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U.S. Foreign Policy Nixon through Carter. Nixon & The Vietnam Problem Nixon wished to reshape relationships b/t US & China & USSR, but first had to.

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Presentation on theme: "U.S. Foreign Policy Nixon through Carter. Nixon & The Vietnam Problem Nixon wished to reshape relationships b/t US & China & USSR, but first had to."— Presentation transcript:

1 U.S. Foreign Policy Nixon through Carter

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3 Nixon & The Vietnam Problem Nixon wished to reshape relationships b/t US & China & USSR, but first had to deal with Vietnam. ▫As Repub after 2 consecutive Demos, anticomm credentials a must. ▫Likewise, RMN believed that if the USSR & China perceived the US as weak, they would be unwilling to negotiate a mutual reduction in tensions.  Toward this end, decided an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam was unacceptable. RMN settled on 2 pronged, but symbiotic plan ▫Gradual withdrawal of US troops  Slow to appease “silent majority” who still supported the war- but deliberate to assuage growing protest ▫Vietnamization of the war  US would train & arm the ARVN (South Vietnamese Army)

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5 In ‘70, unease in SE Asia obscured RMN’s plan. ▫The comm supporting govt of Prince Sihanouk was overthrown and a republic was est’d Cambodia. ▫When comms began moving on Phnom Penh, RMN ordered air strikes on Cambodian targets (secretly)  Caused rioting on college campuses (most famously the Kent State University killings) ▫It was clear from domestic response in US, it would be fruitless (politically) to continue the war in this direction. ▫Focus returned to Vietnam- where NV was pressing forward now that US had withdrawn from the battlefield Richard Nixon, Vietnam, & Detente

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7 Re-Americanization & The End in Sight When NVA launched surprise attack in Spring, 1972, RMN brought US forces back into the war ▫Ordered massive bombing of Hanoi & mining of NV harbors to keep Chinese supplies from getting through. ▫Simultaneously, offered Hanoi withdrawal of US forces in 4 months if all POWs released & a cease-fire est’d. ▫Hanoi refused (they wanted him to give them Saigon) Now RMN’s policies bore fruit: ▫USSR went ahead with a peace summit (while the US was conducting their bombing campaign) ▫China expressed its support for a negotiated settlement N. Vietnam had lost its 2 strongest allies

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9 An Honorable Peace? Month before ‘72 election, Hanoi signaled desire to negotiate, but in SV, Thieu refused. NV then balked at going forward- RMN ordered largest bombings ever in ‘72 (including civilian centers in Hanoi & Haiphong) The Christmas bombings produced huge outcry, but in January, ’73, NV returned to the peace talks & a cease-fire was signed. The US could now focus on its relationship with USSR & China ▫2 years after peace talks ended, NV launched massive attack in SV; new pres Gerald Ford refused to recommit US forces- Saigon fell to NVA in 4/30/75 The specter of Vietnam its resulting syndrome affected US politics for decades.

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11 Nixon & the Diplomacy Question Vietnam left US faltering in “ideological mire” ▫Anti-comm had not resulted in victory in V. (in Cuba & Korea) should we engage in diplomacy w/ Enemy? ▫During 1 st decades, Cold War realpolitik (diplomacy based on power considerations, instead of morals or ideals) dovetailed w/ idealpolitik (diplomacy must always align with ideology), now this wouldn’t work  Comm clearly not monolithic, not confined to single flavor.  What was appropriate response?  Realpolitik: Use diplomacy to keep power balanced  Idealpolitik: Refuse to negotiate with either USSR or China ▫Nixon agreed w/ NSA Kissinger  Balancing power meant acknowledging right to exist of all nations- comm & demo  Play upon differences of comm w/in USSR & China

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13 The Kissinger Philosophy Kissinger’s realpolitik was based on the idea that the US was not in a struggle of good vs. evil, but in competing ideologies We should defend our interests, but aggressive “crusades” were not conducive to peaceful coexistence Détente (or an easing of tensions) became the focus ▫The USSR had caught up with us militarily  Contaiment by force (or threat of force) was impossible ▫USSR was committed to a weltpolitik (global policy) ▫But US refused to absolve itself of its obligations  NATO, Taiwan, S. Korea, etc.  Diplomacy must be used to curtail Soviet aggression & preserve those regions under US protection

14 For HK, “linkage” was key to managing USSR ▫A series of agreements and understandings on subjects like arms control, trade, etc. b/t the 2 countries would give the USSR a vested interest in maintaining peace. Not to say we were warm & fuzzy w/ USSR ▫The Am. “big stick” would still be there, but would be supplemented with enough carrots to show our desire was for peaceful coexistence Linkage also meant the different subjects themselves were tied ▫Progress could not be achieved in trade, unless the Soviets were willing to go forward on arms control The Kissinger Philosophy

15 Let’s eat the white man’s egg roll! I told him the dog was chicken! I wonder if these guys are screwing with me?

16 Nixon & China (background) 1 st place where HK’s policy saw fruit was with China. ▫Soon after its revolution, tensions b/t China & the USSR erupted into what came to be known as the Sino-Soviet Split  Russians called Mao “Hitler”  Chinese called Russians “fascists” bent on global hegemony (a quote from Marx!) ▫The main concerns were nationalism & land  Like Yugo, China refused to be part of a Soviet “empire”  Yugo (under Tito) had refused to be a member of the Warsaw Pact  China shared a 4500 mile border with the USSR (approx 1k less than US-Canada border)  USSR claimed land that China had claimed

17 In 1969, Soviet forces & Chinese battled for a 1.5 mile uninhabited island in the middle of the Ussuri River. Zhenbao/Damanskii Island was uninhabited, but claimed by both sides. The conflict resulted in thousands of troops dispatched to island and resulted in over about 1k deaths In 1991, Russia & China signed an agreement giving the island back to the Chinese permanently

18 1 st thing RMN & HK did was officially recognize the PRC (prior to this, it didn’t exist: Taiwan was China) ▫By calling China by its chosen name (PRC), RMN acknowledged its right to exist- opening the door to diplomatic relations ▫Led to invitation to world table-tennis championships ▫Which paved way for presidential visit w/ Mao & Zhou Next step was trade ▫RMN began trade with the PRC, but stopped short of selling arms (didn’t want to create a rift w/ USSR)- it allowed its allies to do this instead ▫Using the perceived threat of a Sino-US alliance, RMN leveraged a more open relationship w/ USSR. Nixon & the China Card

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20 Nixon, Arms Control & Detente The issue of nuclear arms control became central focus of détente. ▫In ‘72, w/ US-China relations opening, the US & USSR were engaged in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT). ▫Seeing their enemy becoming cozy with their enemy, changed Soviet leaders regarding nuclear missiles.  Parity was goal  Nuke stockpiles were limited  2 ND Round of talks were scheduled (SALT II), which reached even more sweeping set of reductions under Ford  Which the Senate refused to ratify, but both govts abided by it for the most part

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22 The Soviet Economy & Détente In the 70s, the Soviet econ was in shambles ▫Military build-up at cost of secondary industries ▫Long lines for basic necessities ▫Industries needed for econ growth were not there USSR was behind & falling further behind ▫Only industrial society where peacetime life expectancy was dropping & infant mortality was rising!  Poor diet (due to ag policies), alcoholism, etc  Brezhnev recalled the effect of poor econ growth on Khrushchev (fired) and knew his days were numbered He (& Soviet leaders) allowed US industries to exploit Russian natural resources (in Siberia) in exchange for loans, food, & shares in the profits

23 The Limits of Détente While the global superpowers reduced tensions, rest of the world not so fortunate- CW tensions had infected the developing world ▫Latin America ▫SW Asia (Middle East) ▫Africa ▫SE Asia

24 Latin America After WWII From end of WWII through the 1960s, Latin America was the site of aggressive interventionism from the US ▫Irony was that Lat Am aided the Allies during WWII, but received no aid after the war (while our enemies did) ▫The 50s saw US intervention in  Puerto Rico: anti-US revolution put down by troops  Guatemala: CIA-sponsored coup d'état  Panama: US troops put down anti-US protests ▫The 60s saw it in  Cuba: CIA sponsored Bay of Pigs “invasion”  Panama: Citizens shot for protesting for the canal’s return  Dominican Repub: Marines sent in during election  Guatemala: Green Berets sent in against govt rebels

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26 Latin America & Nixon Nixon was determined to kill JFK’s Alliance for Progress ▫Congressional critics pointed out its failures & ▫RMN’s veep, Nelson Rockeller reported after visiting that LatAm countries were closer to revolution now than in 1960) Nixon proclaimed LatAm countries wanted “trade, not aid” ▫Toward that end, began opening US markets to LatAm goods  Lowering tariffs  Setting up the GSP (General System of Preferences) GSP didn’t help Venezuela & Ecuador in 1973 when the US denied trade preferences w/ OPEC members during the oil embargo When Peru nationalized its industries, Nixon chose to ignore it- then came Chile

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28 Chile & Nixon In 1970, Socialist Salvador Allende became president of Chile w/ 36% of the vote (2 pts above his predecessor) Allende barely held control of his govt at start of admin- then his socialist tendencies kicked in & ruined him ▫He nationalized US industries in Chile (w/o compensation) ▫Invoked a class warfare model w/i Chile Nixon apparently willing to overlook Peru, but not Chile. ▫He ended US credit to Chile & seized financial assets (urging allies to follow suit) Allende had more than enough credit w/ comm nations. He expanded his class warfare ideas and alienated the middle & upper classes and the military Nixon responded by sending the CIA to undermine him

29 RMN authorized CIA to undermine Allende- mistake Allende was already undermining himself- & quickly, too When it came out we were involved ▫Reignited anti-Americanism on the continent ▫LatAm countries blamed US for toppling democratically elected govt & installing a military strongman If we had let nature take its course, Allende’s own people would have overthrown him (sooner, rather than later!) Afterward, LatAm countries began uniting together- against US ▫OAS delegates met separately, then called the US rep to listen to their ideas ▫Separate LAES (Lat Am Econ Sys) created- excluding US Chile & Nixon

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31 Skyjackin ’ in Flight By the early 1970s, tensions b/t the US & Cuba had eased ▫US had backed off its JFK era aggression ▫Castro was getting tired of the constant skyjackings  From 1958-2007, approx 100 hijacking events b/t US and Cuba  Int’l pressure is great upon Fidel The door was open to expanding détente policy Then came Angola

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33 Civil War in Angola In ‘75, civil war began after Portuguese (last Euro power to retain colonies) finally gave up its possessions. ▫Angola had provided a buffer b/t black Africa & white supremacist S. Africa & the Rhodesias) After 3 factions battled for control: MPLA (USSR), FLNA (US & PRC) & UNITA (US & S. Africa) fought a war that lasted for 27 yrs ▫MPLA received aid (weapons, jets, “military advisors”, etc.) from Cuba ▫This resulted in the US (under Ford & Kissinger) aiding UNITA  Fearful of another Vietnam, the Senate refused to support it. Kiss & Ford: although not a vital interest, Soviet behavior could not be ignored & was incompatible w/détente Soviets: supporting nat’l movements w/i their rights & not incompatible w/ détente Result was a protracted renewal of Cold War proxy wars…

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35 US & Ethiopia & Somalia USSR next intervened in conflict b/t Somalia & Ethiopia. The war b/t Muslim Somalia & Christian Ethiopia was ironic for the nature of its external involvement ▫In 1974, the govt of Haile Selassie was overthrown in a Marxist coup that resulted in a pro-Soviet military junta being est’d. ▫Meanwhile Somalia had undergone its own military coup & was ruled by strongman (Siad Barre) also supported by the USSR Barre had decided upon an expansionist policy and the result was a “politics makes strange bedfellows” strategy. ▫The US had remained out of E. African politics when Ethiopia fell to communism ▫We saw an opening: a USSR-supported nation waging war against another USSR-supported nation (& Somalia got short end of stick) ▫US began supporting Barre (who kicked out Soviet advisors) w/ 100m/year- (but he still lost to Ethiopia, which remained comm until 1989)

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37 The Oil Crisis of 73 The decision by OPEC in 1973 to limit oil production was met with sympathy by many 3 rd World countries (known collectively as the G77). ▫OPEC was standing up to the Industrialized World (G7) ▫Ironically, higher gas prices were felt most in the G77  Crippled new industries & petrol-based ag programs Despite effects, G77 did not form coalition w/ US, W. Europe, & Japan to force OPEC’s hand- ▫Feared angering them & losing promised econ help (which didn’t come anyway) ▫Schadenfreude: Weak were causing the Strong to suffer Oil crisis affected world: G7 suffered econ stagflation, resulting in massive drop in foreign aid

38 OPEC’s Failure OPEC’s control was met with high hopes by the G77 ▫OPEC would use their leverage to raise prices of natural resources in G77 countries ▫Similar cartels would develop among G77 countries for their goods: Tin, Copper, Etc. ▫OPEC would use its new-found wealth to aid G77 None of these hopes found ground to take root ▫OPEC fragmented as members began underselling cartel ▫No new cartels developed ▫OPEC profits went to NY banks where it was lent at market rates to G77 countries (who were unable to pay it back & sank deeper in debt)

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40 Foreign Policy Under Carter US foreign policy changed with Jimmy Carter’s assumption to presidency Carter’s values meant Kissinger’s realpolitik retired in favor of idealpolitik (based on moral rejuvenation of our own govt) Carter believed key to re-creating the consensus upon which American foreign policy was built, was to focus on promoting democracy & protecting human rights

41 Carter & Interdependence Carter rejected Kissinger’s Machiavellian balance of power in favor of a more open trans-national approach: interdependence Interdependence had 4 underlying assumptions ▫1. Nuclear weapons had ensured world peace  As a deterrent to even conventional warfare (fear of escalation) ▫2. Econ & welfare issues as important as nat’l security  Countries more focused on “low politics” than “high politics (improving their citizens’ standard of living) ▫3. In this new age, socio-econ goal could not be met alone  West needed developing countries raw materials  DN needed our tech & industry ▫4. Power politics could not resolve welfare issues  Coercive politics would not solve long-term needs- end up alienating countries whose support is vital to socio-economic self-interest

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43 US & Egyptian-Israeli War In 1973, Egypt & Syria attacked Israel on Yom Kippur ▫Israel had captured the Sinai in ‘67 & cont’d to occupy it ▫USSR saw opp for increased influence  Sent huge airlift of offensive arms to Arab states  Opposed any cease-fire that didn’t involve Israeli pullout of Sinai  Called on Arab states to join war (& voiced approval of OPEC embargo) Nixon sent massive airlift of military supplies Israel recovered quickly ▫Took back the Golan Heights & pushed back into the Sinai ▫Egypt called upon US to pressure Israel to accept cease-fire ▫When US refused, USSR threatened to intervene ▫US ends up pressuring Israel, to avoid escalation Kissinger believed time was ripe for a peace settlement

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45 The Sadat-Begin Accords While US & USSR discussed how a MidEast peace plan to look, Anwar Sadat (Egypt) & Menachim Begin (Israel) bypassed the middlemen and began negotiating one-on-one Sadat was the first Arab leader to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist & 1 st to speak to the Israeli Knesset However, peace was more complicated than wanting it ▫Sadat: Return to ‘67 borders (return Sinai, West Bank, Gaza & Golan) in exchange for peace ▫Begin: WB & Gaza was hereditary land reconquered (Judea & Samaria)  Also proposed that Palestinians be given self-rule, not self- determination Talks broke down and the US reentered the picture

46 Carter & Middle East Peace JC believed peace possible if 3 conditions were met ▫Israel returned to ‘67 borders ▫Palestinians were part of the process ▫Arab states had to recognize Israel & end hostilities Begin proved problematic ▫Interpreted UN Res. 242 so WB & Gaza was Israeli land ▫Opposed a Palestinian state ▫Promoted more Israeli settlements in WB & Gaza Sadat had allowed for immediate peace & recognized Israel’s security needs (he was reasonable & Begin showed bad faith) Finally, in ‘78 JC took a gamble & invited both men to Camp David in MD

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48 Camp David Accords While at Camp David, JC, AS, & MB discussed what could be done to achieve peace After much deliberations, a tentative settlement was reached- one where Sadat made most of concessions ▫No guarantee on w/drawal from WB or Gaza or even Palestinian self-determination ▫Israel recognized “legit rights of Palestinians” ▫Temp halt on new settlements on WB ▫Egypt signed a peace treaty (strongest of Arab states) Instead of trend in peace settlements, was condemned by Arab states (Jordan, SA, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria & S. Yemen) Arab states became more hostile to US meddling & Israel resumed its settlements ▫3 years later AS was assassinated by a fellow Egyptian

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50 Collapse of Carter’s Foreign Policy Interdependence never quite took root during the 1970s. USSR saw JC as weak and ignored his appeals to universal moral standards ▫Cont’d building up its trad military (outspent us by upwards of 50%) For them new North-South axis (G7 v G77) was still not nearly as relevant as the East-West axis of old ▫Poured $$ into G77 countries; fueled regional conflicts ▫3 events signaled death of Carter’s moral diplomacy  Invasion of Afghanistan  Marxist Rev in Nicaragua  Hostage Crisis in Iran

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52 Invasion of Afghanistan The decision by the USSR to invade Afghan occurred when the Marxist rev that occurred there seemed in danger of being overthrown by Islamist rebels USSR worried about radical Islam (which had taken over Iran & Pakistan) spreading into Afghan & then infiltrating the USSR (it had 50 million Muslims on its Southern border) In ‘79, invoked Brezhnev doctrine: sent troops & military aid ▫No socialist state will be surrendered to counterrevolution ▫Expected no real response from US (maybe token condemnation) Carter: action deplorable; changed opinion on USSR goals ▫Became more hard-line  Boycott of Olympics  Halted high-tech trade & embargoed grain

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54 The Nicaraguan Revolution In ‘60s, nationalist rebels protested govt corruption & brutality Sandinistas (FSLN) hated by US-supported Somoza govt, giving Nics the idea that Sands were a viable opposition (they weren’t) Sandinistas gained great pop as Somoza cont’d screw things up Then Somoza’s son (a high-ranking govt official himself) participated in assassination of an opposition newspaper editor. Civil war. In ‘79 war ended w/ Sandinistas supported by Cath Church, much of the populace, & international govts (Somoza was assassinated in Par) Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins. ▫1.6 bill debt, 50,000 dead, & 600,ooo homeless, econ US condemned the revolution & Cuban alliance to spread rev in Lat Am (i.e. El Salavador) Reagan began arming/training rebels (Contras)

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56 The Iran Hostage Crisis The one real inconsistency in JC’s foreign policy was his approach to Iran. ▫Since ‘20, Pahlevi dynasty ruled Iran, but w/ assumption of Reza Shah Pahlevi, human rights took nosedive ▫Son Mohammed was worse: during the ‘60s & ‘70s political opponents were imprisoned & tortured by SAVAK (Iranian CIA) ▫When Islamist rebels began clashing w/ the govt in ’78, it was only a matter of time ▫In early ‘79, the Shah was overthrown & Islamic Repub of Iran was est’d. ▫B/c US supported Pahlevi, condemned by new leader Ayatollah Khomeini Khomeini, Islamist cleric, est’d theocratic rule in Iran Late ‘79, Shah came to US for med treatment- Iran protested violently (wanted him back in Iran standing trial for his crimes) & group of college students invaded US embassy & took occupants hostage By time it ended 444 days later, JC thoroughly discredited & Ronald Reagan was president

57 Conclusion US foreign policy in the 1970s began w/ the US trying to extricate itself from Vietnam and ended w/ our complete humiliation in Iran. In b/t we saw relations cool, then reheat w/ the USSR & US prestige roller coaster up and down in the 3 rd World as Carter’s human rights focus attempted to make up for the Machiavellian attitudes of predecessors only to result in increased regional conflicts which we were ill-prepared to engage


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