Presentation on theme: "WS1 Panel: with the post-MDG debates: global aspirations, domestic politics and (un)intended consequences."— Presentation transcript:
WS1 Panel: with the post-MDG debates: global aspirations, domestic politics and (un)intended consequences
Young and Dynamic? – a critical review of Korea’s national level post-MDG debates Soyeun Kim and Hanee Kang From what to do to how to do: some reflections from Japan’s experience of development aid for post-2015 debates Sato Kan Hiroshi and Mizuno Masami Dong Sang E Mong: Post-2015 Education Goals and Korea's Education ODA Policy Priorities Moon Suk Hong and Tae Joo Lee
“The post-2015 decision-making process has taken over the world of international development. Nearly every conference and every research or policy paper must now include the number 2015 in its title, thus making it "relevant". It is easy to be jaded by it all. Are these discussions really worthwhile? Will they really somehow trickle down into real change? As I have written before, I think this process has been valuable; we are going through a paradigm shift which will have (largely positive) repercussions on policies and budgets.” Jonathan Glennie Guardian Professional, Thursday 29 May 2014
But the reality on the ground… Korea and Japan’s national level debates strikingly limited and at best superficial Esp. Korea - the Busan HLF4 only a handful of diplomats and largely advocacy CSOs with a close link to international NGOs. The process filled with an intricate mixture of varied ideas, thorny emotions and increasingly convoluted landscape of dev cooperation – financing (Korea); revision of Article 9 (Japan). subsequent actions for the goals and targets somehow become reduced to additional tick boxes or some jargon-laden add-ons to already chaotic policy documents or guidelines
What’s at stake? the good old implementation gap? the ‘Western’ vs ‘East Asian’ model? (differentiated approaches to ‘effective’ dev) profoundly shaped by donors’ domestic setting – relatively little studied 1.political economic climate such as the impact of the rising conservative politics, economic downturn and the geopolitical dynamics in the region : also the China and North Korea question 2.burden of disseminating/promoting ‘global agenda’: catching up those jargon-laden documents, heavy/challenging task of translation, and lacking articulate-ness in discourse production when compared with the ‘Western’ organisations
that Korea and Japan (both government and non-governmental actors) has with the post- MDG debates as an East Asian DAC donor. unpacking the way in which the these two aid circles interact with the global post-MDG process, and vice versa. the process of (dis-/mis-)engagement and (non-/mis-)interaction with the post-MDG agenda may transpires as aspiration, or hindrance, while shedding light on the relative silence and ‘disinterest’ by the two aid circles.
Young and Dynamic? – a critical review of Korea’s national level post-MDG debates Soyeun Kim (Sogang University, Korea) Hanee Kang (Re-shaping Development Institute, ReDI, Korea)
Taking the discrepancy and unevenness at the heart of our discussion to identify / contextualise / historicise the augmented and uneven geographies of the post- MDG process in the Korean aid landscape two sources of Seoul's uneven process: relatively shorter overseas aid experience (young) & institutional dynamism analytical foci. Y: capacity, experience and expertise within the Korean domestic aid constituencies D: fragmentation/turf war and the strong presidential influence
Conceptualising 'complicated relationship': discrepancy and unevenness juxtaposing two strands of studies - to anchor seemingly an idiosyncratic case of Korea to wider epistemological debates on this issue 1.indicators (here the MDGs and post-MDGs) to induce behavioural (policy) and knowledge (ideas) changes for global governance 2.emerging donors in the global aid architecture Korea as an 'emerging' donor – dynamics of localising the global norms or the other way around!?!
Fukuda-Parr and Yamisn (2013a, 2013b) An analytical approach drawing upon the work by Davis et al. (2012) - how the MDG indicators have become transformed into a global policy agenda and a planning framework by establishing –performance standards for monitoring and evaluation, –a subsequent 'knowledge effect' through communicating and mobilising attention to key concepts for development purposes. incentives for changes in both behaviour (policy) and knowledge (ideas) via adaptation and localisation of MDGs.
adaptation/ localisation and communication of MDGs as well as its use two key aspects of global governance through indicators 'social processes' surrounding the use of indicators including local responses like claiming of legitimacy/power or contestation over if and how indicators to be adapted dynamism of indicators
prevailing tendency within existing literature many works on the impact on the South (as recipients) without much discussion on how indicators are localised as donors in their domestic institutions The underlying assumption - Northern donor's adaptation of MDGs were straight forward therefore almost no divergence? raises a very important question of how the rest of the world ('non-Western') is gazed solely as decision/norm takers - therefore neglecting any attempt by 'non-Western' actors in their own way of 'participation' as decision/norm makers (see Wade, 1996; Lee, 2008; Kim, 2011; Reilly, 2012) the point made by Jenny Constantine yesterday at the workshop
calling an attention to the augmented and uneven geographies of the domestic post-MDG process in an emerging DAC donor - Korea How likely the emerging donor as an international development partner 'participates' (or not) in the process? so far largely explored from a more international relations framework and a statist approach - a 'unified' front of government responses to the global process at global political fora. Such decisions and statements at the tops do not truly reflect how those ideas and norms travel; are localised ; and are acted upon specifically look into that schism.
Hows and whys of young and dynamic Korean Aid Process
Pre-OECD/DAC Act on the Measures for the Admission to International Financial Institutions (enacted in 1963) Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) Act (enacted in 1987) Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) Act (enacted in 1991) Overseas Emergency Relief Act (enacted in 2007)
After-OECD/DAC 2008: DAC Special Review on Korea : DAC membership : Framework Act on International Development Cooperation and the Presidential Decree Strategic Plan / Mid-term ODA Policy ( ) Annual Implementation Plan (since 2011) Country Partnership Strategy (since 2011)
(Year) Bilateral aid Multilateral aid Source: EDCF Stats (http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oda/use.jsp) (Million USD) Aid Budget ( /net disbursement)
Aid Budget Korean government declared the target of GNI/0.25% (USD 3,200 mil) by 2015 when joining OECD/DAC in 2010 In 2009, Korea’s aid budget was USD 816mil (GNI/0.10%) Since 2010, 17% increase average/each year In 2012, it increased to USD 1,597mil (GNI/0.14%) which is far behind the target of 0.25% by 2015 Either, the target should be adjusted or, MOSF attempts to adopt ‘Development Financing’ associated with private funds
Aid Architecture (DAC 2008) CSOs Business OOF Committee for Int’l Development Cooperation Under the Prime Minister about 30 other ministries /agencies /municipalities QUANGOs & Thinktanks (gov-funded, company-owned) KOTRA etc Consulting companies
million KRW Name of governmental body(Ministry)Bi MULTI Total Prime Minister’s Office Ministry of Strategy and Finance (EDCF included) 7,076.83, ,059.6 Ministry of Education Ministry of Foreign Affairs(KOICA included) 5,690.41,4897,179.4 Ministry of Justice Ministry of Security and Public Administration Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Ministry of Health and Welfare Ministry of Environment Ministry of Employment and Labor Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport -1.1 Korea Communications Commission Korea Fair Trade Commission 1.7- Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission 0.9- Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs 1.8- Korea Customs Service Statistics Korea National Police Agency Cultural Heritage Administration Rural Development Administration Korea Forest Service Intellectual Property Office Meteorological Administration National Election Commission 3.6- Total 14,254.56, ,410.7 Aid budget of implementing agencies
Imperial President Korea's top down model of executive branch Powerful presidential agenda taking the centre stage of the Korean aid agenda setting as spontaneous policy space emerges five year single term - leads to policy inconsistency easy to influence policy and political appointee: Unlike its US counterpart, the Korean case is more of ‘parachuting in’ ideas and agenda to the ministries and bureaucracy by those political appointees.
Arbitrary localisation and divergence
Post-MDGs Process in general 정부기관 및 주무부처에서 Post-2015 체제의 후속작업에 맞추어 구체적인 ODA 정책 및 시행 등을 직접적으로 확인하기가 힘들고 ( 자료가 잘 없음 ), 이슈가 있을 시 혹은 분야별로 중요한 일이 발생할 시 ( 예 년 세계교육회의 개최 ) 등의 경우에는 해당 관련 부처 혹은 기관 ( 예. 교육부 등 ) 이 함께 논의하여 진행 한국 정부는 MDGs 달성 기여과정에 있어서 ‘ 정책 - 이행 -M&E’ 프레임워크를 위한 전체적인 ‘ 매핑 (mapping)’ 이 부재하였다는 한계가 있었다. -> 이 문제가 Post MDGS 에서도 이어지는 것 그러나 무엇보다도 가장 중요한 것은 국가의 원조정책과 외교부 및 KOICA 원조지원 전략의 ‘ 공식화 ’ 문제이다. 외교부는 MDGs 지원 정책 및 전략 자체가 부재하고, 사실상 그러한 정책 또는 전략이 있다 하더라도 그 여부를 파악하기가 어려운 실정이다.
Imperial President president Lee Myungbak's 'contribution diplomacy' and Green Growth –Green Growth President Lee(2012) 지금은 다 사라짐 녹색성장위원회 폐지 ?? 유명무실 ?? Saemaul movement as a successful rural development model by the current President Park as her father Park Chung Hee’s legacy –Global Saemaul Movement President Park(2013~Present) 모든 농촌개발사업 이름에 새마을 붙임 모든 개발 actor 들이 새마을에 뛰어듦
Development Financing Ministerial Rivalry Post-MDGs 따르지 않고 Arbitrary localization Creative understanding Referencing France and others EDCF 에서 코이카 사람들 빼간다