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Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution.

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Presentation on theme: "Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution."— Presentation transcript:

1 Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution

2 Overview 1)The Project 2)The Findings 3)Recommendations

3 List of Cases Failed Partial Success Success Angola, Bosnia and Herze- El Salvador, govina, Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Rwanda, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somalia, Liberia, Namibia, 89 Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, 98 Zimbabwe, 1980

4 Guatemala El Salvador Nicaragua Zimbabwe Mozambique Namibia Cambodia Liberia Bosnia Lebanon Angola I Rwanda Angola IISierra Leone Somalia Sri Lanka Success Partial Success Failure < 2,5002,500-7,500 7,500 – 60,000 Puzzle 1 : What constitutes an adequate security “guarantee”? N U M B E R S O F T R O O P S OUTCOMEOUTCOME

5 UNAVEM II Angola I $175 UNAMIR Rwanda Oct 93 – April 94 $35 ONUSAL El Salvador Jul 91 – April 95$124 UNTAC & UNAMIC Cambodia Nov 91 – Sept 93$1,621 IFOR, SFOR Bosnia & Herzegovina Dec. 95 – now $16, MissionYears Total Expenditure Puzzle 2: Which cases get the most international attention?

6 Given a world of limited resources and attention, which of the following tasks would you prioritize when implementing a peace agreement? Human Rights? Local Capacity Building? Disarmament? Demobilization?Elections? Refugee Repatriation? Police and Judicial Reform? Puzzle 3

7 It’s simple to predict when implementation will succeed: when it is easy and when there are lots of resources.

8 Conflict Score More than 2 parties Disposable Resources No Agreement/Coerced Agreement Collapsed State Likely Spoilers Hostile Neighbors >50,000 soldiers Secession

9 Cases By Difficulty (From Most to Least Difficult) Sierra Leone Bosnia Liberia Sri Lanka Cambodia Lebanon Somalia Angola I Angola II Zimbabwe Rwanda Mozambique El Salvador Nicaragua Guatemala Namibia

10 Willingness Score Great Power/Regional Power Interest Resource Commitment Risk Lives

11 Guatemala Namibia El Salvador MozambiqueZimbabwe Lebanon Bosnia Liberia Sri Lanka Sierra Leone I Angola I Somalia Interest & Difficulty: Case Outcomes Rwanda Nicaragua Cambodia Angola II

12 … It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted. - Brahimi Report

13 Mission Population Total Expenditure (millions) IFOR, SFOR (95-now) Bosnia & Herzegovina 3,835,777 $16,000 ++$4, KFOR/UNMIK (99- now) Kosovo 1,902,000$3,500$1, UNTAC & UNAMIC (91-93) Cambodia 12,212,306 $1,621$ UNAVEM II (91-93) Angola I 10,145,267 $175$17.25 UNAMIR (93-94) Rwanda 7,229,129$35$4.84 Peacekeeping Expenditures Expenditure Per capita

14 Kosovo and the DRC

15 “If we had gone to the Security Council three months after Somalia, I can assure you no government would have said, “Yes, here are our boys for an offensive action in Rwanda.” - Iqbal Riza

16 “There is no way I or anyone in this situation can presume you are dealing with a party out to dupe you. We came in believing that each side was talking in good faith.” - Oluyemi Odeniji SRSG, Sierra Leone May 14, 2000

17 “A key to understanding the failure of the Lusaka Accords is to unravel how the U.N. officials could certify UNITA compliance with cantoning its troops and demobilizing its army, while unofficially acknowledging that UNITA withheld 15-25,000 soldiers.” - Angola case study

18 “You can’t go to the Security Council and say, ‘We think Indonesia is going to implement a scorched-earth policy and we need a foreign intervention now.’ The politics of the council are such that you can’t paint a worse-case scenario.” - Unnamed Diplomat

19 “I deeply regret that we were unable to prevent the senseless bloodshed of August and September. But if we compare the prospect now with that of two years ago, we see that East Timor is one more case where time and patient diplomacy have brought hope to what had been a hopeless situation.” - Kofi Annan December 14, 1999

20 Policy Recommendations 1)Need to treat great/regional power interest as hard constraint 2)Without great/regional power interest, don’t do the hard cases 3)Need for better strategic assessment concerning case difficulty 4)If there are spoils, spoilers, and hostile neighbors, don’t implement unless you have the capability to manage them 5)Need for intelligence gathering and analysis capability 6)Need for contingency planning

21 Given a world of limited resources and attention, which of the following tasks would you prioritize when implementing a peace agreement? Human Rights? Local Capacity Building? Disarmament? Demobilization?Elections? Refugee Repatriation?Police and Judicial Reform?

22 Policy Recommendations: Subgoals 1) Ambitions must be commensurate with resources and permitted strategies 2) Priority in implementation should go to demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics 3) Reconceptualize relationship between democracy and human rights and peace implementation 4) Pursue civilian security and local capacity building


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