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Dominique Unruh Non-interactive zero-knowledge with quantum random oracles Dominique Unruh University of Tartu With Andris Ambainis, Ansis Rosmanis Estonian Theory Days WORK IN PROGRESS!

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Dominique Unruh Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles2 Classical Crypto (Quick intro.)

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Dominique Unruh Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles3 Statement x (math. fact) Witness w (proof of fact) P ZK proof of x Zero-knowledge Proof leaks nothing about witness Soundness Hard to prove wrong statements Uses: Proving honest behavior, signatures, …

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Dominique Unruh Towards efficient NIZK: Sigma protocols Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles commitment challenge response Prover “Special soundness”:Two different responses allow to compute witness ⇒ For wrong statement, prover fails w.h.p. Verifier

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Dominique Unruh Toward efficient NIZK: Random Oracles Model hash function as random function H Many useful proof techniques 5 H x H(x) Learn queries Insert “special” answers (“programming”) Rewind and re-answer

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Dominique Unruh NIZK with random oracles Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles6 Fiat-Shamir Fischlin com chal resp Prover H(com) NIZK consists of com,chal,resp Prover can’t cheat: H is like a verifier Security-proof: Rewinding Fix com Try different chal, resp until H(chal,resp)=xxx000 Proof := com,chal,resp Need to query several chal,resp Implies existence of witness

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Dominique Unruh Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles7 Quantum! Classical security easy. But if adversary has a quantum computer?

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Dominique Unruh The “pick-one trick” (simplified) Given a set S can encode it as a quantum state |Ψ 〉 s.t. for any set Z you find one x 1 ∈ S∩Z but not two x 1,x 2 ∈ S Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles8 S Z x1x1 x2x2

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Dominique Unruh Attacking Fischlin Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles9 Fix com Try different chal, resp until H(chal,resp)=xxx000 Proof = com,chal,resp S={chal,resp} Z={H(·)=xxx000} Valid fake NIZK Without knowing witness! (Because we have only one S-element) [Fiat-Shamir attacked similarly]

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Dominique Unruh How does “one-pick trick” work? Grover: Quantum algorithm for searching Observation: – First step of Grover produces a state encoding the search space This state (plus modified Grover) implements “one-pick trick” Hard part: Prove “can’t find two x 1,x 2 ∈ S ” Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles10

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Dominique Unruh No efficient quantum NIZK? Non-interactive ZK with Quantum Random Oracles11 All random oracle NIZK broken? No: under extra conditions, Fiat-Shamir and Fischlin might work (no proof idea) We found a provable new construction (less efficient)

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Dominique Unruh I thank for your attention This research was supported by European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa

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