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Michael W. Klein Fletcher School, Tufts University The Political Economy of International Money Tower Center for Political Studies, SMU Federal Reserve.

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Presentation on theme: "Michael W. Klein Fletcher School, Tufts University The Political Economy of International Money Tower Center for Political Studies, SMU Federal Reserve."— Presentation transcript:

1 Michael W. Klein Fletcher School, Tufts University The Political Economy of International Money Tower Center for Political Studies, SMU Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization & Monetary Policy Institute April 4, 2014

2 Keynes’ Views on Capital Mobility 1920 (commenting on the pre-WWI period) “The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth... he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world.”

3 1933 (speech in Dublin) “I sympathize … with those who would minimize rather than those who would maximize economic entanglements among nations. Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel – these are things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be home-spun whenever it is reasonable and conveniently possible and, above all, let finance be national. …and Capital Controls

4 More Recently 1990s: “Emerging Market Economies” coined Benefits of capital account liberalization Stan Fischer, January 2003 Ely Lecture to the American Economic Association “…despite the crises and the arguments of many critics of globalization, almost no country has [shut themselves off from international capital flows]. The revealed preference of the emerging market countries is to stay involved with the international financial system.”

5 Reversal of Views in Early 2000s EMEs begin to re-introduce capital controls Kenneth Rogoff, when serving as Chief Economist and Director of Research of the IMF “These days, everyone agrees that a more eclectic approach to capital account liberalization is required.” Finance and Development, December 2002

6 In Wake of Crisis: “The Reformation” QE2 & EME appreciation, inflow controls Brazilian finance minister, Guido Mantegna declares “Currency Wars” in September IMF Staff Notes (2010, 2011). Capital Controls as a “Last resort” – The Economist “The Reformation: A disjointed effort by the IMF to refine its thinking on capital controls,” April 7, 2011 Jeanne, Subramanian, Williamson (2012) PIIE “properly designed, they might even be a regular instrument of economic policy.”

7 What are Capital Controls? Differential treatment of residents & non-residents. Administrative – Outright prohibitions – Reporting requirements – Licensing requirements Market-Based – Taxes (e.g. Tobin Tax on forex transactions, Brazil’s IOF tax on existing equities) – URR (e.g. Chile’s encaje 1992 – 1998). – Thailand (10/2010) re-introduce 15% withholding tax on interest payments and capital gains on bonds held by foreign investors

8 Gates vs. Walls “Capital Controls” broad term Long-Standing / Episodic Long-standing controls, e.g. China – Seen as allowing China to keep RMB undervalued Episodic controls, e.g. Brazil IOF – Currency Wars, 9/2009 after 30% appreciation in 2009 Walls vs. Gates more apparent now because trend towards liberalization halted, controls re- imposed

9 Why Gates ≠ Walls Gates may be less efficacious than Walls Gates might not latch shut tightly – Evasion more likely if investment in surveillance, reporting and enforcement. Gates might shut too late – Recognition lag; Implementation lag Gates may have rusty hinges: “Punch Bowl” Benefits of Gates rather than Walls Procyclical More narrowly targeted Gates vs. Bank Regulation: broader, better for countries lacking regulatory & supervisory frameworks.

10 Why Gates vs. Walls Matters Practical discussion on the desirability of capital controls centers on episodic control – These can be imposed and removed – Theory more supportive of these than of long- standing But the evidence on the efficacy of controls (e.g. weathering the Great Recession) based on experience with long-standing, not episodic.

11 Capital Controls: 2 Potential Roles Trilemma – Scope for Monetary Autonomy Prudential: focus on inflow controls – Surges – Asset Price Booms – RER appreciation 11

12 Exchange Rate Management M Monetary Policy Independence Capital Mobility The Policy Trilemma: Typically considered Tradeoff of B vs. C; avoided choosing A

13 Δ Own Interest Rate w/ Δ Base Country Interest Rate

14

15 15 Trilemma Results with “partial” policies: Klein & Shambaugh 2014 “Rounding the Corners of the Policy Trilemma” Less←Monetary Autonomy →More Exchange Rate Regime Peg≠Soft Peg≠Float Capital Control Regime Open=Mid-Open≠Closed  Pegs sacrifice autonomy.  Gates ineffective, perhaps except for comprehensive gates.  Autonomy: Focus on local conditions rather than base?

16 From “Capital Controls: Gates vs. Walls,” VOX EU, Jan. 17, Gates and the Real Exchange Rate

17 Conclusion Distinction between walls and gates Policy debate over imposition of gates more relevant for many countries than erecting walls Evidence shows that gates, unless broad- based, do not afford monetary autonomy, or insulate an economy from effects from international capital markets.


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