Presentation on theme: "Perspectives on Globalization"— Presentation transcript:
1Perspectives on Globalization Causes, consequences and strategies(Economics and Politics)Lars Niklasson, Political Science, Linköping University
2Course requirements (MIER 7,5 hp, Swedish master 15 hp) Active participation in the seminarsThree mixed groupsMIER: Seminar on challengesMIER: Take-home examSwedish master: More seminars & short paper
3The idea of the course 1. How politics impacts on the economy/firms Regulation, Institutions, Governance etc.2. How economics (firms) impacts on politicsStructural change, globalization, lobbying etc.General theories (IR)Political Economy (often motives, explanations)ComparisonsIt is all about Globalization!
4What is globalization? Economic integration of the globe: We can buy cheap thingsJobs get outsourcedThe third world wins or looses?Pollution or greener technologies?Power shifts to global firms?Power shifts from the US to China?Europe needs to change a lot?
5Topics of the debate: Is everything you hear true? Inevitable (?) change through technology and the integration of markets (What more?)Leads to increased competition but also new marketsFinancial imbalance: Western governments have deficits and loans from China. Firms have money.Countries need lower taxes? and investments in skillsFirms need to understand new customers, brands, good location and flexibility/networking(Energy shortage?)
6The critique, IThe International Forum on Globalization: Alternatives to Economic Globalization, 2002:Against corporate globalization: ”big firms get too much power and ruin the resources of the planet”Local economies better than exports and integrationCultural and economic diversity is neededLocal and national political power, democracy= similar to the progressive movement in the 1890s?= other values? Other economic theories?
7The critique, II ”It’s too neoliberal”: Too much deregulation, too much belief in the marketBut some strategies are the opposite of liberalism:State support to make firms competitiveNeo-mercantilism (i.e. too little liberalism? A bad mix?)= What is the manifest strategy/-ies?What works in theory? In practice?What are our core values? How can they be promoted?
8Aims and ambitionsUnderstanding key issues in the global economy & politicsProduction, finance, trade, development, environmentGovernment and businessPolitics shapes the economy (firms): institutionsThe economy (firms) has an impact on politicsA variety of perspectivesEconomics, Politics, IR/CP, SociologyCombine and contrast, to bring out assumptionsRavenhill, Schmidt, K&L, MLD&KSA
9Questions What is globalization? (production, trade, finance) What is global regulation? (WTO, Kyoto etc)How is national politics relevant?How is policy/regulation/institutions relevant?State support for businesss(Will globalization change the models?)Why are the Nordic countries doing well?What is private and transnational regulation? How does it have an impact? (ideas)
10Perspectives on globalization Globalization is (in brief) an ongoing transformation and integration of the economy, with implications for politicsInevitable? Uniform? What are the drivers/causes?Can it be ”controlled” by politics? Can we make it “good”?A threat or an opportunity? More good than bad?”Intended” effects: More wealth in more countries; win-win, short-term problems (flexibility)Unintended effects: Poverty, environmental, big profits, degradation of industryWe need to understand it better: the drivers
11Criteria for evaluating globalization GrowthMore opportunities or more restrictions?Less government support for business?Quality of lifeWelfare, living standards (developing countries?)DemocracyAccountability? Leadership?Unintended consequences?
12What is globalization? (Ravenhill 2011: intro) Economic integration: FDI and TNCsInternational/GlobalFrom mercantilism to integrationBretton Woods 1944American hegemonyFrom embedded liberalism to neoliberalism?The crisis : what does it show?Why crisis? Why rescue packages?(IPE as a new subfield)See also McGrew (2011) table 9.3
13How can we study globalization? Several research paradigms (Watson 2011)Different kinds of causality (McGrew 2011)My solution:A list of factors, from structural to culturalAdditive, successive factors: all are relevant, but in different waysUntangle the mess of causal factors! Set them in relation to each other.(Lichbach & Zuckerman 1998: Comparative Politics)
14A list of successive factors Structures: Economy, technologyInstitutions: International regulationInternational politics and PathsDomestic politicsNational patterns: variety of regulationIdeas: scientific and normativeFashions: follow the trends
15Factors and literature StructuresInstitutionsPolitics and PathsDomestic politicsNational patternsIdeasFashionsRavenhillSchmidt, K&LSchmidt, MLD&KSAMLD&KSA
16Research paradigms (Watson 2011) International RelationsRealism (states as short-term rational actors)Liberalism (states as long-term rational actors with a motive to cooperate)Marxism (normative critique of capitalism)International/Global Political EconomyLiberalism (Smith) vs Mercantilism/Nationalism (List)See also: ”Comparative advantage” (Hiscox box 4.8)(Comparative Politics)Rationalism/interests, structures, ideas: combinations(American vs British School in IR)
17Four ways to study globalization Source: Watson table 2.2International Relations:Focus on statesInternational/Global Political Economy: focus on economic actors (or politics)American School , ”IO”Abstract and driven by methods = similar to Economics. (Assumptions for convenience and math, not accuracy; Hay)Realism, statism,Rational choice(Liberalism)Neoliberalism, Nationalism/mercantilismBritish School:Wider perspectives and normative =similar to SociologyStructuralismPoststructuralism(Constructivism)Marxism/critical
18Causes and effects (Hay 2011) Hyperglobalization too strong: Economists’ assumptionsPerfect integration of markets, esp.capital? Exit costless?Cheap labor best? Welfare always a cost?(Financial capital vs. industrialists/investors)The state a source of competitiveness? (Neomercantilism)Convergence? LME/CME respond differentlyGlobalized problems difficult to handle: free ridersEffect: Retrenchment? Other drivers of policy changeCause: Globalization? Difficult to measure (Regionalization?)Why no convergence of interest rates? (Should they converge?)
19Logics of globalization (McGrew 2011) Economy or multidimensional processes?De-territorialization, difficult to separate domestic from international, global division of laborRescaling, regionsIncreasing trade, within TNCsSpecialization and competitionFinance, investments, productionDeindustrialization of the northLabor migration from south to northBut: ”Beijing consensus” = state capitalism
20The causes of globalization Source: McGrew, table 9.2Causal mechanismFocus”Forces”StructuralToo strong: Shaped by other factorsDeterminismPath-dependence?Why and HowTechnologyEconomyHegemonyConjunctural (Conditional)”Could have been different”Circumstances, timingTendenciesHow, When and What formInstitutions (regulation)PathsConstructivist(A subset of conjunctural?)Ideas shape interestsWhen and What form(Schmidt 2002!)Ideas(Politics)
21We need to study policy, politics and practice (Schmidt 2002) Policy without politics: assumes interests and paths, overlooks alternatives and culturePractices without policy/politics: economic determinism and pathsPolitics without policy/practice: ideas without economic factors, institutions and interests= economic background factors + politics (ideas)Push and pull(IR too abstract and theoretical, not empirical, p 60f)
221. StructuresIs globalization driven by background forces such as technology and economy?ITChina, India, BRICs etc.Outsourcing of production (Thun)New markets(Because of deregulation?)Are all countries affected in the same way?Firms (and governments) do different things
23The globalising firm (Thun 2011) Production: outsourcing, value chainsWhy now? Trade liberalization, developmental states in Asia/relocation of American firmsHierarchies or markets and networks. Captive?Upgrading of the subcontractors? Competition?Nation states too small and too big?China: local diversity, slow development of carsAlso sales: new markets, new valuesVariety? Are all firms similar?Good or bad?
24China, India etc. ”We” see cheap labor, competitors They get higher living standards, education etc.Large increase in living standards in China and IndiaEnergy consumption goes upThey buy more European goodsHow do they organize their economies and societies?From suppliers to new firms?Foxcon at the Pearl River Delta = IphoneCompare Wales, Ireland, Mexico etc.
25Implications for globalization Inevitable causes, uniform effects?Resistance is meaningless?
262. Institutions (global regulation) Regulatory frameworks (rules, organisations) shape some of the effects of globalization. What rules? Enough rules?Trade (Winham 2011, Ravenhill 2011)Money and finance (Helleiner 2011, Pauly 2011)Environment (Dauvergne 2011)Development (Wade 2011, Phillips 2011)Transnational regulation (MLD&KSA 2006)Soft regulation (Mörth 2006)How did the rules develop? (part 3)International politics, paths, ideas etc.
27The global trade regime (Winham 2011) Repeal of the Corn Laws 1848: new majorityProtectionism in the 1870s.USA 1930 (Smoot-Hawley) vs 1934 (RTAA)GATT 1947 (No ITO 1948)Non-discrimination, ”Most favored nation””Safeguards” as limitsEnvironmental concerns are barriersFair to developing countries?Several rounds, increased scope (table 5.1)WTO 1994, ministerial conferences, DSU
28Regional Trade Agreements, RTAs (Ravenhill 2011) EU, Nafta, Asean etc. (table 6.1)Logic: FTA, Customs union, Common market, EMUPolitical motives: confidence, security, joint power, lock-in reforms, satisfy voters, easier implementationEconomic motives: protecting sectors, deeper integration, better than unilaterism (scale)But: third parties may be cheaper (”trade diversion”)Conflicts with WTO, ACP-countries /Lomé
29RTAs, continued Nested with security, neoliberal ideas, contagion Winners and losers, Strategic trade theoryDeeper integration because of its own momentum (neofunctionalism) or intergovernmental bargaining?Increased trade because of RTAs?Stepping stone (easier) och stumbling block (complexity) for global negotiations?
30Money and finance (Helleiner 2011) The gold standard=fixed exchange rate, breakdown 1930International causes: change of hegemonDomestic causes: interventionist policies, speculationBretton Woods and the dollar: IMF, IBRD, (GATT)Motives: reduced risks, national autonomyWhy globalization: diversification, efficiencyRisks: unstable, ”impossible trinity” (autonomy, openness, stable exchange rates)Distrbutive consequences
31Money and finance, continued The strong dollar allowed the US to finance deficitsLoss of benefits for the US, loss of stability?Managed exchange rates 1982Plaza, 1987 LouvreManipulating competitiveness?China buying dollars to keep their currency low?EMU and the Euro(Why has it failed? Is it still needed? What can be done?)
32Global financial crises (Pauly 2011) Allocates resources where needed? Unstable?Lender of last resort vs Moral hazard -> regulationMore difficult to interpret information: uncertaintyCoordinated policies or discipline by the market?Loss of political sovereigntyBank regulation: systemic risk, public and privateBIS, Basel Committee etc. (box 8.3)Illiquidity or insolvency? (Firms and countries)The crisis 2008: solved, but more systemic risk, high costs
33Environment (Dauvergne 2011) Stockholm, Rio, Kyoto, Johannesburg, CopenhagenGrowth to reduce poverty? Kuznets curveTrade for efficiency, standards, technologiesUnequal consumption etc.Distance from effects, pollution havensGEF: Assistance to the south benefits the northRegimes are Common: Weak implementation?Ozon (CFC substitutes) vs Climate change and Forests
34Development (Wade 2011)China and India grow fast. 38% of world populationBetter with more globalization? Trade?InequalityGovernment failure worse than market failure?Industrial/military policies for growth (mercantilism) even in the US
35Development (Phillips 2011) Modernization and catching up vs dependencyEast Asia: due to the market or the state? ExportImport-substituting industrialization, ISIThe Washington Consensus: one size fits allGovernance, state capacity, ownership etc.”The poor are excluded from globalization” or ”globalized markets impose obstacles to development”
36Transnational regulation (MLD & KSA 2006) A process of re-ordering regulation beyond the state”Transnational” is more humble than ”global”More actors, soft modes of regulation and sanctionWhat: Governance without/with government, networksRegulatory states, regulation as distrustBy whom? Epistemic communities (Politics below)Institutional frames, fields, homogenization, ideas, forcesIdeas travel: translation, hybridization, institutionalizationMulti-level interaction
37Transnational regulation: ”private regulation” Law firms in competiton regulation (Morgan 2006)Transnational social space, actors, institutionsEU and US competition regulation, need for advice from transnational law firmsStandard-setting in accounting (Botzem & Quack 06)Globalization of financial reporting and auditingOECD, EU, UK alternative models. IASCShift to financial market regulation
38Soft law: a new kind of regulation Soft regulation: ”suggestions”? (Mörth 2006)Governance: soft law, public/private, networksCollaboration = Deliberative democracy beyond the state?Dahl, Held, Dryzek, HirstCompare EU: Open Method of Coordination (=no mandate)Dynamics of soft law (Jacobsson & Sahlin-Andersson 2006)Diversification and convergenceNon-state organizations interrelate with statesRule-setting, monitoring, agenda-settings (interrelated)Authority by organizing, expertise, association. Webs.
39Implications for globalisation? International regulation has an impact on the structural forces of globalization (technology and economy) by setting limits to public and private action.International organizations are an important arena for work on globalization?Private organisations are less visible.Not enough? Not the right policies? Etc.
403. International politics and paths International organizations: operations (and design)IMF, World Bank, WTO (frozen ideas?)A motive for states to collaborateFrom Realism/Nationalism to Liberalism. Marxism (Watson)Theoretical or Normative positions?Cooperation (Aggarwal & Dupont)International negotiationsRational, Rules of the game, Ideas.Who is in power?Path dependence, difficult to changeUnintended consequences(Transnational ideas)
41International organizations as arena for international politics What are they?RTAs: EU, ASEAN, NAFTA etc.Bretton Woods: IMF, IBRD, WTOEnvironmental agreements: Rio, Kyoto etc.Financial regulation: BIS, Basle Committee etc.Transnational organizations
42International organizations, continued How do they operate?Membership, stringency, scope, delegation, centralization: Because of type of problem? (Aggarwal & Dupont, table 3.1 Below)States as members? Delegated powers?Suprantional? Intergovernmental? Private?Politics? Civil servants? Accountability? Democracy?What role for civil society, NGOs etc?
43Motives for states to cooperate (Aggarwal & Dupont 2011) Interdependence: economic gains in the long run but political motives in the short run to ”free ride”Prisoners’ Dilemma (dominant strategy to cheat)”Inhibiting fear” (mistakes): Assurance GameWhere to meet”: Battle of the SexesMixed games, repeated gamesSolutions: Insulation, corporatism, international regimes and organizations (enforcement, information, fairness)Why? Hegemonic power (realism), demand, paths, nesting, linkages (liberalism), ideas (constr.)
44Institutional solutions Source: Aggarwal & Dupont table 3.1Free riding temptationInhibiting fearWhere to meetStrategic gamePrisoners’ DilemmaStag HuntBattle of the sexesIllustrationsTrade liberalizationDebt reschedulingFinancial integrationTrade specializationManaging adjustmentsMultilateral negotiationsRole(s) of institutionsEnforce contractsEnhancers of cooperationProviders of solutionsExamples of international solutionsMonitoringSanctionsQuota systemsKnowledgeCapacityNegotiation forumAgenda setting
45International negotiations Intergovernmentalism = focus on negotiations by states (especially in the EU)Why these positions? Look inside the state:Interests = domestic politics (below)= governmens help their exporting industry (the winners)Ideas = a convincing framing, discourse (below)= a new economic theory, such as monetarismBargaining strategies: interdependence, within rulesGame theory (above), nested games
46Path-dependence Politics continues along a path Some actions are easier than other becasue of previous choicesInternational and national politicsSchmidt on UK, Germany, France belowIt is a logic of the situation (time and place: history)Also unintended consequences: new pathsExample: Rulings by the European Court of Justice on ”mutual recognition” (implicit in the Rome Treaty?)Neofunctionalism: crises lead to action, a self-moving process
47A kind of path: regulatory fields (Jacobsson 2006) International organizations make rules, evaluationsEmbedded states (and agencies): EuropeanizationStates need to respond = recreates the stateRule-followers more than rule-makers?(=the logic of the field? A kind of path?)Scripts, translation, such as the Employment StrategyFragmentation (epistemic communties)De-coupling
48Transnational regulation driven by networks of agencies International competition network (Djelic & Kleiner)From positive to negative views on trust1890 Sherman Antitrust Act led to more mergersEurope: Cartels better than the chaos of competitionAmerican influence after WWII: Germany, EEC1990: EU, end of communism, globalizationInconsistent and conflicting regulation->coordinationExperts (OECD), statism (WTO) or community (ICN)
49Three possible scenarios for transnational governance (table 14.2) Source: Djelic & Kleiner 2006Experts(OECD)Statist(WTO)Community (ICN)Rule makers vs rule followersSeparateCombinedProduct of governance processStandardsBinding rulesBeliefsMode, logic of rule makingExpert drivenPolitical negotiationsNegotiations,Expert inputMode, logic of rule monitoring”Expert awe”Coercion, constraintsSocialization+/-Presupposes legitimacyEfficientEasy to start
50Transnational regulation by epistemic communities Networks of central bankers (Marcussen 2006)Central banks and their governorsAn epistemic community, a networkWhere do they meet? BIS, IMF etc.Networks produce standards, knowledge and identity
51Institutional dynamics (MLD & KSA 2006) A self-reinforcing governance spiral: distrust, controlCompetition, a market for regulationDistrust by scientization, marketization, deliberative democracy (Institutional forces, meta-rules, undetected)Responsibility becomes unclearControl achieved through rival regulationIncremental change, complex but similar processesAnti-globalists reinforce these patterns, a stabilizing orderSpaces, actors, relations. Efficiency based on powerFirst-mover advantage for the US (=entrepreneur)
52Why CO₂-emissions trading? (Engels 2006) ”Markets for pollution” to create property rightsPollution = negative externalityQuasi-market: Commensuration is difficultSociologists: states organize marketsSupranational and national regulatory processAn international process after KyotoThree spaces: BP, UN and EUTransnational actors
53Why certification of forestry? (McNichol 2006) Independent certification: A green premium. Market or state? Complement or threat to existing regulation?At the intersection of producers and consumersCan change over time, by entrepreneursFSC, Forest Stewardship Council 1993Consensus and cooperation, universal criteria/local variation, several dimensions of sustainabilitySuccess and uncertainties, conflictsAn articulated para-regulatory advocacy coalition: FSC initiated by retailers, moderate NGOs, eco-entrepreneursFour strategic action fields, competitors, states as allies
544. Domestic politics Winners and losers Institutions again (the regulation of politics determines/shapes the outcome of politics)Ideas? Discourses (Schmidt below)Epistemic communities?Impact of globalizationDeveloped countries (Hay 2011, above)Developing countries (Wade 2011, Dauvergne 2011, above)
55Winners and losers? (Hiscox 2011) Interests are based on material position: holders of abundant vs scarce resources (?)Unions and their firms on the same sideThe repeal of the Corn Laws 1848: new majorityHeckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-SamuelsonBut: Why import cars from other countries?Also immigration, investment and exchange rates
56Institutions/constitutions lead to different politics Institutions: elections, legislatures, agencies etc.Proportional voting, strong parties=more tradeDelegating power to the president. Reality more complex: ”bootleggers & baptists”, nested games, framing/ideasRational choice institutionalism: rational action within the rules (institutions/constitutions)”Economic analysis of political rules”Example: bargaining outcomes in bicameral legislatures
585. National patterns: countries are different A variety of patterns, no convergence?Institutions: LME and CME (Schmidt, K&L, L&R)Institutions are equilibria?Self-enforcing, but how?Institutions shape the economy?Patterns of specializationOr: the economy shapes the institutions?Firms, entrepreneursNordic model or models (K&L)Political institutions determine economies? (L&R)
59European Capitalism (Schmidt 2002) What is the impact of globalization on France, Germany, UK? (Sweden?) Different reactionsChallenges, policies, adjustment, discoursesBritain (liberalism) changed early, anticipated EU policies, a transformative discourseGermany (corporatism) changed lately, late change of post-war discourseFrance (statism) tremendous policy adjustments without a legitimating discourse
60Policy, Politcs, Practice (Schmidt 2002) Historical institutionalism (+interests, norms) + ideas, discoursesPolicy without politics: assumes interests and paths, overlooks alternatives and culturePractices without policy/politics: economic determinism and pathsPolitics without policy/practice: ideas without economic factors, institutions and interests= economic background factors + politics (ideas)Push and pullIR too abstract and theoretical, not empirical (p 60f)
61Autonomy and control: losses and gains (Schmidt 2002) Loss of national autonomy: monetary policy, tariffs, subsidies, nationalization, benefits. Still varietyLoss of national control: MNCs more independent but still ties to home countries (identity, legal), exit costsGains in supranational autonomy and control (EU, WTO, IMF) but also networks and private regulationEuropeanization (and different views of the EU)EU as a shield, creating new risks: EMU (national wage bargaining without national monetary policy)
62National policy adjustments (Schmidt 2002) Mediating factors, mechanics of adjustment explain responses to pressures (table 2.1):Economic vulnerability: CompetitivenessPolitical institutional capacity: veto-pointsPolicy legacies: fit/misfit with pathsPolicy preferenes: openness to the newDiscourse: new perceptions change preferencesSequence of change: monetary, industrial, socialEU pressures vary: specified (highly/less), suggested, no specification (competition, mututal recognition) table 2.2Outcomes: inertia, absorption, transformation (figure 2.2)
64Convergence? (Schmidt 2002) Evolution rather than convergenceDiffering impacts of financial markets, differing roles of the state, differences in production profileComparative advantages and disadvantages of the three modelsStill three modelsTable 3.6, Figure 3.1Ch 4 on the dynamics of adjustment in UK, D, F
65The Nordic models (Kristensen & Lilja 2011) Varieties of Capitalism and how they react to globalizationNordic capitalism unexpectedly successfulFirms’ (subsidiaries) strategies in local contextSocial inventions leading to experimenting firmsLiberalization + new forms of corporatismNordic welfare: bad shape 80s, reform 90sEnabling welfare state and individualized servicesStrong in Chandlerian innovation (Germany crafts-based)Networking firms: need for skills, more than R&D
66Supportive welfare? (Kristensen & Lilja 2011) The Nordic countriesDifferent in types of industry, R&DSimilar in learning work organizationWelfare systems support learning organizationsFlexicurityPublic sector experiments (private providers)
67Four countries (Kristensen & Lilja 2011) Finland: Flagship-driven + subsidiariesDenmark: More SMEs, 20% change job every yearNorway: Natural resources, international, learningSweden: MNCs, knowledge-driven?BUT: Is Sweden similar to Denmark? Flexicurity?Lessons: Beyond Keynesianism and NeoliberalismDifferent kinds of risk-sharing/risk-takingEnabling welfare states
68Implications: What can be done to stimulate firms? ”Medicine for Sweden” (Arvidsson et al 2006)Leading firms in pharmaceuticals and medtechBig investments in medical researchPublic health care was an important intermediaryUser, developer of productsNow companies work with US hospitalsWhat can be done?Smarter regulation (”neomercantilism”)Are there risks with the government?What else is important? Entrepreneurship? Deregulation?
69What drives firms? (and politics?) Economists vs. Sociologists Rational utility-maximizersRational risk-minimizersEntrepreneurs see opportunitiesSchumpeter: Creative destruction, structural changeMuddling through: wait and seeComplex regulation leads to de-couplingCopy what others do, follow the trendsTrends and ideas can come ”from the side”
70How are firms regulated? (Engwall 2006) Complex corporate governanceOwners and managers: reciprocal relationshipOwners, governments, media, civil societyHandle uncertainty through boundary-spanning unitsInternal gate-keepers to handle relationsExternal intermediaries: consultants, NGOs (CIO)
71Regulation of universities (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, Wedlin) New ”products”/ideas from the US:Management education, MBA, on the marginAccreditation, ranking: soft regulation, competingBy media and professional organizationsDemand from business schoolsField = interlinked systemRegulation unintended/uncoordinated consequences?Isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normativeEffects: Americanization? Homogenization?
726. The importance of ideas Are all actors ”rational”?Why does politics change?Dominant idea: ”Comparative advantage” (Hiscox box 4.8)New discourses (Schmidt)(Merkel et al on what governments can do)
73Discourses (Schmidt 2002) How governments manage to gain agreement Explains changeIdeational dimension (contents):Cognitive (necessary) and normative (appropriate) contentChange in policy discourse and programme (table 5.3)Crisis, contradictions, lack of coherenceInteractive dimension (process):Coordinative and communicative stages (fig )Epistemic communities, ”norm cascade” etc.Context (single-/multi-actor systems), causal influence
74The role of discourses (Schmidt 2002) Britain: constructing a transformative discourseFrance: in search of a legitimizing discourseGermany: recasting the traditional discourseSynthesis: fig 7.1When practices no longer workAnd policies no longer facilitateAnd ideas no longer explain:(Depending on mediating factors)New ideas generate/legitimize…New policies which facilitate…New practices, which work
777. Fashions Beyond rational self-interest It is ”rational” to do what others do (Hayek!)Governments and firms”Muddling through”Do the appropriate vs calculate what is bestNew ideas spread quickly, Follow the fashionDeep ideas: scientization, rationalization
78Deep ideas: structures of the mind? Scientific rationalization (Drori & Meyer 2006)Handle risks, organizing/rationalizingWhy science? It works? Power? Modern religion?Marketization (Djelic 2006)Why? Modernization? Diffusion of ideas?Smith and Menger vs mercantilism and historicismKeynes vs Monetarism (Chicago, Austria, Freiburg)Better ideas or spread by politicians and IMF etc.?Routines, networks, symbols, imitation, structuration
79Deep ideas, continued Organizing (Ahrne & Brunsson 2006) Culture and organization. StandardizationMeta-organizationsRationalization of virtue (Boli 2006)Awards, certification etc.Rationalization of universities (Ramirez 2006)Expansion, socially useful, flexible, exportsEuropean regulation of universities (Hedmo, KSA, Wedlin 2006, above)
80Conclusions 1. The impact of politics on firms Regulatory frameworks, ideas2. The impact of firms on politicsLobbying, ideasAll factors are relevant, but when and how?Simplification needed?
81Additional readings Lindvall & Rothstein Arvidsson et al Lichbach & ZuckermanMerkel et al on governments