Introduction and Background Cyber Adversary Characterization workshop in 2002 Research discussions continued via email Briefings to Blackhat and Defcon to introduce concept and obtain feedback Future workshops planned for October 2003 Slides will be on both conference web sites
Why characterize? Theoretical: To gain understanding of and an ability to anticipate an adversary in order to build improved threat models. Practice: Improved profiling of attackers at post attack and forensic levels.
Point Scoring: Rating-the-Hacker Toby Miller email@example.com
Point Scoring: Why? No “standard” system to help rate the attacker No system to help with the threat level Help management in the decision making process
Point Scoring: The Categories Passive Fingerprinting Intelligence The Attack The Exploit Backdoors | Cover up Other
Example Score Metric Linux3 FreeBSD4 OpenBSD6 IRIX4 Windows3
Point Scoring: Past, Present, Future Originally posted on incidents.org Currently on rev2 Soon to release rev 3 www.ratingthehacker.net
Tool characterizations, Disclosure Patterns and Technique scoring. Tom Parker – Pentest Limited (UK)
The Hacker Pie Representative of characterization metrics which build the final characterization. Available elements dependant upon scenario. Does not rely solely upon IDS/attack signature data.
The Hacker Pie (continued) Pie reliant upon the results of multiple metrics which are, in many cases inter-related, strengthening the likelihood of an accurate characterization. Relationships between key metrics and key data enable accurate assumptions to be made regarding unobserved key information.
The Pie Explained Metric OneMetric ThreeMetric Two Key Data Characterization Metric Four 0 2 1 2
Point Scoring Systems (Continued) Attempt to characterize an adversary based on attack information captured from the wild. Attempt to characterize adversary based upon “technique classification model” Attempt to characterize adversary based upon “tool classification model”
Tool classification model Availability of application Origins of application Ease of use –Requires in-depth knowledge of vulnerability to execute? –Other mitigating factors
Example Exploit Classification Web App FlawPublicPrivate Proprietary Application Penetration Via SQL Injection 34 Open Source Application Penetration Via SQL Injection 34 Proprietary Application Penetration Via Arbitrary Script Injection 23 Open Source Application Penetration Via Arbitrary Script Injection 23 Proprietary Application Penetration Via OS command execution using SQL Injection (MS SQL) 35 Proprietary Application Penetration Via OS command execution using SQL Injection (other) 47 Proprietary Application Penetration Via SQL Injection (MS SQL) 56 Proprietary Application Penetration Via SQL Injection (other) 47
Disclosure Food Chain Characterization All tools have a story Often years before dissemination into public domain. Social demeanour often key to placing in disclosure disclosure chain. “Pyramid” metric.
2 Approaches to Modeling the Cyber Adversary: Offender Profiling & Remote Assessment Dr. Eric D. Shaw Consulting & Clinical Psychology, Ltd. firstname.lastname@example.org
Offender Profiling Roots in Law enforcement & intelligence community (criminal event or incident analysis)—intensive review of past offenders Insider Computer Crimes, 1998-present –50 cases –10 in-depth case studies from companies or gov’t. contractors Products –Typology of actors: motivation, psychological characteristics, actions –Critical pathway—process of interactions w/environment (personal and professional) leading to attack –At-risk characteristics –Organizational vulnerabilities & Insights into prevention, deterrence, detection, management
Offender Profiling Headlines The Termination Problem Actor subtypes—the Proprietor & Hacker The Tracking Problem Organizational Vulnerabilities Detection Issues Intervention Challenges Hacker Overview
Attacks: The Termination Problem Simple termination of Disgruntled Insider is not the answer—80% attack after termination (4 hours-2 months) 70% attack from remote locations vs. inside— termination did not impact access Attack types: –DOS to disrupt business –Destruction & corruption of data –Theft of Proprietary data –Time bombs –Extortion –Attack on reputations
Attackers Hackers—40%: affiliated with and active in hacking community, brings hacking practices to worksite Proprietors—40%: defend system as belonging to them, resist efforts to dilute control Avengers—20%: attack impulsively in response to perceived injustice
Prevention: Screening & Selection The Tracking Problem Screening & Selection Problems in 60% of cases—no or delayed background, nepotism, failure to detect risk factors 30% had prior felony convictions 30% had high-profile hacker activity
Organizational Issues 80% of cases occur during periods of high organizational stress or change at the highest to supervisory levels Lack of policies contributed to disgruntlement or facilitated attack in 60% of cases Lack of policy enforcement contributed to disgruntlement of facilitated attack in 70% of cases
Detection Problems 80% of attackers used operational security to protect attack planning or identity Time disgruntled to attack: 1-48 months with a mean of 11.3 months Time active problems (probation) to attack: 0-76 weeks with a mean of 26 weeks Forget the “big bang” theory of the sudden, unforeseen attack
Intervention Problems Management intervention initially exacerbated problems in 80% of cases (ignore, placate or tolerate problems, negotiate then cut-off, terminate poorly) Problems with termination process in 80% of cases (esp. failure to terminate access) Multidisciplinary risk assessment prior to termination
Hardcore Hackers: Not Script Kiddies Age Mean=25.5 Tech Capability Prior Offenses 50% Acted with Others 75% Status in Hacker Community Oquendo 29HighYes High Zezev 30HighNoYesUnknown Carpenter 20HighYesNoLow Demostenis 23LowNoYesLow
Remote Assessment Using WarmTouch (patent pending)
Why Use WarmTouch Software to Detect Disgruntlement or Psych Change on-line? Communication has moved on-line Loss of visual & auditory cues on-line Failure of other systems to detect violations: technical noise, supervisor & peer reporting Protects Privacy Provides Objectivity
Vulnerable CITI Minor Infraction Moderate Infraction Major Act Personal Stressors Professional Stressors Mounting Stress and Frustration Person-Situation Interaction: Detect Psychological “Leakage”
“Software” Components Psychological Profiling Algorithms –Emphasis on measuring emotional state Anger Anxiety Depression –Changes in emotional state from baseline Psychological characteristics: decision-making and personal relations –Loner/team player –plans/reacts –Rigid/flexible –Sensitivity to environment Alert Phrases-key words –Threats –Victimization –Employment Problems Communication Characteristics –To, From, Time, Length, etc.
WarmTouch “Software” Overview WarmTouch origins in IC, 1986-present Use of WarmTouch with Insider Communications –Khanna at Bank –Threat Monitoring –Sting operations & negotiations –Suspect identification –Hanssen Other WarmTouch Applications
Case Example: Financial Proprietor Well paid systems administrator Personality Traits-Proprietor –Entitlement –Manipulative –Devaluing of others –Padded OT Context: Supervisor Change
Email from Boss Asked to train back-up “You seem to have developed a personal attachment to the System Servers. These servers and the entire system belong to this institution not to you…”
Email 1: April (Asked to train his back-up, subject refuses) “His experience was ZERO. He does not know ANYTHING about...our reporting tools.” “Until you fire me or I quit, I have to take orders from you…Until he is a trained expert, I won’t give him access...If you order me to give him root access, then you have to permanently relieve me of my duties on that machine. I can’t be a garbage cleaner if someone screws up….I won’t compromise on that.”
Email 3: July “Whether or not you continue me here after next month (consulting, full-time, or part- time), you can always count on me for quick response to any questions, concerns, or production problems with the system. As always, you’ll always get the most cost- effective, and productive solution from me.”
Email 4: July “I would be honored to work until last week of August.” “As John may have told you, there are a lot of things which at times get “flaky” with the system front-end and back-end. Two week extension won’t be enough time for me to look into everything for such a critical and complex system.” “Thanks for all your trust in me.”
The Event On last day of work, subject disables the computer network’s two fileservers. Company executives implore subject to help them fix the problems, but he refuses. Independent consulting firm hired to investigate problems, discovers sabotage. Timing: deception to cover plotting.
WarmTouch Challenge Detect deterioration in relationship with supervisor Detect Deception
Covert vs. Overt Hostility in Email Prior to Attack Three Months Prior Two Months Prior Two Weeks Prior Attack Overt Hostility Covert Hostility
Zezev vs. Bloomberg: Managing his Psychological State Task: to lure him to London for the bust –must manage his anger and anxiety at delays and manipulations –satisfy his dependency—need for $ & job Warmtouch help: –Objectively highlight and help manage psychological states –Objectively measure success
Support to Sting Ops/Negotiations: Levels of Anger in Zezev’s emails to Bloomberg
Robert Hanssen 8 Communications with Soviet Handlers Between October 1985 & November 2000 Challenge for Software: –Detect signs of emotional stress associated with spying, disgruntlement and “affair” as documented in public records
Other WarmTouch Applications Communications Manager –Analyze state of relationship –Assess characteristics of persons in relationship –Help modify language to improve/modify relationship –Track success/changes over time Media Monitoring –Attitude of Egyptian press toward U.S. –Attitude of customers toward product or service
Internet Threat Actors Marcus H. Sachs Director, Internet Storm Center The SANS Institute http://isc.sans.org
US national information networks have become more vulnerable—and therefore more attractive as a target Growing connectivity among secure and insecure networks creates new opportunities for unauthorized intrusions into sensitive or proprietary computer systems The complexity of computer networks is growing faster than the ability to understand and protect them The prospects for a cascade of failures across US infrastructures are largely unknown The Cyber Threat to the United States
Hacker/Script Kiddies/Hobbyist Disgruntled Employee Insider aiding others Hacktivist Industrial Espionage Foreign Espionage Terrorist State Sponsored Attack Cyber Threats to the Critical Infrastructure
Low High High Low Potential Damage Probability of occurrence 2003 2004 2005 Source: 1997 DSB Summer Study Hacker Criminal Espionage Terrorist State Sponsored The Threat is Increasing
Internet was not built to be secure “Secure” (i.e., obscure) software being replaced by commercial products in infrastructures Software development focused on “Slick, Stable, Simple” (not “Secure”) System administrators lack training Leaders rarely see computer security as part of the “bottom line” User awareness is low Why are we so Vulnerable?
The real threat to the Critical Infrastructure is not the hacker, but the structured state-sponsored organization However... –Sometimes it’s hard to tell the difference - both use the same tools –Growing sophistication and availability of tools increases concern –Must assume the worst until proven wrong So... –The government takes seriously all unauthorized activity –They will use all technical and law enforcement tools to respond... and deter –They will seek legal prosecution where appropriate Why The Feds are Concerned About Hackers
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ New Homeland Security Strategies
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Nation fully dependent on cyberspace Range of threats: script kiddies to nation states Fix vulnerabilities, don’t orient on threats New vulnerabilities require constant vigilance Individual vs. national risk management Government alone cannot secure cyberspace
Enhance law enforcement’s capabilities for preemption, prevention, and prosecution Secure the mechanisms of the Internet including improving protocols and routing Foster trusted digital control systems/ supervisory control and data acquisition systems Reduce and remediate software vulnerabilities Improve physical security of cyber and telecommunications systems Priority II A National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program
Inside the Internet Storm Center Data Collection DShield Users AnalysisDissemination DShield.org
Typical Residential Cable Modem Log Pop-up ads (Spam) FTP attempt s Pop-up ads (Spam) FTP attempt s
Internet Storm Center Web Page http://isc.sans.org
2002 Top 20 List Top Vulnerabilities to Windows Systems W1 Internet Information Services (IIS) W2 Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) -- Remote Data Services W3 Microsoft SQL Server W4 NETBIOS -- Unprotected Windows Networking Shares W5 Anonymous Logon -- Null Sessions W6 LAN Manager Authentication -- Weak LM Hashing W7 General Windows Authentication -- Accounts with No Passwords or Weak Passwords W8 Internet Explorer W9 Remote Registry Access W10 Windows Scripting Host Top Vulnerabilities to Unix Systems U1 Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) U2 Apache Web Server U3 Secure Shell (SSH) U4 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) U5 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) U6 R-Services -- Trust Relationships U7 Line Printer Daemon (LPD) U8 Sendmail U9 BIND/DNS U10 General Unix Authentication -- Accounts with No Passwords or Weak Passwords www.sans.org/top20