Presentation on theme: "The Kansas City Plant and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies Jay Coghlan, Executive Director Scott Kovac, Program Director John Witham, Communications Director."— Presentation transcript:
The Kansas City Plant and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies Jay Coghlan, Executive Director Scott Kovac, Program Director John Witham, Communications Director July 25, 2006 The purpose of this presentation is to help encourage organized local and regional opposition to the U.S.’ current nuclear weapons policies and the role that the Kansas City Plant plays in them.
Mission Statement The mission of Nuclear Watch of New Mexico is to provide timely and accurate information to the public on nuclear issues in New Mexico and the Southwest. Through the resulting empowerment of effective citizen action, Nuclear Watch of New Mexico seeks to promote both greater safety and environmental protection at regional nuclear facilities and federal policy changes that genuinely encourage international efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Watch is a proud member of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, a grassroots network of 34 organizations working in the shadow of the nuclear weapons complex on health, cleanup and weapons issues.
Nuclear Weapons Complex Map
Nuclear weapons Spending
L A N L we ap on s vs. cle an up
Connection to New Mexico Honeywell FM&T manages operations at four New Mexico sites under the Kansas City Plant contract: Kirtland Air Force Base (science and engineering R&D) Air Park Facility (products for NNSA Office of Transportation) Craddock Modification Center (modifies NNSA transport vehicles) Los Alamos Office (production and scientific support, nuclear weapons detonator production)
Reality “As the most comprehensive manufacturing facility within the nuclear weapons complex, the KCP plays an important role by taking designs from the national labs and turning science into reality.” Kansas City Plant website,
5,000 “weapons packages” monthly The scope of operations at the Kansas City Plant includes manufacturing and/or procuring a multitude of nonnuclear electrical, electronic, electro-mechanical, mechanical, plastic, and metal components for nuclear weapons… [A]n average of 5,000 weapon packages are shipped monthly. DOE November 2000 contract with Honeywell, recently extended to December The non-nuclear components we produce comprise 85 percent of the parts manufactured within the nuclear weapons complex, as well as 85 percent of the components that constitute a nuclear weapon. David Douglass, President, Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technology before the House Armed Services Committee Procurement Subcommittee, June 12, 2002.
A Brief Post Cold War History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies
Opportunity Missed 1994 Nuclear Posture Review “Lead and Hedge.” Did not reduce total number of nuclear weapons, but did reduce delivery systems. “Must preserve options for unloading/reconstituting US nuclear forces…” “Demonstrate capability to refabricate and certify weapons types in enduring stockpile.” “Maintain capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads.” “No new-design nuclear warhead production.” Good news: “Fully implement nuclear arms control agreements and NPT, BWC, and CWC.”
Opportunity Gone December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review: Expanded the rationale for potential use of nuclear weapons and the targeting from 2 countries to 7 (presumably Iraq is now off the list). “New triad” of existing land, air, and submarine-based nuclear forces, plus Ballistic Missile Defense and “responsive infrastructure”. As the primary producer of non-nuclear components, the Kansas City Plant is key to that responsive infrastructure (5,000 shipments of nuclear weapons components per month). “If directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required." "Plutonium Operations: For the long term a new modern production facility [the “Modern Pit Facility”] will be needed… Capabilities at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee and the Pantex Plant in Texas will be greatly expanded. Called for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and lower-yield, more usable nuclear weapons.
It’s a “sort of” a treaty (less than a page long): * Russia and U.S. to both reduce their strategic stockpiles to 2,200 or under deployed nuclear weapons by Russia currently has an estimated 3,500 strategic warheads, U.S. 9,900 (source: NRDC “Nuclear Notebook”) Treaty expires December 31, 2012, unless extended. No verification protocols. Either party can withdraw at anytime with 3 months notice. No mandate for irreversible dismantlements, “Arthur Anderson Accounting” of deployed weapons. Omits tactical “battlefield” nuclear weapons. May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
It Gets Worse May 2002 “National Security Strategy of the USA” assumes right to pre- emptive war. “To support preemptive options, we will: build better, more integrated intelligence…, coordinate closely with allies…, continue to transform our military forces…” Pentagon’s March 2005 draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations codified pre-emptive war includes pre-emptive nuclear war. “Geographic combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for… (a) An adversary using or intending to use WMD… (d) To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces… (e) For rapid and favorable war termination on US terms. (f) To ensure success of US and multinational operations. Draft was withdrawn after adverse national and international publicity.
Article VI: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...” In 1996, the International Court of Justice ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was illegal, except for dire national survival, and concrete steps toward disarmament was mandated NPT Review Conference: nuclear weapons signatories pledged to 13 concrete disarmament steps. The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, potentially leading to a resumed nuclear arms race with Russia. Blocked a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Targeted non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons, giving them additional incentive to develop and keep nuclear weapons (e.g., Iran and North Korea). Made a nuclear “deal” with India, a NPT non- signatory. Declared the self-appointed right to pre-emptive war, including nuclear war. Laid the foundation for new-design weapons through the RRW. What has the Bush Administration done?
In 2005 Congress created the RRW Program “for improving the long-term safety, reliability, and security of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.” Despite $68 billion invested, NNSA and weapons labs say the Stockpile Stewardship Program is no longer sustainable. Linton Brooks, head of NNSA, to US Senate, April 2005: “The Cold War legacy stockpile may also be the wrong stockpile from a military perspective” and we can develop RRW by Linton Brooks at Y-12 nuclear weapons plant, March 2006: “the RRW can adapt an existing weapon within 18 months and design, develop and begin production of that new design within 3-4 years… we can respond quickly to changing military requirements.” The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program
More than 1,000 tests. Lab directors have certified reliability ever year since the 1992 testing moratorium. Supermajority of components are non-nuclear and can be tested in labs. Senior scientists say there are “straightforward” of guaranteeing reliability, such as more frequent tritium replenishment. To nuclear war planners, reliability is whether a weapon’s yield is + 5% of design, not if it actually explodes. Existing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Are Reliable
The stockpile is healthy, it is reliable. It meets all the safety standards, it is ready to go, and it will kill you… This is gigantic hoax on the taxpayer. It is stimulated by the self interest of NNSA and the design labs based on the desire to extract ever more money from the taxpayer. You think our weapons don't work? Go stand under one. But don't take your wife and kids." Bob Peurifoy, retired Sandia nuclear weapons scientist, March 12, 2006 Don’t take your wife and kids!
Back to the Kansas City Plant Honeywell to downsize and relocate By RANDOLPH HEASTER The Kansas City Star July 20, 2006 “Honeywell said Wednesday that it planned to reduce its work force and locate to a smaller, more efficient facility in the area by Those changes would be in response to the goal of the National Nuclear Security Administration to create a smaller and safer nuclear weapons stockpile by 2030.”
The Kansas City Plant May Be Relocated, But Is Not Going Away KANSAS CITY PLANT TABLES FUNDING BY PROGRAM: (dollars in millions) NNSA FY 2005 FY 2006 FY OUT-YEAR FUNDING: (dollars in millions) FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY (6.5% rise over the next four years) Source: NNSA FY07 Congressional Budget Request
Heavy Workload At the time [July 2005], Caroline Bibb, president of the Honeywell Corp. subsidiary that operates the Kansas Honeywell Corp. City Plant for DOE, said the plant was experiencing its heaviest workload in 20 years and was projecting that the pace would continue until “Honeywell gets extension, will move KC plant” Kansas City Business Journal, July 20, 2006
Vote!!! Watchdawg says “if you don’t vote, don’t *itch.” Hassle your congressional delegation, make your opinions known, write letters to the editor, etc. Most importantly, DON’T MOURN, ORGANIZE!!! It is vital that there be a local citizens group watchdogging nuclear weapons programs at the Kansas City Plant. Nuclear Watch New Mexico and the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability will help you! Argue that money spent on US nuclear weapons is better spent on true long- term national security threats, such as energy independence, global climate change, natural disasters, health care needs and true nuclear weapons nonproliferation by example. Stayed informed, tune in, and support us at Our children, grandchildren, and their kids deserve better than nuclear weapons. What can concerned citizens do?