Presentation on theme: "Birchwood – 24th July 2014 ISO 19443 - Update Iain McNair."— Presentation transcript:
Birchwood – 24th July 2014 ISO 19443 - Update Iain McNair
Reminder on what has been proposed September 2013 – Original proposal via BSI from ISO - ISO/TC 85 - N1273 “Quality Management Systems - Specific requirements for the application of ISO 9001 and IAEA GS-R requirements by organizations in the Supply Chain of the Nuclear Energy sector” Proposal to base requirements on NSQ100 - Vers 0 Dec 2011- developed by NQSA (AREVA and BV) Supported by NucSIG SG as a starting point for drafting.
Development since (1) Paris meeting Mar 2014 – agreed that generally supported internationally and should proceed – ISO 19443 allocated as ref. Iain McNair from NucSIG and Phil Shaw from UKAS adopted as experts to WG.
Development since (2) Drafting meeting set for ISO TC 85 meeting Moscow, 2-4 June 2014 – Cancelled Meeting now scheduled for 15 October – Paris In the interim have set out what is happening in newsletters and event at Stockton March 2014. Sought input from NucSIG members. Will submit to ISO WG after this event.
Government overview of UK Nuclear Supply Chain - minutes of the UK Government Departments of Energy (DECC) and Business (BIS) joint ministerial led Nuclear Industries Council meeting on 14th April 2014 “Clarity on the scope, timing, and quality requirements of the UK new build opportunities will allow improvement activity to be appropriately timed.” “There is a pressing need to establish a regime to qualify products and systems for different technologies in the UK.” “The supply chain has reported that they understand the necessary quality requirements. However, on scrutiny it’s clear that this is often not the case.”
Meeting with ONR Supply Chain and Teleconf with members of NucSIG (1) Issues that must be addressed specifically include : 1.Nuclear Safety Culture (at all Tiers) 2.Leadership and Management for Safety principles 3.Must recognise Safety Categorisation / Classification – fits into Graded Approaches see IAEA TECDOC 1740-2014 and SSG 30 – 2014 for latest guidance 4.Enhanced and encompassing vendor analysis. – transferability of information. Recognition of what certification actually means. 5.Cascadability of requirements – document must be readable/ understandable down to n th level supply chain. Comes back to Contract Reviews (and flows into Design Reviews) 6.Must understand the overarching responsibility of Licensees/Operators and National laws applicable right down levels, regardless of globalisation and internal / external contractual arrangements. As such must allow Regulators / Licensee operators / Primary suppliers access to assure throughout entirety of supply chain related to Management systems / QA /QC, but going beyond in collaboration – eg BS11000.
Meeting with ONR Supply Chain and Teleconf with members of NucSIG (2) 7.Integrated management taking in Safety, Security, Environmental etc considerations. 8.Each level must be able to demonstrate it is an Intelligent Nuclear Customer and then deliver to requirements. 9.Globalisation and Major, multi – body corporations / companies, in multiple locations. All need addressed by requirements. 10.Non –Conforming, Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (NCFSI) – Identification of and shared intelligence on. Include Reporting of Defects. 11.Operational Experience (OPEX) – Prompt sharing of information up and down as well as across supply chain. Note this should also include knowledge on matters arising on non-nuclear supply where the items are likely to be used in the nuclear supply chain. 12.Lifetime records. Consideration needs to be given to latest developments in Building Information Modelling/Management (BIM) or other labelled Information system based approaches. Top down definition of what is needed when, by whom, where and in what format.
Recent discussion with Chair of ConSIG (1) The most worrying story I am hearing is the lack of basic quality understanding in many Tier 1/2 (depends where you sit how you label them) organisations and below; and as such: Lack of ownership by them of nuclear safety categorisation / classification, Single discipline and holistic design reviews being glossed over and not including Tier 3/4 specialist designers, Thus construction starting or even being completed before the design is complete and resultant field changes / modifications or even scrap and rebuild. Lack of flow down of safety / quality requirements - some Tiers not even recognising the work is nuclear related. Failure to develop or use Quality Plans/ Programmes for the works - terminology is an issue. Failure to use let alone comply with I&TP
Recent discussion with Chair of ConSIG (2) Failure to qualify special processes and operators despite the specifications calling for these to be done. Failure to share Learning From Experience and notification of non-compliances especially if found internally - commercial pressures applying threats of legal action if the information is passed around has even been noted. Lack of appreciation of "Suspect and Counterfeit Items". This is seen as a global issue yet we are hearing of 'certified' materials and products that when received bear no resemblance to the requirements. The resulting lack of confidence in certification has led several UK Licensees / Operators to do independent inspection and test of base materials on receipt. The other outcome is likely to be much more intense assessment of suppliers and increased Independent I&TP. Consequently documentation package requirements are not being cleared as work progresses and thus products including structures are being quarantined until they can be shown to conform. I have even had reported to me a comment by a construction director - who didn't last long on the project! "You mean you expect us to deliver to the specification".
Conclusion Everyone needs to go back to basics and ensures that the whole of their management (CEO down to floor level) understands exactly what is needed, and ensures that clear management and technical requirements are passed on and delivered against. ************* “The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yes “the devil is in the details.”.” Adml H Rickover; USNavy : 1982