Presentation on theme: "Tony Cucolo Major General, US Army 21 MAR 12"— Presentation transcript:
1 Tony Cucolo Major General, US Army 21 MAR 12 Hard Choices: Equipping an Army for a New Strategy with a Smaller BudgetTony CucoloMajor General, US Army21 MAR 12
2 Where I’m from: “Army G-8” The G-8’s RoleWhere I’m from: “Army G-8”Deputy Chief of Staff G-8Integrates staffs and commands to provide fully equipped forces as directedManage Army reset for the current and next fightAssess the Army’s next essential needDevelops and defends the “Army Program”How does theArmy support thedefense Strategy?What size Army?What capabilities?Translate requirements to solutionsDevelop the Army resourcing planQuadrennial Defense ReviewCenter forArmy AnalysisForce DevelopmentProgram Analysis and Evaluation3
3 What I do: “Force Development” The FD’s RoleWhat I do: “Force Development”Equipment ModernizationStrategyTranslate requirementsinto programsPlan, synchronize, and integrateequipping requirements fordeployed unitsBalance, prioritize requirementsagainst resourcesJoint and FuturesMaterielIntegrationResourcing4
4 New Defense Strategic Guidance Transition from today’s wars to preparing for future challengesRebalance to Asia-Pacific, while remaining vigilant in Middle EastMaintain our Article 5 commitments to NATOStrengthening alliances/partnerships across all regions10 primary missions of the US Armed Forces; 4 for sizing:Counter Terrorism and Irregular WarfareDeter and Defeat Aggression“deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere”Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear DeterrentDefend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil AuthoritiesMaintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacityAbility to surge and regenerate (reversibility)Keep faith with troops, families, and veterans5 Jan 12
5 “Sizing” Guidance Sizing guidance: Deter and Defeat Aggression: One large-scale combined arms campaign with follow-on small-scale stability/transition operations for limited period using standing forces (or sustained with partial mobilization), and defeat aggression by an opportunistic adversary in another region, simultaneously.Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare: Sustain capabilities, capacity, and institutional expertise for direct action and security force assistance.Defend the Homeland: Heightened defense posture in/around the United States (including missile defense) and support to civil authorities for one large-scale terrorist attack or natural disaster or complex catastrophe.Specifics:Reduce AC end strength to 490K by end of FY 17Reduce at least 8 AC BCTs, including 2 ABCTs in Europe
6 U.S. is likely to face a hybrid strategy into the foreseeable future Hybrid StrategiesThree components of Hybrid ThreatsNation States or Proxies with a range of capabilitiesDesire to preclude U.S. from executing its “way of war”Capabilities that create a “Strategic Lever”… specifically designed to impact U.S. actionsConventionalStructure and CapabilityIrregularOperationsTerrorist/CriminalactivityProxiesStrategic CapabilitiesHYBRIDSTRATEGYRecognize conventional confrontation with the US is a losing propositionFocus on US vulnerabilitiesUtilize home terrain advantagesNontraditional employment of all possible capabilitiesEnd State:frustrate US operationsensure survival of key capabilitiesturn conflict into protracted war of attritionThe new norm for our Army in this era of persistent conflict includes responding to hybrid threats – diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities.To confront these threats, our forces will continue to operate “among the people” rather than “around the people.”U.S. is likely to face a hybrid strategy into the foreseeable future6
7 Joint Operational Access Concept Gaining & Maintaining Access Hybrid Threat ConceptAnti-access and area denial campaigns … strategic thru tactical levelsEngage at small unit level to obtain overmatchUse violence, intimidation and coercion against the populationWMD capable… but still seeking nuclearAvoid detection and targeting by operating among the peopleSlow down or halt our momentum using anti-tank missiles, IEDs, air defense and SOFIncreased use of robotics and unmanned aerial systemsEmploy electronic warfare to counter US precisionConduct sophisticated information campaigns designed to erode US will over timeJoint Operational Access ConceptCONUSAirSeaBattleArea DenialGaining & Maintaining AccessIntermediate Staging BaseAnti AccessHybrid Threats7
8 A Changed View: Range of Military Operations With hybrid strategies presenting hybrid threatsFormerly, a narrow lens…(…butThe Army still did what it was told outside this narrow lens)But now a specified wide lensSpecific ThreatSpecific LocationDeter &DefeatStabilityOpsCOINHD/DSCACT/IWCyber &SpaceCWMDSpecific threat, degree of certainity,and known location drove:DoctrineEquipmentTrainingOrganizational StructureForce PostureAssume RiskAssume RiskBPCFHAConduct Unified Land OperationsGain and Maintain AccessNukeDefeat Anti-AccessDefeat Area DenialHard Complex problems, but simple narrative to Congress and the American People based off real potential threat to vital national interests.Joint Combined Arms Fire & ManeuverAs operational constructHistoric Examples:s Rainbow PlanningAirmobileActive DefenseAir Land BattleNow: Air Sea BattleNo holistic Operational Construct will arise that encompasses all of Unified Land Ops and drive doctrine, equipment, etc., as Air Land Battle did.
9 Unified Land Operations Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolutionDecisive ActionOffensive Defensive Stability DSCAExecuted through…Army Core CompetenciesCombined Arms Maneuver Wide Area SecurityBy means of…Mission CommandGuided by…
10 The “specialize” or “generalize” question… How adaptable is the general purpose formation built for unified land operations?
11 Our Strength is Our Ability to Adapt Operational Adaptabilitycodified in doctrine(“Unified LandOperations”)Security Force Advise & Assist TeamsAdvise &AssistBrigadesPakistan Flood ReliefPRT SupportHaiti EarthquakeAssistancePolice Training ProgramsHeavy Air AssaultsBorder TrainingFull SpectrumOperationsSupport to Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, Info Ops and CT Ops in Horn of AfricaHurricane KatrinaReliefSustain Ops in Honduras, Bosnia, Kosovo and EgyptOIF IAirLandBattleExecuted by Operationally Adaptable Brigades & Battalions11
12 Our Marching Orders Are Clear THE ROLE OF THE ARMYThe purpose of the U.S. Army is to fight and win our Nation’s wars. Warfighting is our primary mission. Everything that we do should be grounded in this fundamental principle. Our strategic framework is guided by three principal and interconnected roles:PREVENT: The Army prevents conflict by maintaining credibility based on capacity, readiness and modernization. It averts miscalculations by potential adversaries.SHAPE: The Army shapes the environment by sustaining strong relationships with other Armies, building their capacity, and facilitating strategic access.WIN: If prevention fails, the Army rapidly applies its combined arms capabilities to dominate the environment and win decisively.
13 Shape the Security Environment: Prevent, Shape, WinPrevent wars (deter & contain):Brandish land forces of sufficient size and fighting power to deter potential opponentsDemonstrate ability to deploy forcesConduct sustained stability operations to prevent conflictPreventShape the Security Environment:Expand and strengthen relationships with partners around the globeDevelop new relationships*Foster mutual understandingHelp partners defend themselves, both internally and externallyOpen access for US forcesShapeWin decisively and dominantly:Lead Joint Task Forces; provide connectivity to JIIM elements*Employ a versatile mix of units to conduct sustained land campaigns and counter-terrorism operationsConduct sustained stability operations to conclude a conflictWin
18 Budget GuidanceCut $487 billion over next decade; $259 billion over next 5 yearsNo longer size active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations while retaining expertise of a decade of warAsia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and naval forcesMiddle East ... Increasingly maritimeEliminate 2 heavy brigades in EuropeSecurity partner of choice – innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approachesPremium on self- and rapidly-deployable forcesPremium on forces present or able to rapidly repositionReduced inter/intra-theater airliftCut Regular Army to 490K by end of FY 17, including at least 8 BCTs (future design under review)Retain more mid-grade offices and NCOsDelay GCV and Army aviation modernization; terminate JLENS and HMMWV upgrades; reduce JAGMAir ForceDisestablish 6 fighter squadrons (5 A-10, 1 F-16)Divest C-27JLimited military pay raises beginning in 2015Reductions in planned civilian pay raisesIncreased TRICARE fees for retireesAdditional BRAC round(s)26 Jan 12
19 The process begins with defining the and validating requirements…and since we cannot afford to resource every valid requirement, routine prioritization becomes key.
21 Current Priorities and Top 10 Programs Empower, Protect and Unburden the Soldier; equip the Squad to be the foundation of the decisive forceNetwork the ForceDeter & Defeat Hybrid Threats by Replacing, Improving and/or Transforming:Combat VehiclesAviationLight Tactical Vehicles10 Critical ProgramsJoint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T)Joint Battle Command-Platforms (JBC-P)Nett WarriorDistributed Common Ground System- Army (DCGS-A)Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)Kiowa Warrior (KW)Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)21
22 But the challenge goes beyond equipment…and with great complexity.
24 Strategic Expectations What if we get it wrong?Strategic ExpectationsWhenWhat We DidWhat We ExpectedWhat We GotPost WWIIPrecipitous drawdownArmy budget reduction in favor of Strategic Air CommandStrategic nuclear war with USSRConventional war in KoreaPost KoreaForce reductionPentomic Division then ROAD DivisionTactical nuclear weaponsStrategic nuclear war with USSR preceded by conventional/tactical nuclear war in Europe as part of NATO allianceDefense of Korea with the ROKProtracted counterinsurgency in VietnamPost VietnamSteep drawdownEnded conscription…converted to the All Volunteer ForceDeveloped new doctrine…AirLand BattleModernized…Big Five SystemsRevolutionized training...National Training CentersConventional/Tactical Nuclear War with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe with NATO AlliesEnd of the Cold WarOne brief conventional fight with IraqPost Gulf WarBegan a steep drawdown (collecting the “Peace Dividend”)Restored the honor and reputation of US ArmsStabilized at a lower level of budget and manpowerArmy reoriented to fight conventional wars with rogue statesPlanning construct was for two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW’s) plus lesser operationsEnduring Stability Operations in Bosnia and KosovoOne major, unconventional country takedown…Taliban AfghanistanOne major, brief conventional fight with IraqTwo major counterinsurgency wars…Iraq and AfghanistanCT Operations in the Horn of Africa
25 The best hedge against an uncertain future is a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-disciplined land force with global reach.
26 Tony Cucolo Major General, US Army 21 MAR 12 Hard Choices: Equipping an Army for a New Strategy with a Smaller BudgetTony CucoloMajor General, US Army21 MAR 12
28 Army Global Commitments PACOMNORTHCOMEUCOMCENTCOMOEF- PHILIPPINES480 SOLDIERSALASKA13,850 SOLDIERS(FWD Stationed)HAWAII22,630 SOLDIERSJAPAN2,500 SOLDIERSSOUTH KOREA18,970 SOLDIERS(Part of AC Station Overseas)CONUS SPT BASE2,870 SOLDIERS(RC Mobilized Stateside)USAREUR38,230 SOLDIERS(FWD Stationed)OEF- AFGHANISTAN65,810 SOLDIERSBOSNIA90 SOLDIERSIRAQ130 SOLDIERSKUWAIT15,100 SOLDIERSKFOR690 SOLDIERSSOUTHCOMQATAR1,860 SOLDIERSAFRICOMJTF-GTMO350 SOLDIERSJTF- HOA1,220 SOLDIERSMFO640 SOLDIERSHONDURASJTF-BRAVO290 SOLDIERSOTHER OPERATIONS& EXERCISES5,200 SOLDIERSARMY PERSONNEL STRENGTHComponentRC AUTHORIZED FOR MOBILIZATION / ON CURRENT ORDERSIN NEARLY 120 COUNTRIES OVERSEAS21 Feb 2012
29 Allocation of Defense Resources DoD BudgetArmy Average 28%High 33.2%Low 25.0%Navy Average 31%High 32%Low 30.2%Air Force Average 31%High 33.5%Low 29.2%Other Average 10%High 15.6%Low 1.3%Allocation of resources within DOD have remained relatively constant over the past 60 years, except during war.
30 An independent thought: The role of the Army is to provide strategic breadth and depth to the Joint Force through the conduct of decisive unified land operations in support of National objectives.The Army gives the Commander in Chief the widest range of options for actions on land.
31 Army Force-Sizing Missions Defend the Homeland & Support Civil AuthoritiesDeter and Defeat AggressionDefeat Opportunistic AggressionConduct Stability & Counterinsurgency OperationsCounter Terrorism & Irregular Warfare
32 Smaller Force ... Different Focus FOUO -- DRAFT -- PREDECISIONALSmaller Force ... Different Focus20032018Force Pool 1ACRCACRCDefend the Homeland & Support Civil AuthoritiesACRCCounterterrorism & Irregular WarfareRotational DepthForce Pool 2ACRCACRCDefeat Opportunistic AggressionACRCCombined Arms Campaign + Transition OperationsForce Pool 3ACRCFOUO -- DRAFT -- PREDECISIONAL
33 Affordably Building a Force Identify areas where risk can be accepted and trades can be made to achieve high priority/high payoff modernization objectives.QuantityScheduleCostOrganization SizeCapability(Portfolio, Formation, Platform)Item CostVariant of ItemProcurementScheduleWhere does the Army accept risk?
34 Combined Arms Maneuver – the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.Wide Area Security – the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals.Source: TRADOC Pamphlet
35 Operational Concepts to Engage Army Unified Land Operations play a significant role in Joint Unified ActionJoint Operational Access Concept(Counter Anti-Access / Area Denial)Littoral Operations ConceptJoint Concept for Entry OperationsSustained Land Operations ConceptJoint Sustainment Operations ConceptUSA / USMC Concept for Gaining and Maintaining AccessBuilding Partner Capacity ConceptDeterrence Operations Joint Operating ConceptCyber Operations ConceptArmy is in integral part of joint concepts that support Unified ActionTwo key concepts right now are Joint Operational Access Concept and Building Partnership Capacity Concept focusing on Phase 0 (Shaping) OperationsJoint Operational Access Concept = Countering Anti-Access / Area Denial (has 5 major supporting concepts)Building Partner Capacity Concept = Security Assistance, Training, Support through Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic35