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CS6803 Information Security Management Information System Security Engineering and Management Module 13, Overview of: 13a. Government Crypto Devices and.

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Presentation on theme: "CS6803 Information Security Management Information System Security Engineering and Management Module 13, Overview of: 13a. Government Crypto Devices and."— Presentation transcript:

1 CS6803 Information Security Management Information System Security Engineering and Management Module 13, Overview of: 13a. Government Crypto Devices and Policies 13b. Physical Security 13c. Information Security Audits Spring 2011

2 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Module 13a Objectives  To give an overview of some Department of Defense (DOD) networks, particularly the “Global Information Grid,” where crypto is used  To discuss The general principles used in National Security Agency (NSA) crypto products Some sample NSA crypto equipment Government Key Management Policies and Practices  The focus of this talk in on topics for those who will be working for the US Government, particularly the DoD, intelligence agencies, etc.  This material is required for the 4011 and 4013 certifications

3 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Global Information Grid (GIG)  The GIG is essentially a secure intranet for the national security community, including DoD, the Intelligence Community (IC), etc.  From an NSA website describing the GIG and Information Assurance (IA): The GIG will be a net-centric system operating in a global context to provide processing, storage, management, and transport of information to support all Department of Defense (DoD), national security, and related Intelligence Community missions and functions - strategic, operational, tactical, and business - in war, in crisis, and in peace.

4 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Global Information Grid (GIG)  The GIG concept has been in use since circa 2000, and is really an integration of many existing and planned networks  Integration is at the level of the communications networks, the information layer, and the management layer  IA is standardized, and is embedded into all aspects of the GIG High assurance crypto on all links Standard, high assurance multifactor authentication Defense in Depth NSA is responsible for GIG IA (security) through their GIG IA Portfolio Office (GIAP)

5 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Global Information Grid (GIG)  The GIG communications network includes very high bandwidth fiber backbone (both leased from commercial providers and government owned), satellite links, and terrestrial copper and wireless components to the individual user.  The network is all IP, including voice and other media.  Legacy networks have been, or will be, transitioned into the GIG architecture.  Note that “the grid” or “the global grid” has been adopted by many in popular culture to refer generically to a/the set of devices and sensors connected via the Internet

6 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 GIG Vision  The following slides are from a public NSA briefing a few years ago, and provide more insight into the GIG vision  Also read the NSA page on the GIG in the webliography

7 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 INTEGRATED INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE Information Services and transport Service Agents Intelligent, integrated communication intranetwork Adaptive, dynamic resource management Secure NAVIGATION GEO-POSITIONING Robust Distributed Inexpensive SURVEILLANCE Continuous Global High Resolution Imagery Day/Night/All Weather WEAPONS Remote/Local Accurate Responsive Inexpensive COMMAND AND CONTROL Commanders Internet Situation Monitoring Planning and Replanning FORCE ENHANCEMENT Mobile Lethal Sustainable Flexible INFORMATION OPERATIONS Defensive IW Offensive IW Assurance LOGISTICS SUPPORT Just Enough Just In Time Fully Visible

8 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 An internet-like transport architecture between space, air and ground nodes –Integrated Space, Air and Ground Networks –Global access to deployed / mobile Users (COTM) –Timely delivery of air and space data to Theater and CONUS (AISR, SISR support) –Automated, dynamic, high assurance network operations –Increased capacity and connectivity: RF and laser communications network Network of Networks Enable Future Innovations and Growth Through A Flexible Yet Secure Network Architecture

9 CS6803 Information Security Management Integrates mobile/tactical users and global intelligence services via IP (optical comm links and EHF, Ka and X-band) Copyright 2011

10 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols  The link and network layer protocols on fiber backbone networks are different from the familiar ethernet, n, etc. Protocols used on backbone fiber include: Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) at the link layer Asynchronous Transport Mode (ATM) over SONET at the network layer (ATM is also used elsewhere) Internet Protocol over fiber (usually IP over WDM or DWDM) for link and network layer  SONET and ATM are very common on high speed links, and require special encryptors  SONET and ATM are lower in the ISO protocol stack than IP, which is often carried on SONET and ATM, as well as Ethernet, WiFi, etc.  The next few slides discuss SONET and ATM very briefly

11 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols: SONET  Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) Primary link layer optical backbone technology deployed today Paths are switched in multiples of 155 Mb/s (OC-3); 2.5 Gb/s (OC-48) and 10 Gb/s (OC-192) trunks are the norm, and 40 Gb/s (OC-768) trunks are being deployed now. SONET “frames” carry telephone circuits, T1, T3, ATM, IP directly, and other protocols Typically used to link facilities over dedicated or leased fiber links  Links may be the whole fiber or individual wavelengths (“lambdas”)  DoD facilities may be classified enclaves

12 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications Protocols: ATM  Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) “virtual circuits” (VCs) between endpoints (often routers, but also some end user devices, video, sensors, etc.) 56 byte “cells” (similar to packets, but fixed size and small) Usually carried over SONET ATM VCs carry telephone circuits, IP packets, other protocols Commonly used for router to router links Sometimes gets “closer” to the end user; multiple ATM end points may go out over the same SONET link

13 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Aside on Fiber Backbone Communications  Fiber backbone connects single security level enclaves at different locations: need Type I SONET, ATM backbone encryptors  IP encryptors also needed, especially when a facility is not at one security level MLS is needed for MLS endpoints Non-MLS used for single level endpoints and to link single level enclaves Need higher speed IP encryptors in the near future  Current roadmap is a transition to IP directly over fiber with Wave Division Multiplexing (WDW) for different paths (router to router) Will need very high speed IP encryptors for IP directly over fiber, which are in development

14 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 SIPRNet, NIPRNet  Two longstanding networks still in use are NIPRNet and SIPRnet NIPRNet is the Non-secure IP Router Network is for sensitive, but unclassified (SBU) data, such as personnel, medical, etc. data SIPRNet is the Secure IP Router Network is for Secret data (but nothing higher)  Both are standard IP networks, and may connect to the public internet with firewalls  SIPRNet is used within classified environments, and uses NSA approved Type I encryption to tunnel through the internet where it is connected. It cannot communicate directly with any nodes that are not on SIPRNet  Both of these are run by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), essentially the IT organization for DoD.  Other special networks are used for TS and higher information

15 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Crypto for Classified Data  The rest of the slides in section a present an overview of government crypto, particularly NSA crypto for classified data.

16 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Trends in Government Cryptography & Key Management Technology and Policies  Evolving, particularly for classified information  Overall IT and network infrastructure is moving from expensive custom equipment to COTS (Commercial off the shelf) products and standards where feasible  Moving from point to point encryptors (T1, ATM, SONET, etc.) to more modern and dynamic environments (e.g. IP networks, SecureXML, etc.), but still using GOTS (Government Off The Shelf) crypto; may allow some COTS products for Secret soon.  Policies and implementation complicated by need for controlled sharing among very diverse military and intelligence coalitions  Also complicated by domestic homeland security coalitions (CIA/NSA/FBI/DHS, FEMA, local law enforcement, etc.)  Things change slowly, so there is still a lot of legacy equipment in use now and for the future

17 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Status of Government Cryptography & Key Management Policies  Recent “roadmaps” are being changed  Major technical and policy problems still unsolved, especially for coalitions Patriot Act allows the data sharing issue among “intelligence community”, the FBI, DoD, and law enforcement, but they still have different definitions for S, TS, etc. and systems are not interoperable  A new “Information Sharing Environment” is under development to facilitate this. Clearance and need to know are still important Policies on data sharing and searching/correlating data from different organizations are still being developed Technology to enforce security for such such data sharing is still needed Crypto and PKI will have to fit into this environment

18 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 CAVEAT  This talk has the most recent information released to the general public on the web More information is available that can only be accessed from.mil or.gov domains: such information is not in this lecture  Some of the material is already out of date for new deployments But basic design and policy principles are similar  Most of this is still currently in use in places Lots of legacy crypto is still used  Different departments and agencies interpret and enhance security policies differently  When you start a federal job, find out what is in place for your organization at the time you start

19 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NSA Approved Cryptography  An NSA-approved cryptographic device consists of 3 certified components: An approved algorithm An implementation that as been approved for the protection of classified information in a particular environment A supporting key management infrastructure  “Zeroize” button to securely erase keys and unencrypted information (even after power loss) in an emergency on most crypto devices  Cryptography and Key Management Policies

20 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Traditional NSA/NIST Encryption Classes  Type 1 - U.S. Classified  Type 2 - U.S. Federal Inter-Agency For Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) government communications; “Warner Amendment” unclassified data  Type 3 - Interoperable Inter-Agency (Federal, State and Local) & Commercial Use NIST-approved data encryption standards (DES, AES, etc.)  Type 4 - Proprietary Not a federal standard, not used for federal info Exportable, for Commercial & International use NSA is responsible for Type 1, 2; NIST for Type 3 standards (FIPS Standards)

21 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NSA Approved Type I Devices  Algorithms Last 2 decades: Baton (crypto), Skipjack (crypto), Firefly (Key exchange) originally classified; some now declassified Since 2003, AES is also allowed and recommended for new devices  128 bit and higher for Secret  192 bit and higher for TS and above  Keys True random numbers needed  Generation based on physical phenomena; pseudo-random not strong enough Historic: centrally generated and tested by NSA  Difficult distribution problem  Now used for special purpose keys Session keys generated by NSA approved embedded hardware (e. g., leaky resistor for random noise generation) in crypto devices

22 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NSA Approved Type I Devices (continued)  Hardware design and implementation approved by NSA  Usually a separate hardware device (box, card) is required  Careful attention to “red-black” separation Red == classified; black == unclassified (but classified information that has been encrypted with an approved algorithm is considered “black”) Common Criteria Level 6 or higher (Orange Book B2) equivalent or better assurance level Rigorous check for covert channels, “sneak circuits” Rigorous check for cross-talk (EMSEC) Failure modes cannot allow for information leak from red to black

23 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Government AES Usage Policy  NIST/FIPS approved for protecting sensitive (SBU) electronic data  Analyzed by NSA for use with classified data Algorithm allowed for classified, unclassified, & commercial use Crypto devices still need NSA approval for use with classified data  NSA policy for use of AES with classified data: 128-bit key & above are suitable for SECRET info TOP SECRET info requires 192 or 256 bits See webliography for full policy statement  New Type I encyptors being developed with AES as a built in option

24 CS6803 Information Security Management Sample Government Crypto Devices  The following slides and corresponding webliography links describe many of the crypto devices still in use, but it is a far from exhaustive list.  You may find this information interesting to scan or browse through, but it is not required for this course. This is just a bunch of snapshots in time (including one old snapshot of a 10 year old Navy web site listing the crypto gear that they used then).  Most of the links are to vendor web sites, so the gear there is still available, even though it may seem very dated. Upgrading systems can be a very long process in the government. Copyright 2011

25 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Sample Type I Devices: Legacy  Link encryptors, e. g. KG-84, KG-192, KIV… for T1, etc.  Still widely used by DoD e. g. Secure IP Router Network (SIPRNet)  New technology used to emulate old devices for compatibility Smaller, lower power, more reliable, but still use the old protocols and algorithms so they interoperate with the old crypto's still in use  Still need to support older key distribution methods

26 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Recent Type I Devices: Network (SONET)  KG 189 SONET backbone encryptor (widely used, but GD has rolled SONET capability into the KG 75, which was originally only ATM)  KG 340 SafeNet SONET 10G encryptor (2008) Note: SafeNet also sells a commercial SONET 10G encryptor which is only EAL4 (pending), FIPS (pending) and not approved for classified material  KG G encryptor contract awarded 11/2009 (see webliiograph)

27 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Recent Type I Devices: Network (Examples)  KG 75 Fastlane Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) virtual circuit encryptor (see GD web site in webliography); new versions also support SONET  KG 175 Taclane series “classic” IP (200 Mb/s) (see GD web site in webliography)  KG 175D Taclane Micro—compact version of Taclane, also HAIPE compatible (see later slide)

28 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Recent Type I Devices: Endpoints (Examples)  KOV-26 Talon PCMCIA card encryptor (L3 Communications) (Eternet, wifi, HAIPE compliant)  SecNet WiFi card/encryptor (see Harris web site & look at the antenna on the card!)  STE (L3 Communications) encrypting phone/fax/modem; secure mobile phones for CDMA, GSM, satellite phones  Sectera (GD) series: wireline, GSM wireless, Sectera Edge Smartphone  Fortezza PCMIA card for crypto & credentials (holds multiple keys, identity info, and has crypto engine, all in a tamper resistant package)

29 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Some NSA Approved Crypto Products (Graphic Circa 2001, But Devices Commonly In Use Today)

30 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Fortezza® Card  PCMCIA hardware token for crypto processing and key storage  Implements NSA/NIST-compliant crypto standards for network security  11 character PIN; card disabled after 3 consecutive wrong pins  “tamper-resistant”: destroys key if tampered with  Fortezza Plus card for secret level keys and encryption

31 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Secure Terminal Equipment (STE)  ISDN phone (fax and modems also available)  Key materials & crypto hardware on Fortezza Card  Approved for Classified use  Phone not classified when card is removed

32 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Sectera Edge Smartphone  Wireless voice to Top Secret; reportedly used by Obama  Wireless data access to SIPRNet (Secret IP Router Network— only to Secret level)  $3500

33 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Sample Type I Devices: Recent and Projected  High Assurance IP Encryption (HAIPE) program Multiple products exist now and more are in development, going to very high data rates: trend for most new crypto NSA adaptation of IPSEC protocol for session setup, mutual authentication, key exchange, and headers “Hardened” protocol stack and Type I crypto algorithms IPv6 versions under development: see webliography  L3 KG-245 series 1 Gb/s and 10 Gb/s products available now.

34 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Sample Type I Devices: Recent and Projected (continued)  Secure VoIP phones Lots of issues and different architectures proposed  Voice over Secure IP (i. e., VoIP on an already secure network)  Secure Voice over IP (i. e., a secure version of VoIP over an unsecured network) Some Voice over Secure IP already deployed

35 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Classification of Keys  All key material (keys, seeds, etc.--collectively called keys in this lecture) are classified using the same classification scheme as other data data, and may include additional codewords (e. g., “COMSEC”) Key classification is primarily about access rights, not key length/strength, although there are some broad policy rules given later  All keys used for Secret and above data come from NSA or approved NSA equipment  Any equipment loaded with keys is classified at the level of the highest level key (join of all the levels if non-linear ordering)  Classified keys, keyed equipment, and anything with keys are handled and stored as other classified equipment Labeling Physical access control, with storage in approved containers or facilities Inventory management Possible compromises reported to ISSO Approved destruction

36 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Classification of Keys (continued)  Key use: Key must have classification level not lower than information encrypted Crypto device must be of the appropriate class (Type 1, Type 2, etc.) or stronger required for the level of the information  Key Management: key issuer and key user must have classification level not lower than the key  When cryptos set up a secure communication path, endpoint crytpos mutually authenticate and ensure that the other end is using a key of the same classification level When equipment can set up multiple communications paths (e. g., a KG-175 ATM encryptor), and the equipment is NSA endorsed as MLS, different paths may be at different levels; then a key for a path’s classification level is used for that path, and is verified by both endpoints

37 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Storage on Cryptos  Most cryptos have multiple keys loaded, including Authentication keys “Key encryption keys” (KEKs) used only to encrypt keys for local storage or transfer Multiple communication keys  Currently active session keys  Keys are changed on a regular basis, and future keys may be preloaded on the crypto  Emergency keys that are used in a crisis situation in place of the current key

38 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Transfer: Physical Devices  Paper (human transcription), paper tape, mag tape (not used any more)  Electronic data storage examples DS 101 Fill Device  Small device used to hold keys that plugs into a special socket on the the front panel of a crypto; think of it as a pre-cursor to a USB thumb drive for keys (but not using USB)  Used to load new keys from NSA  Used to reload keys in case they are zeroized CIK--Crypto Ignition Key  Looks like a plastic key with metal contacts  “split key”: CIK is matched to a device, and half the key is stored on the device, half on the CIK  Device is not classified when CIK is not loaded  Used on earlier secure phones, etc.; some still in use Fortezza PCMCIA card  Stores multiple keys for various purposes  Used to store keys for current secure ISDN phones DoD Common Access Card (SBU, unclassified only)

39 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Transfer: OTAR  OTAR (Over the Air Rekeying) Sending new keys to a remote crypto over the communications link  Keys are encrypted with the KEK for transmission  Keys are automatically loaded onto the crypto devices  Typical method in recent and future cryptos DS101 still used for initial keying and key backup

40 CS6803 Information Security Management Government Identity Cards  DoD Common Access Card (CAC) Required for all DoD personnel “Smart Card” for Identification, physical access, and computer/NIPERNet network access Includes human readable and machine readable information, certificate for PKI See CAC Home Page, CAC FAQ, Jan news story cited in the webliography NIPRNet is the primary DoD network for unclassified information Copyright 2011

41 CS6803 Information Security Management Government Identity Cards  HSPD 12 (2004) (see webliography) Mandated a common ID card for all government employees and contractors  Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card now being deployed in response to HSPD-12 Functionally similar to CAC: for ID, physical access, computer/network access Smart card, human and machine readable; has certificate for PKI Not CAC interoperable; move to a common standard for both Copyright 2011

42 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Federal Government PKI  Strong push to use PKI for all user access to federal systems DoD requires the use of the Common Access Card (CAC) token (PKI) for access to the Non-Classified Internet Router Network (NIPRNet) PIV for all civilian government employees, contractors  Separate Public Key Infrastructure policies for DoD (including classified) and unclassified federal agency information Both based on X.509 certificates See webliography for detailed DoD and Federal policy documents  DoD has established four certificate assurance classes to be used in various environments, with different policies for each class Major points are summarized in the next slide Details for some are in the following slides

43 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000  Still on the web, but due for a publicly released update :-) Basic concepts and designs still operative Progress along the roadmap has been made  Part of the overall DoD Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) KMI also includes generation and distribution of classified keys for Type I encryptors  A framework for generation, production, distribution, control, revocation, recovery, & tracking of public keys (certificates) & their corresponding private keys Uses CAW & Fortezza® cards for a X.509-based PKI  Specially designed to suit DoD needs, maintained by DoD  Being implemented in phases  See webliography for roadmap details

44 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD Certificate Assurance Classes

45 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Management Life Cycle For PKI  The next few slides go through the primary steps in the key management life cycle for a certificate in a PKI, with comments on the specific policy considerations in DoD and other federal agencies  The basic principles are applicable to civilian and commercial PKI

46 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 User Registration  User register with a “Registration Authority” (RA, also called Local Registration Authority, LRA) which is responsible for verifying the identity of the user and the user’s need for a certificate  Identity verification is a key issue for any PKI or Identity system (such as passports, drivers license, etc.) This is the potential week spot in any PKI or Identity system not just DoD systems DoD identity verification policy depends on certificate Class, with in person registration required for Class 3 and higher. Forms of identification that are acceptable (military ID, federal ID, multiple non-federal IDs, etc.) are spelled out in the policies

47 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key and certificate generation  The RA transmits the registration information to the Certificate Authority (CA)  The public/private keys are generated and certificates are created and digitally signed by the CA The signing key is a critical information asset; if it is compromised all certificates signed by that CA should become invalid, and digital signatures from prior user certificates can be forged DoD class 4 and 5 CAs use the high assurance Certificate Authority Workstation (CAW)  The certificate provides a cryptographic binding of the user ID to the public key  The certificates are issued to the user

48 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Registration  The identity and public key information care registered and can be distributed  The public key information is posted to the appropriate directory services  The private key may be archived for key recovery; CAW and DoD policy mandate this The archive may be at the CA or as a separate service

49 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Operational Use  The certificate is on HardWare or SoftWare token Class 5 on HW token (e. g., Fortezza Plus) (Fortezza can hold multiple keys from mutliple CAs) Class 4 on HW token (e. g., Fortezza, CAC) Class 2, 3 on SW token  PIN/Passphrase or biometric is used for certificate access control Class 4, 5: system generated  11 digit pin on Fortezza  Automatic lockout after 3 successive failed attempts Class 2-3: user selected PIN/passphrase

50 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Storage and Update  Storage of Key Material PIN/passphrase or biometric protection for key material on tokens Fortezza Plus is not classified when not activated by the PIN  A Fortezza Plus not in a workstation is, by default, not activated by the PIN, so it is unclassified and may be carried around  Key Update Keys, certificates have expiration dates built in Life depends on policy; typically 1 year for class 4-5 Update for hardware tokens requires in person visit to CA

51 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Key Recovery and Revocation  Key Recovery If token is “locked” due to repeated false authentication attempts, CA can “unlock” it; for FORTEZZA, a CAW must be used. If the token is lost/destroyed, keys can be recovered from registration information to decrypt existing documents CAW provides key recovery services  Key Revocation Keys may be revoked if a user’s classification level or need to know change, if the user is no longer trusted, or if the token thought to be lost or compromised Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are distributed Timely distribution of CRLs is an issue

52 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000  The following slides are graphics taken from the Roadmap document  There are also two graphic slides on the overall Key Management Infrastructure of NSA  Reminder: these are not new documents, but are the latest available to everyone. If you start a job with the federal government, check for the current information

53 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 PKI System Context in DoD

54 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 PKI System Elements

55 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Architecture

56 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Deployment

57 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 DoD PKI Roadmap 2000 DoD PKI Roles DOD PKI Web-Based Cert Auth (CA) DOD Directory Services LRA User 1 User Registration Web-based 2 Password Relying Party Local Registration Authority 5 Pull Cert 4 Auto Cert Private Key 3 Web-based Public Key Cert

58 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011

59 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NSA Commercial Class 3 and below PKI Physical ManualSystems KMI PRSN Pilot High Grade Electronic Applications EKMS Operations DISA Current DoD Class 3 PKI Root X.509 Certificate Based Applications Current Class 4 PKI (DMS) Root Recent KMI Architecture

60 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 il KMI Managers Medium Assurance ROOT NSA High Assurance ROOT CF, Tier 0 Manual Systems REGIONAL SITES (Servers) Medium Assurance Certification Authorities Tier 1 High Assurance Certification Authorities KMI Management Servers Networks/Web BASE/POST ACCOUNT (Client Workstation) diial DEC10000 dgi t a Commercial Certification Authorities KMI Architecture Vision

61 CS6803 Information Security Management Information System Security Engineering and Management Module 13b: Physical Security (Government Focus)

62 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Module 13b Objectives  To discuss the basics of physical security

63 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Physical Security  Physical security is critical to the protection of sensitive information  DoD has detailed policies on the physical security of classified materials  The policies depend on the classification level of the materials  Policy topics are discussed, but not specific policy parameters

64 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Layered Physical Security  Physical security is done in layers: Facility security (ground, buildings) Restricted area security (part of a building specifically for classified materials) Locked “containers” or “safes” to store classified materials Computers with classified information  Physical security also includes personnel security, which is not covered here

65 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Facility Clearances  A facility Clearance (FCL) is required for any facility that will contain classified materials or where classified work will be done  An FCL does not mean that classified materials or work can be anywhere  Restricted areas are areas (possibly the entire facility) where classified materials can be stored or classified work can be performed; restricted areas meet further requirements  Every facility with a FCL is required to have a Facility Security Officer (FSO) who is responsible for ensuring that the facility security policies are enforced

66 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Facility Clearances Requirements  The activities at the facility must require access to classified information for legitimate U.S. Government needs  The facility must have a reputation for integrity and lawful conduct in business practices (e. g.., if there are compromises of classified information, or if security policies are violated, the FCL may be revoked)  The facility must not be in under foreign ownership, control, or influence, to the extent that granting FCL would be inconsistent with national interest  The Facility Security Officer (FSO) must be a U.S. Citizen employee  Senior Management and the FSO must have a Personal Clearance

67 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Facility Perimeter Considerations  Stand-off zones to restrict proximity to facility  Barriers  Eliminate potential surveillance from outside perimeter (trees, fences, other buildings, etc.)  Guards, patrols, lighting

68 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Restricted Areas  Rooms, suites, floors, whole buildings, or whole facilities where classified work is performed Different restricted areas may be needed for different security levels Multiple restricted areas within one facility are often used for different levels, different codewords, etc. Restricted areas may be nested, e. g., a TS restricted area inside a Secret area  A Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF) is a restricted area for highly classified (e. g., TS/codeword) materials

69 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Perimeter Control for Restricted Areas  Clearly defined perimeter – No barriers necessary (but are usual)  Access control to the area Policy may dictate “two person rule” for some highly sensitive areas: one person cannot be in the area alone  Personnel within the area are responsible for challenging all individuals who may lack proper authority  Inspections must be done randomly  All individuals are subject to inspection Must be done within facility grounds Inspections are not necessary for highly personal – purse, wallet, clothing etc. Inspections on entry and exit

70 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Automated Access Control System  Automated access control systems may be used for entry to restricted area (no physical guard to check ID, although one might be nearby)  Two factor ID normally used: ID badge (smart card, mag strip, RFID)+ PIN ID badge+ biometric  “Piggybacking” (admitting more than one person on one ID) not allowed  Both IDs must be used to open door if a “two person” rule is in effect

71 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Automated Access Control System (continued)  Typically used for “inner” areas with guards at outer perimeter  Manufactures must meet the following requirements Chances of unauthorized access are no more than one in 10,000 Chances of authorized access being rejected in no more than 1 in 1,000 Locations of access must be protected Tamper alarm protection is mandatory for Top Secret Closed Area

72 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 “Uncleared” Visitors in Restricted Areas  Cleared personnel may escort uncleared personnel into a restricted area (depending on policy)  All classified information must be stored in an approved safe and all classified discussions stopped while an uncleared visitor is present  Visual or audible warning are often used as a reminder while uncleared are present, e. g., flashing red light on ceiling

73 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Other Restricted Area Policies  Policies depend on classification level  TEMPEST protection Electronic Audio Visual  Wall materials/strength/thickness  Door materials/strength  Window materials/strength (if permitted at all)

74 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Other Restricted Area Policies (continued)  Locks (type, strength)  Intrusion detection systems (motion, audio, thermal, vibration sensors  Alarms  Use of insecure phones  Restrictions on removing storage media (disks, tapes, CDs, USB drives, etc

75 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Storing Classified Information  When not in use classified information is kept in approved safes (“containers”) with combination locks Safe construction practices defined by government policy based on classification level Safe can ONLY be used for classified information  End of Day Security Checks – At the close of each day – ensure all classified data is securely stored At the end of each shift – ensure all classified data is securely stored except when facility is in continuous operation Checks may be performed by security guards on a daily basis Checks may include looking through unsecured materials (desk top, unsecured desk drawers, unsecured cabinets, etc.) to ensure no classified material has been left unsecured Clean Desk Policy may be in effect

76 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Protection of Combinations  Record of names with combinations maintained by Site Security Office in locked safe  Combinations selected by Site Security Office  Combinations cannot be shared  Combinations cannot be written down by the user  All containers are locked if not under the direct supervision of an authorized person  Combination is dependent upon classification of contents, upgrade in classification requires a new combination

77 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Changing Combinations  Combinations are changed in the following circumstances: Assignment of safe to a new person Assignment of safe to new security level Termination of employee Withdrawn, suspended or revoked clearance Compromise of security container  Unlocked and unattended safe

78 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Protection of Classified Information on Computers  Computers with classified information must be in a restricted area with a security level at least as high as the information on the computer Laptops with classified information must have that information encrypted with approved Type I encryption when the laptop is removed from the restricted area  Other protection mechanisms (use depends on classification level, policy) Removal or disabling of writable media drives Removal or disabling of ports (USB, firewire, etc.) Disable booting from removable media Forced use of password on startup, after idle period Encryption of disk contents Locking to desktop Periodic checking for keystroke loggers, etc.

79 CS6803 Information Security Management Information System Security Engineering and Management Module 13c: Information Security Audit

80 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Module 13c Objectives  To understand the principles of the security audit: What is a security audit? The goal of the security audit What organizations are involved How an audit is conducted The outcome of an audit  This module is about the process, not a detailed roadmap for an audit of a specific organization  This section is not specific to DoD or government organizations. Most large corporations perform regular security audits, usually at a 2-3 year interval.

81 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 What is a Security Audit?  As with seemingly everything in this course, there is no standard definition :-)  In general, a security audit is a review of the current status of information security done by an external organization Corporate: usually a “security audit” department outside the IT organization (usually reporting to the CFO, part of corporate audit) is used to audit corporate or business level information security A small company may hire an outside firm that specializes in security audit Federal government departments are audited by GAO, as required by FISMA (lecture 6) Federal government contractors doing classified work are subject to a security audit of the classified systems

82 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 One Definition of a Security Audit  “A computer security audit is a systematic, measurable technical assessment of how the organization's security policy is employed at a specific site. Computer security auditors work with the full knowledge of the organization, at times with considerable inside information, in order to understand the resources to be audited.” (Security Focus; see webliography

83 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 What a Security Audit is NOT  It is not penetration testing (Pentest): Pentest is a very detailed and complete set of testing for a certain class of vulnerabilities; audit covers a much broader range of security issues and is not as detailed in all of them …but pentest of certain critical vulnerabilities may be part of an audit  It is not a review of Audit Logs: audit logs are just logs of certain activities in a system, and only looks at security from a forensic (after the fact) perspective …but a selective review of some audit logs to look for security policy violations might be part of an audit

84 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Who Is Involved in an Audit  The Audit Team: the ones conducting the audit  The Audited Organization (Audit Target) Management  Make resources and personnel available to the auditors  Be interviewed by auditors  Receive and act on audit results Employees and contractors  Be interviewed by auditors (some, not all)  Answer questions about system elements on which an auditor is performing “hands on” evaluation

85 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Audit Principles (A Useful, But Not Universal View)  The audit team is from outside the organization being audited  The audit team is very familiar with the overall corporate (or government agency) business and practices  The audit team starts with the risk analysis and security policy of the organization being audited The audit is essentially an external verification that the documented risk management approach and security policies are being implemented and followed properly Sometimes questions about the risk management approach and security policy are raised at the audit and referred to higher management as part of the audit final report You have to have a good risk analysis and derived policies in place well before the audit!

86 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Security Audit Focus  Security audits are part of the on-going process of defining and maintaining effective security controls and policies  Everyone who uses any computer resources throughout the organization is potentially involved  Auditors perform their work through personal interviews, vulnerability scans, examination of OS settings, network configuration, examination of individual’s computers, etc. Interviews: all higher level managers, key security personnel, and a random set of general users (usually not all) Examination of individual’s computers: all with access to highly sensitive information, random set of others  Primarily concerned with HOW security policies are actually implemented Risk Analysis Policies of the systems being audited

87 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Audit Software Packages  Software is available for some phases of security audit Provide automated checklists for specific audit questions; may be add-ons to ISO 17799, OCTAVE, etc. Provide test suites for specific audit topics, such as vulnerability scans, password cracking, etc.  These are just a starting point for the audit team!

88 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 A Few Issues That Might Be In An Audit (from Security Focus)  Are passwords difficult to crack?  Are there access control lists (ACLs) in place on network devices to control who has access to shared data?  Are there audit logs to record who accesses data?  Are the audit logs reviewed  Are the security settings for operating systems in accordance with accepted industry security practices?  Have all unnecessary applications and computer services been eliminated for each system?  Are these operating systems and commercial applications patched to current levels?  How is backup media stored? Who has access to it? Is it up-to-date?  Are there adequate cryptographic tools in place to govern data encryption, and have these tools been properly configured?  Have custom-built applications been written with security in mind?  How have these custom applications been tested for security flaws?  How are configuration and code changes documented at every level? How are these records reviewed and who conducts the review?

89 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Other Questions That May Be In An Audit  Do employees and contractors understand the security policies that apply to them? Interview with particular and randomly selected people  Do they follow these policies? Interviews, and hands on analysis of individual computers from particular and randomly selected people Look for policy violations, such as illegal or disallowed software, downloaded copyright protected content, pornography, etc.  Do they understand what to do and who to call if there is a “security event” on their computer, or any system they have access to?  Is there a disaster recovery plan? Have the participants and stakeholders ever rehearsed the disaster recovery plan?

90 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Audit Stages  Pre-Audit Auditors Target  Audit The Actual Auditing  Post-Audit Report on findings to audit target management

91 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011  Auditors spend significant time preparing for each audit (days to weeks)  They need to understand the scope of the audit  They review: Results of previous audits (make sure problems have been corrected) Latest risk analysis and assessment Currently applicable security policies (corporate, organization, and system specific) Previous security incidents Policy for use of proprietary (corporate, civilian, government) or classification (DoD) markings and handling of materials  Understand the systems in the target organization High level functions Security controls  Understand the nature of sensitive information used by the target organization  Prepare checklist for each audit step Pre-Audit: Auditors

92 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Pre-Audit: Target Organization  Prepare the organization for the audit Review policies with all employees Remind employees of the purpose and conduct of the audit  Non-confrontational  Honesty in all answers Review specific issues with relevant people  Critical areas--make sure all policies are known and followed  Make sure issues raised in prior audit have been addressed, and be prepared to explain how to auditors

93 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011  Auditors should minimize impact on operations  Audit should be conducted in a non-confrontational manner The auditors want to uncover problems so they can be fixed, not to cause trouble Identifying and solving security problems is in everyone’s interest  Collect data about the physical security of computer assets  Perform interviews of site staff  Go through the prepared checklist Perform network vulnerability assessments OS and application security assessments Access control assessment etc.  Auditors should be looking for unexpected problems The Audit

94 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011  Short briefing to target management at the end of the audit Raise any issues that need to be addressed immediately Otherwise, provide general information Do not give details until the audit team has a chance to meet and evaluate all survey and test results.  Audit team reviews all results and generates final report  Final report Overview of organizations security posture Cite all security deficiencies  Rate severity  Recommend corrective actions  Follow-up audit on a smaller case maybe schedule Post Audit: Audit Team

95 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Post Audit: Target Organization  Review audit results  Take corrective actions as needed Some low severity deficiencies may be left as is after a review by the organization due to either cost/benefit analysis, or a documented willingness to accept the risk  Update the risk analysis and policies as needed  Start getting ready for the next audit!

96 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 Audit Associations/ Groups  U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)  National State Auditors Association  National Association of State Auditors, Controllers, & Treasures  Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)  SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security Institute (SANS)

97 CS6803 Information Security Management The End  This is the final slide in the final lecture in this course.  I hope you have found this course interesting, and, more important I hope you have learned useful and important ideas and ways of thinking about security that will be of value in your career.  My best wishes for success to all of you. Bill Hery Copyright 2011

98 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 CNSS Policy Statemement on AES use for classified material 13a. DoD crypto Federal X.509 Policy (2006)13a. DoD crypto This is for federal agencies, not DoD classified systems rtificate_policy_v9_0_9_february_2005.pdf Army requires PKI for NIPRNET 13a. DoD crypto Common Access Card FAQ13a. DoD crypto Information Sharing Environment 13a. DoD crypto An environment is under development to allow DoD and the "intelligence community" to align classification levels and share classified data on automated systems

99 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NIST on PKI (4/06)13a. DoD crypto DoD PKI Roadmap13a. DoD crypto DoD X.509 Crypto Policy13a. DoD crypto DoD PKI Program Management Office 13a. DoD crypto DoD PKI web site. Many pages are only available in.mil and.gov domains IPv6 and HAIPE13a. DoD crypto Common Access Card Home Page 13a. DoD crypto HSPD-1213a. DoD crypto HSPD-12/PIV FAQ13a. DoD crypto On a Department of Commerce site, but is essentially the same in all departments PIV and CAC13a. DoD crypto Harris DoD WiFi crypto products 13a. DoD crypto NSA Suite B Crypto13a. DoD crypto Suite of cryptographic algorithms and protocols recommendations consistent with NSA security policy for both classified and unclassified materials GD Crypto Products13a. DoD crypto A web site showing various Type I crypto products from General Dynamics, including Fastlane, Taclane, and Sectera Copy of Navy Crypto web site 13a. DoD crypto Interesting site with a copy of a Navy site on Type I crypto gear. This copy was probably made in the early 2000's. The Navy site is no longer publicly available. This is an interesting resource on legacy crypto, and early versions of some of the recent ones (Taclane, Fastlane). Certificate Authority Work Station 13a. DoD crypto GD website on their CAW for the NSA approved PKI.

100 CS6803 Information Security Management Copyright 2011 NSA Global Information Grid (GIG) IA page 13a. DoD crypto A quick intro to the GIG, mostly about the IA component TALON PCMCIA encryptor13a. DoD crypto L3 web site for the product L3 Crypto devices13a. DoD crypto This page lists a range of communications devices for DoD, but look at the KG, STE, Talon, Guardian, and OMNIxi series devices for crypto gear KG-530: 40 Gb/sec SONET encryptor 13a. DoD crypto A contract to develop this was awarded to GD HSPD-12/PIV FAQ13a. DoD crypto On a VA site, but essentially the same for all govt agencies Federal X.509 Policy (2009)13a. DoD crypto This is for civilian federal agencies, not DoD classified systems Common Access Card FAQ13a. DoD crypto Common Access Card (CAC) FAQ Conducting a Security Audit: An Introductory Overview 13c. Security Audit Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) 13c. Security Audit Home page for ISACA Security Auditing: A Continuous Process 13c. Security Audit A more detailed list of things to included in an audit


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