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Integrated Approach to Nuclear Security and Safeguards Dr. Sukesh Aghara Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards University of Massachusetts.

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Presentation on theme: "Integrated Approach to Nuclear Security and Safeguards Dr. Sukesh Aghara Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards University of Massachusetts."— Presentation transcript:

1 Integrated Approach to Nuclear Security and Safeguards Dr. Sukesh Aghara Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards University of Massachusetts Lowell

2 Prof. Sukesh Aghara – UMass - Lowell Associate Professor, Nuclear Engineering Ph. D. Nuclear Engineering - University of Texas, Austin, 2003 Experience 2014 – p: Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Laboratory (INSSL) 2013 – p: Director, Nuclear Energy Education Training (NEET) 2010 – 12: Director, NSF Center for Energy and Environmental Sustainability (CEES) 2007 – 09: NASA Administrator’s Fellow, Langley Research Center 2004 – 12: Associate Professor, Texas A&M University, Prairie View Teaching & Training Radiation transport, Radiation Shielding, Nuclear Fuel Cycles, Nuclear Energy Policy, Nuclear Security Research Nuclear analytical techniques, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguards, Space Radiation Prof. S. K. Aghara Web: Ph:

3 Global Nuclear Energy Nuclear power provides 16% of the world's electricity Globally there are 430 reactors in 31 countries Source: World Nuclear Association US – 19 %UK – 18%France – 78%Germany – 17%Canada – 15% Russia – 17%S. Korea – 35%Japan – 18%China – 2%India – 3.6% CountryOperating Reactor New Construction USA1044 Russia3310 France581 China1730 India187 Vogtle Units 1&2 Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Safety are more important than ever Prof. S. K. Aghara

4 Global Adaption of Nuclear Energy Safety Security Safeguards Economics

5 Q: Do you recognize this weapon design?

6 Q: What type of fissile material was used in “Little boy”?

7 Safeguards objective ▫ Provide the international community with credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities, through objective and independent verification that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.

8 IAEA Safeguards - Milestones 1950s-1960s: as nations started to trade in nuclear plants and fuel the IAEA safeguards system was established to ensure that this did not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons ▫ INFCIRC/ : following the signing of the NPT, the IAEA was tasked to apply safeguards on all the nuclear material in the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) ▫ INFCIRC/ present: came about due to the clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq, problems in applying safeguards in the DPRK, and the experience gained in verifying the denuclearization of South Africa. Additional Protocol (AP) was first adopted in 1997 ▫ INFCIRC/540 Prof. S. K. Aghara

9 Path to Nuclear Weapons – Build One MiningMillingConversionEnrichment Nuclear Power Nuclear Weapons Reprocessing Prof. S. K. Aghara

10 Purse a Nuclear Weapons Program Need fissile material ▫ How much? Design ▫ Ease and size Resources ▫ Industrial capabilities ▫ Reflectors, igniters ▫ Humans ▫ Finance Delivery ▫ Simple, crude Prof. S. K. Aghara

11 Significant Quantity (SQ) - Timeliness 11 Prof. S. K. Aghara

12 IAEA Safeguards Terminology Prof. S. K. Aghara Materials Balance Area (MBA) Key Measurement Points (KMP) Significant Quantity (SQ) Physical Inventory List (PIL) Book Inventory MUF MBR SRD LOF Bulk Facility Item Facility Diversion Rate

13 13 State Level Motivations International security Regional Issues Lack of confidence on International Security Prestige/Hegemony Prof. S. K. Aghara

14 Safeguards Regime As early as 1960’s there was some concern about small groups pursing nuclear weapons ▫ Lawrence Livermore Laboratory conducted an elaborate controlled experiment in 1964 where 3 PhD nuclear physicists were randomly picked and were asked to design a nuclear weapon  28 months later they presented a design that was confirmed by the LLNL scientists that it would work!! Never became a serious concern for the Safeguards Regime, Why? Prof. S. K. Aghara

15 Safeguards Regime Building a nuclear bomb would require a team of specialists with knowledge of physics, the properties of nuclear material, metallurgy, and explosives And the team would need some special equipment The undertaking would be dangerous The outcome would be uncertain Too costly, not achievable – This has been a true assumption so far Prof. S. K. Aghara

16 New Paradigm – Steal One New concerns emerge ▫ “Do not detonate the small bomb. Keep it for us. It may be useful.” – 1961 French General in Algeria during the nuclear weapons testing Safeguards does not address this Nuclear Terrorism - successful sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor, the deliberate release of any significant amounts of radioactive material, or the detonation of a nuclear bomb by a non-state actor Threat from stateless terrorists and more widespread access to nuclear materials and know-how started to manifest

17 Threat – Nuclear Terrorism The twentieth-century nuclear stalemate is turning into the twenty-first – century era of nuclear terrorism, failed states, sophisticating terrorist networks ▫ Huge inventory of nuclear warheads and new nuclear weapons state  ~70,000 (1990’s) to ~22,000 (2012)  90% percent are US and Russian  India and Pakistan (1998) confirm their possession of nuclear weapons  North Korea (2006) conducted a successful nuclear weapons test  A 58 percent increase (since 2010) in the number of jihadist groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by al Qaeda affiliates – RAND study 2014 Prof. S. K. Aghara

18 Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? – Brian Jenkins Nuclear terrorism is about a serious threat — the possibility that terrorists might somehow obtain and detonate a nuclear weapon Nuclear terror is about the anticipation of that event. Nuclear terrorism is about terrorists' capabilities, while nuclear terror is about imagination. New Paradigm – Political Science ”A campaign of terror might even yield what an act of terrorism could not” Prof. S. K. Aghara

19 Nuclear Terrorism Threats ▫ Fundamentalist ▫ Idealist ▫ Mental disorder ▫ Mafia ▫ Religion ▫ Criminal Targets ▫ Materials ▫ People ▫ Information ▫ Facilities Pathways ▫ Where ▫ When ▫ How Prof. S. K. Aghara

20 Safeguards to Security From 1950 – 1990: proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology ▫ IAEA, Nuclear Safeguards, NPT From 1990 – 2001: illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and material from ▫ Nunn–Lugar Act or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program ▫ Focused on Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries Present: Nuclear terrorism from sophisticated non-state actors ▫ Global Threat Reduction Initiatives (GTRI), Nuclear Security Summit ▫ Comprehensive needs (safeguard and secure) Terrorist capabilities, motivations, and opportunities have changed Prof. S. K. Aghara

21 Safeguards to Security Change in the makeup of Non-State groups since the 1990’s ▫ Sustained motivations to cause devastating mass destruction (organized) ▫ Significant resources: financial, material, and trained (resourced) ▫ Permissive sanctuary for operations (networked) Opportunities to acquire nuclear weapons components and capabilities more pervasive ▫ Security of Russian weapon storage facilities imperfect ▫ Large global inventory of nuclear material ▫ Nontraditional weapon designs and material

22 Nuclear Security Threat Assessment: “Over a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the [IAEA] every year.” —Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency Prof. S. K. Aghara

23 Nuclear Security Incidents NTI reports 1000s of nuclear smuggling incidents (~20 involving HEU or Pu) over past 20 yrs. ▫ Many more cases likely unreported or undetected Effective policy requires understanding the causes of lapses in security that, under different circumstances, could have been catastrophic: ▫ Y-12 (U.S.) security breach (2012) ▫ Pelindaba (South Africa) break-in (2007) ▫ Kurchatov Institute (Russia) accounting problem (2001) ▫ Project Sapphire – 600 kgs of 90% percent U-235 (1998) ▫ Aum Shinrikyo – religious cult, solicitation for nuclear weapons and materials, Chemical Weapon (1995) ▫ A. Q. Khan network – Al Qaeda and Iran; Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking (1990 – 2001) Prof. S. K. Aghara

24 Identify Uranium Enrichment Facility ▫ Individual earned a PhD in a foreign country and gained a secret clearance ▫ Often seen in sensitive work areas taking notes and collecting items ▫ Fellow employee saw secret documents in his home ▫ Suspicious managers move employee to less-sensitive position ▫ Eventually family to home country for a vacation and never returns ▫ Continued to ask employees for additional sensitive information from home country Insider Theft Prof. S. K. Aghara

25 What is Nuclear Security? Deals with the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive substances and associated facilities Prof. S. K. Aghara

26 Smuggled nuclear device ▫ Theft or purchase of nuclear weapon Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) ▫ Fabricate a bomb using fissile material Radiological Dispersion Device ▫ Crude Pu explosion Nuclear Security - Risks Barrier to nuclear terrorism ≠ Access (weapons or SQ of SNM)

27 INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Threats (insiders/outsiders), Targets (materials, people, information), Pathways (where, when, how) Prof. S. K. Aghara

28 INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Prof. S. K. Aghara

29 Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand Prof. S. K. Aghara

30 Scenario: A shipment of nuclear warheads are loaded in a train and are being transported Blue Team – Goal is to transport the war heads safely. Red Team – Goal is to acquire nuclear war heads for nefarious purposes. Anchor your discussions within your teams on:  Critical elements of security  Vulnerabilities in security  What are the potential threats  Pathways to avoid these threats Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand Prof. S. K. Aghara

31 Exercise 1 - Discussions Observations ▫ Guards and gates ▫ Layered approach ▫ Sealed cargo - password protected Issues ▫ Large cargo ▫ Two person rule absent ▫ Central control ▫ All the guards in one car ▫ Too many people involved at a large weapons complex Prof. S. K. Aghara

32 IAEA Nuclear Security Framework There is no single international instrument that addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner Legal foundation for nuclear security comprises of international instruments and recognized principles designed to control nuclear material and other radioactive substances Advance science and technology for interdiction and forensics Prof. S. K. Aghara

33 State’s Nuclear Security Elements 1.Legislative and regulatory framework 1.Agencies to enforce and implement 1.Security systems for prevention, detection and response to a nuclear security event National detection strategy Prof. S. K. Aghara

34 Nuclear Security Vocabulary Prof. S. K. Aghara Insider Threat Categories of Nuclear Materials Design Based Threat (DBT) Sabotage unauthorized access radioactive material transport Nuclear Security Summit Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Nuclear Terrorism Nuclear Forensics Nuclear Fuel Cycle Detection and Measurements HEU

35 Nuclear Security Elements Prevent Detect Respond Manage Damage Manage Damage Materials Control & Surveillance Human Reliability Programs ▫ Insider Threat ▫ Sabotage ▫ Evaluate Material movement Border Crossing Post Detonation Radiation Protection Emergency Planning Law Enforcement Clean up & recovery Forensics Prof. S. K. Aghara

36 Exercise 2

37 Exercise 2 – 2 Minutes Task: 1.List the sequence of events 2.Identify agencies and titles 3.List technically relevant items Analysis and Information Management – Making Sense of it all Prof. S. K. Aghara

38 Nuclear Security Detection Architecture Prof. S. K. Aghara Communications Detection systems intelligence agencies systems of regulatory compliance experts Local response teams national response teams International engagement law enforcement

39 Response Assessment Alerts & Alarms Nuclear Security Detection Architecture Prof. S. K. Aghara Communications Law enforcement Intelligence agencies Systems of Regulatory Compliance Experts Local response teams National response teams International engagement Detection systems

40 Gap in demand vs. opportunities for nuclear security education and training ▫ 100,000 professionals with responsibility for nuclear security (WINS study, 2013) Multidisciplinary: Scientific and Technical Medical and Health Sciences Social Sciences, Humanities, and Law Global Systems for Nuclear Security It’s not just about technology – it’s about systems of systems

41 Detect – INSSL Research Detector characterization Autonomous Detection - Robotics Material Accountancy High resolution spectroscopy Enrichment measurement Pu mass measurement Prof. S. K. Aghara

42 Information Management - – INSSL Research Fuel Cycle Analysis ▫ Isotope inventory ▫ Thorium cycle Technology Evaluation ▫ Pyroprocessing ▫ Enrichment Nuclear analytical techniques ▫ Nondestructive inspection Prof. S. K. Aghara

43 Education & Training – INSSL Activities Education Fundaments of Nuclear Security and Safeguards Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Fuel Cycle Threat Assessment and Risk Management Nuclear Instrumentation Safeguards Approaches and Verification Techniques Training Workshops Certificate programs Summer programs Professional Development Courses (PDC) Prof. S. K. Aghara

44 Education & Training – INSSL Activities

45 Hands-on – INSSL Activities 1.H IGH -R ESOLUTION G AMMA -R AY S PECTROSCOPY WITH HPG E DETECTORS Semiconductor gamma-ray detection is introduced and students compare HPGe resolution to NaI detector resolution 2.Determine Enrichment quantities By measuring peak areas of U and Pu samples with high resolution gamma spectroscopy, calculate ratios for various energy lines and identify samples by their enrichment characteristics 3.Determine Mass of Pu By measuring sample with high resolution spectroscopy and recording the peak areas and sample dimensions, calculate the efficiency of the sample and the mass of Pu. Prof. S. K. Aghara

46 Take Away There is a growing demand for employees with nuclear security training and education ▫ Limited scope for a dedicated programs Cross-disciplinary programs designed with international prospective are vital for developing a global nuclear security community Prof. S. K. Aghara

47 Questions? Prof. S. K. Aghara


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