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Peninsula Campaign and Shenandoah Valley Campaign Lesson 6.

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1 Peninsula Campaign and Shenandoah Valley Campaign Lesson 6

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3 Principles of War and Elements of Operational Design in the Peninsula Campaign Objective Offensive Mass Economy of force Maneuver Unity of command Security Surprise Simplicity Synergy Simultaneity and depth Anticipation Balance Leverage Timing and tempo Operational reach and approach Forces and functions Arranging operations Centers of gravity Direct versus indirect Decisive points Culmination Termination

4 Peninsula Campaign: McClellan George McClellan –Among the Army’s best educated officers… “the Young Napoleon” –Excellent organizer and administrator The right man to rebuild the Federal Army after the defeat at First Manassas –Extremely cautious; always wants more troops and more time to prepare Prone to believe enemy is stronger than he really is –Mutual distrust with Lincoln

5 Peninsula Campaign: McClellan One of McClellan’s formative experiences in the Mexican War was the siege of Vera Cruz After the war McClellan was part of a team of US officers sent to observe the Crimean War –Studied the siege of Sevastopol there No one in the US Army knew more about conducting sieges than McClellan Advocated the limited war and the conciliatory approaches

6 Peninsula Campaign: Joe Johnston Reinforced Beauregard at First Manassas Highest ranking officer to leave the US Army for the Confederacy –However the letter Davis sent to the Senate requesting confirmation of his full generals listed Johnston fourth –This infuriated Johnston and from that day on he had a difficult and quarrelsome relationship with Davis Defensive-minded

7 Peninsula Campaign: Faulty Intelligence McClellan near Washington with 100,000 men Johnston near Centreville with 40,000 –Allan Pinkerton, McClellan’s intelligence officer, estimated Johnston had 150,000 Pinkerton’s exaggerated estimate reinforced McClellan’s natural tendency toward caution Pinkerton’s (left) skill in running a railroad detective agency did not translate to being a good military intelligence officer

8 Peninsula Campaign: Urbanna Plan McClellan preferred an amphibious operation to an overland one in order to avoid Johnston –Developed the “Urbanna Plan” which involved a move by water from Annapolis, MD through the Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rappahannock River –The landing site of Urbanna was a small hamlet about 60 road miles northeast of Richmond

9 Peninsula Campaign: Urbanna Plan McClellan hoped to avoid attacking Johnston frontally Instead he would insert himself between Johnston and Richmond, forcing Johnston to evacuate his strong Manassas- Centreville line in order to defend the Confederate capital The Urbanna Plan was designed to be a turning movement

10 Peninsula Campaign: Confederate Withdrawal Before McClellan could launch his plan, Johnston began to feel vulnerable so far forward Johnston left only a 5,400 man force under Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and withdrew the rest of his force behind the Rappahannock River –This move effectively negated the Urbanna Plan When Federal forces inspect the abandoned Confederate works at Centreville they find many of the suspected defenses were merely “Quaker guns”

11 Peninsula Campaign: McClellan’s Response By this time McClellan was mentally committed to an amphibious movement even though most of its advantages were gone He shifted his landing site to Fort Monroe which had remained in Federal hands after Virginia seceded John Wool commanded a 10,000 man force at Fort Monroe

12 Peninsula Campaign

13 Peninsula Campaign: Security Lincoln was not overly enthusiastic about the Peninsula Campaign but he was happy that McClellan was at least doing something Among Lincoln’s concerns was the safety of Washington after McClellan’s army departed He asked McClellan to explain his plan for safeguarding the capital and McClellan never really gave Lincoln a straight answer –McClellan was very condescending to Lincoln –He seemed to think that as a professional soldier he did not need to bother sharing his plans with an amateur

14 Peninsula Campaign: Mass and Security Amphibious movement began March 17 –121,500 men, 14,492 animals, 1,224 wagons, 200 cannon –One British observer describes it as “the stride of a giant” (mass) On April 3 Lincoln started asking serious questions about the safety of Washington and became convinced it was inadequate –He ordered McDowell’s 30,000 man corps to remain in place rather than join McClellan (security) McClellan’s failure to make Lincoln feel comfortable about Washington came back to haunt him

15 Peninsula Campaign: Confederate Defenses McClellan began his advance inland on April 4 Facing him was a 13,000 man force commanded by John Magruder –Magruder had a weak defensive line designed to trade space for time until a more solid defense could be formed –Magruder was a very high strung personality and he started sending off panicky reports to Robert E. Lee who was serving as Davis’s military advisor Lee tried to calm Magruder down and began a “reconcentration” of forces which would ultimately bring 53,000 Confederates into position to oppose McClellan (balance)

16 Peninsula Campaign: Deception Magruder was not a particularly distinguished combat general but he was an amateur thespian He put his acting talent to work to deceive McClellan –Magruder marched a couple of his regiments out of a thicket into clear view of the Federal advanced guard –The Confederates then disappeared into another woods, doubled back around while they were out of sight, and then repeated the process

17 Peninsula Campaign: Deception The target of a military deception operation is the mind of the enemy commander It is always easier to make someone believe what they were already predisposed to believe Thanks to Pinkerton’s exaggerated estimates and McClellan’s natural caution, McClellan was predisposed to believe the Confederates outnumbered him Magruder’s ruse worked perfectly Magruder’s nickname was the “Great Demonstrator”

18 Peninsula Campaign: Yorktown Magruder’s deception, poor maps, difficult terrain, uninspired actions by subordinates, and McClellan’s natural caution led him to stop his advance within 24 hours and begin siege operations against Yorktown (maneuver?) Joe Johnston said, “Nobody but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.” (offensive?) Mortars used in the Federal siege of Yorktown

19 Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads The Confederates had converted the old USS Merrimack into an ironclad and rechristened it the CSS Virginia –The casemate walls contained 24 inches of oak and pine timbers which were then covered with four inches of armor plating

20 Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads The presence of the Virginia posed a serious threat to the Federal fleet On March 8, the Virginia made its trial run and wreaked havoc among the five Federal blockade ships anchored in Hampton Roads As the tide ebbed the Virginia withdrew to deeper waters, intending to finish her work the next day

21 Peninsula Campaign: Ironclads By then however, the Federal ironclad, the Monitor, had arrived on the scene The two fought to a tactical draw, but again the Virginia had to withdraw to deeper waters giving the Monitor a strategic victory The Virginia remained a threat, but fears that she would single-handedly destroy the Federal fleet were now abated

22 Peninsula Campaign: Confederate Withdrawal On May 3 Johnston began to evacuate Yorktown and withdraw up the Peninsula –This opened up the York and James River to Federal gunboats –It also forced the abandonment of Gosport Naval Yard and scuttling of the Virginia which opened up the James River to the Federals Currier and Ives print of the destruction of the Virginia

23 Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg and Drewry’s Bluff Johnston’s strategy was to withdraw to the immediate vicinity of Richmond in order to strengthen his defenses and prevent McClellan from outmaneuvering him The Confederates fought a rear guard action at Williamsburg to cover the retreat Williamsburg favored the defense. The Peninsula is only seven miles wide there and Longstreet positioned himself between Queen’s and College Creeks which further narrowed the distance to three miles.

24 Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg and Drewry’s Bluff Williamsburg indicated several themes that would repeat themselves throughout the Peninsula Campaign –The terrain favored the defense –Frontal attacks would prove very costly –Synchronizing in order to achieve mass at the decisive point would be difficult –McClellan would absent himself from the tactical battlefield and not provide the necessary command and control

25 Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg and Drewry’s Bluff Without the Virginia blocking the way, McClellan also had a potential water approach to Richmond On May 15, five Federal ships including the Monitor advanced up the James River only to be blocked by the Confederate fort at Drewry’s Bluff, just seven miles below Richmond

26 Peninsula Campaign: Williamsburg and Drewry’s Bluff Drewry’s Bluff was indicative of problems the Federals had throughout the campaign of achieving joint unity of effort The Navy had requested “a cooperating land force” but McClellan had answered that he was “not yet ready to cooperate with them” Naval commander Louis Goldsborough said, “Without the Army the Navy can make no real headway towards Richmond. This is as clear as the sun at noonday to the mind. Goldsborough and McClellan would fail to achieve unity of effort on the Peninsula.

27 Jackson’s Valley Campaign While all this is going on on the Peninsula, Stonewall Jackson was having a big effect in the Shenandoah Valley The Valley represented a potential Confederate avenue of approach to Washington, which concerns Lincoln Still in his capacity as Davis’s military advisor, Lee began coordinating with Jackson to help relieve pressure on the Peninsula –While “the Confederates were concentrating coastal troops at Richmond, their immediate response [to McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign] began with Jasckson’s important Valley campaign” Hattaway and Jones, 176

28 Jackson’s Valley Campaign Shenandoah Valley –Agricultural support for Confederacy –Controlled Baltimore & Ohio Railroad –Avenue of approach into Maryland and Pennsylvania Originally Jackson faced 38,000 Federals with only 4,500 of his own men –Federal force grew to nearly 60,000 which Jackson kept from threatening the Peninsula

29 Jackson’s Valley Campaign Jomini ( ): Swiss military theorist who influenced many Civil War generals through his Summary of the Art of War Very geometrical and scientific approach to war –Stressed interior lines Interior Lines Exterior Lines

30 Jackson’s Valley Campaign Jackson neutralized Federal forces three times larger than his own. Fought six battles between March 23 and June 9: Kernstown, McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic. “Jackson’s foot cavalry” –676 miles in 48 marching days; an average of 14 miles a day

31 Jackson’s Marches 22 March Mount Jackson-Strasburg March Strasburg-Kernstown-Newtown March Newtown-Mount Jackson April Mount Jackson-Elk Run Valley April-3 May Elk Run Valley-Mechum’s River Stn May Staunton-Shenandoah Mount May Bull Pasture Mount-Franklin May Franklin-Lebanon Springs May Lebanon Springs-Bridgewater May Bridgewater-New Market May New Market-Luray May Luray-Milford May Milford-Front Royal-Cedarville May Cedarville-Abraham’s Creek 22

32 Jackson’s Marches 25 May Abraham’s Creek-Stevenson’s 7 28 May Stevenson’s-Charlestown May Charlestown-Halltown 5 30 May Halltown-Winchester May Winchester-Strasburg 18 1 June Strasburg-Woodstock 12 2 June Woodstock-Mount Jackson 12 3 June Mount Jackson-New Market June New Market-Port Republic 30 8 June Port Republic-Cross Keys 5 9 June Cross Keys-Brown’s Gap June Brown’s Gap-Mount Meridian June Mount Meridian-Ashland Station120 (one rest day)

33 Jackson’s Marching Rules: Issued May 13, 1862 Instructions on filling canteens which would prevent straggling for this purpose, Hourly rest breaks of ten minutes in duration, Mess times, Location of commanders during the march, Procedures for safeguarding weapons, Personnel accountability procedures, Guidance for transporting baggage, and Medical and ambulance support procedures. –Frank Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, McGraw-Hill: NY, 1957, p

34 Soldier’s Load As a general rule, commanders should limit a soldier’s load to an amount equal to 45% of his body weight in order to retain agility, stamina, alertness, and mobility. For the average soldier this is 72 pounds.

35 Soldier’s Load In the interest of being able to move rapidly, Jackson kept his soldiers’ load to the minimum. –Jackson’s men did not carry extra clothing, overcoats, or knapsacks. –They marched with their rifles, ammunition, and just enough food to keep going. –Each man carried one blanket or rubber sheet and slept with a comrade for extra warmth. –The cooking was done at a common mess so that not everyone had to carry individual frying pans and skillets. Even the skillet handle had been spiked so that on the march it could be stuck in a rifle barrel. Marshall, S. L. A. The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation, The Marine Corps Association: Quantico, 1980, p. 25

36 A. P. Hill’s “Light Division” One soldier’s explanation of how Hill picked the name: “Why it was called the Light Division I did not learn; but I know that the name was applicable, for we often marched without coats, blankets, knapsacks, or any other burdens except our arms and haversacks, which were never heavy and sometimes empty.” W. F. Dunaway quoted in William Hassler, A. P. Hill: Lee’s Forgotten General, Garrett and Massie: Richmond, 1962.

37 Jackson’s Valley Campaign Jackson’s success in the Valley affected things on the Peninsula On May 18, McClellan had been told by Secretary of War Stanton that McDowell’s Corps would be marching from Fredericksburg where it had been held previously for fear of Washington’s safety Jackson’s new threat caused Lincoln to change his mind and on May 24 he telegraphed McClellan, “In consequence of Gen. Banks’ critical position I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell’s movement to join you.” –McDowell complained, “If the enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming us first at one point then at another, he will paralyze a larger force with a very small one.” (simultaneity and depth)

38 Peninsula Campaign: Seven Pines On May 28 Johnston received a report from Jeb Stuart that McDowell was not moving toward Richmond but was instead returning to Fredericksburg –With McDowell held in place thanks to Jackson, the Confederates could act more aggressively Johnston learned from other reconnaissance that McClellan’s army was divided by the Chickahominy River Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave the Confederacy an incredible intelligence advantage over McClellan

39 Peninsula Campaign: Seven Pines Johnston tried to crush the isolated southern wing of the Federal army in the Battle of Seven Pines May 31 –Johnston mismanaged the battle, issued vague orders, and was wounded –Robert E. Lee replaced him

40 Robert E. Lee Johnston was well- liked by the soldiers and Lee was initially looked at with suspicion However, even Johnston admitted, “The shot that struck me down is the very best that has been fired in the Confederate cause yet.” Lee Takes Command by Mort Kunstler

41 Robert E. Lee Lee completely changed the situation –Good relationship with Davis –Offensive-minded and extremely audacious –Makes excellent use of intelligence and cavalry –Strong advocate of the turning movement

42 Seven Days Jackson’s success allowed Lee to concentrate his forces against McClellan –Lee will defend Richmond with 20,000 and use 60,000 to attack Plan depended on the timely arrival of Jackson who was to attack Porter from the flank and rear –Jackson was inexplicably late Result was Mechanicsville (June 26) turned out to be an unsupported frontal attack rather than an envelopment

43 Seven Days Gaines’s Mill (June 27) –Another poor performance by Jackson limits Confederate victory, but Lee succeeded in causing McClellan to go on the defensive Savage Station (June 29) Frayser’s Farm (June 30) Malvern Hill (July 1) –Federal artillery defeated Confederate frontal assault McClellan withdrew to Harrison Landing under protection of Federal gunboats on the James River

44 Seven Days It would be 1864 before the Federal army again got as close to Richmond as it did during the Seven Days

45 Critique of Jackson’s Performance on the Peninsula Historians have closely scrutinized Jackson’s poor performance on the Peninsula in contrast with his brilliant performance in the Valley Explanations include –He did not receive orders to act more aggressively –He was unfamiliar with the geography –He could operate better independently than in close cooperation with others –He felt other units ought to bear more of the fighting burden

46 Critique of Jackson’s Performance on the Peninsula The main reason was that by the time Jackson got to the Peninsula he was physically and mentally was exhausted –Jackson usually required much sleep and he just did not get it during the rigors of the Valley Campaign and his subsequent march to the Peninsula –His aide Sandie Pendleton wrote on June 7, “Jackson is completely broken down.”

47 Principles of War and Elements of Operational Design in the Peninsula Campaign Objective Offensive Mass Economy of force Maneuver Unity of command Security Surprise Simplicity Synergy Simultaneity and depth Anticipation Balance Leverage Timing and tempo Operational reach and approach Forces and functions Arranging operations Centers of gravity Direct versus indirect Decisive points Culmination Termination

48 Next Fort Donelson and Shiloh


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