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EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14 octobre 2013Page 1 Mali, SERVAL operation French Air Force operational & tactical learnings Paris, 14 octobre 2013.

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Presentation on theme: "EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14 octobre 2013Page 1 Mali, SERVAL operation French Air Force operational & tactical learnings Paris, 14 octobre 2013."— Presentation transcript:

1 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14 octobre 2013Page 1 Mali, SERVAL operation French Air Force operational & tactical learnings Paris, 14 octobre 2013

2 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 2 1.Crisis mgt, deployment, missions. 2.Keys for initial swiftness. 3. Air campaign. 4. The enemy and the theater. 5. Lessons Learned

3 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 3 North-South: -different geography - economy, people… - historical tensions -Military coup in Bamako (2012 march, 22 th ): disorganized Armed Forces - Northern nationalists, rebels got the opportunity and took control of northern Mali (Kidal march 30 th – Gao march 31 th – Tombouctou April 1 st ) - April 6 th, Independent region of AZAWAD is proclaimed - Provides sanctuary for armed rebels groups. AZAWAD 1. Crisis management

4 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 4 AZAWAD 2013 January 10 th : 2013 January 10 th : rebels carried out a strong offensive southward and seized Konna town inbound Mopti. Malian Pdt wrote a letter to UNSG who transmitted it to UNSC and asked help of France. UNSC declares : to provide assistance to the Malian Defense and Security Forces in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated groups The members of the Security Council reiterate their call to Member States to assist the settlement of the crisis in Mali and, in particular, to provide assistance to the Malian Defense and Security Forces in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated groups. French Pdt decided to give direct military assistance to Mali. From crisis Rising… 1. Crisis management

5 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 5 … to immediate response 3 4 Jan. 11 th (noon): Jan. 11 th (noon): political decision Jan th (night): Jan th (night): 1st strike, pre deployed M2000D from N’Djamena. Preliminary orders for 2d strike/reinforce. Jan. 12 th (PM): targets selected Jan. 13th (AM): longest strike mission of FAF history :9h45 of flight Jan. 13th (AM): Rafale raid takes-off from mother base (St Dizier ), longest strike mission of FAF history :9h45 of flight. >30 targets destroyed after 3 days 1. Crisis management

6 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 6 DAKARABIDJAN N’DJAMENALIBREVILLEC135 CN235 C130 C160 M2000D F1CR ATL2BAMAKO 3000 km 1000 km 3000 km Harfang Niamey Rafale CSAR E3F reinforced capability 1. Deployed assets French air assets already present in western Africa, reinforcements and distances of APODs

7 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 7 1. Missions Missions for French Air Force : 1. provide air strikes directly to help Malian forces and FR SOF to stop rebels running to the south before Mopti (which is a very important lock on the way to Bamako) and reinforce quickly the air component (>+800 FR pax) 2. deny and disorganize rebels’ supply chain just north of front line and far away (North of Mali) 3. provide CAS sorties to support Malian and FR troops and SCAR mission to give them freedom of movement 4. provide air mobility to give FR troops the ability to take quickly under control the most important airfields IOT take control of the two only bridges over Niger river and organize permanent air sustainment 5. settle an air C2 to plan and conduct an air joint and combined operation (up to 8 nations involved) / every components providing air assets 6. organize the air ISR campaign including all allied and joint assets 7. support the joint operation : plan permanent air transportation (water, food, ammunition, vehicles, troops…) including a/c from other nations, CSAR, air and space control, JTACs, Air tactical controllers …

8 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 8 2. Keys for initial swiftness We are operating while the situation is worsening :  political tempo is often very high (emergency crisis situation)  less than 48h to deliver the first effects by air power (Libya,

9 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 9 For initial entry in a semi-permissive environment : - Over Mali, as over Libya … - have a maximum flexibility with a real multirole combat system - survive Vs Air-to-Air & Ground-to-Air threats (MICA, SPECTRA, AASM in DEAD) - strike hard & deep into the theater and in a very short time to deny the enemy any time for tactical adaptation (AASM) - be part of the intelligence process which is key factor of success : AREOS pod is both a tactical & strategic tool. - have a very high interoperability level because operations are joint (all components) and combined (coalition) from C2 to the battlefield - be easy to handle/comfortable (permanency requests very long missions), and quick to learn - be safe (twin engine is needed) while easy to sustain - Have high readiness and good expeditionary ability to be deployed very quickly (<48h) 2. Keys for initial swiftness

10 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 10 First ops mission is also deployment… During three days : daily 2 ops missions (4 sorties) with air to ground engagements with only 1,5t of initial deployment and 17 technicians then 7/H24 operation including 37% of night ops for the first two months Serviceability rate : 93% Logistics & footprint : RAFALE Vs M2000 : less tons, less m3 Beginning of June : >3000FH in more than 600 sorties (average duration 6h) / 52% of all targets engaged by the Air Force struck by RAFALE first stand-alone deployment of AREOS ground shelter with a very good efficiency in short-loop intelligence process. Mali : Rafale over Mali retour

11 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 11 Focus Rafale 2. Keys for initial swiftness Independent ISR capability to be able to support a political decision Multirole aircrafts to get versatility and be ready to face any unexpected situation in combat area Multirole aircraft to downsize the volume of deployed forces while maintaining a very high readiness level for any mission  deploy quicker & maintain same ops level Tankers are key systems to get the appropriate reach and necessary playtime for fighters above the theater AWACS is a key system to control tactical assets, retask them as necessary and get the appropriate level of reversibility (key advantage of air power at crisis beginning). Both for Libya or Mali operations, need to strike in first, far from homeland & deploy quickly.

12 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 12 AI ISR ISR CAS Diabali GCAS AAR CAS Phase 1 Phase 2 CAS SOF AAR Tombouctou Phase 1 (Jan.: 11-15) Phase 1 (Jan.: 11-15) Stop the raiders. Phase 2 (Jan. 16 – Fev. 8): Control river Niger loop area. Seize the initiative in the North. Phase 2 (Jan. 16 – Fev. 8): Control river Niger loop area. Seize the initiative in the North. CAS Gao 3. The air campaign

13 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 13 ISR Diabali SGTIA1 FRENCH LAND FORCES AFR TROOPS PARATROOPERS FROM ABIDJAN Deliberate Show of Force Deliberate Speed up ground manoeuver GAO GAO (26 Jan.) SoF support Air Landing (Niger troops) hold the airstrip. SOF FRENCH LAND FORCES CAS CAS CAS TSL TSL (10-12 Fev.) Seize and hold the airstrip KDL & GAO KDL & GAO (30 Jan.) Reinforcements Next: TBU TBU (29 Jan.) Heavy vehicle drop TBU TBU (27 Jan.) Airdrop: 250 troopers Airborne operation during phase 2 3. The air campaign

14 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 14 AI ISR Diabali ISR CAS CAS CAS Phase 2 GCAS AAR Phase 3 SOF African Forces SCAR Phase 3 (09 Fev.- Apr 15) : Phase 3 (09 Fev.- Apr 15) : Neutralize, deny sanctuaries Adrar, Timetrine 3. The air campaign

15 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 15 GCAS ISR Phase 4 (Apr 16- … ) : (ISR) Phase 4 (Apr 16- … ) : Monitor (ISR) & permanent Show of presence 3. The air campaign

16 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 16 Détail camp. Air transportation (from France to APODs): 3800 pax (100 % FAF) t freight (80% FR) Air to air refueling 1 TKR for 1 jet (almost)! Combat missions: up to 12 sorties/day FAF means deployed: fighters CSAR C2 ATT UAVs AAR 1st month Mean * (FAF) March (FAF) Highly optimized: split-ops 3 retasks/missions (ISR/CAS/SCAR) Coalition: 9 ATT, 8 ISR, 6 TKR* 1 st part (intensive) :3 months (Jan.-Mar.) During the first month 50% more weapons fired than during Libyan crisis first month. MALE UAVs: 80 sorties, 1400 fh 1000 targets HELOS: 80 missions >150 pax evacuated Total* (FAF) Full spectrum: same assets … same sorties … 3 levels of action Total* (FAF) 3. The air campaign

17 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 17 –Asymmetric enemy Several groups, different strategies Quickly vanishing Low signature Maximum imbrication Looks for STRAT success despite TAC setback –Very dynamic battle space 3 different fronts at least Rapidly shifting ground maneuver No ground picture building at tac level –Application of air power : High political tempo Extreme elongations Permanency (asym. adv) Use of APODs & pre-deployed forces Every conventional mission played French C2, but still a multinational operation (eg: 8 nations having assets on the FR-CAOC ATO) Air Force focus on: Stop the southward raiding; then Deep strike Logistics Support of ground troops and always … ISR ! … NOT the enemy! 3. The enemy and the theater

18 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 18 … and a safe but swift engagement process PID ROE CDE TEA Positive Identification (is this a legitimate target ?) Rules of Engagement (Have I the right to strike it ?) Collateral Damage Estimate (any risks for civilians goods/persons ?) Target Engagement Authority (Who decide ?) Safety and swiftness The right asset at the right place and time with the right level of fire power… Flexible ordnances, as for reach / guiding (MTO, …), effects Cockpit fusing, airburst, … Centralized (safe) vs Decentralised (swift) retour

19 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page First Lessons Identified 1.C2:Swiftness & discrimination => permanency + instant sharing Reachback model is combat proven; Global need for SATCOM (elongations/retasking), or at least C2 relays having SATCOM; Networking IS important (collaborative building and sharing of SA, retasking) : key role of joint tactical datalinks (sharing air and ground recognized pictures); Tchats have become central tools for C2 (what doctrine?); Shorten the loop « sensor to shooter » (low lifetime targets): short-looped ISR (15’ between first sight and broadcasting) must be formalized (products/proc); Need for a good pool of C2 specialists, educated and trained because the shortest the loop the more people you need (+ high retasking rate, >50%); High level of jointness (short lifetime targets: nearest/most appropriate asset must be used) ; key role of Los at very level, in any component: ALOs/FAC are cultural nodes. 5. Learnings Focus TEA

20 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 20 INTEL short loop with AREOS RECO-NG / AEROS Pinpoint high sensitive target Timing between T0 = aircraft shooting picture T1 = SRD emitting target folder with level 1 analysis up to 20 tgts with 2 Rafale

21 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page MALE: Permanency: they can play as COM-relay, even C2 nodes (better SA). Having a multi-sensor capability onboard makes sense… (color, SAR/GMTI, ELINT) Airspeed must be sufficient (weather, frequent retasks, different POI 50 Nm away) FMV: Broadcasted to different “clients” at the same time (Strat/Op/Tac + SOF); shared SA and capability to immediately adapt TEA level. / Offensive actionsOperations preparation / Force Protection Area surveillance : Situation understanding Find activity Pattern of life Pre-strike HVI Battle Damage Assess. Reconnaissance Convoy escort Force protection Laser designation UAVs

22 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 22 INTEL CAOC DESIGNATE INFOS JOINT ALLIED REPORT INFOS AEW C2 FIND FIX  TRACK + PID JSTAR, SENTINEL, … INVEST SEND BDA GIVE DEL UAVs: dynamic targeting back

23 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page First Lessons Identified 1.C2 2.ISR Key factor => short loop (action-aimed INTEL) & discrimination Strong need for a very short loop air and ground) bringing INTEL for immediate action; Thinking INTEL according to “age of usefulness” rather than solely according to origin (ROIM vs ROEM vs ROHUM); Need for sensors maneuvering (global), centralized at the SIDO level (CAOC) and based on common (joint) tools for sharing & fusing in order to: preset (via SAR/GMTI, ELINT,..) tactical sensors ensure robust discrimination through crosscueing; UAVs are unrivalled (permanency: 1flight = 27h) for time analysis (pattern of life) enabling discrimination, as well as for swiftness (already on scene); Any asset must act as a sensor, and be able to share (NCW using tactical datalinks). 5. Learnings Focus UAV Focus SRD

24 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page First Lessons Identified 1.C2 2.ISR 3.PROJECTION Swift, far, in a rough environment => AAR & Direct delivery Swift engagement => strategic airlift (61% total volume), massive (1 st month SERVAL = same volume as full HARMATTAN operation); Government assets overwhelmed (5% total): contractors mandatory, as well as allies => need for more mutual knowledge & standardization as far as military airlift is concerned (loadmasters, procedures…); Critical traffic jam at Bamako APOD (flights from Istres to GAO, Niamey…): need for direct delivery (1 A400M on IST-GAO = 5 C160 on BKO-GAO) Air to air refuelling: mandatory for power projection (3 C135 / 4 Rafale 13/01) (2 MRTT would have done the job + carrying the whole technical staff) and set the level of fighter activity (critical help from allies). 5. Learnings

25 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page First Lessons Identified 1.C2 2.ISR 3.PROJECTION 4.EDUCATION / TRAINING Initial entry, broad spectrum of missions with a light footprint: need for a permanent pool of combat-ready broadly qualified fighters; C2 domain is critical, both in quantity & quality: then again having a combat-ready pool is mandatory; Education & training « at home » crisis-time can be maintained using former experienced pilots (both retired or in activity at HQ…) 5. Learnings

26 EMAA/BEOP/DIVISION RETEX Date : 14/10/ 2013Page 26 QUESTIONS ? Merci pour votre attention…


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