Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan."— Presentation transcript:

1 Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan

2 Risk Spectrum Non-residual Risk is addressed pre-event by prevention, mitigation, resilience & preparedness (& avoidance) Residual Risk is addressed post-event by Emergency Response (detection, diagnosis, containment, treatment, recovery, investigation) Natural Accidental Intentional 9 January Naturally Occurring Pandemic Reemerging Infectious Diseases Unintended Consequences of Research Laboratory Accidents Lack of Awareness Policy Choices Negligence (Failure to Follow SoPs) Crime & Counterfeit Drugs Sabotage Attack Leading to Release Biowarfare Terrorism State BW

3 Synthetic Biology and 1540 Varying views on what synthetic biology is. Engineering approach to biology: Design for purpose Use of standard components 9 January 20133

4 What are the risks? Security – misuse to design BW –Combination of improved genomics, IT, automation of sequencing/synthesis and on-line services (including design tools), making design possible, easier and more accessible/distributed Safety – unintended consequences –Of research or of continued evolution of genetically modified species released into the environment Safety – laboratory accidents/release 9 January

5 Who is involved? Gene Foundries (main clients academia and Big Pharma) Fabrication Centres Oligo producers Gene-design tool creators/Gene designers Academia (6 Academies, iGem, FBI) Corporate R&D (eg biofuels) Citizen scientists 9 January

6 ICLS Synthetic Biology Project Objectives Global adherence of gene foundries to a version of the ‘Code’ Vertical expansion to include all involved in synthetic gene commerce (suppliers, designers, manufacturers, clients) Development of a code for all active players in synthetic biology (ie all above plus academia, corporate R&D, citizen scientists) Creation of a global forum to discuss issues as they arise Keep ahead of the curve in managing associated risks 9 January

7 What has been done? IASB and IGSC Codes of Conduct US DHSS Guidelines Common features: –Check orders for gene sequences of concern –Check clients –Keep records –Links with law enforcement (FBI outreach initiative) DIYer Codes, iGem rules, SynBerc ICLS Heidelberg Meeting/SynBio Project 9 January

8 European DIYbio Code 16 August

9 US DIYbio Code 16 August 20129

10 ICLS Heidelberg Meeting Addressing Global Security Meeting Perceived needs –Common customer (black and white list) and gene sequence databases –International coordinating body and ‘seal of approval’ for gene foundries –International law enforcement Points of Contact equivalent to FBI programme –A code of conduct and a systems approach to biosafety and biosecurity for all working in SynBio 16 August 2012 Synthetic Biology: Biosafety and Biosecurity Considerations 10

11 Heidelberg Outcomes: Don’ts 1.No to shared client data: –No white lists –Black lists the responsibility of governments 2.No to common gene sequence database –Not practicable/proprietary –Problems of gene sequence vs species 16 August

12 Heidelberg Outcomes: Dos Part 1 1.Use Common language to explain to clients need for screening 2.Test ‘Seal of approval’, certifying guidelines-compliant 3.Address gene sequence vs species issue jointly 4.Keep a watching brief on pathways/new constructs 5.Consider client code of conduct 16 August

13 Heidelberg Outcomes: Dos Part 2 6.Consider licenses for smaller research outfits/citizen scientists/small market clients 7.Seek global adherence to the gene foundry code 8.Create a global forum for discussion of SynBio issues 9.Seek a general code of conduct for all SynBio actors 10.Address environmental and biosafety issues 16 August

14 Heidelberg Outcomes: Dos Part 3 11.Engage Interpol as global PoC on law enforcement issues 12.Engage BTWC National PoCs 13.Use the BTWC meetings to progress synbio issues 14.Address sales to legitimate entities in ‘pariah’ states 15.Address issues of transport of synbio products 16.Leverage existing synbio networks to work on broadening and globalisation issues 16 August

15 Heidelberg Outcomes: Report 16 August Printed copies available Distributed by FBI at 6 Academies Meeting in DC, June 2012 Special thanks to sponsors UK SPF FBI Sloan Foundation Thanks to partners IASB IGSC Other participants

16 Next steps 1.Engage Interpol 2.Engage the Six Academies 3.Engage more governments 4.Engage Citizen Scientists, Corporate R&D, Big Pharma 5.Meet Chinese gene foundries (Aug 2012, Shanghai) 6.ICLS/BGI co-host conference in Hong Kong, 7-8 March 2013 –Engage/invite BRIC and emerging biotech countries –Broaden participation vertically and horizontally –Lay groundwork for biosafety and environmental engagement 16 August

17 Relative Strengths of Government vs Civic Society Government International aspects Legislation and regulation Surveillance Interdiction/Prevention Preparedness and Planning Enforcement Forensic assessments Education Civic Society Institutional Practice Personal Practice Culture/Self-policing Cutting Edge Knowledge Distributed Networks: –Flexible and Responsive –Resilient –Innovative –Local and global - REACH 9 January

18 Basic Home Truths 1 9 January If you want things to happen, they need to add value locally, not make your interlocutor’s work harder To be sustainable, action plans have to address local priorities This means local priority setting and ownership, which is loss of control of the agenda for the outside ‘helpers’

19 Basic Home Truths 2 9 January In most countries, there are no biosecurity specialists Biosafety and biosecurity is not even the second hat – way down the list Must be careful how we use good people – must not take them away from doing things which are more important

20 So … 9 January If biosafety and biosecurity, and BWC implementation, are secondary priorities with other players then, in engaging these other players, we must address these issues as secondary objectives within a greater whole which addresses locally identified priorities.

21 Motivations Biosafety Biosecurity Certification Career advancement Compliance Liability protection Financial Status/image Altruism Personal connection 9 January

22 9 January Government and Civic Society Working Together Public Health, Agriculture, Food Safety, Environment Water, Soil Trade, Customs Education Sci/Tech Trade Security Law Enf. GvtRegulatory Agencies, Customs, Law Enforcement Security Services National Security Import/Export Armed Forces Customs/Border Occupational Safety, Industry, Education, Certification Naturally Occurring Pandemic Reemerging Infectious Diseases Unintended Consequences of Research Laboratory Accidents Lack of Awareness Policy Choices Negligence (Failure to Follow SoPs) Crime & Counterfeit Drugs Sabotage Attack Leading to Release Biowarfare Terrorism State BW Health Professionals & Societies, farmers etc… Academia Schools NGOsTrade and professional associations Outreach programmes, First responders Biosafety Associations, Professional trainers

23 Thank you 9 January Fairfax Drive Arlington VA

24 Towards A New Methodology? Define risk profile = consequences to be avoided Establish triage criteria and threshholds Identify causes (categories, sub- categories) Identify events/actio ns which give rise to these Identify all potential counter- measures Filter options through risk profile/budg et Derive action plan 9 January


Download ppt "Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google