Scope Develop and launch two spacecrafts to Mars during the 1998 Mars transfer opportunity. Development cost was estimated at $183.9 Million. Collect and return to Earth, science data resulting from the water and remote investigations of the Martian environment by the Lander.
Scope Orbiter should act as a relay station for five years. Assist in data transmission to and from the Mars Polar Lander. Provide detailed information about the atmospheric temperature, dust, water vapor, and clouds on Mars. Provide valuable information about the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) in Mars.
A second spacecraft Mars Polar Lander will be launched. Perform daily recording of the sound and images of Mars for one Martian year (687 days). The Purpose of the mission is to gather atmospheric data of each of the seasons on Mars. The mission's projected end date is December 1, 2004.
Feb 7, 1994: Program Started. May 1, 1995: Project Manager Named. JPL names John B. McNamee manager of the newly-formed Mars Surveyor '98 Project. May 8, 1995: Instrument Proposals Solicited. Oct 20, 1995: Instruments Selected. Dec 1, 1995: Project Scientist Named. Richard Zurek Jan 4, 1997: Orbiter Design Reviewed. Aug 1, 1997 - Sep 30, 1998: Orbiter Assembled and Tested. Feb 1, 1998: Lander and Orbiter Renamed. Dec 11, 1998: Orbiter Launched. Pre-Launch Launch & Cruise 02/07/94 12/11/98 09/23/99 12/01/2004 Orbiting
Dec 11, 1998: Lander Leaves Earth. Dec 11, 1998 - Sept 11, 1999: Mars Orbiter Interplanetary Cruise. Feb 3, 1999: New Management. Richard A. Cook is the MSOP project manager. September 1999, the spacecraft was to fire its main engine to achieve an elliptical orbit around Mars. Sept. 23, 1999: The Mars Climate Orbiter mission was lost when it entered the Martian atmosphere on a lower than expected trajectory. Pre-Launch Launch & Cruise 02/07/94 12/11/98 09/23/99 12/01/2004 Orbiting
Faster, Better, Cheaper Costs were reduced and program scope — including both content and the infusion of new technology — increased at the same time. The the focus on cost and schedule reduction increased risk beyond acceptable levels on some NASA projects.
Mission Success First Schedule Recommendations: Number One Priority Should be Mission Success over Cost and Schedule. “bottoms up” budget and schedule should be developed. The team should take ownership of the schedule There should be adequate schedule slack available to solve problems. Check if mission success has been compromised as a result of schedule?
Cost A total of $327.6 million was allocated for the Mars ’98 Project (which included the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar Lander) $193.1 million for spacecraft development, $91.7 million for launch, and $42.8 million for mission operations $80M of the $193.1M went toward the building of the MCO spacecraft $5M of the $42.8M used to operations the MCO
Cost $35.5M went toward the launching of the MCO Mission cost of the MCO totaled $120.5M (36.8% of the total budget allotted to both missions) The Independent Assessment Team charge with investigating the failure of the spacecrafts concluded that the ’98 Mars Project was at least 30% under-funded.
Project Management JPL/Mr. John McNamee Project Manager for MCO and MPL HQ/SD/Mr. Steven Brody MCO Program Executive NASA Headquarters MSFC/DA01/Mr. Drew Smith Special Assistant to Center Director George C. Marshall Space Flight Center HQ/SR/Dr. Charles Holmes Program Executive for Science Operations NASA Headquarters HQ/QE/Mr. Michael Card Program Manager NASA Headquarters email@example.com
Project Management Existing Processes and Requirements NASA has significant infrastructure of processes and requirements in place to enable robust program and project management, beginning with the capstone document: NASA Procedures and Guidelines 7120.5. Many of these clearly have a direct bearing on mission success.
Project Management So What Went Wrong? Heart of Mission’s Navigation Mishap Due to a conversion error in which commands to the spacecraft were sent in English units rather than metric units Unofficially, the problem had been detected but due to politics between the development team and JPL, a fix was never deployed
Project Management The official report cited the following “contributing factors” to the loss of the spacecraft undetected errors in ground-based models of the spacecraft the operational navigational team was not fully informed on the details of the way that Mars Climate Orbiter was pointed in space a final, optional engine firing to raise the spacecraft’s path relative to Mars before its arrival was considered but not performed
Project Management Summary One Technical Problem failed conversion of unit Many Process and Social Problems No review (e.g. verification), insufficient training, informal processes in place, formal processes ignored Led to a destroyed spacecraft
Your consent to our cookies if you continue to use this website.