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Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter.

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Presentation on theme: "Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter."— Presentation transcript:

1 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 10 Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

2 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Overview I. Introduction to Game Theory II. Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games III. Infinitely Repeated Games IV. Finitely Repeated Games V. Multistage Games

3 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game A Normal Form Game consists of: n Players n Strategies or feasible actions n Payoffs

4 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 A Normal Form Game Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

5 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game: Scenario Analysis Suppose 1 thinks 2 will choose “A”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

6 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game: Scenario Analysis Then 1 should choose “a”. n Player 1’s best response to “A” is “a”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

7 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game: Scenario Analysis Suppose 1 thinks 2 will choose “B”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

8 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game: Scenario Analysis Then 1 should choose “a”. n Player 1’s best response to “B” is “a”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

9 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Game Scenario Analysis Similarly, if 1 thinks 2 will choose C… n Player 1’s best response to “C” is “a”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

10 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Dominant Strategy Regardless of whether Player 2 chooses A, B, or C, Player 1 is better off choosing “a”! “a” is Player 1’s Dominant Strategy! Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

11 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Putting Yourself in your Rival’s Shoes What should player 2 do? n 2 has no dominant strategy! n But 2 should reason that 1 will play “a”. n Therefore 2 should choose “C”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

12 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The Outcome This outcome is called a Nash equilibrium: n “a” is player 1’s best response to “C”. n “C” is player 2’s best response to “a”. Player 2 Player 1 12,11 11,1214,13 11,1010,1112,12 10,1510,1313,14

13 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Key Insights Look for dominant strategies Put yourself in your rival’s shoes

14 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 A Market Share Game Two managers want to maximize market share Strategies are pricing decisions Simultaneous moves One-shot game

15 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The Market-Share Game in Normal Form Manager 2 Manager 1

16 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Market-Share Game Equilibrium Manager 2 Manager 1 Nash Equilibrium

17 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Key Insight: Game theory can be used to analyze situations where “payoffs” are non monetary! We will, without loss of generality, focus on environments where businesses want to maximize profits. n Hence, payoffs are measured in monetary units.

18 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Examples of Coordination Games Industry standards n size of floppy disks n size of CDs n etc. National standards n electric current n traffic laws n etc.

19 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 A Coordination Game in Normal Form Player 2 Player 1

20 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 A Coordination Problem: Three Nash Equilibria! Player 2 Player 1

21 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Key Insights: Not all games are games of conflict. Communication can help solve coordination problems. Sequential moves can help solve coordination problems.

22 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 An Advertising Game Two firms (Kellogg’s & General Mills) managers want to maximize profits Strategies consist of advertising campaigns Simultaneous moves One-shot interaction Repeated interaction

23 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 A One-Shot Advertising Game General Mills Kellogg’s

24 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Equilibrium to the One-Shot Advertising Game General Mills Kellogg’s Nash Equilibrium

25 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Can collusion work if the game is repeated 2 times? General Mills Kellogg’s

26 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 No (by backwards induction). In period 2, the game is a one-shot game, so equilibrium entails High Advertising in the last period. This means period 1 is “really” the last period, since everyone knows what will happen in period 2. Equilibrium entails High Advertising by each firm in both periods. The same holds true if we repeat the game any known, finite number of times.

27 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Can collusion work if firms play the game each year, forever? Consider the following “trigger strategy” by each firm: n “Don’t advertise, provided the rival has not advertised in the past. If the rival ever advertises, “punish” it by engaging in a high level of advertising forever after.” In effect, each firm agrees to “cooperate” so long as the rival hasn’t “cheated” in the past. “Cheating” triggers punishment in all future periods.

28 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Suppose General Mills adopts this trigger strategy. Kellogg’s profits?  Cooperate = /(1+i) + 12/(1+i) /(1+i) 3 + … = /i General Mills Kellogg’s Value of a perpetuity of $12 paid at the end of every year  Cheat = 20 +2/(1+i) + 2/(1+i) 2 + 2/(1+i) 3 + = /i

29 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Kellogg’s Gain to Cheating:  Cheat -  Cooperate = /i - ( /i) = /i n Suppose i =.05  Cheat -  Cooperate = /.05 = = -192 It doesn’t pay to deviate. n Collusion is a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game! General Mills Kellogg’s

30 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Benefits & Costs of Cheating  Cheat -  Cooperate = /i n 8 = Immediate Benefit ( today) n 10/i = PV of Future Cost ( forever after) If Immediate Benefit > PV of Future Cost n Pays to “cheat”. If Immediate Benefit  PV of Future Cost n Doesn’t pay to “cheat”. General Mills Kellogg’s

31 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Key Insight Collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium when there is no certain “end” to a game. Doing so requires: n Ability to monitor actions of rivals n Ability (and reputation for) punishing defectors n Low interest rate n High probability of future interaction

32 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Real World Examples of Collusion Garbage Collection Industry OPEC NASDAQ Airlines

33 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Garbage Collection Industry Homogeneous products Bertrand oligopoly Identity of customers is known Identity of competitors is known

34 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Normal Form Bertrand Game Firm 1 Firm 2

35 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 One-Shot Bertrand (Nash) Equilibrium Firm 1 Firm 2

36 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Potential Repeated Game Equilibrium Outcome Firm 1 Firm 2

37 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., OPEC Cartel founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela Currently has 11 members “OPEC’s objective is to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers…” (www.opec.com) Cournot oligopoly Absent collusion: P Competition < P Cournot < P Monopoly

38 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Current OPEC Members

39 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Cournot Game in Normal Form Venezuela Saudi Arabia

40 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 One-Shot Cournot (Nash) Equilibrium Venezuela Saudi Arabia

41 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Repeated Game Equilibrium* Venezuela *(Assuming a Low Interest Rate) Saudi Arabia

42 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Effect of Collusion on Oil Prices Quantity of Oil Price World Demand for Oil Medium $15 Low $30

43 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 OPEC’s Demise Low Interest Rates High Interest Rates

44 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Caveat Collusion is a felony under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Conviction can result in both fines and jail- time (at the discretion of the court). Some NASDAQ dealers and airline companies have been charged with violations OPEC isn’t illegal; US laws don’t apply

45 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Simultaneous-Move Bargaining Management and a union are negotiating a wage increase. Strategies are wage offers & wage demands Successful negotiations lead to $600 million in surplus, which must be split among the parties Failure to reach an agreement results in a loss to the firm of $100 million and a union loss of $3 million Simultaneous moves, and time permits only one-shot at making a deal.

46 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The Bargaining Game in Normal Form Union Management

47 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Three Nash Equilibria! Union Management

48 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Fairness: The “Natural” Focal Point Union Management

49 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Lessons in Simultaneous Bargaining Simultaneous-move bargaining results in a coordination problem Experiments suggests that, in the absence of any “history,” real players typically coordinate on the “fair outcome” When there is a “bargaining history,” other outcomes may prevail

50 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Single Offer Bargaining Now suppose the game is sequential in nature, and management gets to make the union a “take-it-or- leave-it” offer. Analysis Tool: Write the game in extensive form n Summarize the players n Their potential actions n Their information at each decision point n The sequence of moves and n Each player’s payoff

51 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Firm Step 1: Management’s Move

52 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Firm Union Accept Reject Accept Reject Step 2: Add the Union’s Move

53 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Firm Union Accept Reject 100, , -3 Accept 300, , -3 Reject 500, , -3 Step 3: Add the Payoffs

54 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The Game in Extensive Form Firm Union Accept Reject 100, , -3 Accept 300, , -3 Reject 500, , -3

55 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Step 4: Identify the Firm’s Feasible Strategies Management has one information set and thus three feasible strategies: n Offer $10 n Offer $5 n Offer $1

56 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Step 5: Identify the Union’s Feasible Strategies n Accept $10, Accept $5, Accept $1 n Accept $10, Accept $5, Reject $1 n Accept $10, Reject $5, Accept $1 n Reject $10, Accept $5, Accept $1 n Accept $10, Reject $5, Reject $1 n Reject $10, Accept $5, Reject $1 n Reject $10, Reject $5, Accept $1 n Reject $10, Reject $5, Reject $1

57 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Step 6: Identify Nash Equilibrium Outcomes: Outcomes such that neither the firm nor the union has an incentive to change its strategy, given the strategy of the other

58 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Finding Nash Equilibrium Outcomes $1Yes $5 $1 $10 Yes $5Yes $1 No Yes $10, $5, $1

59 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Step 7: Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Outcomes Outcomes where no player has an incentive to change its strategy, given the strategy of the rival, and The outcomes are based on “credible actions;” that is, they are not the result of “empty threats” by the rival.

60 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Checking for Credible Actions Yes No

61 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The “Credible” Union Strategy Yes No

62 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Finding Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Strategies $1Yes $5 $1 $10 Yes $5Yes $1 No Yes $10, $5, $1 Nash and CredibleNash OnlyNeither Nash Nor Credible

63 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 To Summarize: We have identified many combinations of Nash equilibrium strategies In all but one the union does something that isn’t in its self interest (and thus entail threats that are not credible) Graphically:

64 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Firm Union Accept Reject 100, , -3 Accept 300, , -3 Reject 500, , -3 There are 3 Nash Equilibrium Outcomes!

65 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Firm Union Accept Reject 100, , -3 Accept 300, , -3 Reject 500, , -3 Only 1 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium Outcome!

66 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Re-Cap In take-it-or-leave-it bargaining, there is a first-mover advantage. Management can gain by making a take-it or leave-it offer to the union. But... Management should be careful, however; real world evidence suggests that people sometimes reject offers on the the basis of “principle” instead of cash considerations.

67 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Pricing to Prevent Entry: An Application of Game Theory Two firms: an incumbent and potential entrant The game in extensive form:

68 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 The Entry Game in Extensive Form Entrant Out Enter Incumbent Hard Soft -1, 1 5, 5 0, 10

69 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Identify Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria Entrant Out Enter Incumbent Hard Soft -1, 1 5, 5 0, 10

70 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Two Nash Equilibria Entrant Out Enter Incumbent Hard Soft -1, 1 5, 5 0, 10

71 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 One Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Entrant Out Enter Incumbent Hard Soft -1, 1 5, 5 0, 10

72 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Insights Establishing a reputation for being unkind to entrants can enhance long-term profits It is costly to do so in the short-term, so much so that it isn’t optimal to do so in a one-shot game.


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