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2 Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next? Opportunity to create new Service visions What.

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Presentation on theme: "2 Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next? Opportunity to create new Service visions What."— Presentation transcript:

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2 2 Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next? Opportunity to create new Service visions What is a Force Planning Construct? Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of U.S. Armed Forces needed for a range of planning scenarios Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment, frequency and concurrency of contingency operations, steady-state and surge requirements, force availability, etc.

3 Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale conventional operations (“lesser included cases”) Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale conventional operations (“lesser included cases”) OVERSEAS PRESENCE FORCES ENGAGED FORCES AVAILABLE NUKE DETER. HA/DR PEACEKEEPING DEMOCRACY STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES STRAT LIFT PEACEKEEPING OVERSEAS PRES. MRC #1 STRAT LIFT MRC #2 OVERSEAS PRES. WIN MRC #1 STRAT LIFT WIN MRC #2 POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPS ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES OVERSEAS PRES. PEACEKEEPING DEMOCRACY STRAT LIFT STABILITY OPS NUKE DETER. HA/DR OVERSEAS PRES. HA/DR RESERVE FORCES SITUATION: ENGAGED IN ONE MRC SHIFTING TO TWO MRCS ENGAGED IN SECOND MRC POST-CONFLICT PERIOD PEACETIME 3

4 Major QDR Objectives Preserve the Bottom-Up Review force planning approach, create a rationale for cuts to force structure and personnel Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingencies Continue capability enhancements to support operations to halt invasions (e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike) FY1997 Programmed Force 1997 QDR Active Personnel 1,450,0001,360,000 Reserve Personnel 900,000835,000 Civilian Personnel 800,000640,000 FY1997 Programmed Force 1997 QDR Army Active Divisions Reserve Personnel 10 582,000 10 530,000 Navy Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve) Air Wings (Active/Reserve) Amphibious Ready Groups Attack Submarines Surface Combatants 11/1 10/1 12 73 128 11/1 10/1 12 50 116 Air Force Active Fighter Wings Reserve Fighter Wings Reserve Air Defense Squadrons Bombers (Total) 13 7 10 202 12+ 8 4 187 Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Forces33 Most significant cuts 4

5 Major Forces (Active/RC ) USA Divisions Cavalry Regiments Enhanced Separate Brigades 10/8 1/1 15 USN Aircraft carriers Air Wings Amphib Ready Groups Attack Submarines Surface Combatants 12 10/1 12 55 108/8 USAF Fighter Squadrons Air Defense Squadrons Bombers (combat-coded) 46/38 /4 112 USMC (3 MEFs) Divisions Air Wings Force Service Support Groups 3/1 Major Objectives Size for homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies Accept risk in the second of 2 major theater wars Deter forward to prevent conflicts, rather than respond to crises Shift from optimizing for conflicts on the Korean and Arabian Peninsulas to a broader range of scenarios Defend the United States; 1 4 2 1 Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option for decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations 1-4-2-1 5

6 Support wartime requirements Change the capabilities mix, forces sized about right Prioritize capabilities for 4 focus areas Build partner capacity Global Deterrence Transnational Deterrence Regional Deterrence Homeland Defense War on Terror Irregular Warfare Conventional Campaign(s) Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Consequence Management Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Stability Operations Information Operations Train & Equip Foreign Internal Defense Counterinsurgency Interdiction Major Combat Operations Stability Ops Reconstruction Consequence Mgmt. Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Forward Presence WMD Elimination Information Operations “Michelin Man” 6

7 Scenario Case Major stabilization operation + Deter and defeat a highly capable regional aggressor + Support civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in U.S. homeland Deter and defeat regional aggressor #1 + Deter and defeat regional aggressor #2 + Enhanced homeland defense posture Major stabilization operation + Long-duration deterrence operation in separate theater + Medium-sized counterinsurgency operation + Support civil authorities in homeland 7 Mid- to Long-Term or

8 Theater #1 ‒ Combined arms campaign in all domains to defeat acts of aggression + Theater #2 ‒ Deny the objectives of / impose unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in 2 nd region + Homeland Defense ‒ Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities during consequence management events Steady-State No longer size for large-scale, long-duration stability operations Asia-Pacific rebalancing Another nuclear forces cut may be possible Surge (Illustrative) ‒ Support continuing counter- terrorism operations ‒ Sustain other “steady-state” mission demands o Maintaining a stabilizing global presence o Nuclear deterrence o Homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities o Lesser contingencies 8

9 Steady State: Nuclear Deterrence, Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations Theater #1 Combined Arms Campaign to Defeat Aggression Defeat Theater #2 Deny Objectives / Impose Unacceptable Costs on Opportunistic Aggressor STEADY-STATE OPTEMPO SURGE OPERATIONS PHASE 4/5 OPERATIONS Presence Homeland Defense Support to Civil Authorities / Consequence Management COCOM Force Requirements Air Force Rotation Goal Active 1:3 (1:4 desired) Rotation Policy Reserve 1:5 (AF 1:10 volunteerism) Component Rotation Policy 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve Full Mobilization No force rotation 9

10 Air superiority fighters, bombers Low-density, high-demand Strategic mobility Majority of the fighter force Theater mobility Examples 10 Post-surge rotational Rotational

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12 Increase timing between major warfights Change surge scenarios to enable force structure/end strength cuts (e.g., adopt new operational concepts that emphasize global surveillance and strike, cyber, SOF, “swing” forces, undersea warfare, etc. vice deploying forces to engage in major ground operations) In other words, “do less with less” Decrease steady-state and long-term rotational requirements 12

13 DecreaseIncrease Post Surge Rotational Demand New planning scenarios that change requirements for rotational forces AC/RC mix more similar to a peacetime steady-state mix AC/RC mix may favor forces with greater rotational availability Changing COCOM requirements for rotational forces Supply A smaller overall force due to budget cuts AC/RC mix may favor forces with greater rotational availability These changes could have profound implications for the Air Force’s AC/RC mix 13 Post Surge Rotation 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve

14 Expeditionary Combat Support, Force Enablers, Force Generation Capabilities, etc. Hybrid Major Contingency WMD Elimination Operations Joint Theater Entry Operations AirSea Battle in the Western Pacific Global Swing Forces Expeditionary Crisis Responses Building Partner Capacity Sustained Counter-Terrorism Operations Range of Defense Planning Scenarios Capability Requirements Predominately Air and Naval Capabilities Predominately Ground and Expeditionary Capabilities 14

15 15 “The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing military policy … the strategic concept of the service…a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security.” — Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954 “Changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation … must be met by shifts in national policy and corresponding changes in service strategic concepts” Operational domains that are increasingly contested Asia-Pacific rebalancing Growing need for systems that are survivable, persistent, multi-mission capable, and can operate from access-insensitive areas New visions should consider:

16 Denied Areas Future Gulf? Denied Areas Increased depth of the battlespace Close-in bases at risk Average range to possible target areas > 1,200 nautical miles Campaigns may be protracted Key Considerations Future Pacific? 1,500 nm 1,000 nm 2,400 nm 2,355 nm 1,850 nm 2,200 nm 16

17 17 Dominating the EM spectrum Balancing mix of short-and long-range Fully harnessing the robotic revolution A future force capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested environments – Greater focus on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific operations America’s “swing force” that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression A force that takes full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE, other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM spectrum Creating resilient forward postures

18 18 Getting the future carrier air wing right Harnessing the potential of cyber & DE Expanding payloads of the submarine fleet Developing the right PGM magazine Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and into contested areas Take advantage of manned and unmanned undersea capabilities that can operate in denied areas Take advantage of new technologies that could create cost/exchange ratios favorable to the United States Prepare for operations that may be of long duration

19 Air-Breathing, Long-Endurance Communications Relays Space Assets More Dispersed, Resilient Basing Posture Aerial Refueling Standoff Strike Platforms Undersea Land- Attack Capacity Penetrating Munitions Penetrating Bombers Next Generation Jammers Standoff Strike Platforms Electronic Warfare Expendables Carriers with Longer Range Air Wing Capabilities Penetrating, Carrier-based Multi-Mission UCAV 19

20 20 Right-sizing expeditionary lift Modernizing the STOVL force Supporting capabilities for distributed ops Fielding next generation EW capabilities Focus on rapid crisis responses – Not a second land army Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East – Work with allies and partners to establish forward expeditionary operating locations Joint theater entry ops (different than traditional “forcible entries)

21 Leveraging the indirect approach: SFA, BPC Land-based long- range strike Land-based sea denial Air and missile defense New approaches and capabilities for imposing costs in the Pacific and Persian Gulf Focus on preparing for hybrid and counter-WMD operations Land-based sea control 21

22 22 Early 1990s: End of Cold War >> shift to conventional theater contingency scenarios 2001: 9/11 >> address homeland defense requirements 2002-2013: Iraq, Afghanistan >> major expansion of SOF, CT, unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc. Today End of 12 years of war >> no large-scale stability ops Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges, WMD proliferation, hybrid conflicts >> time for a new FPC rather than an “update” that sustains the status quo

23 Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations 1993 BURToday Service Shares of the Base Defense Budget Air Force Navy & Marine Corps Army Defense-Wide 23

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25 Scenario A: Full Sequester Scenario B: Half Sequester FY14 President’s Budget Baseline: No Additional Cuts (In FY14 Dollars) Full SequesterHalf Sequester FY2014-18-$260 B-$56 B FY2019-23-$261 B-$191 B Two FYDP Total-$522 B-$247 B 25

26 Land, Expeditionary Air Sea Special Operations Space, Cyber, Comms Strategic Missile Defense Logistics, Basing PersonnelReadiness S&T $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B -$50 B -$300 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$350 B -$100 B Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario Accelerated next bomber procurement Funded new stealthy, multi-mission remotely piloted aircraft Added precision-guided munitions to help offset force cuts Invested in airborne directed energy weapons 26

27 Land, Expeditionary Air Sea Special Operations Space, Cyber, Comms Strategic Missile Defense Logistics, Basing PersonnelReadiness S&T $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B -$50 B -$300 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$350 B -$100 B Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range capabilities – Kept Air Force above 1,000 combat-coded fighters Traded non-survivable RPAs for a new generation of stealthy, multi-mission unmanned vehicles Reduced strategic and tactical airlift Traded military and civilian personnel, contractors, to support modernization Reduced near-term readiness FY14-18, fully restored readiness for FY19-23 27 Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario


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