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International Security and Peace WWI Prof. Jaechun Kim.

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1 International Security and Peace WWI Prof. Jaechun Kim

2 WORLD WAR I  Ask two critical questions!  What were the political objectives?  What were the causes?  Why do we have to care about WWI?  The first global war: 65 million men mobilized, 11-12 million lost lives more than 21 million wounded; civilians suffered great casualties…  The whole society was mobilized… the civilian population worked as never before…  Repercussions in Int’l Relations: Beginning of drop Europe as center of power; Emergence of US as a great power  End of Imperialism… and colonialism…

3  Revulsion followed enthusiasm after the war: optimism about the liberal capitalism… belief in progress and mankind… rise of communism and fascism…  Extraordinary scholarly attention with regard to cause of WWI  “theory of inadvertent war” War is not a deliberate choice of leaders War is not a deliberate choice of leaders War breaks out because of intl systemic pressure that cause war that no one really wants… War breaks out because of intl systemic pressure that cause war that no one really wants…  Backgrounds - Int’l Environment  Bismarck formed the Three Emperor’s League between G, Italy, and Austria-Hungary  Triple Alliance in 1882  B then signs secret treaties with Russians  Reinsurance Treaties  Isolation of France

4  William II clashed with B in Prussian policy toward Russia… B resigns in 1890  William II didn’t renew Reinsurance Treaty with Russians  “Russo-Franco Alliance”  Dual Entente in 1895 between France and R France would support R if R was attacked by G France would support R if R was attacked by G R would support F if F was attacked by G R would support F if F was attacked by G If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilizes, both France and Russians would mobilize… If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilizes, both France and Russians would mobilize…  Britain abandons policy of “splendid isolation.” Why?  Britain now begins to look for allies. Anglo-Japanese Alliance(1902). Entente Cordiale (1904) with France. Then treaty with Russia  Triple Entente was formed against Triple Alliance

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6  The war to end all wars?  The first crisis between Germany and France (over Morocco in 1905) Kaiser giving speech supporting the independence of Morocco Kaiser giving speech supporting the independence of Morocco  Second crisis: Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908)  Serbia backed by Russia vs. Austria backed by Germany Russia was not ready for war… Russia was not ready for war…  Third Crisis (over Morocco again): Agadir Crisis (1911) Germans sending gunboats to Agadir… Germans sending gunboats to Agadir…  Fourth Crisis: Two Balkan Wars, 1914 & 1913 Serbia emerging the most powerful on the Balkan… Serbia emerging the most powerful on the Balkan… Great tension between Serbia and Austria… Great tension between Serbia and Austria…  The assassination on July 28ty 1914 was the event which sparked off a whole series of events and crises; these crises culminated in the outbreak of WWI…

7  Backgrounds-Social Structures and Moods  Oligarchic state structure and fears of upheaval But because of industrial revolution, the new middle class was growing… new proletariat class… and they wanted reform But because of industrial revolution, the new middle class was growing… new proletariat class… and they wanted reform  “Even if everything now goes smash, it will be all worth it!” War was a relief from internal tensions… (German minister for war) Oligarchs were not interested in reforms… wanted wars abroad… Oligarchs were not interested in reforms… wanted wars abroad… War came as relief from internal tensions… War came as relief from internal tensions…  Systemic militarism Period of huge military build-up… Germany - universal conscription; large reserves; detailed war planning… armies and navies were expanding… Period of huge military build-up… Germany - universal conscription; large reserves; detailed war planning… armies and navies were expanding… Huge influence of military… civilians weren’t involved in military plans.. Huge influence of military… civilians weren’t involved in military plans.. War is glorious and even fun!! War is glorious and even fun!!  (Blind) Nationalism Particularly on Balkans… Panslavism and Pangermanism… Particularly on Balkans… Panslavism and Pangermanism…  Social Darwinism Doctrine of racial superiority Doctrine of racial superiority  Imperialism… Social Darwinism justified the imperialism…

8  Causes (Interpretations) of WWI  Inadvertent War Thesis – Fischer Thesis (Third Level) (First Level) (Third Level) (First Level)  Inadvertent War Thesis claim that the third level factors such as the Cult of Offensive, Interlocking Mobilization System (i.e., rigid war plans), and Alliance System under the multi-polar system that existed in Europe in the early 19 th century led to WWI !!

9  Multi-polar system that existed in Europe led to WWI….  Tight alliance system, rigid war plans based on cult of offensive, and system of interlocking mobilization is to blame…

10  P Bracken, P Kennedy, S Van Evera, T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow P Bracken: “The war systems of the day stimulated each other into a frenzy. Political leaders lost control of the tremendous momentum built up when their armies went on alert.” P Bracken: “The war systems of the day stimulated each other into a frenzy. Political leaders lost control of the tremendous momentum built up when their armies went on alert.” Schelling: “a great starting of engines, a clutching and gearing and releasing of brakes and gathering momentum until the machines were on collision course.” Howard: “armies were juggernauts which even their own generals could hardly control.”

11  How did the “system” dictate the logic? (1) Rigid War Plans!  War plans were worked out in advance down to the last detail  Very rigid… Could not be adjusted to changing situations  War plans had a momentum of their own! Statesmen could not modify them…  In the war planning process itself, political considerations were never really taken into account! The plans were elaborated on the basis of military considerations… (at odds with Clausewitz…) Ned Lebow: “The German Army’s almost total autonomy enabled it to plan for war in a political vacuum. When the July crisis came, G’s political leaders were confronted with a military plan that had been formulated solely with reference to narrow organizational criteria and requirements.”

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13  Schilieffen Plan Alfred von Schiliefen Alfred von Schiliefen In case of war, attack France first, then attack Russia…  can’t fight both F and R at the same time… In case of war, attack France first, then attack Russia…  can’t fight both F and R at the same time… Decisive victory over France  British neutrality…; It was believed that Russians would take about 6 weeks to mobilize.. Decisive victory over France  British neutrality…; It was believed that Russians would take about 6 weeks to mobilize.. Conversation between German Ambassador in Britain and the Kaiser Conversation between German Ambassador in Britain and the Kaiser Britain – Belgian security treaty… Britain – Belgian security treaty…

14  The rigidity of Russian military plan Russian plans called for immediate attack against both A-H and Germany Russian plans called for immediate attack against both A-H and Germany P Kennedy of History Dept at Yale: “The Russians possibly possessed the most inflexible plan of all, and their inability to mobilize separately against A-H proved to be one of the most fateful errors of the July crisis.”  Political leaders were ignorant of the military plans Political leaders in Germany didn’t understand that if they attack Belgium and France, they would invite Brits into the war. Russian leaders didn’t know their war plan required mobilization against both AH and G… Political leaders in Germany didn’t understand that if they attack Belgium and France, they would invite Brits into the war. Russian leaders didn’t know their war plan required mobilization against both AH and G… They didn’t understand the consequences of their order to mobilize… They didn’t understand the consequences of their order to mobilize…

15 Schilieffen Plan

16 (2) Cult of Offensive (Stephen Van Evera) and theory of offense - defense balance…  Offense had the advantage over Defense Van Evera: Germany’s expansionist policy was rooted in a (baseless) belief that the offense had the advantage. Van Evera: Germany’s expansionist policy was rooted in a (baseless) belief that the offense had the advantage.  Firepower enhancing technology – favors defense! Clausewitz: Defense is always easier in land warfare because of the advantages of cover and the capability to choose and prepare terrain and fortify positions Clausewitz: Defense is always easier in land warfare because of the advantages of cover and the capability to choose and prepare terrain and fortify positions Van Evera: If the military realities had been understood, if the actual power of the defense had been understood, the whole system would have been much more stable. Van Evera: If the military realities had been understood, if the actual power of the defense had been understood, the whole system would have been much more stable.  Leaders didn’t understand the meaning of technological change… that introduced firepower enhancing technology…

17  War could and should be won by quick and decisive offense… Windows of opportunities are closing… because of the construction of Russian railroads..  S plan was a highly offensive-oriented war plan.. (3) Interlocking mobilization system  S plan – by mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G would be able to defeat F before facing R…  The Germans could not allow a Russian general mobilization to run its course w/o ordering their own mobilization and in fact attacking France…  By mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G would be able to defeat F before having to face Russians…  Russian Mobilization would lead to German mobilization, and under the German war plan mobilization meant war against France! Because it mandated surprise attack of France…  interlocked!!! Lloyd George (Prime Minister of Britain): “The governments of Europe simply stumbled and staggered into war.” Lloyd George (Prime Minister of Britain): “The governments of Europe simply stumbled and staggered into war.”

18 (4) Tight alliance system under multipolar international system… international system…  Chain-ganging…

19  Validity of Inadvertent War Theory  In order for the inadvertent war theory to hold lack of understanding (on the part of the political leaders) lack of understanding (on the part of the political leaders) Russian leaders did not understand that their mobilization would lead to German mobilization… Russian leaders did not understand that their mobilization would lead to German mobilization… German leaders did not understand the implications of S plan… German leaders did not understand the implications of S plan… political leaders were not free “agents” political leaders were not free “agents” “Moltke had superseded the Chancellor in all but names.” “The military logic took over…” “Moltke had superseded the Chancellor in all but names.” “The military logic took over…” Sazonov in Russia lost control over the situations Sazonov in Russia lost control over the situations No room for political leaders to maneuver… No room for political leaders to maneuver…

20  Fischer Thesis (Fritz Fischer)  Minimalist Germany-blaming view : G might have risked a continental war, but G preferred the prewar status quo to a continental war. G knowingly risked a continental war. : G might have risked a continental war, but G preferred the prewar status quo to a continental war. G knowingly risked a continental war.  Intermediate G-blaming view : G preferred a continental war to the prewar status quo, but she preferred the prewar status quo to a great war. Fischer school moderates. : G preferred a continental war to the prewar status quo, but she preferred the prewar status quo to a great war. Fischer school moderates.  Maximalist G-blaming view : G preferred a great war (including GB) to the prewar status quo; decision to fight against France and Russia was already made : G preferred a great war (including GB) to the prewar status quo; decision to fight against France and Russia was already made

21  Which is more convincing, Fischer thesis or systemic theory?

22  Clausewitz and WWI  War plans (S plan of Germany and Russian war plan) were based on military considerations w/o political considerations  separation between military and political…  War plans did not adjust to changing situations…  War plans were not based on the fact that political considerations should precede military means…

23  What were the political aims that Germany was pursuing? Did means match to pursue these goals?  Expansion of territories… annexation of Belgium and Eastern France (maybe Poland and Lithuania, too…)  Germany: By the and of 1914 it was obvious that their previous war plans would not work…  Peace could have been available earlier… The Allied terms were still not that harsh Withdrawal to her prewar frontiers in the west Withdrawal to her prewar frontiers in the west The abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine The abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine Indemnity for Belgium Indemnity for Belgium Creation of independent Poland Creation of independent Poland

24  German leadership was fighting for objectives that could be obtained only by total victory…  Erich von Ludendorff’s bent on total victory (or absolute war)…  Erich von Ludendorff’s bent on total victory (or absolute war)…  Absolute war involves total subordination of politics to war efforts.

25 Civil-Military Relations in Germany before and during the WWI  Gen. Erich von Ludendorff and his bent on absolute war  Classic example of militaristic society  Military assuming large role in public life  Military supported by powerful interest groups…  Political leaders were onlookers..  Public had confidence in military leadership…  Ludendorff’s war aim included expansion of territories – annexation of Belgium and Eastern France… basically unatainable…  Ludendorff vs. Bethmann  Firing of Foreign Minister…

26  Unrestricted submarine warfare (1918)  Toward 1916 G could not attain a decisive victory as planned…  But Ludendorff ordering indiscriminate submarine warfare…  Rejecting Woodrow Wilson’s peace terms…  Dissolving Reichstag… *Georges Clemenceau (French Prime Minister): “War is too serious a business to be left exclusively in the hands of generals.” *Georges Clemenceau (French Prime Minister): “War is too serious a business to be left exclusively in the hands of generals.”

27 Some of the Characteristics of Battlefields Some of the Characteristics of Battlefields  Influence of Clausewitz on battlefields  “buffalo” tactics – violent frontal assaults  “buffalo” tactics – violent frontal assaults  Deadlock of trench warfare  Deadlock of trench warfare  War of Attrition  War of Attrition  Blind emphasis on moral forces  Élan in France (600,000 casualties during first six months of the war)  Skeptical of strategic maneuver;  Accumulation of maximum force at the decisive point in order to defeat the enemy main force in battle;

28  The conduct of operations so as to inflict the greatest possible number of losses on the enemy;  One more push or more will power would earn victory;  Desperate attempts by soldiers field to redefine old concepts of courage and valor;  Dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties;

29 WORLD WAR II  WWII in context * About 60 million people were dead * About 60 million people were dead * Truly world wide war * Truly world wide war  National Policies and Ideas  Germany practiced creative history! practiced creative history! V treaty were too harsh  Lebensraum V treaty were too harsh  Lebensraum Rise of Hitler Rise of Hitler  Japan Militarism appears in Japan.. Dominate foreign policies and national ideas.. Militarism appears in Japan.. Dominate foreign policies and national ideas.. A sugar-coated self image A sugar-coated self image

30  Italy  Britain and France weakened by WWI weakened by WWI  Russia Bolshevik Revolution & Aftermath Bolshevik Revolution & Aftermath  How the Storm Gathered  Non-aggression pact at Locarno in 1925  Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact in 1928  World-wide economic depression – 1929  Hitler comes into power in 1933

31  Hitler’s recoveries & conquests  The Rhineland (industrial heartland of G) 1936  Austria 1938 – assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss Dollfuss  Czech 1938-39 - demanded Sudentenland  Munich conference *Emil Hacha..  Munich conference *Emil Hacha..  Poland next – 1939 (Sept. 1)  Far East  Japan invaded Taiwan (1895), Korea(1905), Manchuria, and China… Manchuria, and China…  The US wanted neutrality until late 1930s  Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7 th 1941)

32 Origins (Causes) of WWII  Hitler blaming view Cf. AJP Taylor, Origins of the Second World War Cf. AJP Taylor, Origins of the Second World War  3rd level explanation to the outbreak of WWII  K. Waltz and BOP theory  Problems in multi-polar system  Chain-ganging  Buck-passing  Why is bipolar system stable compared to multi-polar system?  Neither chain ganging nor buck passing

33  Chain ganging and buck passing and advantage of offense and defense  Cult of defensive and WWII  Military-fueled cult of offensive vs. civilian-based cult of defensive – WWI  spiral process in which alliance dynamics magnified the consequences of local disputes, turning them into global issues. WWII  deterrence failure in which buck-passing diplomacy by the status quo powers encouraged expansionist powers to risk aggression!

34  German Strategy  Strategy of Piecemeal Expansion  Strategy of limited liability and buck-passing  Soviet Union : Stalin-Soviet Union would not pull others’ : Stalin-Soviet Union would not pull others’ chestnuts out of the fire; Stlalin to Khruschev chestnuts out of the fire; Stlalin to Khruschev - Couldn’t they put up any resistance at all? - Couldn’t they put up any resistance at all?  France : pass the cost to Brits (buck-passing)  Britain : strategy of limited liability

35  Churchill: “There was never a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe.”  Why did the W Democracies adopted a strategy of appeasement?  2 nd level explanation-Democratic Peace?


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