Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part."— Presentation transcript:

1

2 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. A NTITRUST LAW Chapter 20 Meiners, Ringleb & Edwards The Legal Environment of Business, 12 th Edition

3 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. A NTITRUST L AW Antitrust law addresses prohibitions on attempts by competitors to restrain competition and injure competitors. Antitrust statutes require the courts to determine what really constitutes antitrust law Therefore “Antitrust Law” refers to antitrust statutes and the interpretation of these statutes by the courts.

4 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. A NTITRUST S TATUTES The growth of large corporations increased political pressure for restrictions. The Result: Sherman Act Clayton Act Federal Trade Commission Act Courts generally must decide how the laws will be applied as key parts are vaguely worded

5 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. T HE S HERMAN A CT T HE S HERMAN A CT Passed by Congress in 1890. Regarded largely as a way to reduce concerns that large business interests dominated some industries. The major sections of the Act are so broad that one could find almost any business activity to be illegal. No restraint of trade Cannot monopolize or attempt to monopolize

6 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. T HE C LAYTON A CT T HE C LAYTON A CT Enacted in 1914 Wanted government to have the ability to attack a business practice early in its use to prevent a firm from becoming a monopoly. Practices are illegal that “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”

7 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. T HE F EDERAL T RADE C OMMISSION A CT o Enacted in 1914 o Established the FTC as an agency to investigate and enforce violations of antitrust laws. o Declares it illegal to be engaged in “unfair methods of competition” Any business activity that may create a monopoly by unfairly eliminating or excluding competitors from the marketplace.

8 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. E XEMPTIONS o Clayton Act exempts some activities of nonprofit and certain agricultural, fishing and some other cooperatives. o The Export Trading Company Act allows limited antitrust immunity for sellers of exports. Domestic producers may be allowed to join together to enhance their ability to export products to other countries. o Parker Doctrine allows state government to restrict competition in public utilities, professional services, and public transportation. o McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts insurance (as long as states regulate). o Noerr-Pennington Doctrine says lobbying to influence a legislature is not illegal. o Most labor union activities are exempt.

9 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. E NFORCEMENT E NFORCEMENT Sherman Act - Violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act can be felonies. Private parties or the government can seek injunctive relief under the Act in a civil proceeding. Private parties who have been harmed by a violation of the Sherman Act can sue for treble damages (3x damages!) Clayton Act – Private parties may bring civil proceedings, but usually, FTC issues cease and desist orders, which prohibit further violation by a party. FTC Act - Penalties range from an order preventing a planned merger to substantial civil penalties.

10 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C YBER L AW C YBER L AW “SOFTWARE REPLACING LAWYERS” Anheuser-Busch InBev, largest beer company in the world, wanted to merge with Mexico’s Grupo Modelo. Plan reviewed by the Department of Justice DoJ for antitrust issues. Merger was allowed. BUT only after Modelo’s U.S. operation was sold, as well as brewery in Mexico. Such cases can involve millions of documents reviewed by lawyers. In this case, software was trained to search for relevant documents. Kcura: Company that developed the software Has worked with DoJ to seek better predictive coding tools through data sources. In Modelo case, the savings estimated to be more than 50% of the traditional search methods.

11 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. R EMEDIES A VAILABLE Government can: o Restrain a company or individual from performing certain actions o Force a company to sell part of its assets o Force a company to let others use its patents or facilities o Cancel or modify existing business contracts o Only plaintiffs suffering injuries caused by anticompetitive behaviors of firms can recover damages under the law.

12 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. P ER S E R ULE AND THE R ULE OF R EASON o Per Se Rule means that a certain business agreement, arrangement, or activity will automatically be held to be illegal by the courts. o Rule of Reason means that the court will look at the facts surrounding the business practice before deciding whether it helps or hurts competition. o Courts Consider: Business reasons for the restraint The restraining business’s position in the industry Structure of the industry

13 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. M ONOPOLIZATION Sherman Act and Clayton Act are concerned with monopolization of markets, but provide little guidance re: behavior that crosses to illegal monopoly practices. Law favors competition because It lowers price for consumers It spurs companies to innovate It increases consumer choice Monopolies Often charge higher prices Offer inferior service Are slow to innovate Courts usually consider Structure of the market Nature of the behavior

14 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C ASE C ASE S PANISH B ROADCASTING S YSTEM OF F LORIDA V. C LEAR C HANNEL C OMMUNICATIONS Spanish Broadcasting System (SBS) owns 14 Spanish-language stations (includes 5 stations in top-ten markets). Hispanic Broadcasting Corp. (HBC) owns 55 Spanish-language stations and are in all top-ten markets. Clear Channel (CC) owns largest English-language radio network in U.S., with 1200 stations, and owns 26% of HBC. SBS sued CC and HBC, claiming they conspired to drive SBS out of Spanish-language radio market, violating the Sherman Act. Claimed: They discouraged advertisers from placing ads with SBS; Induced SBS employees to quit and join HBC; Made it difficult for SBS to enter new markets by bidding up prices and taking away business opportunities; and Interfered with SBS’s ability to raise money. District Court dismissed lawsuit – no antitrust violation under the Sherman Act. SBS appealed. (Continued)

15 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. HELD: Affirmed. Plaintiff must show harm to competition in general and market as a whole rather than merely damage to an individual competitor. Section 1 of Sherman Act prohibits combinations and conspiracies that restrain interstate or foreign trade. Section 1 standard is “whether practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors”, using the “rule of reason.” Here there is impact only on SBS, but no allegation that conduct had overall impact on Spanish language advertising market. In addition, SBS has expanded into New York, Chicago & Miami and were even engaged in merger talks with HBC. Section 2 says: it is a crime to conspire, to attempt or to actually monopolize. The claim must prove harm in a “distinct market.” SBS claimed that “market” was the advertising in top-ten Spanish language markets (HBC earned 51% of the revenue there). CC doesn’t participate in this market, so can’t monopolize. Even if CC owns 26% of HBC, that does make them an “effective participant” in that market. No anticompetitive conduct by HBC. C ASE C ASE S PANISH B ROADCASTING S YSTEM OF F LORIDA V. C LEAR C HANNEL C OMMUNICATIONS

16 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. M ERGERS Merger – When two or more firms come together to form a new firm. Horizontal merger – The two or more firms were competitors before the merger. Mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power. Premerger notification to Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or FTC.

17 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. D ETERMINING M ARKET P OWER Product and Geographic Markets – Percent of relevant market controlled by the firm Product Market – A monopoly exists when there is only one firm producing a product for which there is no good substitute Geographic Market – Generally limited to the area where consumers can reasonably be expected to make purchases

18 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. P OTENTIAL C OMPETITION The Supreme Court has stated That the possibility that the two companies are potential competitors may be enough to stop a merger. FTC v. Procter & Gamble (in text): Merger between Proctor & Gamble and Clorox was prohibited because of “potential competition”. The Court wanted Clorox to be faced with the threat of strong potential competition by a company like P&G.

19 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. W HEN M ERGERS A RE A LLOWED o Merger Guidelines – Major reason to approve merger is that it will enhance the efficiency in the market, benefiting consumers by better resource allocation. o Failing Firm Defense – If one of the firms involved in a merger has been facing bankruptcy or circumstances that threaten the firm, the Court will look more favorably upon the merger. The firm must show: Not likely to survive without merger No other buyers, or this one will least affect competition Tried and failed at all other ways to save firm o Power Buyer Defense – A merger that increases concentration to high levels can be defended by showing that the firm’s customers are sophisticated and powerful buyers.

20 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. H ORIZONTAL R ESTRAINTS OF T RADE When businesses at the same level of operation come together in some manner, they risk being accused of restraining trade. Collection of rival firms that come together by some form of agreement in attempt to restrain trade (restricting output & raising prices) is called a cartel. Examples: Mergers Horizontal price-fixing Exchanges of information Territorial restrictions Cartels such as Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

21 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. P RICE F IXING o Firms selling the same product agree to fix prices; the agreement will almost certainly violate the Sherman Act. Per-Se IllegalRule of Reason o Should Per-Se Illegal apply or Rule of Reason? o In United States v. Trenton Potteries: When competitors get together to fix prices, there is a violation of the Sherman act – whether or not the prices they set are reasonable. o Most price-fixing is a horizontal arrangement that is per se illegal. o Blanket licensing is not illegal if no other way certain market to work

22 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C ASE C ASE F REEMAN V. S AN D IEGO A SSOCIATION OF R EALTORS Multiple Listing Service (MLS) used by real estate agents to share info re: properties via computerized database. Agents subscribe to MLS to list properties and see info about other properties on the market. Before 1992, 12 MLSs served San Diego, buying data services from 4 different database operators. 11 MLS associations combine, creating Sandicor, so all subscribing agents can have access to all San Diego properties – would cost less than maintaining separate databases. 11 MLSs still sign up agents & collect fees, but Sandicor sets rules. No price cutting is allowed. When MLSs compared costs, they found largest MLS spent $10/month per subscriber, while 2 small ones spent $50/month per subscriber. Fee for all was set at $44 per subscribing agent, paid to Sandicor. That price was less than the $50 per subscriber the small operators incurred, so lower-cost associations agreed to cover losses the smaller MLSs incurred. A service that had cost of $10/month to some MLSs now was $44, and Sandicor was profiting in excessive fees. (Continued)

23 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. o Freeman and other San Diego real estate agents sued, saying price of service is inflated. Freeman offer to Sandicor to market MLS info thru a new service center at a lower price to subscribers was rejected. Freeman sued for conspiracy in restraint of trade and price fixing. District court dismissed. Freeman appealed. o HELD: Reversed and remanded. o Sandicor charges subscribers for their use of MLS; its MLS fee includes the support services provided by associations. The support fee Sandicor in turns pays the associations for support services fixed at level more than 2X what would cost the most efficient association to provide them. o Sandicor charges MLS subscribers $44 per month; an association collects this fee from subscribers and hands it over to Sandicor; Sandicor then returns $22.50 to associations as the support fee. o Can’t turn a horizontal agreement to fix prices into an innocent act just by changing the way the books are kept. C ASE C ASE F REEMAN V. S AN D IEGO A SSOCIATION OF R EALTORS

24 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. E XCHANGES OF I NFORMATION E XCHANGES OF I NFORMATION Information Sharing One problem in antitrust law is deciding whether the trading of information among businesses helps or restrains the competitive process. U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co.~ The gypsum companies defended their practice of verifying competitors’ prices as a good- faith effort to meet competition. The court did not apply a per se rule against such price information exchanges; it warned that such exchanges would be examined closely and would be allowed in limited circumstances. Conspiracy to Restrict Information May also be illegal to band together to restrain nonprice information. FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists ~ Court held that dentists’ organization policy requiring members to withhold X-rays from dental insurance companies is a conspiracy in restraint of trade upheld under rule of reason.

25 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C ASE C ASE T ODD V. E XXON C ORPORATION o 14 large oil companies organized system to conduct surveys of the salaries they paid to managerial, professional and Technical (MPT) employees. Reps. of each company met regularly to talk about jobs, and consultant analyzed and distributed data to 14 firms – data used to set EEs salaries. o Todd sued under Sec. 1 of Sherman Act saying purpose of sharing info was to hold down MPT salaries. District Court dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed. o HELD: Remanded. o Price fixing is per se unlawful. If can prove an agreement to fix salaries, then there’s a violation. o Data exchange claims are close cousins of traditional price fixing. If plaintiff can prove 1) defendants exchanged info deemed anticompetitive and 2) activities had an anticompetitive effect on MPT labor market, then may have a cause of action. o On remand, court should consider whether plaintiff demonstrated “anticompetitive effects” on the market power of the defendants. Must also consider if data are made publicly available. If so the exchange is more likely to be approved by the court. o If companies had given info to employees, this would have mitigated anticompetitive effects of the exchange.

26 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. T ERRITORIAL R ESTRICTIONS o Occurs when firms competing at the same level of business reach an agreement to divide the market to eliminate competition among those firms. o These are often held to violate antitrust law. legal illegal o An activity that is legal if undertaken by a single firm may be illegal if undertaken by a group of firms.

27 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. V ERTICAL R ESTRAINTS OF T RADE Vertical restraints of trade concern relationships between buyers and sellers (producers, distributors and retailers). Examples of vertical restraints of trade include vertical price fixing and vertical non-price constraints. See Exhibit 20.3

28 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. V ERTICAL P RICE F IXING Usually trying to control price at which product is sold to consumer. Resale Price Maintenance – (RPM) - an agreement between a manufacturer, supplier and retailers of a product under which the retailers agree to sell the product at not less than minimum price. Once a producer or supplier sells a product to a retailer, it cannot fix or otherwise dictate the price the retailer will charge consumers.

29 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. R ESALE P RICE M AINTENANCE o Small retailers favor RPM because they are more likely to have the same prices as the mass merchandisers, i.e. Mom’n’Pop can compete with Wal-Mart. o Producers of well-known, established products often favor RPM because it allows retailers to earn higher profits for the sale of their products. o Mass retailers oppose RPM because they have grown large by slashing retail prices and taking customers away from smaller stores. o Dr. Miles case: Supreme Court held that manufacturer cannot “fix prices for future sales.” That is, cannot set prices further down the sales chain. Major change: Now not per se illegal. See Leegan case.

30 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. V ERTICAL N ONPRICE R ESTRAINTS Manufacturers frequently impose non-price restraints on their distributors and retailers. Example: Coke and Pepsi have territorial restrictions on the sale of the manufacturer’s products. Delivery in competition with another bottler is grounds for revocation of the franchise agreement. Customer restrictions may be imposed on distributors and retailers when manufacturer elects to sell directly to a certain customer. The court applies the rule of reason in such cases.

31 C ASE C ASE L EEGIN C REATIVE L EATHER P RODUCTS VS. PSKS Leegin designs, makes & distributes leather goods. Popular belts with the brand name “Brighton.” Sold across country, to mostly small, independent specialty stores. Leegin refused to sell to retailers that discounted Brighton goods below suggested prices. Also allowed products not selling well that the retailer did not plan on reordering to be discounted. Leegin told stores “In this age of mega stores... consumers are perplexed by promises of product quality & support of product which we believe is lacking with these large stores. “ Also that consumers are confused by the popular “sale, sale, sale,” etc. Leegin policy: Consistent prices allowing selected retailers to earn profits & support the Brighton brand. Leegin discovered that Kay’s Kloset, discounted Brighton brand by 20%. Requested Kay’s to stop price cutting below suggested retail price. Kay’s refused. Leegin stopped selling to Kay’s. Kay’s sued Leegin for violating Sherman Act. Trial court would not allow expert testimony about economic benefits of Leegin policy. Held the resale price maintenance was per se violation. (Continued) ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part.

32 Jury awarded Kay’s $1.2 million damages – tripled punitive damages. Appeals court affirmed. Leegin’s appealed to Supreme Court. Held: Reversed and remanded. Promotion of interbrand competition is important because antitrust laws want to protect this competition. Single manufacturer’s use of vertical price restraints eliminates intrabrand price competition. Also has potential to give consumers more options so they can choose among low-price low, service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in between. Absent vertical price restraints, retail services that enhance interbrand competition might be under-provided. This is because discounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish services and capture increased demand those services generate. Resale price maintenance, also can increase interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for new firms and brands. Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason. C ASE C ASE L EEGIN C REATIVE L EATHER P RODUCTS VS. PSKS

33 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. E XCLUSIONARY P RACTICES Various business practices are designed to indirectly exclude competitors from a particular market. Such practices, which include tying arrangements, exclusive-dealing agreements, and boycotts, may violate antitrust laws if their effect is anti-competitive.

34 T YING A RRANGEMENTS (T IE I N S ALE ) Agreement by a party to sell a product (the tying product) conditioned that buyer purchases a different (complementary or tied) product. Tie-ins meet a rule of reason test so long as competitive alternatives exist. If a tie-in creates a monopoly when there are no or few good alternatives, it is likely illegal; if products or service are tied together when there are other competitors, the tie-in will likely pass the rule of reason test. Supreme Court is likely to impose a per se illegality only when three conditions are met – Vertical Restraint Guidelines The seller has market power in the tying product Tied and tying products are separate There is evidence of substantial adverse effect in the tied product market In other situations: rule of reason is to be employed. ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part.

35 I NTERNATIONAL P ERSPECTIVE I NTERNATIONAL P ERSPECTIVE “CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW” People Republic of China enacted an Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) (2008). [Supervised by Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC)] More like antitrust law in EU than in the U.S. AML can be applied to both horizontal and vertical agreements. Less concern about vertical arrangements than horizontal agreements among competitors. Violators face civil and administrative penalties, but not criminal penalties. Antitrust enforcement can affect decisions of multinational firms. InBev of Belgium merged with Anheuser-Busch (U.S.) to create world’s largest beer company. AMC placed restrictions of ownership share the new company could have in Chinese breweries. Surprising blockage of Coca-Cola attempted purchase of Huiyuan Juice group. AMC rejected the move, saying it would hurt small competitors in the market. Potential mergers are also reviewed for national security issues.

36 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. B OYCOTTS Boycott: When a group conspires to prevent the carrying on of business or to harm business. Any group can promote this – consumers, union members, retailers, wholesalers or suppliers. Act together to inflict damage on a business. Boycott is used to force compliance with a price-fixing scheme or other restraint of trade. Usually fall under per se rule.

37 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. T HE R OBINSON -P ATMAN A CT Enacted in 1936, it amends the Clayton Act. The highly controversial section 2(a) basically states that a seller is said to engage in price discrimination when the same product is sold to different buyers at different prices. Price Discrimination - Many cases under Robinson Patman are alleged economic injuries either from a firm charging different prices in different markets or from bulk sale discounts given to larger volume retailers. Predatory Pricing - When Company A attempts to undercut Company B in an effort to drive Company B from the market. When B is gone, A raises prices again. Analysis has been extended to “predatory bidding”

38 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. P RICE D ISCRIMINATION To win a predatory pricing case a plaintiff must present strong evidence showing that  Defendant priced below cost  Below cost pricing created a genuine prospect for the defendant to monopolize the market  Defendant would enjoy monopoly long enough to recoup losses suffered during price war Are the volume discounts given to large-volume retailers legal? DEFENSES Cost justification - Difference in transportation costs – a) more expensive to drive further and b) it’s cheaper per unit to deliver 500 refrigerators versus 10. Meeting competition - Firm cuts its price in order to meet competition. It must be done in good faith, not in an effort to injure competitors but to stay competitive.

39 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C ASE C ASE W EYERHAEUSER V. R OSS -S IMMONS H ARDWOOD L UMBER HELD: Decision vacated. Jury’s decision not supported by evidence. Ross loses. Predatory-bidding scheme creates a buyer’s monopoly known as monopsony power. It requires the buyer to suffer losses in short run on the chance that buyer will reap excellent competitive profits in the future. If there is no proof that the original losses of low bidding/buying have not been recouped by long-term gains, the monopsony power allegation cannot exist at law. Ross conceded that it had not satisfied the standard of proof for monopsony power in its case against Weyerhaeuser.

40 ©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. C ASE C ASE W EYERHAEUSER V. R OSS -S IMMONS H ARDWOOD L UMBER Ross-Simmons (Ross) sued Weyerhaeuser for antitrust violation. Ross said that Weyerhaeuser drove them out of business by consistently outbidding Ross for logs to process into lumber. Claim is that predatory behavior was to get control of market so that Ross couldn’t compete in lumber market. Jury held for Ross for $26 million. Appeals court affirmed. Weyerhaeuser appealed.


Download ppt "©2015 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google