Presentation on theme: "Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan: The Modern Theory of Coordination Problems in Development Karla Hoff ABCDE Conference, 4-18-00, Revised 9-16-00."— Presentation transcript:
Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan: The Modern Theory of Coordination Problems in Development Karla Hoff ABCDE Conference, 4-18-00, Revised 9-16-00
A coordination failure can occur if: Agents' behavior creates externalities that raise the relative return to each agent of those behaviors by an amount large enough that there are multiple equilibria, and some are better for everyone
Early 1970s: Externalities are a “fable,” say Coase’s followers Coase (1974) British history suggests that market arrangements (once property rights are defined) can efficiently provide for lighthouses. Cheung (1973) Contracts between beekeepers and orchard owners resolve the market failure of "unpaid" services
Old and modern views of externalities and public goods Old view: “Atomistic ” New view: “Ecological " Externalities Beekeeper Systematic, diffuse externalities Search costs Corruption Spillovers in technology Social and political interactions Role model effects Public goods Lighthouse Price vector (if there are multiple equilibrium price vectors) Group reputation Knowledge
Are coordination failures important? In theory? In empirical investigations? For policy?
Example 1. Training and innovation A central difference between advanced and less developed economies is the extent of training and innovation. Can we explain a low level of training and innovation as a coordination failure?
Training and innovation Training and innovation Train Do not train Worker’s decision tree Innovate Do not innovate Firm’s decision tree Suppose that there is perfect contracting between a firm and its employee. How can a “coordination failure” then occur?
Joint decisions are made by a single worker and his employer Period 1Period 2 Decisions over investment in innovation and training output is produced Separation with probability s Source: Acemoglu 1997. Note: The pink node is a chance node, reflecting exogenous risk of separation. Train and innovate Do neither 0 Stay together Separate - C + B -C + [B probability of a good match]
Example 2. Rent-seeking DC’s and LDCs differ in the extent to which economic activity is directed at rent-seeking, rather than output enhancement. Can we explain a high proportion of rent- seekers in the population as a coordination failure?
Agent’s decision tree Cash crop producer Subsistence producer Rent seeker 5 10 if there are no rent-seekers 8 if producers do not retreat to subsistence
Multiple equilibria may exist $ 0 payoff to cash-crop producer High-income equilibrium ratio of rent-seekers to cash crop producers payoff to rent- seeker Source: Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny 1993 Acemoglu 1994 10 8 5 Low-income equilibrium
Example 3. Social organization Some neighborhoods are characterized by low civic participation and crime, and also low maintenance of property. Can we explain that as a coordination failure?
Household’s decision tree in residential community Buy home equity and expend effort in home and community improvement Do not buy home equity and do not expend effort 3 assumptions : (1) Price appreciation depends on fraction ( x) of households who are homeowners; (2) There are capital market imperfections; and (3) “Home improvement effort” can’t be contracted for. These assumptions imply that a homeowner’s payoff increases with income and with x. Payoff to homeownership - cost of borrowing - cost of effort Payoff to renting
Multiple equilibria may exist Income, y 0 1 critical value of y a t which homeownership becomes the preferred strategy income of the richest x th percentile of households x, fraction of homeowners Blighted neighborhood Neighborhood with high civic activism Source: Hoff and Sen 1999
Unresolved Question Unresolved Question How important are local interaction effects in explaining divergent fortunes of countries and communities?
Ex. 4. Transition Economies and the Emergence of the Rule of Law There is a debate about two alternative strategies in the transition process: regulation followed by privatization versus privatization without prior regulation
Two Views “Privatization offers an enormous political benefit for the creation of institutions supporting private property because it creates the very private owners who then begin lobbying the government...for institutions that support property rights.” Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny 1998 “[The owner typically] doesn’t pay wages to the employees, doesn’t pay taxes, is not interested in the enterprise’s development, establishes subsidiaries in order to ‘pump out’ the assets while leaving only the legal shell of the company, etc.” Radygin 1999
Decision tree of agent with controlling interest in a firm, after privatization State capture Rule of law VSVS VLVL If V L > t > V S, the “efficient owner” is a creature of his environment Note: The pink node is a chance node. Tunnel value out Maximize firm value t
A “partial reform” trap is possible t 0 1 Critical value of t at which tunneling becomes the preferred strategy t* Tunneling value for the richest x th percentile of owners fraction of owners who tunnel Rule of law State capture Source: Hoff 2000 Shift up to pink curve depicts the effect of an increase in the entrepreneurial ability of those with control rights, or greater confidence in the emergence of the rule of law
Summary of the ecological/social interactions perspective Agents’ decisions Train/innovate or not Rent-seek or produce Own or rent Tunnel or invest productively the environment search costs returns to production local civic participation state capture or rule of law depend on, shape & ultimately may make traps of
Role for Policy Experiments "The task of... finding out which combination of activities should be coordinated is not unlike the problem of hundreds of people, scattered in a dense, foggy forest, trying to locate one another...even the market mechanism cannot solve it...” Matsuyama 1995 There may be great scope for improvement through experimentation.