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COLLABORATION AND TRUST BUILDING AMONG STAKEHOLDERS IN CITARUM RIVER BASIN CONFLICT Utomo Sarjono Putro; Dhanan Sarwo Utomo; Pri Hermawan School of Business.

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Presentation on theme: "COLLABORATION AND TRUST BUILDING AMONG STAKEHOLDERS IN CITARUM RIVER BASIN CONFLICT Utomo Sarjono Putro; Dhanan Sarwo Utomo; Pri Hermawan School of Business."— Presentation transcript:

1 COLLABORATION AND TRUST BUILDING AMONG STAKEHOLDERS IN CITARUM RIVER BASIN CONFLICT Utomo Sarjono Putro; Dhanan Sarwo Utomo; Pri Hermawan School of Business and Management Institut Teknologi Bandung 1

2 2 RIVER REGION UNIT in: -Prov. Banten -DKI Jakarta -Prov. Jawa Barat POLA INDUK JAWA BARAT 2000/ MCC 2001 Citarum River Basin: 6.080 Km2

3 3 POPULATION PRESSURE PRESSURE causes deforestation Untreatment waste disposal from industries UNCARE CULTURE causes rubbish along the river TOO MUCH: FLOOD TOO LITTLE: DROUGHT TOO DIRTY: DISEASE Three Classical Problems of Citarum River basin Problem RUSTAM SYARIF/ 2002

4 4 STOP DEFORESTATION ----------------------NOT HAPPY UPPER LOCAL GOVERNMENT STOP ILLEGAL LODGING ---------------- NOT HAPPY UPPER STREAM LOCAL PEOPLE AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT--------------------------------NOT HAPPY COMMUNITY SELF INTERESTS UPSTREAM --------------------------------------- SUFFER DOWNSTREAM DOWNSTREAM DOESN’T CONTRIBUTE TO UPPER ------UNPROTECTED UPSTREAM BLAME INDUSTRIES---------------------------------------------------------------UNEMPLOYMENT OVERACT ENVIRONMENTALIST --------------------------STAGNANT DEVELOPMENT Partial Proposals Create Confrontations AT LAST THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE AND MORE DEGRADED AND “ THE PEOPLE” IS THEN BEING VICTIMS

5 5 Transformation System Ideal Future (No dilemmas) Agents have common position; Agents have no dilemmas of cooperation. Existing Agents conflict each other Agents blame each other Partial Actions Confrontations involving dilemmas Drama Theory How can dilemmas be eliminated? Collaboration

6 OBJECTIVES  This study aims to construct an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory frame-work in which the Agents are equipped with emotions and ability to change their emotions.  The simulation model is developed to mimic the dynamic of negotiation in real world.  Using the constructed model, this study will propose strategy that can promote collaboration among stake holders in Citarum River Basin Conflict. 6

7 Methodology 7

8 Modelling Conflict by Drama Theory Agent based Model: How is the influence of Agents’ emotion on dilemma reduction? 8

9 Climax: ABM of Dynamic Negotiation Agent 1Agent 2 New Payoff New Emotion New Perception Current CRF Next CRF Options Agent 1`s position Agent-2`s position O1Y (75)N (87) O2N (79)Y (89) Options Agent 1`s position Agent-2`s position O1Y(75)N (87) O2N (79)Y (89) Negotiation Current Dilemma Next Dilemma Internal attributes: Payoff/Preference Perception other agent’s payoff Bargaining strategy Emotion Internal attributes: Payoff/Preference Perception other agent’s payoff Bargaining strategy Emotion 9

10 10 Options Agent-1`s position Agent-2`s position O11 Y (75)Y (87) O12 N (79)Y (89) Modeling Negotiation Process Incompatible choice 10 Options Agent-1`s positi on Agent-2`s position O11 Y (75)Y (87) O12 N (69)Y (59)  Every agent who has a dilemma will negotiate based on his/her emotional state (positive or negative emotion).  Positive emotional state is more conducive to a person acting in a friendly and sociable manner with others;  Conversely, a negative emotional state tends to heighten chances that the individual will be unfriendly, inconsiderate, or even rude to others. Payoff Distance Agent-1’s proposal Agent-2’s proposal Agent-1 Agent-2

11 11 Climax: Dilemmas  Confrontation dilemmas (happen when there is no common position)  Threat dilemma  Rejection dilemma  Positioning dilemma  Persuasion dilemma  Collaboration dilemmas (happen when there is a common position)  Trust dilemma  Cooperation dilemma

12 12 Threat Dilemma Party 1 has threat dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s threat is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers another scenario than the threat.

13 13 Rejection Dilemma Party 1 has rejection dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1`s rejection of party 2’s position is not credible according to party 2, because party 2 knows that party 1 prefers party 2’s position than the threat.

14 14 Positioning Dilemma Party 1 has positioning dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept his/her position because party 1 prefers party 2’s position than his/her own position.

15 15 Persuasion Dilemma Party 1 has persuasion dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not persuade party 2 to accept party 1`s position because party 2 prefers threated position than party 1`s position.

16 16 Trust Dilemma Party 1 has trust dilemma with respect to party 2, if party 1 can not believe that party 2 commits with the common position (agreement), because party 1 knows that there is another scenario preferred by party 2 than the common position.

17 17 Cooperation Dilemma Party 1 has cooperation dilemma with respect to party 2, because party 1 has incentives not to commit with the common position (agreement), because another scenario is better than the common position.

18 Climax: Dilemma can be identified from CRF Current Dilemma Current CRF Negotiation Next CRF Next Dilemma 18 Next Interaction

19 19 Climax: Modeling Emotion  Emotion model used in this paper is the development from emotional negotiation model PAD (Jiang et.al.):  Pleasure (r p ): gives the direction of emotions; i.e; positive emotion status (Pleasure)/negative emotion status (Displeasure).  Arousal (r a ); the degree of effects from environments that strengthen (Arousal) or weaken the pleasure (Non-Arousal).  Dominance (r d ); the degree of an agent`s ability to control the pleasure and arousal.  Therefore, each agent has the emotional state, i.e.:.

20 Modelling Emotion Dynamics based on experience from the last interaction My current bargain is better than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Satisfy, Joy My current bargain is better than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Anger My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain but my bargain is perceived better. OCC emotion : Gratitude My current bargain is worse than my previous bargain and my bargain is perceived worse. OCC emotion : Fear confirmed 20

21 Common Reference Frame Before and After 2008 (based on focus group discussion) 21

22 Common Reference Frame Before and After 2009 (based on focus group discussion) 22

23 Experiments 1:Sensitivity Analysis Experiment Scenarios: 1 ) All agents begin the negotiation with negative emotion 2 ) All agents begin the negotiation with neutral emotion 3 ) All agents begin the negotiation with positive emotion Each scenario was run 30 times Using 95% confidence interval there is enough evidence that if agent begin the negotiation with negative emotion the times required to eliminate confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain will be higher than if agents use positive or neutral emotion 23

24 Experiments 2 24 Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotion Scenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008 There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics

25 Experiments 2 25 Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s emotion Scenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009 There is a phase in the simulation output that can mimics the actual agent’s emotional dynamics

26 Experiments 3 26 Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positions Scenario 1: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2008 The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world

27 Experiments 3 27 Testing the feasibility of proposed model to describe the dynamics of agent’s positions Scenario 2: The initial CRF is initiated according to the CRF before 2009 The model can predict the majority of agent’s position in the real world

28 CONCLUSIONS (1)  This study constructed an agent-based simulation of the dynamics of negotiation based on drama theory that incorporates agent’s emotions.  The model can show the evolution of a common reference, the time required to eliminates confrontation dilemmas and the collaboration dilemmas that remain after all agents reach compatible positions.  The model can also mimic the dynamics of agent’s position and the majority of agent’s position in the real world.  The model in this study can provide insight to stakeholders regarding the potential evolution of the conflict that may occur due to the action and reaction of each agent. Using table top exercise or FGD, the model can help to test possible scenarios and alternatives. 28

29 CONCLUSIONS (2)  Based on the simulation results in Citarum River Basin conflict case, it can be concluded that:  If agents use negative emotions to other agents then, the time required to eliminate the confrontation dilemmas will be longer than if they use neutral or positive emotions.  If agents use negative emotions the numbers of collaboration dilemmas that remain are significantly higher than if they use neutral or positive emotions.  In the real world, positive emotions can be implemented in several forms for example:  willingness to compromise,  give empathy to others,  to convince others etc. 29

30 Thank You 30


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