Presentation on theme: "Dynamic response to ever changing threat perception"— Presentation transcript:
1 Dynamic response to ever changing threat perception Preventive VigilanceDynamic response to ever changing threat perception
2 CASH Security of Post Office cash and valuables. Prevent excess cash retention. Min/Max Bal. ReviewSecurity during transmission and line-limits.Pay Day precautions.Physical counting of cash and use of Treasury Module.ECB Memos.Bank Reconciliation.Fake cheque clearance.
3 STAMPS Used-up stamps prevalent in large quantities. Fake stamps keep coming to notice.Bulk Mailers, Religious Institutions easy targets for pushing used-up/fake stamps.Check at acceptance point can only be effective.Proper records of bulk sale/posting necessary in treasury/BMCs.
4 FRANKING Large pilferages noticed by commercial mailers. Both customers and DOP found cheated.Second office of posting to be monitored most carefully.Check at acceptance point most effective.Old machines/die to be destroyed.Site visit / record check necessary.
5 MONEY ORDERS Fake High Value MOs introduced into system. Office copies of list intact, interpolations in second copy common modus operandi.Unsuspecting receiving office pays out.Fake stamps and seals used.HVMO forms sent by fictitious service Regd. articles.
6 CASH CERTIFICATES FRAUDS Encashment of lost/stolen CCs (without proper verification in transfer cases) [Guwahati GPO]Use of lost/stolen CCs by forging No. & Series to avoid Negative List [Kanpur GPO]Double/multiple discharge [Amlapuram HO, Raniganj HO]Discharge of imaginary CCs [Raniganj HO]Inflated amount of discharge shown [Raniganj HO]Non-inclusion of sale in issue journal and non-credit of sale proceeds of genuine CCs [Teliabagh SO, Varanasi]Pledging of lost/stolen/counterfeit CCs [Patna, Chandigarh, Gorakhpur] specially by contractors as security for contractsEncashment of lost/stolen CCs through fraudulent name transfer
7 LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASES PO LEVEL Negative List not consultedProper verification procedure not followedPayments exceeding Rs /- made in cash instead of by chequeLocal address of the investor is not verified in RBT casesPayments are made without specific pay order of the competent authorityNon-maintenance of NC-12 & NC-12 (a) registers and its non-reconciliation with issue journals and money accounted forNon/delayed submission of due returns to the PAO
8 LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASES PO LEVEL Returns to PAO without supporting vouchers – cases of will follow and other remarksReturns to PAO without the signatures of the competent authority – under signature of APM instead of PostmasterProper upkeep of purchase applications not ensured – kept loose not in guard files and in proper securityPoor record maintenance – wanting / missing office copy of issue/discharge journals, stock register, guard files, invoice, indents etc.Acceptance of Agents as witnessNon-conducting of internal branch inspection by the Chief / Sr./ Postmasters
9 LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASES PAO LEVEL Non/delayed opening of bags of returns received from HOsNon-scrutiny / matching of supporting documents with due returnsNon-pairing of issue/discharge details even of representative samplesNon-detection of significant short/excess vouchers with returnsNon-detection of even imaginary / inflated discharges (even for periods paired) // double / multiple discharge even during the same monthNon-maintenance of S & I registerNot keeping watch over the timely receipt of due returns from HOsUpkeep of records – records not available even during the period of preservationRecords destroyed after preservation period even without mandatory pairing/checking
10 LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASES ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSPECTORIAL LEVEL Major frauds being detected on anonymous complaints – Collapse of regular supervisory / regulatory mechanismQuestionnaire during inspections/visits not followedTenure transfer instructions not followed scrupulously – extension given without examination of performance / previous service recordsTable transfer norms not implemented in HOsRegular posting of same group of officials in SB/CC related posts (cooling off period not followed)No follow-up on due reports from POs to Divisional offices
11 LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASES ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSPECTORIAL LEVEL Light punishments, not commensurate with loss/offenceDelay leading to retirement of main/subsidiary offendersNo review of such penalties / misplaced sympathy and compassion shown during reviewSubsidiary and co-offenders not properly identifiedDelay and hesitation in reporting cases to policeNo proper follow-up action on findings of departmental investigationDormant status of DO/RO/CO Checking squads – all satisfactory reports with nil irregularity noticed – number and amount of frauds increasing
12 Non/delayed-credit of deposits in government account by the counter PA FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALSNon/delayed-credit of deposits in government account by the counter PABogus ATs inserted in the systemIssue of duplicate passbook without proper verificationNon-maintenance of stock register for passbooksExchange of passbooks between counters without acquittanceFraudulent use of blank passbooks and post office stamps/sealsAccess of unauthorized persons to post office records – unauthorized help taken by staffForged closure / premature closure of accounts by forging signatures of customers
13 Forged withdrawal from accounts of customers by forging signatures FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALSForged withdrawal from accounts of customers by forging signaturesDouble / multiple closure of accountsFraudulent collaboration with Agents leading to cheating of customers investing through agentsRouting of counter business through Agent – Fraudulent drawal and sharing of commission – a recent trend – commission is generated even in cases evidently of reinvestmentManipulation of records/ledgers/computer database – inflating balance for fraudulent withdrawalSlackness/arrear of work in SBCOPayments exceeding Rs /- are made in cash instead of cheque
14 FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY AGENTS Creating trust with customers then breaching the same – criminal breach of trustTaking advantage of customers hurry and ignorance of proceduresTaking advantage of customers’ interest in part of the commissionNon-issue of preliminary receipts to customersRetention of passbooks by the AgentsGetting blank / self / without endorsement cheques for investment – fraudulent diversion of the amount in their interest
15 FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY AGENTS Managing blank / messenger signed withdrawal slips from customers – leading to premature fraudulent closureReplacement of original papers (mainly account opening form) for opening of accounts with papers in their own handwriting to facilitate issue of duplicate and finally fraudulent closureAccess to post office records – allowed to make their own entry in passbooks as per their schedules of deposits – fabricated entry in passbooks misleading depositorsEasy availability of blank passbooks to the Agents leading to issue of false passbooks with altered amount to the depositors
16 Types of Frauds in Computerized Offices Stamp prepaidSupervisor password known to operatorsInclusion of article & MOsManipulation of reportsViolation of security instructions issued by Directorate
17 COMPUTER SECURITY GUIDELINES Directorate Instructions 46-5/2004-Tech dtd. 21 July 2004Sharing of Password to be stoppedPassword to be periodically changedConfidential information to be stored onstandalone system onlyUnauthorized access to Servers/PCs to be stopped
18 During MaintenanceMaintenance or rectification of faults in the computer system should be carried out under proper and close supervision in case of maintenance of hardware by an external agencyEnsure that no data – file / program is copied and taken by the maintenance engineer.Maintenance of software should be done by the users.
19 Bad hard disk should not be released even after it has been replaced by a new one. Such hard disks may be destroyed by following procedures as applicable to weeding out of classified files.AMC – Repairs – Need to remove all data– wipe out the hard disk , so that deleted information can’t be reversed.
20 Case Study - I Station Kacheguda HO Committed by SBCO supervisor SB LANRs. 1,34,317.00Full amount recoveredBreach of password secrecy
21 Case Study - II Anna Road HO System Administrator involved Sanchay PostChanging of BAT through data entry moduleDetected due to complaints and mismatching of LOT and vouchers.
22 Case Study - III Worli Naka Post Office, Mumbai Sanchaya Post Data Entry Mode used – due to Cheque clearance.Use of APM passwordDetected due to union complaint
23 RMS OPERATIONS Cases of abstraction/loss of articles Trends in particular sections/setsRotation of staff, particularly those of doubtful integrityPosting of periodicals in PSO
24 RMS OPERATIONS Loss of CSD Bags, Postage Stamps etc. Careless handling of accountable articles, Non tallying of registered abstracts, fix individual responsibilityPunishment for loss/abstraction
25 Suggestions for prevention Training to Officers to conduct Technology inspections.Regular monitoring of password security and sanctity.Technology squad check on lines similar to vigilance squad check.Technology Vigilance to be separated from technology implementation.Data base warehousing at RO/CO. Databases of HPOs/Pos may be obtained once in 2-3 months and may be checked at Tech Cell of RO/CO. Use of analysis services of RDBMS should be done.Need of Technology audit by professionals.Making a Regional cadre for technology officials and system administrators.
26 Monitoring & Investigation Effective monitoring of software usage, observance of password secrecy at Pos, and vigilant inspections of computerized offices will prevent frauds.To investigate computer related frauds, we have to be innovative in our approach to ensure that the real culprit is brought to the book.