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The Cryptographic Module Validation Program and FIPS 140-2.

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Presentation on theme: "The Cryptographic Module Validation Program and FIPS 140-2."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Cryptographic Module Validation Program and FIPS 140-2

2 NIAP SSL TLS SMIME IKE EKE SPEKE IPSEC IT SECURITY Systems Smart Cards PKI Telecom Biometrics Healthcare Firewalls Operating Systems DBMS Web Browsers CMVP DES 3DES AES Skipjack SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 DES MAC HMAC FIPS Crypto Modules RSA ECDSA DSA DSA2 RSA2 ECDSA2 Wrapping D-H MQV RSA FIPS 171 EncryptionHashingAuthenticationSignatureKey Mgt. Protocols Security Specifications Future Standard, Specification or Recommendation Standard in Progress Existing Standard Test Development in Progress Standard and Testing Available Existing Standard no Testing Industry Standard, Specification or Recommendation CygnaCom COACT SAIC TUVITCSC DomusInfoGard Atlan Accredited Testing Labs ARCA EWA


4 Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Established by NIST and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in 1995 Original FIPS requirements and updated FIPS requirements developed with industry input Six NVLAP-accredited testing laboratories True independent 3 rd party accredited testing laboratories Can not test and provide design assistance

5 CMVP Accredited Laboratories InfoGard Laboratories CEAL: a CygnaCom Solutions Laboratory COACT Inc. EWA - Canada LTD, IT Security Evaluation Facility Domus IT Security Laboratory Atlan Laboratories Sixth CMT laboratory added in 2001

6 Applicability of FIPS U.S. Federal organizations must use validated cryptographic modules GoC departments are recommended by CSE to use validated cryptographic modules International recognition

7 Vendor Designs and Produces Cryptographic Module and Algorithm CMT Lab Tests for Conformance Cryptographic Module and Algorithm CMVP Validates Test Results and Signs Certificate User Specifies and Purchases Security and Assurance Flow of a FIPS Validation

8 Level 1 is the lowest, Level 4 most stringent Requirements are primarily cumulative by level Overall rating is lowest rating in all sections Not Validated Security Spectrum Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4 FIPS Security Levels

9 Derived Test Requirements Cryptographic module testing is performed using the Derived Test Requirements (DTR) Assertions in the DTR are directly traceable to requirements in FIPS All FIPS requirements will be included in the DTR as assertions Provides for one-to-one correspondence between the FIPS and the DTR

10 Derived Test Requirements (concluded) Each assertion will include requirements levied on the Cryptographic module vendor Tester of the cryptographic module Modules tested against FIPS will use the associated DTR

11 Revalidations An updated version of a previously validated cryptographic module can be considered for a revalidation rather than a full validation depending on the extent of the modifications from the previously validated version of the module. 1. Modifications are made to hardware, software or firmware components that do not affect any FIPS security relevant items. Signed Letter from Accredited Laboratory 2. Modifications are made to hardware, software or firmware components that affect some of the FIPS security relevant items. Re-validation TE’s annotated as RE-Tested with an overall regression test performed

12 CMVP Status Continued record growth in the number of cryptographic modules validated Over 200 Validations representing nearly 250 modules All four security levels of FIPS represented on the Validated Modules List Over forty participating vendors

13 FIPS and FIPS Validations by Year and Level (January 15, 2002)

14 Certificate 150 May 23, 2001 Certificate 200 December 18, Validation Milestones FIPS Signed 05/25/01 FIPS DTR Available 11/15/01 FIPS Validations Accepted

15 Validated Modules By Type Accelerators Co-Processors Routers/VPNs Kernels/Toolkits PDAs Postal Faxes Link/Frame Encryptors Radios/Phones PC/Smart/Tokens

16 FIPS Testing Begins FIPS Testing officially began November 15, 2001 FIPS Testing ends May 25, 2002 Testing laboratories may submit FIPS validation test reports until May 25, 2002 After May 25, 2002 all validations and revalidations must be done against FIPS 140-2

17 FIPS Testing Begins … Agencies may continue to purchase, retain and use FIPS validated products after May 25, NIST has provided common algorithmic testing tool to Accredited Laboratories: Includes DES, Triple-DES and AES DSA and SHA-1 - to be integrated ECDSA available as separate tool – to be integrated RSA, SHA-{256,384,512}, DH, MQV - future

18 CMVP Status (concluded) End of FIPS testing and beginning of FIPS testing and validations with new implementations of FIPS 197 (AES) expected to cause unparalleled growth Increasing international recognition of the CMVP and FIPS 140-2

19 Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG)-UK December 28, 2001 –CESG proposes the use of FIPS 140 as the basis for the evaluation of cryptographic products used in a number of UK government applications and encourages the setting up of accredited laboratories in the UK to perform these evaluations.

20 … Making a Difference 164 Cryptographic Modules Surveyed (during testing) 80 (48.8%) Security Flaws discovered 158 (96.3%) Documentation Errors 332 Algorithm Validations (during testing) (DES, Triple-DES, DSA and SHA-1) 88 (26.5%) Security Flaws 216 (65.1%) Documentation Errors Areas of Greatest Difficulty Physical Security Self Tests Random Number Generation Key Management

21 Alcatel Algorithmic Research, Ltd. Ascom Hasler Mailing Systems Attachmate Corp. Avaya, Inc. Baltimore Technologies (UK) Ltd. Blue Ridge Networks Certicom Corp. Chrysalis-ITS Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc. Cryptek Security Communications, LLC CTAM, Inc. Cylink Corporation Dallas Semiconductor, Inc. Datakey, Inc. Ensuredmail, Inc. Entrust Technologies Limited Eracom Technologies Group, Eracom Technologies Australia, Pty. Ltd. F-Secure Corporation Fortress Technologies Francotyp-Postalia GTE Internetworking IBM Intel Network Systems, Inc. IRE, Inc. Kasten Chase Applied Research L-3 Communication Systems Litronic, Inc. M/A Com Wireless Systems Microsoft Corporation. Motorola, Inc. Mykotronx. Inc National Semiconductor Corp. nCipher Corporation Ltd. Neopost Neopost Industrie Neopost Ltd. Neopost Online Netscape Communications Corp. NetScreen Technologies, Inc. Network Associates, Inc. Nortel Networks Novell, Inc. Oracle Corporation Pitney Bowes, Inc. PrivyLink Pte Ltd PSI Systems, Inc. Rainbow Technologies RedCreek Communications Research In Motion RSA Data Security, Inc. SchlumbergerSema Spyrus, Inc. Technical Communications Corp. Thales e-Security TimeStep Corporation Transcrypt International Tumbleweed Communications Corp. V-ONE Corporation, Inc. Participating Vendors (January 15, 2002)

22 FIPS and FIPS Derived Test Requirements (DTR) Annexes to FIPS Implementation Guidance Points of Contact Laboratory Information Validated Modules List Special Publication


24 NVLAP Program Accredited FIPS Testing Lab Cryptographic Module Vendor Level # NIST/CSE Module’s Test Report List of Validated FIPS Modules List of NVLAP Accredited Labs Submits application; Pays accreditation fee Conducts on-site assessment; Accredits labs Tests for conformance to FIPS 140-1; Writes test report Submits module for testing; Pays testing fee Issue validation certificate To NIST/CSE for validation NIST publishes list of validated modules Issue testing & implementation guidance NIST publishes list of NVLAP Accredited Labs

25 FIPS 140-1: Basic Requirements Defined module boundary. Finite State Machine specification. Defined security policy. Specification of roles and services. Selection of authentication mechanisms. Self-tests of algorithms, random number generators, and critical functions during power-on.

26 Cryptographic Algorithms Must include at least one FIPS approved cryptographic algorithm. Data Encryption Algorithm (DES) Triple DES (allowed for U.S. Government use) Digital Signature Standard (DSA, RSA), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) Must meet requirements in FIPS algorithm standard.

27 FIPS Security Level 1 Specification of the cryptographic module boundary. Production-grade equipment. Logical separation of roles and services but no required authentication. FIPS approved key management. Allows software cryptographic services on a single user general purpose computer.

28 FIPS Security Level 2 Tamper evident coatings or seals, or pick- resistant locks. Role-based authentication to determine if an operator is authorized to assume a specific role and perform a corresponding set of services. Allows software cryptography in evaluated multi-user timeshared systems.

29 FIPS Security Level 3 Tamper detection and response for covers and doors. Identity-based authentication. Stronger requirements for entering and outputting critical security parameters and cryptographic keys. Trusted path requirements for modules using trusted operating systems.

30 FIPS Security Level 4 Envelope of protection around the entire cryptographic module. Environmental failure protection and testing. Formal modeling for software.

31 Differences Between FIPS and FIPS & 2 Tables of Contents FIPS Overview 2. Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 3. Functional Security Requirements 4. Security Requirements 4.1 Cryptographic Modules 4.2 Cryptographic Module Interfaces FIPS Overview 2. Glossary of Terms and Acronyms* 3. Functional Security Requirements 4. Security Requirements 4.1 Cryptographic Module Specification* 4.2 Cryptographic Module Interfaces * Section added or significantly revised

32 140-1 & 2 Tables of Contents (Continued) FIPS Roles and Services 4.4 Finite State Machine Model 4.5 Physical Security 4.6 Software Security 4.7 Operating System Security 4.8 Cryptographic Key Management FIPS Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.4 Finite State Machine Model 4.5 Physical Security* 4.6 Operating System Security* 4.7 Cryptographic Key Management * Section added or significantly revised

33 140-1 & 2 Tables of Contents (Continued) FIPS Cryptographic Algorithms 4.10 EMI/EMC 4.11 Self-Tests FIPS EMI/EMC 4.9 Self-Tests 4.10 Design Assurance* 4.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks* * Section added or significantly revised

34 140-1 & 2 Tables of Contents (Concluded) FIPS Appendices A: Summary of Documentation Requirements B: Recommended Software Development Practices C: Selected References FIPS Appendices A: Summary of Documentation Requirements B: Recommended Software Development Practices* C: Cryptographic Module Security Policy* D: Selected Bibliography* * Section added or significantly revised

35 FIPS 140-2: Final Revisions 4.2 Cryptographic Module Interfaces Security Levels 3 and 4 Physical ports for input/output of plaintext CSPs shall be physically separate from other ports Logical interfaces for input/output of plaintext CSPs shall be logically separate from all other interfaces Requires implementation of a trusted path

36 FIPS 140-2: Final Revisions (continued) 4.6 Operational Environment Operating system definition expanded to operational environment general purpose operational environment refers to the use of a commercially-available general purpose operating system (i.e., resource manager) manages the software and firmware components within the cryptographic boundary Limited operational environment refers to a static non-modifiable virtual operational environment with no underlying general purpose OS Requirements in FIPS do not apply Modifiable operational environment refers to an operating environment that may be reconfigured to add/delete/modify functionality and/or may include general purpose OS capabilities Requirements in FIPS apply

37 FIPS 140-2: Final Revisions (continued) 4.10 Design Assurance Development Deleted requirements addressed in other sections of FIPS Guidance Deleted security requirements for the IT environment Functional Testing and Test Coverage Deleted all requirements

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