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D/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 2012 Information Systems Security Organization.

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Presentation on theme: "D/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 2012 Information Systems Security Organization."— Presentation transcript:

1 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 2012 Information Systems Security Organization (ISSA) Information Security Forum Dave and Buster's 180 E Waterfront Dr Homestead, Pennsylvania Presenters: Mark Yanalitis CISSP, IT Infrastructure Architect, PNC Bank Bill Johnson CPP, Director of Corporate Security and Employee Safety, Highmark Inc.

2 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Goals for today Define Red Teaming and its’ rationale Discuss differences between commercial and full-spectrum Red Teaming Discuss differences between commercial and full-spectrum methodologies Examine common engagement risks Application of Red Teaming methods A companion document exists as supplemental reading resource for this presentation Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 2

3 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Red Teaming Definitions “An array of activity where the overall goal is to understand the adversaries perspective in order to identify one's own vulnerabilities and challenge one 's own assumptions.” 1 “Authorized, adversary-based assessment for defensive purposes.“ 2 “Review of control design and threat-based penetration testing to simulate actual attacks.” 3 Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 3

4 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Commercial v. Full Spectrum Commercial engagements Threat-based modeling Compliance mandates IT Audit adjunct testing Goal is quick penetration Cost and time driven Automation dependency Survey the known Full-Spectrum engagements Capabilities-based or hybrid modeling Simulations Goal is understanding Risk analysis driven Human in the loop Expand the knowable by parsing the unknown Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 4 Lets explore the motivating factors for commercial and full-spectrum red teams

5 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Methodologies Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 5 Targeting Client Engagement Master Service Agreement Statement of Work Rules of Engagement Bond of Indemnity Identify Scope Compromise Report Reconnaissance Scan & Attack Reload Commercial Full Spectrum Source: Sandia National Laboratories IDART, 2011

6 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved The Intelligence Process Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 6 4 Schudel, G. and Wood, B. (RAND, SANDIA & GTE: 2000)

7 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Intelligence Cycle A full-spectrum red team will focus upon likely adversarial courses of action as well as current capabilities. Internally to the team, a need exists to have common doctrinal understanding of resource identification, intelligence collection, collection management, training, and leadership. Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 7

8 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Intel Fusion Approach Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 8 5 Adapted from Steele, Robert, D. (New Craft of Intelligence: 2002) A red team collects and produces intelligence at variable rates and differing fidelities. The red team leader must be prepared for these eventualities.

9 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Bias in the Intel process Sources of cognitive error Sources of cognitive error can be found in individual minds, the collective agreement of the team, team composition, and in the quality of support given to the effort. Each individual team member carries both a cognitive bias as the known outsider pre-judged by their own past experiences, as well as the bias of their culture. Organizational and environmental bias indicators The assignment is not taken seriously The team or sponsor becomes too removed from the decision-making process A lack of interaction with the blue team Insufficient access to the details of the target Loss of team confidences The team fails to capture the details of the adversary, and instead mirrors itself The red team does offers no challenge to the blue team Thin top cover: the lack of a robust channel to act on findings in a timely manner, or consider findings with any seriousness. Applied post-event after many bodies already have been thrown at the problem The wrong team targeting the wrong problem (Threat- based team vs. a capabilities based problem) A lack of clarity on the urgency of issues at hand The red team approach is a one-time activity Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 9 6 Defense Science Board. Task Force Report on The Role and Status of Red Teaming Activities: (DoD: 2003 )

10 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Role play the Adversary Lets explore the difference between a threat- based adversary model and capabilities-based adversary model. Threat – A threat represents a known quantity, a known effect singular in origin, essentially a Pathogen-Antigen model. A threat is an X-Y direct, or inverse relationship. Capability – Actors (or a confederation of multiple actors) capable of achieving a singular goal either due to access to resources, or some form of institutional support. The force multiplier effects of capability-based actors behave like an algebraic expression where leading factors have orders of magnitude, possibly even having orders of operation. Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 10

11 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Adversarial Modeling Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 11 Red Team A Red Team B Adversary A Adversary B Adversary C The Universe of Actors and Actions In the full-spectrum Red Team context, the sponsor may need more than one type of red team to realistically model the capability. In the commercial world, modeling capability- based actors is the exception, not the norm. Source: Sandia National Laboratories IDART, 2011

12 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Adversarial Prototyping Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 12 7 Op. Cit. Schudel, G. and Wood, B. : 2000 ‥

13 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Threat Profiling Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 13 8 Duggan, et. al. SANDIA, 2007

14 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Attack Trees Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 14 9 Schneier, Bruce. Modeling Security Threats (Dr. Dobb’s Journal: 1999)

15 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Smart Grid Attack Diagram Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 15 10 Penn State University SIIS Laboratory. (Network and Security Research Center: 2010) Corporate Network The Internet DDR PSTN DID 1-(724)-got-powr 128K CSU/DSU Link over carrier

16 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Smart Grid Attack Tree Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 16 11 Ibid. Penn State University SIIS Laboratory: 2010

17 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved When to Use Red Teaming Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 17 12 Atkins, William. Read Teaming – It's Good to be Bad. (Missouri S&T ACM SIG in Security: 2010)

18 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 18 Ok, you try it now. Target: A reciprocating high-speed gas compressor Source: BPI Compression 2011BPI Compression

19 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Case Study Client Situation A new foreign multi-national corporation (OCONUS) enters Southwestern PA as a result of a purchase and repackage of a number of leases sold by Chesapeake Energy. Almost all of these functional wells remain capped, and lack the infrastructure to get the gas to market. The corporations‘ local CONUS office has orders to open several fields and secure the infrastructure needed to handle gas compression and transfer. The local office issues an RFP, and engages a low-bid contractor solution. The preferred corporate contracted insurer does not feel the site protection solution adequately protects their underwriting investment of leased equipment. The insurer will not offer favorable rates until the site security concerns resolve to their satisfaction. Home office Corporate Security comes into the conversation late, and recommends that the site protection solution for the compressor be turned over to a Red Team/Blue Team for evaluation. Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 19

20 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 20 The red team simulation revealed complete destruction of the compressor and block house site plan in 10 minutes. What was the solution? Where are the vulnerabilities? why did the solution work? ½ ton pickup A cinderblock Fender Jack Stump Remover Mentos Duct Tape Magnesium Ribbon 2 black Super Fan Suits Five 2L bottles of Cola One 2L bottle of Clorox 1 Large Sling Shot Estimated 3 weeks of site observation and rehearsal Flood light and CCTV camera No buried fence It frequently rains here

21 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Case Study Red Team Solution The full red team observed and collected intelligence on the target site for 3 weeks developing a number of information collections and applying information analysis techniques. They chose their best scenario. During the preparation phase, the pair melted down Stump Remover, which contains Potassium Nitrate, the main ingredient in smoke bombs. By adding in some refined sugar, the two made 2 baseball size smoke bombs on a kitchen stove. Magnesium ribbon, bought at an online camping store with a stolen credit card, served as the wicks. The Cola was cut with 20% Clorox and the tops were taped over with Mentos in the bottle necks then loosely capped. The two planned to tape the bottle bombs into the seats and floors of the truck on site, and tie in place the steering wheel.melted down Stump RemoverMagnesium ribbon Two red team members drove a rental car and a stolen pickup to the nearby target site. The red team members changed into black superfan suits (to prevent any hair, shoe, or clothing fibers from falling into the truck). The pair drove lights-out, a sanitized 3/4 ton stolen pickup truck (interior scrub-down, second stolen plate, and tire replaced with junk bald tires) to within 30 yards of the block house on a rainy night. On site, the truck rear was jacked up. While one threw/shot the lit smoke bombs at the base of the fence near the camera, the other placed the cinder block on the accelerator and turned on the ignition, and put the truck in drive. When enough smoke obscured the camera, the jack was kicked out and the truck sped forward ramming the fence and crashing into the block house at high speed. The Mento/Cola/Clorox bombs burst inside the cabin of the truck spoiling the interior environment defeating most physical forensic analysis. The truck destroyed the compressor, and brought most of the block house down on the target. The two fled on foot to the get-away car, and then later burned their suits in to black plastic lumps and discarded them.superfanMento/Cola/Clorox bombs burst Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 21

22 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Case Study: Blue Team Counter-Measures Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 22

23 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Case Study: Blue Team Counter-Measures Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 23

24 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Thank you for listening, are there any questions or comments? Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 24

25 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved Use your powers for the greater good, not evil. 25 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies Friday May 4 th, 2012 Fight the Good Fight

26 d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved References 1McGannon, Michael. Developing Red Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. (Red Team Journal: APR 2004). Internet. Found at http://redteamjournal.com/ http://redteamjournal.com/ 2Sandia IDART Methodology. http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/index.htmlhttp://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/index.html 3Price Waterhouse Coopers. Is your critical infrastructure safe? (PWC LLP:2010) Internet. Found at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/utilities/assets/cyber-attacks.pdf 5.http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/utilities/assets/cyber-attacks.pdf 4Schudel, G. and Wood, B. Modeling the Behavior of a Cyber Terrorist. (RAND National Security Research Division proceeding of workshop. Appendix C: Santa Monica, California: 2000) 49-59. Internet. Found at http://www.csl.sri.com/users/bjwood/cyber_terrorist_model_v4a.pdf. http://www.csl.sri.com/users/bjwood/cyber_terrorist_model_v4a.pdf 5Steele, Robert, D. The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats. (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: 2002). 34-36. 6Department of Defense Science Board. Task Force Report on The Role and Status of Red Teaming Activities (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Washington, D.C. 20301-3140:2003). Internet. Found at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dsb-redteam.pdf www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dsb-redteam.pdf 7Op. Cit. Schudel and Wood, 2000. 8Duggan, David, P., Thomas, Sherry R., and Veitch, Cynthia K.K., and Woodward, Laura. Categorizing Threat - Building and Using a Generic Threat Matrix. (SANDIA National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM. REPORT SAND2007-5791: September 2007). Internet. Found at http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/materials/Adversary_Modeling/SAND2007-5791.pdfhttp://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/materials/Adversary_Modeling/SAND2007-5791.pdf 9Schneier, Bruce. Modeling Security Threats - Attack Trees (Reprint Dr Dobb’s Journal: 1999. Counterpane Internet Security: 1999). Internet. Found at http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.htmlhttp://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html 10Penn State University SIIS Laboratory. Advanced Metering Infrastructure Security. (Penn State University Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Computer Science and Engineering (CSE) Network and Security Research Center (NSRC): 2010). Internet. Found at http://siis.cse.psu.edu/smartgrid.htmlhttp://siis.cse.psu.edu/smartgrid.html 11Ibid. Penn State University, 2010 12Atkins, William. Read Teaming – It's Good to be Bad. (Missouri S&T ACM SIG in Security. SANDIA Critical Infrastructure Systems Department, NM, 10 FEB 2010). Internet. Found at. http://acm.device.mst.edu/security-files/2010-02-10-Red_Teaming.ppthttp://acm.device.mst.edu/security-files/2010-02-10-Red_Teaming.ppt ‡ See the supplemental paper that accompanies this presetation titled : Yanalitis, Mark. RED TEAMING APPROACH, RATIONALE, AND ENGAGEMENT RISKS (self-published: 2011). Friday May 4 th, 2012 Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies 26


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