1. Cryptography and Security Services: Mechanisms and Applications Manuel Mogollon m_mogollon@verizon.net M. Mogollon – 0 Chapter 11 and 12 VPNs, IPsec, and TLS/SSL

2. M. Mogollon – 1 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Session 9 – Contents VPNs Tunneling —IPsec —Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) TLS/SSL

3. M. Mogollon – 2 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TCP/IP Stack and Security Related Protocols Application Layer Transport Layer Network Layer Data Layer SMTP, Telnet, FTP, Gopher TCP UDP IP Ethernet, Token-Ring, FDDI, X.25, Wireless, Async, ATM, SNA...Data Layer ARPRARP S/MIME S-HTTP PGP SET IPsec (ISAKMP) SOCKS V5 TLS/SSL IPsec (AH, ESP) Packet Filtering Tunneling Protocols PPP-EAP, IEEE 802.1X, CHAP, PAP, MS-CHAP

4. M. Mogollon – 3 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS What is a Virtual Private Network? VPNs / Private data communication channels that use a public IP network, i.e., Internet, as the basic transport for connecting corporate data centers, remote offices, mobile employees, telecommuters, customers, suppliers, and business partners. The public network is used as a wide area communications network, and it offers the appearance, functionality, and usefulness of a dedicated private network.

5. M. Mogollon – 4 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS E-Commerce, E-Procurement, E-Care Headquarters Business Partners Mobile Workforce Suppliers Customers Telecommuters Contractors Internet But, the Internet is a public network and it doesn’t have any security!

6. M. Mogollon – 5 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Secure VPNs Security is implemented in all products that offer VPNs. Secure VPNs are revolutionizing the way the Internet is used. IETF has standardized IPsec (IP Security) for secure VPN applications that have the following features: —are transparent to all TCP/IP applications —can be implemented in any LAN/WAN environment using TCP/IP —can secure any business communication over the Internet. IPsec is a mandatory part of the forthcoming IPv6 standard.

7. M. Mogollon – 6 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Implementation of VPNs Located at the carrier’s network —In the first scenario, the service provider provides a service similar to the public switched Frame Relay or ATM service, and the customer trusts that packets will not be misdirected, modified in transit, or subjected to traffic analysis by unauthorized parties. On the customer’s premises —In the second scenario, the customer does not trust the service provider and implements a VPN using CPE equipment that provides firewall functionality and security. Any devices with microprocessors, such as routers, servers, firewalls or even PCs, can perform VPN functions, such as creating tunnels and encrypting packets.

8. M. Mogollon – 7 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Secure VPN Headquarters Business Partners Mobile Workforce Suppliers Customers Telecommuters VPNs Contractors Internet With Secure VPNs, I am sure to whom I am talking. I know my message has not been modified. I know that only authorized persons have seen my message. I know that the message recipient can’t deny receiving my message.

9. M. Mogollon – 8 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS VPN Applications: Extranets and Remote Access Internet Tunnel Mode Protected Subnet Security Policy Server Certificate Authority Gateway Mobile Workforce with IPsec Client Software Transport Mode Protected Subnet Tunnel Mode Authentication is provided between a client and a corporate VPN device, or between two VPN devices. Transport Mode Authentication is provided directly between a client and a server or between two work stations. Server

10. M. Mogollon – 9 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Virtual Private Networks (VPN) Network of virtual circuits for carrying private traffic. VPN Protocols PPP and L2TP are aimed at remote access use. IPsec is used for connecting LANs. PPPL2TPIPsec ModeClient-serverClient-serverHost-to-Host PurposeRemote accessRemote accessIntranets, extranets, via tunnelingvia tunnelingremote access via tunneling OSI layerLayer 2Layer 2Layer 3 TCP/IP LayerDataDataNetwork ProtocolIP, IPX,IP, IPX,IP AppleTalk, etc AppleTalk, etc

11. M. Mogollon – 10 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS VPN Benefits Ease of use – Facilitating electronic communications makes corporations more efficient and productive. Cost —Eliminating long-haul leased lines, 800 numbers or long distance fees, modem banks, and multiple access connections results in significant savings. —Voice over IP reduces long distance phone call expenses. —Savings of up to 65% on monthly circuit costs by moving from a FR and ATM environment to an IP VPN —Teleworker lower connection costs by 20%-25% per month over traditional dial up & ISDN. Use of Standard Protocols – Internet Protocol IP and IPsec provide needed standardization. Simplification of Maintenance and Support – Reducing scalability issues and management complexity simplifies network operation.

12. M. Mogollon – 11 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS What is IPsec? IPsec / (1) A suit of security protocols standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that address data privacy, integrity, authentication, and key management, as well as, tunneling to TCP/IP networks. (2) A secure architecture that supports several applications that encrypt and/or authenticate all traffic at the IP level.

13. M. Mogollon – 12 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Why IPsec IPsec-compliant products allow secure Virtual Private Networks in any existing IP-based network. IPsec is based on several strong encryption standards. IPsec provides security services such as: data origin authentication, access control, confidentiality (encryption), connectionless integrity, rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. IPsec has government and industry support. IPsec allows corporations to select security services according to internal security policies.

14. M. Mogollon – 13 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Internet Protocol (IP) – Security Threats The Internet protocol has no security. —Source/destination address & port Various IP Header Fields Source IP Address Destination IP Address Upper Protocol Header (i.e., TCP, UDP, ICMP) Data IP HeaderTCP IP Packet Attacks include: —IP Spoofing —Packet Sniffing —Session Hijacking —Man-in-the-Middle IP HeaderPayload Data

15. M. Mogollon – 14 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IPsec Interlocking Technologies Cryptographic Security Mechanisms for IP Authentication Header (AH) —Provides integrity and authentication without confidentiality to IP datagrams. —Available even in locations where the export, import or use of encryption to provide confidentiality is regulated. Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) —Provides integrity, authentication, and confidentiality to IP datagrams. Key Management Internet Key Exchange IKEv2 —Allows users to agree on authentication methods, encryption methods, keys to use, and key duration. —Key exchange could be manual or automated.

16. M. Mogollon – 15 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IP Security Architecture IPsec Databases —Security Policy Database (SPD) —Security Association Database (SAD) —Peer Authorization Database (PAD) Security Associations —Information shared between two Gateways on how to secure communications. IP Packets ESP/AH Engine IPsec Databases (SPD, SAD, PAD) Authentication Header Protocol Encapsulation Security Payload Protocol Encryption Algorithm Authentication & Integrity Algorithms Key Management Security Protocols —AH is used to authenticate. —ESP is used to encrypt and to authenticate. Algorithms for encryption and authentication —Symmetric encryption algorithms. —Keyed hash algorithms. Key Management Protocols —Manual and Automated

17. M. Mogollon – 16 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Security Protocols IPsec provides mechanisms to provide security services to IP and upper layer protocols (e.g., UDP or TCP). IPsec protect IP datagrams by defining a method in a SA. The SA associated with a connection could be Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), or Authentication Header (AH), but not both. If both AH and ESP protection are applied to a connection, then two (or more) SAs are created to provide protection to the connection. To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each direction) are required. Both ESP and AH security protocols support two modes of operation: transport or tunnel mode.

18. M. Mogollon – 17 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IPsec Negotiation 1 2 3 4 5 6 Applications TCP/IP Negotiator Engine Unprotect- Protect Engine Security Policy Database Outbound IPsec Packet Applications TCP/IP Unprotect- Protect Engine 1 2 SPI SA Attributes Inbound IPsec Packet IPsec Databases (SAD, PAD) Negotiator Engine Security Policy Database

19. M. Mogollon – 18 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IP Security Architecture RFC 4301 AH Protocol RFC 4302 Encryption Algorithms RPC 3602 (AES-CBC (128-Bit) RFC 3686 (AES-CTR) RFC 2451 (Triple DES-CBC) Authentication Algorithms RFC 3566 (AES-XCBC-MAC-96) RFC 2404 (HMAC-SHA1-96) RFC 2403 (HMAC-MD5-96) IKE v2 RFC 4306 Key Management RFC 4120 (Kerberos) RFC 2093 (GKMP) RFC 2412 (OAKLEY) ESP Protocol RFC 4303 IPsec Document Roadmap

20. M. Mogollon – 19 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS AH and ESP Modes of Operation Tunnel Mode Authentication / Integrity Confidentiality New IP Header ESP Original IP Header Authentication / Integrity Confidentiality Original IP Header Header ESP Authentication / Integrity New IP Header AH Original IP Header Original IP Header Header AH Authentication / Integrity Transport Mode ESP AH Payload Data Outer IP Header Inner IP Header Outer IP Header VPN Device Server Client Tunnel Transport

21. M. Mogollon – 20 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Authentication Header (AH) Data Integrity: Undetected modification to a packet’s content in transit is not possible Authentication: Enables a network device to authenticate a user. Anti-replay service (optional) Authentication Data Algorithms HMAC-SHA-1-96 (Must be supported) AES-XCBC-MAC-96 (Should be supported) HMAC-MD5-96 (May be supported) Security Parameters Index (SPI) Next HeaderReservedAH Payload Length Sequence Number Payload DataIP Header 32 bits AH Authentication Integrity Check Value –ICV (variable) 8 bits Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 - 16 bits8 bits

22. M. Mogollon – 21 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) Data Integrity + Authentication (optional) Anti-replay Service (optional) Confidentiality (optional) 8 bits Security Parameters Index (SPI) Sequence Number 32 bits Integrity Check Value –ICV (variable) Original IP HeaderESP Header Authentication Encryption ESP ICVESP Trailer Payload Data Payload Data (variable) Next Header Pad Length Padding (0 – 255 bytes) 8 bits

23. M. Mogollon – 22 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Internet Key Exchange (IKE v2) IPsec security services use symmetric encryption. —Source and destination need to agree to the mechanisms used to share the secret keys and the keys that are used for authentication/integrity and encryption services. IPsec supports both manual and automatic distribution of keys. Public Key is used for automatic key management, but other automated key distribution techniques may be used. IKE v2 defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete Security Associations (SA).

24. M. Mogollon – 23 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Negotiating a Security Association using IKE IKE Security Association (IKE SA) proposes the following: Type of protection to use, either ESP or AH. Authentication algorithms and keys for signing data. Encryption algorithms and keys to protect data. Hash algorithms to reduce data for signing. Information about a group over which to do a Diffie- Hellman exchange. A pseudo-random function (prf) to hash certain values during the key exchange.

25. M. Mogollon – 24 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Security Association Security Parameters Encryption and authentication algorithms —Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) —Authentication Header (AH) Crypto keys Initialization values Protocol mode Source and destination IP addresses Source and destination IDs Key lifetimes I would like to establish a secure IP communication, and since we haven’t talked before, let’s agree on all the security parameters we need by creating an SA. Source Destination Once we finish, let’s assign an index to the SA, (Security Parameter Index) and store the information in our Security Policy Databases. By doing this, we will not have to create another SA when we communicate again.

26. M. Mogollon – 25 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Internet Key Exchange (IKE) First Message Exchange —IKE Security Association –In IKE_SA_INIT, the initiator and responder negotiate the use of encryption algorithms by establishing an IKE_SA. The agreed keys are used to protect the IKE_AUTH exchange. –In IKE_AUTH, the initiator and responder authenticate each other using authentication mechanisms such as digital signatures (exchanging certificates), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), or pre-shared keys. —Child Security Association –In IKE_AUTH, the first IKE_SA and associated IPsec SA, called child SA, are created. Second Message Exchange —CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is used to create new CHILD_SAs and to rekey IKE_SAs and CHILD_SAs. — All messages are cryptographically protected using the encryption algorithms and keys negotiated in IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_SA_AUTH.

27. M. Mogollon – 26 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IKE First Message Exchange AUTH – AuthenticationCERT – CertificateCERTREQ – Certificate Request HDR – IKE Headeri, r – Initiator, ResponderIDi - Initiator Identification IDr – Responder IdentificationKEi – Initiator DH g i KEr – Responder DH gi Ni, Nr – NonceSA - Security Association TSi, TSr – Traffic Selector SAi1, SAr1 – Used to create IKE_SA SAi2, SAr2 – Used to create the first CHILD_SA SK{….} – Payload is encrypted and integrity protected using SK_e and SK_a. SAi1 HDR SAr1 HDR 1 2 3 4 I would like to establish an IKE security association and a child security association. Initiator Networking Device with IPsec End -system or Gateway environment Responder Networking Device with IPsec End -system or Gateway environment KEiNi [CERTREQ]Nr KEr SK{IDi, [CERT], [CERTREQ], [IDr], AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} HDR SK{IDr, [CERT], AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} HDR

28. M. Mogollon – 27 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IKE Second Message Exchange HDR – IKE Headeri, r – Initiator, Responder [KE] – Optional Key Exchange[N+] – Optional Notify Ni, Nr – NonceSA - Security Association TSi, TSr – Traffic Selector SK{….} – Payload is encrypted and integrity protected using SK_e and SK_a. 5 6 I would like to generate a new Child_SA or rekey IKE SA and/or a previous Child_SA. Initiator Networking Device with IPsec End -system or Gateway environment Responder Networking Device with IPsec End -system or Gateway environment SK{ [N+], SA, Ni, [KEi], TSi, TSr} HDR SK{ [N+], SA, Nr, [KEr], TSi, TSr} HDR

29. M. Mogollon – 28 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IKE v2 Header Initiator’s SPI (8 Octets) – A value selected by the initiator to identify a unique IKE security association. Responder’s SPI (8 Octets) – A value selected by the responder initiator to identify a unique IKE security association. This value is zero in the first message of the IKE_INIT. Next Payload (1 Octet) – the type of payload that follows the header. Major Version (4 bits) – The major version of the IKE protocol used. Minor Version (4 bits) – The minor version of the IKE protocol used. Exchange Type (1 Octet) – The type of exchange being use, IKE_INIT, IKE_AUTH, CREATE_CHILD_SA, or INFOTMATIONAL. Flags (1 Octet) – Indicates specific options that are set for the message. Message ID (4 Octets) – Message identifier used to control retransmision of lost packets. It is used to prevent message replay attacks. Length (4 Octets) – Length of total message (header and payload) IKE_SA Initiator’s Security Parameters Index (SPI) IKE_SA Responder’s Security Parameter Index (SPI) Next Payload FlagsExchange TypeMjVer Message ID Length

30. M. Mogollon – 29 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Generating Key Material in IKE_SA In IKEv2, Diffie-Hellman is the only key exchange algorithm used. Key material for all of the cryptographic algorithms used in both IKE_SA and CHILD_SA is always derived as the output of a prf algorithm. Diffie-Hellman exchange has the following three components: a generator g, the modulo p, and a secret that in IKEv2 terminology is called i or r. During IKE_INIT, in KEi and KEr, the Initiator and Responder exchange Diffie-Hellman information, g i and g r, as well as nonces Ni and Nr The shared key, SKEYSEED, is calculated by both the Initiator and Responder from the nonces exchanged and the Diffie-Hellman shared secret key generated, g i and g r, according to the following formula:

31. M. Mogollon – 30 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IKE v2 DH Key Agreement g =12 p = 47 I Secret = i = 3 Nonce = Ni = 11 g = 12 p = 47 R Secret = r =5 Nonce = Nr = 7 18 36, 11 14, 7 g and p do not need to be secret Both ends use 11, 7, and 18, as the secret and seed to calculate SKEYSEED In the security association, the initiator and responder agreed on the same group or pair of g and p. Initiator Responder

32. M. Mogollon – 31 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Diffie-Hellman Groups in IKE Three distinct group representations can be used with IKE. —Modular Exponentiation Groups (named MODP) —Elliptic Curve Groups over the field GF [2n] (named EC2N) —Elliptic Curve Groups over GF [P] (named ECP). Groups Identifiers supported in IKE —Group 0:No group (used as a placeholder and for non-DH exchanges) —Group 1:A modular exponentiation group with a 768 bit modulus —Group 2:A modular exponentiation group with a 1024 bit modulus —Group 4:An elliptic curve group over GF [2^155] —Group 5:A modular exponentiation group with a 1536 bit modulus —Group 14:A modular exponentiation group with a 2048 bit modulus —Group 15A modular exponentiation group with a 3072 bit modulus. —Group 16A modular exponentiation group with a 4096 bit modulus. —Group 17A modular exponentiation group with a 6144 bit modulus. —Group 18A modular exponentiation group with a 8192 bit modulus.

33. M. Mogollon – 32 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TCP/IP Stack and Security Related Protocols Application Layer Transport Layer Network Layer Data Layer SMTP, Telnet, FTP, Gopher TCP UDP IP Ethernet, Token-Ring, FDDI, X.25, Wireless, Async, ATM, SNA...Data Layer ARPRARP S/MIME S-HTTP PGP IPsec (ISAKMP) SOCKS V5 TLS/SSL IPsec (AH, ESP) Packet Filtering Tunneling Protocols PPP-EAP, IEEE 802.1X, CHAP, PAP, MS-CHAP

34. M. Mogollon – 33 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS and SSL TLS and SSL protocols are used to secure the communication between a client (Web browser) and a server (Web Server) over the Internet. TLS versions 1.1, 1.0, and SSL 3.1 and 3.0 are very similar. TLS and SSL clients are built into all web browsers. TLS and SSL provide mutual authentication (digital signature), confidentiality (data encryption), and data integrity (hash algorithms). A secure client-server communication requires: —Which protocol and version (TLS 1.0, 1,1, SSL2 or SSL3) to use and which cryptographic algorithm will be used. —Whether or not to authenticate each other. Server and client authentication. —The type of cryptographic key exchange where both parties agree on a pre-master secret key —The creation of session keys to encipher the message. —The encryption technique to the enciphering of data using keys generated from the pre- master key.

35. M. Mogollon – 34 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS Architecture Session —A TLS session is an association between a client and a server. Sessions are created by the handshake protocol. —Sessions define a set of cryptographic security parameters, which can be shared among multiple connections. —Sessions are used to avoid the negotiation of new security parameters for each connection. Connection —A connection is a transport (in the OSI layering model definition) that provides a suitable type of service. —For TLS, such connections are peer-to-peer relationships. —A connections is transient. Every connection is associated with one session.

36. M. Mogollon – 35 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Session Parameters Session identifier —An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active or resumable session state. Peer certificate —An X509.v3 certificate of the peer. This element of the state may be null. Compression method —The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption. Cipher spec —Specifies the data symmetric encryption algorithm (such as null, DES, etc.) and a MAC algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA). It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size. Master secret —A 48-byte secret shared between the client and server. Is Resumable —A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new connections.

37. M. Mogollon – 36 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Connection Parameters Server and client random —Byte sequences that are chosen by the server and client for each connection. Server write MAC secret —The secret key used in MAC operations on data written by the server. Client write MAC secret —The secret key used in MAC operations on data written by the client. Server write key —The symmetric cipher key used by the server to encipher data and by the client to decipher it. Client write key —The symmetric cipher key used by the client to encipher data and by the server to decipher it. Initialization vectors —When a block cipher in CBC mode is used, an initialization vector (IV) is maintained for each key. Sequence numbers —Sequence numbers maintained by each party for transmitted and received messages.

38. M. Mogollon – 37 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS Record Protocol The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security that has four basic properties: —The connection is private. Symmetric encryption (e.g., AES, DES, RC4, etc.) is used for data encryption, after an initial handshake in which a pre-master secret key is defined. —The negotiation of a shared secret is secure. –No attacker can modify the negotiation communication without being detected by the parties to the communication. —The peer's identity can be authenticated using asymmetric or public key cryptography (e.g., RSA, DSS, etc.). —The connection is reliable. –Message transport includes a message integrity check using a keyed MAC (HMAC). –HMAC can be used with a variety of different hash algorithms, but TLS uses MD5 and SHA-1, denoting these as HMAC_MD5(secret, data) and HMAC_SHA(secret, data).

39. M. Mogollon – 38 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS Record Protocol Compression (Optional) HMAC Compressed Cleartext Message Stream Cipher Enciphered [Compressed Cleartex Message ║ HMAC] Block Cipher Padding SSL Header Message Block M n Blocks of equal size such that the final SSL Record is not bigger than 2 14 bytes. M1M1 M2M2 …MnMn.. Key Key Exchange HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-RSA Data Encryption Stream Ciphers: RC4 40-bit or 128-bit key. Block Ciphers: DES 56-bit, 3DES 168-bit, or AES-128 The Record Protocol is responsible for coordinating the client and server sessions.

40. M. Mogollon – 39 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Handshake Protocol (Session State) Client Web Server Exchange client and server security capabilities:secure ID, compression method, and initial random number. Client_Hello Server_hello Phase 1 Establishing Security Capabilities Phase 2 and 3 Server & Client Authentication and Key Exchange Server_Key_ Exchange Server and client exchange authentication, type of key exchange, and public-key parameters. Client_Key_ Exchange Server-Shared Master Key Server and client create the shared master key and the cryptographic parameters. Client-Shared Master Key Generating the Master Secret Keys Server Finish Client and server exchange Finish Message and a hash of the Finish Message Client Finish Phase 4 Finish Message

41. M. Mogollon – 40 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Phase 1 Handshake Protocol Client Web Server Client_Hello Server_hello Phase 1 Establishing Security Capabilities 1. A ClientHello.random number (28 bytes), which is used later in the protocol; 2. A CipherSuite list containing the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client (in order of the client's preference, first choice first); 3. A list of the compression methods supported by the client, sorted by client preference. When the client sends a client_hello message, the server must respond with a server_hello message, or else a fatal error will occur and the connection will fail. 1. A ServerHello.random number (28 bytes), different from the one sent by the client; 2. A CipherSuite list containing the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the server (in order of the server's preference, first choice first); 3. A list of the compression methods supported by the server, sorted by the server.

42. M. Mogollon – 41 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Phase 2 Handshake Protocol Client Web Server Server Authentication and Key Exchange 1.Server sends its authentication certificate, using a X.509.v3 certificate. 2.Information about the type of key exchange the server is proposing. —RSA: The secret key is encrypted with the server’s private key. —Fixed Diffie-Hellman: The server’s certificate has the Diffie-Hellman parameters, signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). —Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman: The Diffie-Hellman parameters are signed using the server’s RSA or DSA. —Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: The Diffie-Hellman parameters are not signed. Key Exchange Parameters for RSA or Diffie-Hellman —RSA: The modulo of the server's temporary RSA key and the public exponent of the server's temporary RSA key. —Diffie-Helman: –The prime modulus p used for the Diffie-Hellman operation. –The generator g used for the Diffie-Hellman operation. –The server's Diffie-Hellman public value y (y = g x mod p). 3.A message requesting a client certification (optional); 4.A message indicating that the handshake of phase 2 is complete. Key Exchange Parameters Signing = E S Priv [Hash(ClientHello.random ║ ServerHello.random ║ ServerParams)]

43. M. Mogollon – 42 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Phase 3 Handshake Protocol Client Web Server Client Authentication and Key Exchange 1. Client verifies whether or not the server’s certificate is valid. 2. Client sends certificate, if the server has requested it. —Client must send either the certificate message or a no_certificate alert; this alert is only a warning. If client authentication is required, the server may respond with a fatal handshake failure alert. 3. Pre-master key exchange —RSA: A 48-byte pre-master secret key, encrypted with the server’s RSA public key. —Diffie-Helman: Both client and server perform the Diffie-Hellman calculation to create a pre-master key. 4. Master Key generation —Once the pre-master key has been created, either from RSA or from Diffie- Hellman, the master key is computed as follows: Master_Key = PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret", ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random) PRF = Pseudo Random Function. See slide 20

44. M. Mogollon – 43 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Phase 4 Handshake Protocol Client Web Server Finish 1. Client and server update the cipher_spec with the new, agreed-upon encryption algorithms, keys, and hash functions. 2. Client sends a “finished message” using the just negotiated encryption algorithms, hash functions, and symmetric encrypting keys to verify that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. 3. The finished message is hashed as follows: —MD5 [ master_secret ║ pad2 ║ MD5(handshake_messages ║ Sender ║ master_secret ║ pad1) ] —SHA [ master_secret ║ pad2 ║ SHA(handshake_messages ║ Sender ║ master_secret ║ pad1) ]  Pad1 and pad 2 are the values defined in the MAC  Handshake refers to all handshake messages exchanged  Sender is a code that identifies that the sender is a client (0x434C4E54) or a server (0x53525652). Client and server may begin sending confidential data immediately after sending the Finish message. The master secret is used as an entropy source to generate random values for the export and non-export MACS, secret keys, and initialization values (IV) required to encipher the data.

45. M. Mogollon – 44 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS Alert Protocol Alert messages convey information about the status of the connection. There are two types of alerts: Fatal and Warning.  Fatal Alert: Indicates that the connection is so bad that it needs to be terminated immediately.  Warning Alert: Indicates that there are some problems in the connection. Error Alerts  unexpected_message: An inappropriate message was received. Fatal.  bad_record_mac: This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. Fatal.  decompression_failure: The decompression function received improper input. Fatal.  handshake_failure: Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. Fatal.  illegal_parameter: A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. Fatal.  no_certificate: A no_certificate alert message may be sent in response to a certification request if no appropriate certificate is available.  bad_certificate: A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures were not verifiable.  unsupported_certificate: A certificate was of an unsupported type.  certificate_revoked: A certificate was revoked by its signer.  certificate_expired: A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.  certificate_unknown: Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

46. M. Mogollon – 45 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Key Calculation - Pre Master Key Generation Method 1 RSA – 48-byte Generated by the Client Encipher RSA Decipher RSA Server’s Secret Key Method 2: Diffe-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Server’s Certificate Server’s Public Key Pre Master Key Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Pre Master Key Web Server Client

47. M. Mogollon – 46 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS Key Calculation – Key and MAC Secrets Exchange (wrap / transport ) or agree on (Diffie-Hellman) a pre-master key. Encipher Decipher Client Web Server Master_Key Generation Pre_Master_ Key Client MAC Server MAC Key_Block prf Expansion Client Key, IV Server Key, IV Symmetric Block Encryption Master_Key Generation Client MAC Server MAC Client Key, IV Server Key, IV Symmetric Block Encryption Integrity Confidentiality Key_Block prf Expansion

48. M. Mogollon – 47 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS – Pseudo Random Function The PRF is created by splitting the secret key into two and using one half to generate data with P_MD5 and the other half to generate data with P_SHA-1. Then, the outputs of these two expansion functions together are XORed. The label is an ASCII string. For example, the label "plano tx" would be processed by hashing the following bytes (hex): 70 6C 61 6E 6F 20 74 78. The P_Hash data expansion function is used to create a pseudo random function (PRF). Secret Label (Password) S1 S2 PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5 (S1, label ║ seed) XOR P_SHA-1 (S2, label ║ seed)

49. M. Mogollon – 48 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS TLS – P_hash (secret, seed) P_hash(secret, seed) =HMAC_hash (secret, A(1) ║ seed) ║ HMAC_hash (secret, A(2) ║ seed) ║ HMAC_hash (secret, A(3) ║ seed) ║... HMAC ║ ║ ║ Seed Secret A1 A2 A3 HMAC(secret, A(1) ║ seed)HMAC(secret, A(2) ║ seed)HMAC(secret, A(3) ║ seed)

50. M. Mogollon – 49 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS SSL VPN Provides secure remote access to corporate applications. Uses SSL & TTL as the underlying transport to establish a secure session between any web browser and the proxy server in the SSL VPN Gateway. Presents users with a web portal containing links to applications. Functions as a proxy for both client (web browser) and server (web server) – there is never a direct connection to the private network. Ensures that authorized users have access only to specific resources as allowed by the company security policy implemented by the proxy server and integrated traffic management. Proxy Socks Address Translation Applications Internet Kiosk Web Applications Client/Server Telnet SSH Email File Transfer SSL (TLS) Secure Connection SSLSSL SSL VPN Gateway

51. M. Mogollon – 50 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS SSL VPN Threats User passwords may remain on public-computers after users log off. —User passwords are stored by the browser. Sensitive data, such as browser cache entries, URL entries, cookies, and any historical information created during the session, may remain on public computers after users complete their SSL VPN sessions. Downloaded files are stored in the public computer’s “Temporary Folder.” Users forget to logout. —Next public computer user may have access to applications. Worms and viruses may be transferred from the public computers to the corporate internal network.

52. M. Mogollon – 51 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS IPsec and TLS: Complementary Solutions SolutionsSSLIP SecComments Telecommuter Eg. Employee working from Home Office IPsec provides secure access to all network resources and applications. SSL requires legacy applications to be first ‘translated’ into HTTP or will give access to SSL-enabled apps only. Site-to-Site VPN Eg. Remote branch office requires connectivity to corporate WAN IPsec provides a secure tunnel between permanent locations Remote Webmail Eg. Outlook Web Access, Lotus iNotes SSL allows secure access from any web browser. Internal Application Security Eg. HR Self-service SSL provides application layer security within VPNs Partner Extranet Eg. Supplier access to inventory system SSL doesn’t require installation of software on partner’s equipment but no control on workstation security IPsec might require firewall reconfiguration – need to police access but closer control on workstation security Web Application Portals Eg. iPlanet, web-enabled enterprise apps, custom web apps. SSL is simplest choice for native web apps. IPsec is overkill VOIP security Eg. Either site-to-site or telecommuter VOIP security. VOIP can’t be carried by SSL IPsec is the solution for VOIP encryption Wireless LAN security Eg. Securing WLAN access to the network by using stronger authentication and encryption. IPsec provides secure access to all network resources and applications. SSL requires legacy applications to be first ‘translated’ into HTTP or will give access to web apps only IdealInappropriate Overkill / Complex Appropriate

53. M. Mogollon – 52 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS To Probe Further Atkinson, R. (1995). IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). RFC 1827. Gleeson B., Lin A., Heinanen J, Armitage G., Malis A. (2000). A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private Networks. RFC 2764. C. Kaufman, Ed. (2005). The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2). RFC 4306. Kent, S., Seo K. (2005). Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol. RFC 4301. Kent, S. (2005). IP Authentication Header. RFC 4302. Kent, S. (2005). IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). RFC 4303. Madson, C., Glenn, R. (1998). The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH. RFC 2404. Orman, H. (1998). The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol. RFC 2412.

54. M. Mogollon – 53 VPNIPsecIKE v2 TLS To Probe Further Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., & Wright, T. (2006). Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions. RFC 4366, IETF. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4366.txt?number=4366http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4366.txt?number=4366 Dierks, T., Rescorla, E. (2006). 4346 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1. RFC 4346, IETF. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt?number=4346 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt?number=4346 Freier, A., Karlton, P., & Kocher, P. The SSL Protocol Version 3.0. Internet-Draft, November 1996. Santesson, S. (2006). TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental Data. RFC 4680, IETF. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4680.txt?number=4680 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4680.txt?number=4680 Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., & Ball, J. (2006). TLS User Mapping Extension. RFC 4681, IETF. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4681.txt?number=4681 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4681.txt?number=4681