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1 Toward Systems With a Will to Live SORNS Self Organizing Resilient Network Sensing 3Mar2010 This project is sponsored by the Department.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Toward Systems With a Will to Live SORNS Self Organizing Resilient Network Sensing 3Mar2010 This project is sponsored by the Department."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Toward Systems With a Will to Live SORNS Self Organizing Resilient Network Sensing 3Mar2010 This project is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security under contract D10PC The content of the material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Government, and no official endorsement is implied.

2 2 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) AA

3 3 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities AD AA

4 4 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities Security Agent (SA) Security Domain (SD) Security Communities SD SA AD AA

5 5 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities Security Agent (SA) Security Domain (SD) Security Communities Relatively Static Security and System Artifacts (A) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Static artifacts are systems with and without security measures, updated occasionally. AD AA SD SA Static Artifact

6 6 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities Security Agent (SA) Security Domain (SD) Security Communities Relatively Static Security and System Artifacts (A) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A Dynamic attack includes human and systemic adaptive control preying upon fixed artifact defenses. Static artifacts are systems with and without security measures, updated occasionally. AD AA SD SA Static ArtifactDynamic Attack

7 7 General Current Situation Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities Security Agent (SA) Security Domain (SD) Security Communities Relatively Static Security and System Artifacts (A) Static ArtifactDynamic Attack Dynamic attack includes human and systemic adaptive control preying upon fixed artifact defenses. Static artifacts are systems with and without security measures, updated occasionally. AD AA SD SA

8 8 Static System Dynamic Adversary

9 9 Asymmetries Adversary is a natural system, security strategy is an artificial system Adversary leads with innovation and evolution Adversary self-organizes as a dynamic system-of-systems Three Dynamic Self Organizing System-of-System Security Patterns Pattern employment on the SORNS project … up next …

10 Inspirational Patterns from natural systems that effectively process noisy sensory input from uncertain and changing environments

11 11 Pattern: Bow Tie Processor (assembler/generator/mediator) Context: Complex system with many diverse inputs and many diverse outputs, where outputs need to respond to many needs or innovate for many or unknown opportunities, and it is not practical to build unique one-to-one connections between inputs and outputs. Appropriate examples include common financial currencies that mediate between producers and consumers, the adaptable biological immune system that produces proactive infection detectors from a wealth of genetic material, and the Internet protocol stack that connects diverse message sources to diverse message sinks. Problem: Too many connection possibilities between available inputs and useful outputs to build unique robust, evolving satisfaction-processes between each. Forces: Large knot short-term-flexibility vs small knot short-term-controllability and long- term-evolvability (Csete 2004); robustness to known vs fragility to unknown (Carlson 2002). Solution: Construct relatively small “knot” of fixed modules from selected inputs, that can be assembled into outputs as needed according to a fixed protocol. A proactive example is the adaptable immune system that constructs large quantities of random detectors (antigens) for unknown attacks and infections. A reactive example is a manufacturing line that constructs products for customers demanding custom capabilities. Millions of random infection detectors generated continuously by fixed rules and modules in the “knot” Evolve three fixed V-D-J gene-segment libraries Fixed-rule VDJ assembly with random interconnects Random high variety output with VDJ + VJ assemblies Available high variety genetic DNA input V: 123 Variable segments D: 27 Diverse segments J: 6 Joining segments increases to ~10 9 varieties with addition of random nucleotide connections between VDJ & VJ joinings ~10 6 VDJ+VJ possible antigen detector shapes V1V1 D1D1 VnVn VrVr JrJr DrDr rr 123 Vs 27 Ds 6 Js 1 random from each + random connect DnDn JnJn J1J1

12 12 Adaptable Immune System Bow-Tie Antigen-Detector Generator (generic agile-system architectural-concept diagram) detector sequence n short chain long chain detector sequence n+1 short chain long chain detector sequence n+2 short chain long chain cell body Y detector antibody B-Cell V--D--J V--J 123 V segments 6 J segments27 D segments random nucleotides Infrastructure evolution Detector assembly Module pools and mix evolution Module inventory condition Combine two assemblies Add random nucleotides Use one each V-D-J Use one each V-J Infrastructure Assembly Rules Integrity Management Active Passive genetic evolution bone marrow and thymus genetic evolution ??repair mechanisms?? (rules evolution) (system assembly) (module evolution) (inventory condition) Module Pools

13 13 Adaptable Immune System Bow-Tie Antigen-Detector Generator (generic agile-system architectural-concept diagram) detector sequence n short chain long chain detector sequence n+1 short chain long chain detector sequence n+2 short chain long chain 123 V segments 6 J segments27 D segments random nucleotides Infrastructure evolution Detector assembly Module pools and mix evolution Module inventory condition Combine two assemblies Add random nucleotides Use one each V-D-J Use one each V-J Infrastructure Module Pools Assembly Rules Integrity Management Active Passive genetic evolution bone marrow and thymus genetic evolution ??repair mechanisms?? (rules evolution) (system assembly) (module evolution) (inventory condition) cell body Y detector antibody B-Cell V--D--J V--J systemic integrity-management processes

14 14 Context: A complex system or system-of-systems subject to attack and infection, with low tolerance for attack success and no tolerance for catastrophic infection success; with resilient remedial action capability when infection is detected. Appropriate examples include biological organisms, and cyber networks for military tactical operations, national critical infrastructure, and commercial economic competition. Problem: Directed attack and infection types that constantly evolve in new innovative ways to circumvent in-place attack and infection detectors. Forces: False positive tradeoffs with false negatives, system functionality vs functionality impairing detection measures, detectors for anything possible vs added costs of comprehensive detection, comprehensive detection of attack vs cost of false detection of self. Solution: A high fidelity model of biological immune system antibody (detection) processes that generate high quantity and variety of anticipatory speculative detectors in advance of attack and during infection, and evolve a growing memory of successful detectors specific to the nature of the system-of-interest. Speculative generation and mutation of detectors recognizes new attacks like a biological immune system Pattern: Proactive Anomaly Search

15 15 Context: A decision maker in need of accurate situational awareness in a critical dynamic environment. Examples include a network system administrator in monitoring mode and under attack, a military tactical commander in battle, and the NASA launch control room. Problem: A very large amount of low-level noisy sensory data overwhelms attempts to examine and conclude what relevance may be present, most especially if time is important or if sensory data is dynamic. Forces: amount of data to be examined vs time to reach a conclusion, number of ways data can be combined vs number of conclusions data can indicate, static sensory data vs dynamic sensory data, noise tolerated in sensory data vs cost of low noise sensory data. Solution: Using a bow-tie process, each level looks for a specific finite set of data patterns among the infinite possibilities of its input combinations, aggregating its input data into specific chunks of information. These chunks are fed-forward to the next higher level, that treats them in turn as data further aggregated into higher forms of information chunks. Through feedback, a higher level may bias a lower level to favor certain chunks over others, predicting what is expected now or next according to an emerging pattern at the higher level. Each level is only interested in a small number of an infinite set of data-combination possibilities, but as aggregation proceeds through multiple levels, complex data abstractions and recognitions are enabled. Four level feed forward/backward sense-making hierarchy modeled on visual cortex Pattern: Hierarchical Sensemaking

16 BIS Architecture (Biological Immune System)

17 17 Antibody Creation & Life Cycle Diagram modified from (Hofmeyr 2000). General antibody life cycle: creation, false-positive testing, deployment efficacy or termination, mutation improvement, and long-term memory. 1.Candidate antibody semi-randomly created. 2.Tolerization period tests immature candidates for false-positive matches. 3.Mature & naïve antibodies put into time limited service. 4.Activated (B-cell) antibodies need co-stimulation (by T-cells) to ensure “improvement” didn’t produce auto-reactive result, non-activated & non-co-stimulated candidates die when time limit ends. 5.Highest affinity co-stimulated antibodies are remembered for time-limited long term (eg, many years, decades). 6.Co-stimulated antibodies are cloned with structured mutations, looking for improved (higher) affinity scores.

18 18 Antibody Creation & Life Cycle Diagram modified from (Hofmeyr 2000). General antibody life cycle: creation, false-positive testing, deployment efficacy or termination, mutation improvement, and long-term memory. 1.Candidate antibody semi-randomly created. 2.Tolerization period tests immature candidates for false-positive matches. 3.Mature & naïve antibodies put into time limited service. 4.Activated (B-cell) antibodies need co-stimulation (by T-cells) to ensure “improvement” didn’t produce auto-reactive result, non-activated & non-co-stimulated candidates die when time limit ends. 5.Highest affinity co-stimulated antibodies are remembered for time-limited long term (eg, many years, decades). 6.Co-stimulated antibodies are cloned with structured mutations, looking for improved (higher) affinity scores. Self nonself discrimination: A universe of data points is partitioned into two sets – self and nonself. Negative detectors cover subsets of non-self. From (Esponda 2004) Shape/Pattern Space ~10 9

19 SORNS Application Self Organizing Resilient Network – Sensing

20 20 Reconfigurable Pattern Processor Reusable Cells Reconfigurable in a Scalable Architecture Up to 256 possible features can be “satisfied” by all so-designated byte values Cell-satisfaction activation pointers Independent detection cell: content addressable by current input byte If active, and satisfied with current byte, can activate other designated cells including itself Individual detection cells are configured into detectors by linking activation pointers. All active cells have simultaneous access to current data-stream byte an unbounded number of detector cells configured as dectectors can extend indefinitely across multiple processors Cell-satisfaction output pointers

21 21 Reconfigurable Pattern Processor Reusable Cells Reconfigurable in a Scalable Architecture Up to 256 possible features can be “satisfied” by all so-designated byte values Cell-satisfaction activation pointers Independent detection cell: content addressable by current input byte If active, and satisfied with current byte, can activate other designated cells including itself Individual detection cells are configured into detectors by linking activation pointers. All active cells have simultaneous access to current data-stream byte an unbounded number of detector cells configured as dectectors can extend indefinitely across multiple processors Cell-satisfaction output pointers Enables High Fidelity Modeling

22 22 Intra-SORN-S Collaboration Inter-SORN Collaboration Human Interface Human Control // Inter-SORN Collaboration Level 1 Agents Level 2 Agents Level 3 Agents Level 4 Agents Human Interface Human Control EP Attack Detectors EP Infection Detectors Intra-SORN-S Collaboration EP Attack Detectors EP Infection Detectors SORN-S Hardware Device SORN-S Architecture Self Organizing Resilient Network - Sensing Architecture anticipates collaboration with other SORN by Level 3 agents Multi-level architecture refines sensory input through learning and sensemaking hierarchy, supports remedial action agents (human/automated) with succinct relevant information. Notes: For all-level hierarchical network-agent architecture general concept see (Haack 2009) For hierarchical feed-forward/backward pattern learning, prediction, and sense-making see (George 2009). For all-level hierarchical learning of causal patterns spread as time-sequence events see (Hawkins 2010).

23 23 Level 1 & 2 Agent: Detector Creation & Learning Architecture L2 Agent Other L2 Agent Other L2 Agent Diagram modified from (Hofmeyr 2000). General L1 detector life cycle: creation, false-positive testing, deployment efficacy or termination, mutation improvement, and long-term memory. 1.Candidate fuzzy detector semi-randomly created. 2.Tolerization period tests immature candidates for false-positive matches. 3.Mature & naïve candidates put into time limited service. 4.Activated (B-cell) candidates wait for co-stimulation (by T-cells) to ensure “improvement” didn’t produce auto-reactive result, non-activated & non-co-stimulated candidates die when time limit ends. 5.Highest scoring co-stimulated candidates are remembered for time-limited long term. 6.Co-stimulated candidates are cloned with structured mutations, looking for improved (higher) activation scores. 7.Level 2 Agent insertion of activated candidates from other end- points, and Level 2 Agent distribution of activated candidates to other end points.

24 24 Determining an AIS Approach: According to Jon Timmis Amelia Ritahani Ismail On the Use of Modelling and Simulation for Granuloma Formation. Department of Computer Science, University of York, Final Qualifying Dissertation, Supervisor: Prof. Jon Timmis. The Structure of AIS – de Castro & Timmis (2002) proposed a layered framework for engineering AIS that takes the application domain as a starting point followed by three design layers that form the structure of AIS (refer to figure 2.6). These layers are: the representation of the components of the systems and known as shape space a set of mechanisms to evaluate the interactions of the individuals with the environment known as the affinity measures the use of the algorithm (such as clonal selection, negative selection, immune network) which governs the behaviour of the systems de Castro & Timmis (2002) argue that the basis of every system is the application domain, therefore the way in which the components of the systems will be represented has to be considered. When the suitable representations have been decided, one or more affinity measures (such as Hamming and Euclidean distance) are used to quantify the interaction elements of the systems. Finally, the use of AIS algorithms or processes to govern the behaviour (dynamics) of the systems is needed. Algorithms: generation, negative selection, clonal selection, immune network, etc Affinity measures: the strength of a match between detector and intrusion signature. Shape space: the quantity and nature of the detector features. Application domain: Pattern processor technology applied to IP packets.

25 25 Determining an AIS Approach: According to Jon Timmis Amelia Ritahani Ismail On the Use of Modelling and Simulation for Granuloma Formation. Department of Computer Science, University of York, Final Qualifying Dissertation, Supervisor: Prof. Jon Timmis. The Structure of AIS – de Castro & Timmis (2002) proposed a layered framework for engineering AIS that takes the application domain as a starting point followed by three design layers that form the structure of AIS (refer to figure 2.6). These layers are: the representation of the components of the systems and known as shape space a set of mechanisms to evaluate the interactions of the individuals with the environment known as the affinity measures the use of the algorithm (such as clonal selection, negative selection, immune network) which governs the behaviour of the systems de Castro & Timmis (2002) argue that the basis of every system is the application domain, therefore the way in which the components of the systems will be represented has to be considered. When the suitable representations have been decided, one or more affinity measures (such as Hamming and Euclidean distance) are used to quantify the interaction elements of the systems. Finally, the use of AIS algorithms or processes to govern the behaviour (dynamics) of the systems is needed. Algorithms: generation, negative selection, clonal selection, immune network, etc Affinity measures: the strength of a match between detector and intrusion signature. Shape space: the quantity and nature of the detector features. Application domain: Pattern processor technology applied to IP packets.

26 26 Level 1 & 2 Agent: Detector Creation & Learning Architecture L2 Agent Other L2 Agent Other L2 Agent Diagram modified from (Hofmeyr 2000). General L1 detector life cycle: creation, false-positive testing, deployment efficacy or termination, mutation improvement, and long-term memory. 1.Candidate fuzzy detector semi-randomly created. 2.Tolerization period tests immature candidates for false-positive matches. 3.Mature & naïve candidates put into time limited service. 4.Activated (B-cell) candidates wait for co-stimulation (by T-cells) to ensure “improvement” didn’t produce auto-reactive result, non-activated & non-co-stimulated candidates die when time limit ends. 5.Highest scoring co-stimulated candidates are remembered for time-limited long term. 6.Co-stimulated candidates are cloned with structured mutations, looking for improved (higher) activation scores. 7.Level 2 Agent insertion of activated candidates from other end- points, and Level 2 Agent distribution of activated candidates to other end points. Not necessary – new approach departs from a strict BIS model Eventually it became evident that a cloning improvement GA process was not necessary, as a speculative fuzzy-detector match-event could simply snatch and record the signature that caused the event. The realization: BIS works with complimentary patterns rather than duplicate patterns, and can only create through trial and error a complimentary pattern with best fit. This departure from the BIS model was initially uncomfortable, threw into doubt our high fidelity objective. We got over it. Coverage of pattern space (detector quantity and diversity) is the high fidelity issue, not process mirroring.

27 27 Detection Categories (Types) Rather than categorize by attack type (like UTMs do), of which there is a never-ending list as new types emerge, our categories relate to the detection philosophy: Automated learning of spatial and temporal pattern features within a fixed set of generic pattern structures. A syn flood attack, e.g. is one instance within the temporal-connection pattern category. Spatial means a collection of features at one instant (packet/log-entry) in time that is detected as a pattern-of-interest. Temporal means multi-packet/multi-log-entry features that are detected as a pattern. Correlative (unaddressed here) means multi-flow/multi-log features detected as a pattern. Spatial Connection Spatial Content Temporal Connection Temporal Content L1 packet headers (feasibility demo for TCP/UDP/ICMP). L1 deep packet inspection (feasibility demo for HTTP/SMTP???). L2 multi-packet header detectors (feasibility demo for TCP/UDP/ICMP). L2 multi-packet content detectors (feasibility demo for HTTP/SMTP???).

28 28 Phase 1 Initial Focus IPv4 packet-header detection – single packet-header signature patterns (spatial connection category) Three elements to a pattern signature: address – port – type Address:4 bytes - Only the non-host address is of interest. Port: 2 bytes - Only the destination port is of interest. Types: 3 bits covers 8 types – (TCP, UDP, ICMP, other) x (incoming, outgoing) The L1-Agent preprocessor/controller selects relevant features from network packets and feeds them as condensed “feature packets” to the pattern processor L1 Agent conventional processor/memory detector generator feature packet assembly pattern processor controller Pattern Processor special purpose chip detectors in nursery detectors in service detectors in memory network packets IPv4 feature packets detection alert L2 Agent

29 29 Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. IPv4 addressporttype 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM) ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

30 30 IPv4 address type 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Loaded with 7 values port Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

31 31 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

32 32 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

33 33 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

34 34 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

35 35 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

36 36 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

37 37 IPv4 addressporttype ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○● ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○ ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○ ≈ ○○○○●○○○○○○○○○○○○○ start end , 0.118, 2 ○○ ≈ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○●○○ Processing Data Stream Feature Cells and Finite State Machines (Illustrative example of pattern processor capability) 256-bit associative memory multi-feature detectors (MFD). All active MFDs are indexed by the input stream’s current byte value. If the index finds a set bit, the next MFD is activated and looks at the next stream byte, else the process dies. 7 multi-feature detectors “connected” as a finite state machine (FSM)

38 Very Large Scale Anomaly Detector Patent Pending

39 39 Fundamental Elements feature packet feature value feature stream pattern space pattern list pattern pattern space contains = 2.81x10 14 unique patterns for patterns consisting of 6 feature values with range 0-255

40 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Gang Detector (GD) 10 ≈ Gang Detector (eg, with seven multi-feature detectors) Multi-Feature Detectors (MFD, variable size) Feature Indicator (1-bit) Non-Feature Indicator (0-bit) Pattern (or Pattern Path)

41 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Gang Detector (GD) 10 ≈ A GD is implemented as a 2 dimensional bit array, with each column corresponding to an MFD of independent size, but typically a max of 256 to accommodate associative addressing (indexing) by an 8- bit Feature Packet byte. A Feature Indicator is a 1-bit in any or all of the possible index values. One GD with all Feature Indicators present (all bits set to 1) would have 256x256x256x256x256x256x8 = 2.6x10 15 unique Pattern Paths. This many unique patterns would be represented in just (6x32)+1 = bit data bytes. If each of these patterns were in a pattern list, seven times the number of possible patterns in data bytes would be required, ~10 16 data bytes in contrast. Gang Detector (eg, with seven multi-feature detectors) Multi-Feature Detectors (MFD, variable size) Feature Indicator (1-bit) Non-Feature Indicator (0-bit) Pattern (or Pattern Path)

42 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Gang Detector (GD) 10 ≈ A GD is implemented as a 2 dimensional bit array, with each column corresponding to an MFD of independent size, but typically a max of 256 to accommodate associative addressing (indexing) by an 8- bit Feature Packet byte. A Feature Indicator is a 1-bit in any or all of the possible index values. One GD with all Feature Indicators present (all bits set to 1) would have 256x256x256x256x256x256x8 = 2.6x10 15 unique Pattern Paths. This many unique patterns would be represented in just (6x32)+1 = bit data bytes. If each of these patterns were in a pattern list, seven times the number of possible patterns in data bytes would be required, ~10 16 data bytes in contrast. Gang Detector (eg, with seven multi-feature detectors) Multi-Feature Detectors (MFD, variable size) Feature Indicator (1-bit) Non-Feature Indicator (0-bit) Pattern (or Pattern Path) a unique benefit of the approach

43 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Feature Indicators = 1 Pattern (Path) Gang Detector (GD)

44 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Feature Indicators = 1 Pattern (Path) 8 Feature Indicators = 2 Patterns (Paths) Gang Detector (GD)

45 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Feature Indicators = 1 Pattern (Path) 8 Feature Indicators = 2 Patterns (Paths) 9 Feature Indicators = 4 Patterns (Paths) Gang Detector (GD)

46 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Adding a single Feature Indicator increases the Patterns (Paths) by a factor of 2, an exponential increase. An application might create a new GD with the same percentage of Feature Indicators in every MFD. If that were 50%, with six MFDs of size 256 and one of size 8, the total number of Patterns (Paths) upon creation would be 128x128x128x128x128x128x4= 1.8x10 13 patterns Detectable at data stream feed speed independent of the number of patterns 7 Feature Indicators = 1 Pattern (Path) 8 Feature Indicators = 2 Patterns (Paths) 9 Feature Indicators = 4 Patterns (Paths) 10 Feature Indicators = 8 Patterns (Paths) Gang Detector (GD)

47 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ Adding a single Feature Indicator increases the Patterns (Paths) by a factor of 2, an exponential increase. An application might create a new GD with the same percentage of Feature Indicators in every MFD. If that were 50%, with six MFDs of size 256 and one of size 8, the total number of Patterns (Paths) upon creation would be 128x128x128x128x128x128x4= 1.8x10 13 patterns Detectable at data-stream feed-speed independent of the number of patterns 7 Feature Indicators = 1 Pattern (Path) 8 Feature Indicators = 2 Patterns (Paths) 9 Feature Indicators = 4 Patterns (Paths) 10 Feature Indicators = 8 Patterns (Paths) Gang Detector (GD) a unique benefit of the approach

48 48 Gang Detector Function and Operation Create a new Gang Detector (GD) Mature new GD in the Nursery Use GDs to detect anomalies Insert mature GD into Service Remove GDs from Service GD Creation GD Maturation GD Insertion GD Detection GD Removal GD N1 GD N2 GD Nn GD S1 GD S2 GD Sm Nursery SetService Set D M1 D M2 D Mm Memory Set (single pattern detectors, not GDs)

49 49 Gang Detector Function and Operation 50% of Feature Indicators set across 7 MFDs & Multiple gang detectors covering slightly-overlapping portions of total pattern space collectively increase the total coverage of pattern space. Create a new Gang Detector (GD) Mature new GD in the Nursery Use GDs to detect anomalies Insert mature GD into Service Remove GDs from Service GD Creation GD Maturation GD Insertion GD Detection GD Removal GD N1 GD N2 GD Nn GD S1 GD S2 GD Sm Nursery SetService Set D M1 D M2 D Mm Memory Set (single pattern detectors, not GDs) 99.97% coverage with 512 GDs

50 50 Gang Detector Function and Operation Maturation and detection happen in parallel, processing the same Feature Packet Stream. Thus a single Feature Packet Stream is used for maturing new GDs in the Nursery Set and detecting anomalies in the Service Set, simultaneously. GD Detection For every Feature Value 16 in Feature Packet… Start at next Feature Packet in a Feature Stream Indicate that a Pattern Path match has occurred Feature Packet finished? Do corresponding Multi-Feature Detectors contain a Feature Indicator at the location indexed by the Feature Value? NO YES NO GD Maturation For every Feature Value in a Feature Packet… Start at next Feature Packet in a Feature Stream Choose one MFD in GD Remove corresponding Feature Indicator Feature Packet finished? Do corresponding Multi-Feature Detectors contain a Feature Indicator at the location indexed by the Feature Value 16? NO YES NO done

51 51 IPv4 Pattern-Space Coverage: c=6 IPv6 Pattern-Space Coverage: c=32 50% cardinality 85% cardinality

52 52 Coverage as Function of Cardinality Cardinality losses justify the value of refresh-cycling the in-service GDs, and sharing results with other endpoint agents accelerating decline in coverage as cardinality drops, 40% thought comfortable threshold

53 MFDs at 40% = 98.35% at 1024 GDsCoverage of 32 MFDs Declines Fast

54 54 Learning Curve Comparing Two Training Methods range expanded 6x

55 55 Very Large Scale Anomaly Detector – Other App Domains The SORNS example is a specific domain instance of the more general “normal vs. anomalous behavior” classification problem. Of interest elsewhere, for instance: monitoring the operational behaviors of a swarm of unmanned autonomous weapons sent on a war fighting mission, video image monitoring of human behavior in terrorist target areas like airports, insider threat behavior, monitoring machine and process behaviors in factories (anti-Stuxnet), monitoring critical infrastructure operating behaviors, say for financial-market transactions. Perhaps most interesting, the human brain appears to work on anomaly detection it appears to select and store (learn) pattern features for uniqueness and rarity children learn with attention to things that are different and new it doesn’t learn quickly, but does recognize patterns “immediately” it can learn both by download (taught) and by speculative discovery

56 56 JTRS Network Testing The testing for sufficient device security can never end, because the attacks on security evolve rapidly with intent to breech the device in new effective ways. Something “transparent” is needed on board every device that can monitor its behavior continuously for abnormalities, signal that something is amiss, and provide mediation options and field-operational data. Transparency is key in multiple dimensions: Does not require program intervention (e.g., no action required by anybody except test personnel) Does not interfere with or degrade device functional performance. Does not rely on external support services (e.g., McAfee daily updates). Does not require external control or collaboration (e.g., black box self sufficient). Physical Configuration Phases P1:sniff the host traffic with a (centralized) stand alone wireless device located anywhere in wireless range. P2:sniff host traffic on-board the host (physically attached). P3:integrated with host architecture and can take direct mediation action. Network Interface System Functions End-Point Monitor Radio/Device P3 Network Interface System Functions Radio/Device P2 End-Point Monitor End-Point Monitor End-Point Monitor End-Point Monitor Network Interface Test Central P1

57 57 The InZero® Security Platform provides a new approach to protecting PCs from malware. Rather than scanning suspect files with a virus scanner that looks for an ever-increasing number of malware signatures, the Gateway’s security architecture is based on a hardware sandbox that can safely execute malicious applications without damaging the Gateway or the PC. The hardware sandbox is shown in red because it permits the sandbox applications (e.g., browser) to safely execute arbitrarily dangerous application data files from the internet and from the PC. However, the design of the sandbox prevents any malware in these data files from modifying the Gateway’s software or writing any data used by the operating system. Physical separation prevents the malware from infecting your PC. A Bump on the Network Wire …also wireless and USB filter One possible implementation style:

58 58 Very Large Scale Anomaly Detector - Summary Gang Detector (seven-feature pattern example) Memory breakthrough: 193 bytes vs bytes for pattern storage Coverage breakthrough: 512 GDs covers 99.97% of pattern space at 1 endpoint Good coverage does not require high coverage at any endpoint: Endpoint multiples boost total coverage with same coverage curve Endpoint refresh boosts total coverage with same coverage curve Custom anomaly detection – no two installations alike (in pattern content) Dynamically adaptable to local situation Pattern Processor without tradeoffs Speed breakthrough: speed independent of number/size of patterns Capacity breakthrough: affordable massive pattern counts Potential Product Package Transparent to endpoint: no latency or throttling of comm speed Transparent to network: no accommodations required Transparent to budget: no signature subscription Transparent to installer: bump on the wire installation

59 59 A Fairer Fight Adversarial Agent (AA) Adversarial Domain (AD) Adversarial Communities Security Agent (SA) Security Domain (SD) Security Communities Self Organizing SystemsDynamic Attack Dynamic attack includes human and systemic adaptive control – unable to know the detection detail and capability. Anomaly Sensors collaborate within a network, dynamically adjusting to local situations, and can also collaborate among networks. AD AA SD SA Level-2 Agent (L2) SORNS Net Domain SORNS Communities L3 L2 Just one self-organizing security example of many more to come

60 60 Other Aware-Systems Domains applications in non-cyber domains sensors are proliferating – sensemaking needs attention

61 61 Systems of Systems – Always There, Now Aware 26Jan2011, Ford Previews Vehicle-To-Vehicle Tech At Washington Auto Show A dedicated short-range WiFi system on a secure channel one-ups radar safety systems by allowing full 360-degree coverage even when there's no direct line of sight. Vehicle-to-vehicle warning systems could address nearly 80 percent of reported crashes not involving drunk drivers. Prototypes to tour the U.S. this spring. V2V tech could move to handheld devices, bringing the capability to all cars

62 62 Automated Disease Surveillance Joseph Lombardo, Sheri Lewis, Rich Wojcik, and Wayne Loschen Systems Engineering to Support Discovery of Threats to Public Health. INSIGHT 13(4), December. Requirements Challenges The requirements include a significant reduction in the time for the recognition of a significant health event so that an effective public-health response can be launched to minimize casualties. The system must be able to recognize emerging health risks for both naturally occurring infectious diseases and those that are intentional. False positives must be kept to a minimum, and periodic evaluation is needed to ensure that the system provides the performance needed. For an automated disease- surveillance system to achieve timely positive detection of a covert attack of weaponized bacillus anthracis spores, the system must rely on the behaviors of individuals manifesting early symptoms of the disease. The system may also need to rely on other sources of information not used in a clinical setting. Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics ESSENCE (Lombardo and Buckeridge 2007)

63 63 Smart Roads. Smart Bridges. 7Feb2009, WSJ, SMART MOVES Freeway signs give estimated travel times and other information on Interstate Highway 80 in the San Francisco Bay area. Radio receivers are installed along several freeways in the San Francisco Bay area that read the electronic toll tags in passing cars. One promising avenue: real-time information about road conditions, traffic jams and other events. The next generation of technologies promises to get that news -- and even more detailed information -- directly to drivers in their cars. Gi-Lu Cable-Stay Bridge in Taiwan has wireless sensors and accelerometers that monitor its structural health. © C.H. LOH, NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY AND JEROME LYNCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AT ANN ARBOR

64 64 Securing the Smart Grid: Next Generation Power Grid Security Smart grids are a reality and the future, and they promise greater reliability, affordability, efficiency and, hopefully, a better and environmentally cleaner exploitation of available resources. But all that brings to light new threats to the grids. What does that entail and what can we do to defend them - these are the two main questions that this book offers the answers to. You'll find out more about the threats to smart grids: natural, individual and organizational threats. A special part of the chapter is dedicated to the hacker threat and its various incarnations and motives. The impacts of these threats on utility companies and others are next, with various believable scenarios that point out the threats, their attack vectors and their impacts. From threats to individuals to those to entire countries - it makes you realize what the danger really is. Review: Zeljka Zorz, 6Dec2010, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the threats and impacts of smart metering at the consumer level. With the benefits come security and privacy issues. Leaving security to vendors of home- based products has traditionally not been met with much success. Chapter 4 notes … An important group working on this is the NIST Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG). The primary goal of the CSWG is to develop an overall cyber security strategy for the smart grid. This strategy addresses prevention, detection, response, and recovery. NIST Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG) The CSWG recently created NISTIR 7628 — Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security. NISTIR 7628 — Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security Review: samzenpus, 5Jan2010, Fractal at national transmission and local distribution levels.

65 65 Physical Security & Smart Buildings Sensors on the property, at the building entry ways, within the building. IR motion, video, sound, pressure, …. ID entry ways (key card, fingerprint, iris, facial recognition…) RFID individual-human tracking within a building

66 66 Assessing Fleet Characteristics Useful for Sensing Michael J. Ravnitzky, Offering Sensor Network Services Using the Postal Delivery Vehicle Fleet, 18th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Porvoo, Finland, June 2-5, Postal Sensors Paper MJR-1_1191.pdf Fleet Type Single National Owner Regular Routes Time on the Road Universal Geographic Coverage Centralized Maintenance Geographic Flexibility/ Selectivity TaxisX Police CarsXX City BusesXXX School Buses XX City FleetX UPS/FedExXLimitedXXX Postal Trucks XXXXXX From Slashdot: The US Postal Service may face insolvency by 2011 (it lost $8.5 billion last year). An op-ed piece in the December 17, 2010 New York Times proposed an interesting business idea for the Postal Service: use postal trucks as a giant fleet of mobile sensor platforms.Think Google Streetview on steroids. The trucks could be outfitted with a variety of sensors (security, environmental, RF...)use postal trucks as a giant fleet of mobile sensor platforms

67 67 Potential Applications for Postal Truck-Borne Mobile Sensors Michael J. Ravnitzky, Offering Sensor Network Services Using the Postal Delivery Vehicle Fleet, 18th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Porvoo, Finland, June 2-5, Postal Sensors Paper MJR-1_1191.pdf Application DescriptionLikely Customer Base Chemical AgentsDHS, States Biological AgentsDHS, States Radiological MaterialsDOE, DHS, States Air QualityEPA, States, Cities Environmental SensingEPA, States, USDA, Cities Radio/Television Signal StrengthFCC, Telecoms Wireless Signal StrengthFCC, Telecoms Weather/ MeteorologicalNational Weather Service Pothole Mapping/Road AssessmentPublic Works Departments Natural Gas LeaksGas Utilities License Plate ScanningLaw Enforcement Methamphetamine LabsLaw Enforcement Marijuana Farms/ Drug DepotsLaw Enforcement Illicit Explosives ProductionLaw Enforcement Photo ImagingGoogle, Law Enforcement, Local Governments Noise Profiling/ Acoustic SignatureZoning, Cities, Research Pest ControlState, County Governments Biological SurveysScientific Community Nuclear Radiation LeaksNRC, Utilities Electric Field MappingEPA, Cities, Scientific Community Magnetic Field MappingEPA, Cities, Scientific Community Other Scientific InvestigationDoD, DOE, Scientific Community, Meter ReadingUniversities

68 68 Personal weather station is alien chic "Weather information from thousands of personal weather stations are being used for weather forecasting by several private and government agencies, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS). The Citizens Weather Observation Program (CWOP) was created by a few amateur radio operators experimenting with transmitting weather data with packet radios, but it has expanded to include Internet-only weather stations as well. As of September 2007, nearly 5,000 stations worldwide reported weather data regularly to CWOP's FindU database. In Feb 2007 ( ) DHS listed CWOP as a national asset to the 'BioWatch' Network, stating that data from personal weather stations could be useful in weather forecasts for hazardous releases. In 2007, the FindU server received 422,262,687 weather reports which is a 29.5% increase over [http://science.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/01/19/ ] No longer do home forecasting gadgets look like hospital equipment thanks to Oregon Scientific's efforts to add an aesthetic dimension to its products. Its latest offering looks more like a retro sci-fi movie prop than something used to guess whether you should bring a sweater to the picnic. [http://crave.cnet.com/8301-1_ html]

69 69 Pothole Sensors in Every Car 9Feb2011: The City of Boston is releasing an app called Street Bump that uses the accelerometer in your smartphone to automatically report bumps in the road as you drive over them. The application relies on two components embedded in iPhones, Android phones, and many other mobile devices: the accelerometer and the Global Positioning System receiver. The accelerometer, which determines the direction and acceleration of a phone’s movement, can be harnessed to identify when a phone resting on a dashboard or in a cupholder in a moving car has hit a bump; the GPS receiver can determine by satellite just where that bump is located “We’re constantly looking for new ways to make sure that roads are as smooth as they possibly can be, and we believe that Street Bump is a first-in-the nation app,’’ said Chris Osgood, one half of the two-man Urban Mechanics office. Osgood and Nigel Jacob, New Urban Mechanics cochairman, have developed the prototype with Fabio Carrera, a professor at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Joshua Thorp and Stephen Guerin, developers from the Santa Fe Complex, a civic-minded technology and design think tank in New Mexico. “It’s a new kind of volunteerism,’’ Jacob said. “It’s not volunteering your sweat equity. It’s volunteering the devices that are in your pocket to help the city.’’

70 70 IBM Tivoli


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