke’s “hypothesis” of things “present” to the mind served to distinguish the enthusiast from the sober man at a time when people tired of enthusiasm Hume’s withdrawal of that hypothesis served to remove an obstacle to enthusiasm when people were tiring of reason.

329 329 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism (cont.d)  German philosophy developed to safeguard knowledge & virtue from the subversive doctrines of the late 18 th century by restoring a driving role for logic (added to empiricism), and a focus not on understanding but on will and action (added to Romanticism) Kant built a rational moral system on Hume’s subjectivism. He was politically unimportant. Hegel extrapolated from the Kantian individual to the world to develop a rational system of history & action by the state. Fichte & Schelling built on Rousseau’s Romanticism to empower the individual will.

330 330 The German Subjective Rationalist Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism (cont.d)  German philosophy developed to safeguard knowledge & virtue from the subversive doctrines of the late 18 th century by restoring a driving role for logic (added to empiricism), and a focus not on understanding but on will and action (added to Romanticism) cont.d German philosophy  emphasized mind over matter  rejected utilitarian ethics in favor of abstract logic-driven systems  was scholastic in tone as the first product of philosophy by university professors since later scholasticism, not by worldly or practical men.

331 331 Kant  He is considered the greatest of modern philosophers  He was educated in the Wolfian version of Leibniz’s philosophy but abandoned it because of Hume’s rejection of causality which Kant endeavored to answer/refute Rousseau’s Emile for its appeal to the heart  He was a pietist & a liberal who sympathized with the French Revolution at the beginning & believed in democracy

332 332 Kant (cont.d)  His principle that every man be treated as an end in himself is a form of the doctrine of the Rights of Man  He found nothing worse than subjection of a man to the will of another  He wrote on physical geography, on the theory of earthquakes after the Lisbon earthquake, & whether the Atlantic Ocean made the European west wind moist.  He anticipated but without serious arguments Laplace’s nebular hypothesis in astronomy, but also conjectured that all planets are inhabited, with the most distant ones having the best inhabitants

333 333 Kant (cont.d)  He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason to refute Hume by proving that, while knowledge cannot transcend experience, part of knowledge is apriori (including logic) and not based on experience

334 334 Kant (cont.d)  He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d) He makes a clear separation between two distinctions that Leibniz confused: analytic/synthetic & apriori / aposteriori.  Analytic/synthetic In an analytic proposition the subject is part of the predicate: “a tall man is a man”  (Ta  Ma)  Ma The negation of an analytic proposition is false: ((Ta  Ma)  Ma)  * (  (Ta  Ma)  Ma)  (  (Ta  Ma)  Ma)  (Ta  Ma   Ma) *Logical rule/identity: (A  B)  (  A  B)  (  A  B)  (A  B)  A synthetic proposition is a proposition that’s not analytic T  M (a  T  M)  (a  M) TM