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Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Sequential Games.

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Presentation on theme: "Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Sequential Games."— Presentation transcript:

1 Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Sequential Games

2 A Sequential Game Our basic payoff matrix assumes that strategies are enacted at the same time, as in odds or evens In many games, the moves take place in sequence –In chess, one player moves –Then the other player moves

3 Sequential Games A Sequential Game A firm is considering entering a new business. After it enters, or doesn’t, the incumbent can either expand or maintain his capacity.

4 Sequential Games A Sequential Game A firm is considering entering a new business. After it enters (or doesn’t), the incumbent can either expand or maintain his capacity. The incumbent threatens that it will expand capacity if the new firm enters. If it does, the new firm will lose money.

5 Sequential Games A Sequential Game A firm is considering entering a new business. After it enters, or doesn’t, the incumbent can either expand or maintain his capacity. The incumbent threatens that it will expand capacity should the new firm enter the business. If it does, the new firm will lose money. A simple test: Is it then in the interest of the existing firm to expand? If so, the threat to expand is credible. If not, it is simply a bluff.

6 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Stay OutEnter

7 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand

8 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

9 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

10 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

11 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

12 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

13 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

14 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

15 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

16 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10)

17 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) The choice is easy; expand. The incumbent’s threat to expand is not credible because it is not in his self- interest

18 Sequential Games How to be Credible How can the incumbent firm make its threat credible? –It wants to expand, but also wants to keep the new entrant out.

19 Sequential Games How to be Credible How can the incumbent firm make its threat credible? It could, for example, sign a binding contact on a new building.

20 Sequential Games How to be Credible How can the incumbent firm make its threat credible? It could, for example, sign a binding contact on a new building. –Suppose it spends $15 on a new building. –If it actually expands, the money is not lost. –If it doesn’t the money is lost forever.

21 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) (10, 0)(0, -5)

22 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) (10, 0)(0, -5)

23 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) (10, 0)(0, -5)

24 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) (10, 0)(0, -5)

25 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Entrant Incumbent Stay OutEnter Expand Not Expand (10, 15)(-5,5)(0,20)(0,10) (10, 0)(0, -5) The potential entrant will stay out because the threat to expand is now, thanks to the advance commitment, credible.

26 Sequential Games How to be Credible This example illustrates the importance of credibility and how to achieve it.

27 Sequential Games How to be Credible This example illustrates the importance of credibility and how to achieve it. An example: Independence Day –Important to be the holiday blockbuster –With this title, the promise to come out is credible.

28 Sequential Games Another Illustration I am thinking of hiring you to do some work.

29 Sequential Games Another Illustration I am thinking of hiring you to do some work. –I get $60 of benefit –You give up $40 of leisure –We agree on $50.

30 Sequential Games Another Illustration I am thinking of hiring you to do some work. –I get $60 of benefit –You give up $40 of leisure –We agree on $50. However the agreement is not enforceable.

31 Sequential Games Another Illustration I am thinking of hiring you to do some work. However the agreement is not enforceable. Should you show up and do the work?

32 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0)

33 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0)

34 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0)

35 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0) In short, you know it will be in the employer’s interest not to pay once the work is done. So, the work will never get done.

36 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0) There is an important missing element: the employer’s right to sue for non-payment. The legal system plays an important role. Suppose the courts would award $60 if the employer failed to pay.

37 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0) (20, 0)

38 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0) (20, 0)

39 Sequential Games The Payoff Strategy Employee Employer Don’t WorkWork Pay Don’t Pay (-40, 60)(10,10)(50,-50)(0,0)(0,0) (20, 0) Because we have a legal system and contracts are enforceable, you will do the work and get paid. We have a win-win situation.

40 Sequential Games Some Extensions If I pay you in advance, we have the same issue

41 Sequential Games Some Extensions If I pay you in advance, we have the same issue Without a legal system, we would pass up many valuable opportunities for contracts and exchange of goods and services.

42 Sequential Games End ©2003 Charles W. Upton


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