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1 Sociology’s three big questions THREE SMALL DUTCH QUESTIONS and Presentation at the Danish Institute for Social Research Copenhagen, Denmark December.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Sociology’s three big questions THREE SMALL DUTCH QUESTIONS and Presentation at the Danish Institute for Social Research Copenhagen, Denmark December."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Sociology’s three big questions THREE SMALL DUTCH QUESTIONS and Presentation at the Danish Institute for Social Research Copenhagen, Denmark December 11-12, 2003 Wout Ultee Interuniversity Center for Sociology (ICS) at Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands

2 2 THE FIRST SMALL DUTCH QUESTION LEAVING CHURCH

3 3 IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY DUTCH SOCIETY CONSISTED NOT SO MUCH OF CLASSES LAYERED FROM TOP TO BOTTOM BUT OF RELIGIOUS PILLARS RISING UP NEXT TO EACH OTHER THOSE PILLARS SHAKE SINCE THE 1960S WHY?

4 4 NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION RATIONALIZATION RISE OF SCIENCE

5 5 NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION RATIONALIZATION RISE OF SCIENCE RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF EDUCATION

6 6 NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION RATIONALIZATION RISE OF SCIENCE RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF EDUCATION RELIGIONS WITH FEWER MAGICAL MEANS OF SALVATION

7 7 NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION RATIONALIZATION RISE OF SCIENCE RISING GENERAL LEVEL OF EDUCATION RELIGIONS WITH FEWER MAGICAL MEANS OF SALVATION LEAVING CHURCH

8 8 PERCENTAGES FROM THE DUTCH CENSUS AND FROM SURVEYS CATH LIBPROT ORTHOPROT REST NONE

9 9 PUZZLING FINDING: HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS IN THE NETHERLANDS ROSE A BIT BETWEEN 1960 AND 1971, WHEREAS ‘EVERYBODY’ KNOWS THAT PRIESTS AND LAITY LEFT THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THRONGS?

10 10 TIME-SERIES OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA ARE MISLEADING ABOUT INDIVIDUAL CHANGE FOR CLOSED POPULATIONS, THEY ONLY TELL ABOUT NET CHANGES THEY ARE PARTICULARY MISLEADING IF COHORT CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE NETHERLANDS THE CATHOLIC BIRTH RATE WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF OTHER DENOMINATIONS (INCLUDING NO DENOMINATION)

11 11 DUTCH POPULATION BY ABSOLUTE NUMBER , ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ( * 1000) ACCORDING TO CENSUS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA CENSUS 1960 BIRTHS DEATHS NET MIGRATION - OTHER LOSSES - CENSUS ,634 1, ,274 3, ,076 1, ,225 2, ,079 CATH LIBPROT ORPROT NONE

12 12 NIJMEGEN-GROUP M-MAC DATA SET RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEY OF DUTCH POPULATION DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)? DID YOU EVER CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)? WHEN DID YOU STOP CONSIDERING YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH? THERE IS NO DUTCH CENSUS ANYMORE WHAT IS MORE, LOSSES SHOULD BE PINNED DOWN ON AGE OP PERSONS WITH KNOWN YEAR OF BIRTH

13 13 HYPOTHESES WERE TESTED WITH PARAMETERS FROM EVENT-HISTORY MODELS FOR M-MAC DUTCH DATA IT IS KNOWN FROM CROSS- SECTIONAL SURVEYS THAT PEOPLE WITH MORE EDUCATION ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE A CHURCH MEMBER ARE THEY ALSO MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH AND IF SO, WHY IS THIS SO?

14 14 IN SIMPLE MODELS PERSONS WITH MORE EDUCATION (AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE) ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH LIBERAL PROTESTANTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO DO SO THAN CATHOLICS, AND ORTHODOX PROTESTANTS ARE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH

15 15 GENERAL HYPOTHESIS BEHAVIOUR DETERMINED BY MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES EDUCATION PROVIES A MOTIVE FOR LEAVING CHURCH AUXILIARY ASSUMPTIONS RELIGIOUS MARKETS OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEAVING CHURCH AND FAMILIES AND STATES LIMIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOING SO

16 16 SINCE STARK THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH IS BIG IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION THIS NAME IS A MISNOMER IANNACONE NOW ADVERTISES WITH THE LABEL MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION

17 17 THE LABEL MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION IS TOO BAD SINCE THE U.S. QUESTION IS ABOUT FREE MARKET VERSUS STATE RELIGION AND THAT WAY OF FRAMING THE QUESTION MISPLACES THE EMPHASIS FOR THE NETHERLANDS SINCE THE QUESTION THERE IS ABOUT THE FAMILY PLUS THE STATE VERSUS THE MARKET IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE STATE FULLY FUNDS NOT ONLY ITS OWN SECULAR SCHOOLS, BUT ALSO PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC (AND WHATEVER) SCHOOLS

18 18 IF IN A PROVINCE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO A CHURCH IS HIGHER, CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER IF IN A PROVINCE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF THE POPULATION IS HIGHER, CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER MARKET HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CORROBORATED; FINDINGS

19 19 FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CORROBORATED CHIILDREN OF PARENTS WITH A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING, ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO VOTED LEFT-WING, ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH CHILDREN FROM HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES ARE LESS LIKLEY TO LEAVE CHURCH THAN THOSE FROM CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO WENT TO CHURCH MORE FREQUENTLY ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH

20 20 MORE FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED; SURPRISING FINDING ABOUT CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MARRIAGES CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MARRIAGES ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES CHILDREN FROM MARRIAGES WITH ONE NON- RELIGIOUS PARENT, ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES

21 21 FAMILY PLUS STATE HYPOTHESIS TESTED AND PARTLY CORROBORATED; FINDINGS: PERSONS WHO ATTENDED A PROTESTANT SCHOOL ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH THAN CHILDREN WHO WENT TO A PUBLIC SCHOOL; PERSONS WHO WENT TO A CATHOLIC SCHOOL ARE MORE LIKELY TO DO SO POSSIBLE EXPLANATION: LOCALLY PROTESTANT SCHOOLS FACED MORE COMPETITION FROM SECULAR SCHOOLS THAN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS?

22 22 HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY OF OPPORTUNITIES AND MOTIVES TESTED AND CORRBORATED PERSONS WHO LEFT THEIR PARENTAL HOME AT AN EARLIER AGE AREMORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR PARENTS WENT TO CHURCH MORE OFTEN, THEN THEIR CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR EDUCATION WAS HIGHER, THEN THEIR CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCHES ARE HIGHER

23 23 THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY OF MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE PART OF THE SIMPLE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EDUCATION AND LEAVING CHURCH

24 24 THE SECOND SMALL DUTCH QUESTION WORKING WIVES AND THEIR HUSBANDS

25 25 ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION CONNUBIUM QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM, (WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)

26 26 ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION INEQUALITY CLOSURE MOBILITYCONNUBIUM QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM, (WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)

27 27 ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION INEQUALITY CLOSURE MOBILITYCONNUBIUM ISOLATION / TIES COHESION CONVIVIUM QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM, (WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)

28 28 BOURDIEU ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF THE REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY, THE TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGES FROM ONE GENERATION TO THE NEXT AND BYPASSED THE QUESTION OF THE RECONSTITUTION OF INEQUALITY BY WAY OF CONNUBIUM BOURDIEU FORGOT IT TAKES A MAN AND A WOMAN TO MAKE A CHILD

29 29 IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD COUPLES TEND TO CONSIST OF MEN AND WOMEN WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION IT IS LESS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE LABOUR MARKET POSITION OF SPOUSES (EMPLOYED, NONEMPLOYED) TENDS TO BE THE SAME TOO

30 30 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM

31 31 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM CONNUBIUM

32 32 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM CONNUBIUM

33 33 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM CONNUBIUM CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES

34 34 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM CONNUBIUM CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY

35 35 THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM CONNUBIUM CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY (NON)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY

36 36 AT FIRST SIGHT IT IS NOT PUZZLING THAT LABOUR MARKET POSITIONS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES TEND TO BE THE SAME EDUCATION MAKES FOR LESS UNEMPLOYMENT AND IF SPOUSES HAVE THE SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION, THEN (NON)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY IS A BY-PRODUCT OF EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY

37 37 HOWEVER, ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES LIKE NATIONAL LABOR FORCE SURVEYS MAKES CLEAR THAT (UN)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY PERSISTS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY AND ALSO AFTER CONTROLLING FOR THE LOCAL LABOUR MARKET UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

38 38 THAT IS, PROCESSES OF MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT ARE GOING ON HYPOTHESES ON PARTNER-EFFECTS HUSBAND-EFFECTS ARE STRONGER THAN WIFE-EFFECTS PARTNER-EDUCATION MAKES FOR MORE EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY AND FOR LESS EMPLOYMENT EXIT PARTNER-INCOME MAKES FOR LESS EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY AND FOR MORE EMPLOYMENT EXIT

39 39 HOW TO STUDY PARTNER EFFECTS? M-MAC DUTCH DATA-SET WITH EDUCATIONAL HISTORY, (NON)EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AND INCOME HISTORY NOTE THAT AN ASSOCIATION IN CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA BETWEEN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT MAY RESULT FROM LOW-EDUCATED PERSONS BEING FIRED MORE OFTEN OR FROM THEM BEING REFUSED A NEW JOB MORE OFTEN, OR FROM BOTH

40 40 FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT WITH HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME AS TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS AN EMPLOYED WIFE IS LESS LIKELY TO EXIT EMPLOYMENT IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER AND SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO DO SO IF HER HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME ARE HIGHER

41 41 FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT WITH WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN A MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS AN EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE LIKELY TO EXIT EMPLOYMENT IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER AND LESS LIKELY IF HIS WIFE’S EDUCATION IS HIGHER

42 42 FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY WITH HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME AS TIME - DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A MULTI- VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS A NON-EMPLOYED WIFE IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF HER HUSBAND’S EDUCATION IS HIGHER AND SHE IS LESS LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF HER HUSBAND’S INCOME IS HIGHER

43 43 FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY WITH WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN A MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS A NON-EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER AND HIS CHANCES OF RE-ENTRY DO NOT DEPEND UPON THE EDUCATION OF HIS WIFE

44 44 THE THIRD SMALL DUTCH QUESTION COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY

45 45 DID THE EXTENSION OF STATE COMPULSORY SCHOOLING RESULT IN LESS DOWNWARD EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY? CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

46 46 ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY CLOSURE MOBILITY

47 47 ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY CLOSURE MOBILITY FATHER- SON CLASS MOBILITY

48 48 ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY CLOSURE MOBILITY FATHER- SON CLASS MOBILITY FATHER-SON AND FATHER- DAUGHTER EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY

49 49 Previous Research on the Netherlands: Educational mobility increased according to: loglinear models with educational distributions fitted with trend constraints on uniform association and diagonal densities

50 50 Present research: data Stacked data file from 31 surveys 21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25 Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts ( ) Father’s education 4 categories (low – high) Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories (low – high)

51 51 Four hypotheses from the field of stratification One from each generation of stratification studies Present research: hypotheses

52 52 Zero-generation non-hypothesis There is a linear downward trend in uniform association and diagonal density

53 53 First-generation hypothesis A rising standard of living makes for lower uniform association and lower diagonal density

54 54 Second-generation hypothesis Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends makes for lower uniform association and diagonal density

55 55 Third-generation hypothesis Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends does not alter the density in the diagonal cell for the highest level of education

56 56 How to derive macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses? Embedding the four hypotheses in general sociology

57 57 First-generation hypothesis derived going to school depends upon financial resources people differ in financial resources financial resources have increased and they have become more equally distributed in the course of time

58 58 Second-generation hypothesis derived apart from individual actors there is an all powerful corporate actor: the state and the state has raised the age of compulsory schooling Coleman about corporate actors

59 59 Third-generation hypothesis derived Highly educated parents deploy strategies compensating for state policies raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends Bourdieu about compensatory strategies Elias about a spiraling process as a competitive outcome

60 60

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68 68 How do macro variables influence uniform association and diagonal densities? Uniform association and diagonal densities derived from odds ratios Odds ratios made up from an odds for moving up and an odds for moving down Testing the third-generation hypothesis more severely

69 69 Hypotheses about odds Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends, increases the odds for moving up. But what does it do to the odds for moving down? Few states ever sought to increase the odds for moving down.

70 70 upward trend

71 71 no trend or a downward trend

72 72 TO BE CONTINUED THE LONG-RUN AIM OF THE EXERCISE IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NOTION THAT THERE EXIST CULTURAL RESOURCES (NEXT TO FINANCIAL RESOURCES) IS SUPERFLUOUS

73 73 A BONUS COMPARATIVE QUESTION DOES EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTS DEPEND UPON COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF DESTINATION AND SETTING (THE INTERPLAY OF COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION)?

74 74 DATA FOR 18 HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES IN THE 1990s AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM CANADA DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES

75 75 DATA ARE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR FORCE SURVEY PLUS THE PUBLIC USE SAMPLE OF THE CENSUS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE USA AND SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT SURVEYS IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND UK

76 76 INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES AGE DURATION OF STAY LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

77 77 THE DISTINGUISHED ORIGINS CHINA, ITALY, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, TURKEY AND 182 OTHERS NAMES RECODED INTO MEASURES FOR POLITICAL SUPPRESSION, AND PREDOMINANCE OF CHRISTIANITY

78 78 THE NAMES OF THE DESTINTIONS WERE RECODED INTO THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF A POINT SYSTEM FOR MIGRANTS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT

79 79 SETTING VARIABLES WERE GINI ORIGIN / GINI DESTINATION GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTINATION GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE RELATIVE GROUP SIZE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF GROUP

80 80 CONTROL VARIABLES LABOUR FORCE ACTIVITY OF NATIVES NATURE OF SURVEY (MIGRANTS OVERSAMPLED)

81 81 TO BE EXPLAINED ARE INSIDE – OUTSIDE LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT – UNEMPLOYMENT BOTH FOR MALES AND FEMALES APPLIED WERE MULTI-LEVEL MODELS

82 82 RESULTS AFTER THE CONTROLS THERE ARE THE EXPECTED INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF AGE, DURATION OF STAY, EDUCATION, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

83 83 SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION MAKES FOR MORE ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT, POLITICAL SUPPRESSION IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR LESS AND CHRISTINITY THERE FOR MORE ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT

84 84 SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE SETTING EFFECTS WERE FOUND FOR GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTIONATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE

85 85 MERGING NATIONAL FILES INTO A SUPER-FILE HELPS ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF MIGRANTS

86 86 this presensation liberally quoted from studies I undertook in the course of the years with several Dutch scholars: WIL ARTS WIM BERNASCO JOS DESSENS JAAP DRONKERS HENK FLAP HARRY GANZEBOOM NAN-DIRK DE GRAAF PAUL DE GRAAF JOHN HENDRICKX WIM JANSEN JAN LAMMERS RUUD LUIJKX ARIANA NEED WILMA SMEENK JEROEN SMITS FRANK VAN TUBERGEN WILLFRED UUNK MAARTEN WOLBERS

87 87 EXACT REFERENCES CAN BE FOUND ON MY WEB SITE, WHERE MY PRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN POSTED TOO


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