Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime T.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime T.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International."— Presentation transcript:

1 Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime T.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International Affairs Kristine Boucher IR 720 Theory and Approaches

2 Summary The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has remained a sustainable, expanding entity despite the unequal status of its members Main principle: the spread of nuclear arms is a threat to international security Underlying norm: non-nuclear members not develop nuclear weapons and all members refrain from helping other nations build such weapons

3 Question 1: Is self interest or domination a key basis for major power cooperation within the non-nuclear proliferation regime? T.V. Paul Baldev Raj Nayar, Regimes, power and international aviation, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1995, p. 141 Yes. “The superpowers opposed even allied states acquiring nuclear weapons, fearing that this would help erode their structural dominance. Major power cooperation in this realm has been motivated by a desire to prevent the rise of new powers with nuclear weapons. Major powers…had realized that their nuclear monopoly provided them with a vehicle for preventing other potential challengers, especially within the regions close to them.” (p. 142) Yes. “Even regimes that seem to have been negotiated may be so only in form; they may actually have been imposed if negotiated in the shadow of preponderant power, with their articulated principles or norms serving as an ideological mask for domination, as in the case of nuclear nonproliferation.”

4 Question 2: Is the use of sanctions an effective tool in deterring a state from violating the principles and rules of the international security regime? T.V. PaulJohn Mueller, The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble After the Cold War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1994, p. 363 Yes. “When a state uses the [Non- Proliferation Treaty] as a cover for weapons acquisition…the Treaty provides other member states the legal justification to undertake coercive sanctions…” (p. 144) Yes. “With the application of economic sanctions…the big countries may be honing a credible, inexpensive, and potentially potent new weapon for use against small- and medium-size aggressors and trouble makers. Essentially, they have been able to demonstrate that…they can inflict enormous pain on such countries with remarkably little costs to themselves.”

5 Question 3: Are there questions of credibility regarding the nuclear powers provision of a nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear member states? T.V. PaulScott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996- 1997, p. 57 Yes. “The sheer possession of nuclear weapons by [a nuclear-armed middle or small power] could constrain the maneuverability of the major power…the major power could thus be deterred from acting, in the face of the possibility…that the smaller nuclear power could use its weapons of mass destruction…” (p. 142) Yes. “…weak states do what they must: they can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally…but the policy raises questions about the credibility of extended deterrence guarantees, since the nuclear power would also fear retaliation if it responded to an attack on its ally.”

6 Question 4: Do regime norms affect the decision of middle power states to join or not join a security regime? T.V. PaulPerspectives, A Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication, Report No. 2001/10 “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation”, February 25, 2002 Yes. “Middle powers that are dissatisfied and that are not protected by the security umbrella of a major power, or non-major power states that are in active conflict with nuclear weapons states or have been targets of major power interventions can oppose security regimes that maintain monopoly rights of existing major powers.” (p. 140) The CIA’s September 2001 public report on proliferation highlighted Iran’s pursuit of a uranium conversion faculty that “could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material production needed for a nuclear weapon…”

7 Question 5: Do normative constraints and the idea of nuclear weapons being ‘absolute weapons’ help to ensure that nuclear states will refrain from using them? T.V. PaulJohn Mueller, The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble After the Cold War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1994, p. 367 Yes. “The nuclear taboo…gives a fairly strong assurance to non-nuclear states that nuclear powers are unlikely to attack them using nuclear weapons. The potential for total destruction gives nuclear weapons an all-or-nothing characteristic…mak[ing] it imperative that the possessor not use them against another state except as a last resort weapon.” (p. 146) Yes. “Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of the enveloping allied forces did not cause Saddam Hussein to order his occupying forces out of Kuwait in 1990.”

8 Question 6: Are multilateral (opposed to unilateral) sanctions necessary when punishing a nuclear non-proliferation regime violator? T.V. PaulDinshaw Mistry, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and the U.S. Non-Proliferation Dialogue with India and Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 5, Sept. – Oct. 1999, p. 757 Yes. “Multilateral sanctions are essential in order to maximize the economic damage to a target, since ‘individual senders rarely possess the market power needed to substantially damage through unilateral actions.’” (p. 144) Yes. Example, 1998 Nuclear tests: “…the support of all G-8 and Western states was crucial in implementing sanctions curtailing IFI [International Financial Institution] aid, which, together with Japan’s aid that was also curbed, accounted for the bulk of foreign assistance to India and Pakistan.”

9 Question 7: Are smaller states generally insignificant players in the international security regime? T.V. PaulDavid J. Karl, A Boom of One’s Own: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996- 1997), p. 93 Yes. “Most small powers are system- ineffectuals and they tend to be supporters of security regimes that promote international norms and legal obligations on the part of bigger states. Moreover, they are often coerced into accepting regimes that major powers construct.” (p. 140) No. “…ethnic and religious hatreds in Third World regions may not yield to fears of nuclear retaliation [and] leaders of Third World regimes possess personal value structures predisposing them to capricious and illogical acts from which not even threats of nuclear retaliation can dissuade them.”

10 Question 8: Are security issues primarily responsible for the emergence of international security regimes? T.V. Paul Errol A. Henderson, Neoidealism and the Democratic Peace, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Mar. 1999, p. 226 Yes. Citing Jervis, “…several systemic conditions…are necessary for the emergence of security regimes. These conditions are: 1) major powers ‘want to establish’ regimes, 2) states ‘must believe that others share the value of mutual security and cooperation 3) no state ‘believes that security is best provided for by expansion’, and 4) ‘War and individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly’”. (p. 135) No. “…international security regimes are more a function of the alliance and trade ties among states under conditions of bipolarity as they seek to confront problems of market failure in the global anarchy.”

11 Question 9: The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides transparency and knowledge about the nuclear activities of other states though safeguards like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Is this safeguard effective? T.V. PaulRoger K. Smith, Explaining the Non- Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory, International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 2, Spring 1987, p. 259 Yes. “The IAEA offers a more feasible and less costly mechanism to conduct inspections than any that a single state could provide. States tend to be more agreeable to safeguard inspections conducted by international inspectors than by national inspectors from other countries.” (p. 143) No. “While the safeguards are a critical component of the regime, the IAEA has no mechanism for effective enforcement; its most potent instrument is to suspend technical assistance to a state in violation of the safeguards.”

12 Question 10: Are the costs high for the states that do not abide by the rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime? T.V. PaulMichael Brzoska, Is the Nuclear Non- Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment of Trevor McMorris Tate, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 1992, p. 218 Yes. “…the violator can anticipate being isolated and punished through coercive economic and military sanctions.” (p. 144) No. “One state with nuclear weapons, Israel, is among the largest recipients of aid in the world in per capita terms.”

13 Question 11: Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons? T.V. Paul Yes. “The non-proliferation regime comprises a set of norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which countries pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or help in their acquisition by other states. International and bilateral safeguards verify these pledges and thereby prevent defection and cheating.” (p. 137)

14 Question 11 cont’d: Do the norms of the non-proliferation regime influence the deterrence of nations to acquire nuclear weapons? CNN.com, “Timeline: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development” July 17, 2003 No. Example, North Korea 1994: US and NK sign an agreement whereby NK freezes and eventually dismantles it nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors 2002: NK reactivates nuclear weapons programs and removes monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities 2003: NK withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

15 Question 12: Does the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime look positive? T.V. PaulNicole C. Evans, Winning Minds, Not Hearts, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 60, No. 5, Sept-Oct. 2004, pp. 48-55 Yes. “The abandonment of the regime by the US could…undermine its effectiveness…this prospect is unlikely in the near future because…the non- proliferation regime does not particularly constrain US security policies…in the nuclear arena. “ (p. 153) No. “The United States, China and Russia have all stepped up their offensive weapons programs since the dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Washington’s plans to deploy “bunker buster” nuclear weapons only add to Moscow’s and Beijing’s unease. They are seen as having the potential to disrupt the existing parity of nuclear deterrence and drastically alter the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.”


Download ppt "Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime T.V. Paul, Cambridge Review of International."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google