Presentation on theme: "The Problem of Identity Viktor Pavlu Gerhard Zlabinger."— Presentation transcript:
The Problem of Identity Viktor Pavlu Gerhard Zlabinger
Overview Definitions Comparison of Views Identity and AI
Definition of Identity from latin identidem „idem et idem“ Numerical Identity Leibnitz‘ Law ( ) A = B iff A and B have same properties Qualitative Identity Physical Psychological (Mental)
Physical Identity Inanimate Objects Molecular Structure Location Animate Entities Continuity of Physical States Persons?
Mental Identity wake up, another body not impossible to imagine still the same „you“ Mental Identity ≠ Physical Identity coined by John Locke ( ) Memory A = B iff memories(B) incl. memories(A)
Reid‘s Brave Officer (1785) Whipped as Boy Brave Soldier as Young Man remembers being whipped General when old remembers being brave forgot beeing whipped as boy According to Locke: General ≠ Boy
Derek Parfit‘s „ Reason & Persons“ (1984) A 1 = A N iff there are N-2 states between Mental connectedness Whole mental state Memory + taste, sense of humor, mood, …
Bernard Williams ( ) Thought Experiment 1 (similar to Locke) 2 Persons: A, B Brain State Transfer 1 Body tortured, 1 gets $ They can decide Rational Decision A: torture A, reward B B: torture B, reward A
Bernard Williams II Thought Experiment 2 A will be tortured tomorrow fear A will not remember being told beforehand A‘s whole memory will be erased B‘s memories will be transferred to A fear still rational = exp.1 w/o mentioning A B transfer contradiction
Bernard Williams III Objections A fears mind-wipe, not torture Consequences If only A is transferred to body B, who is body B?
Parfit‘s Descendant Selves Outcome of BST is descendant selve Same mental states But only up to the point of BST both selves are affected by environment develop into two identities both survive (while the single identity ceases to exist)
Will machines have Identity? Yes If seen from functionalist POV and mental state can be transferred No Mental states not transferrable