Presentation on theme: "Process Hazard Analysis"— Presentation transcript:
1 Process Hazard Analysis SAND No CSandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
2 Overview of Presentation ResourcesAcronymsBasic risk conceptsProcess Hazard Analysis (PHA) definedExperience-based versus predictive approachesExperience-based—ChecklistPredictive Qualitative methods (What-If, HAZOP)Team meeting logisticsDocumenting PHAsImplementing PHA findings and recommendations
3 Key acronyms PHA = process hazard analysis HAZOP = hazard and operability [study]RAGAGEPs = Recognized as Generally Accepted Good Engineering PracticesCCPS = Center for Chemical Process SafetyANSI = American National Standards Institute
4 ResourcesCCPS 2008a. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.Chapter 4 • Non-Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedures4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis4.2 Safety Review4.3 Relative Ranking4.4 Checklist AnalysisChapter 5 • Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedures5.1 What-If Analysis5.2 What-If/Checklist Analysis5.3 Hazard and Operability Studies5.4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis5.5 Fault Tree Analysis5.6 Event Tree Analysis5.7 Cause-Consequence Analysis and Bow-Tie Analysis5.8 Other Techniques
5 ResourcesD. A. Crowl and J. F. Louvar Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications, 2nd Ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.Chapter 10 • Hazards IdentificationChapter 11 • Risk Assessment
6 ResourcesCCPS 2007a. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.Chapter 9 • Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis9.1 Element Overview9.2 Key Principles and Essential Features9.3 Possible Work Activities9.4 Examples of Ways to Improve Effectiveness9.5 Element Metrics9.6 Management Review
7 ResourcesHAZOP: Guide to Best Practice, 2nd Edition, Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK.B. Tyler, F. Crawley and M. Preston 2008.
8 Hazard vs. Risk Fundamental definitions: Source: R.W. Johnson, “Risk Management by Risk Magnitudes,” Chemical Health & Safety 5(5), 1998
9 Risk Risk = f ( Likelihood, Severity ) Constituents of risk: Likelihood andSeverityof Loss EventsRisk = f ( Likelihood, Severity )9
10 Risk = Likelihood · Severity n General form of risk equation:Risk = Likelihood · Severity nMost common form:Risk = Likelihood · Severity
11 RISK Risk = Likelihood · Severity Example units of measure: injuries year=loss eventsyearinjuriesloss eventx$ lossyear=loss eventsyear$ lossloss eventx
12 What Is a “Process Hazard Analysis”? A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a structured team review of an operation involving hazardous materials/energies, to:identify previously unrecognized hazards,identify opportunities to make the operation inherently safer,identify loss event scenarios,evaluate the scenario risks to identify where existing safeguards may not be adequate, anddocument team findings and recommendations.
13 What Is a “Process Hazard Analysis”? Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a structured team review of an operation involving hazardous materials/energies, to:identify previously unrecognized hazards,identify opportunities to make the operation inherently safer,identify loss event scenarios,evaluate the scenario risks to identify where existing safeguards may not be adequate, anddocument team findings and recommendationsFocusof thismodule
14 Hazard and Risk Analysis Basic risk conceptsExperience-based vs predictive approaches
15 Experience-based approaches Some PHA methods determine the adequacy of safeguards without assessing scenario risksThis is done on the basis of collective past experienceThis method compares processes with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEPs)
16 Experience-based approaches Effective way to take advantage of past experienceConcentrates on protecting against events expected during lifetime of facilityLow-probability, high-consequence events not analyzedNot good for complex or unique processes
17 Experience-based approaches Examples of experience-based approaches:Safety ReviewChecklist Analysis
18 Experience-based approaches Example experience-based approaches:Safety ReviewChecklist Analysis
19 Experience-based approaches ChecklistUses a written list of items to verify the status of a systemCommonly used in conjunction with another hazard identification methodMay be used to familiarize inexperienced personnel with a processCommon basis for management reviewAddresses material, equipment, and procedures
20 Experience-based approaches Checklist Activity Form 4 groupsList at least 5 questions that require a Yes/No answer about a chemical storage area at your site that would be included in a hazard analysis of the area.Example: gas cylinder storage
21 Experience-based approaches Checklist Activity Gas cylinders storage area: Possible Checklist QuestionsIf cylinders are stored outside, are they stored out of direct sunlight to prevent over pressure?Are cylinders secured by means of chocks or chains while in storage?Are cylinders stored away from standing water?Are cylinders stored so that objects cannot fall on them or strike them?Are cylinders stored so that a leak will not enter a lower elevation of a building or process area?Are cylinders stored with the valve cover or cap secured in place?
22 Hazard Identification Methodologies Many hazard identification methodologies will be aided by piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) or process flow diagrams (PFD)P&ID and PFD present the nominal plant or system layoutP&ID is at an equipment and component levelPFD is a simplified P&ID to present process level
29 Predictive studies Supplement adherence to good practice Qualitative or quantitativeAble to study adequacy of safeguards against low probability / high severity scenariosAll predictive studies are scenario-based approaches
30 Scenario - definition Scenario: An unplanned event or incident sequence that results in a loss event and its associated impacts, including the success or failure of safeguards involved in the incident sequence.- CCPS 2008a
31 Scenario necessary ingredients: Initiating cause ANDLoss event or safe outcome
32 Example of a simple scenario: While unloading a tankcar into a caustic storage tank, the tank high level alarm sounded due to the person unloading not paying close attention to the operation.The operator noticed and responded to the alarm right away, stopping the unloading operation. Normal production was then resumed.What is the initiating cause?What is the consequence?
33 Predictive studies Objective of scenario-based approaches: Identify and analyze all failure scenariosNot generally possible just by inspectionSystematic approach neededIn reality, many scenarios eliminated by common sense and experienceNegligible likelihoodUnimportant consequence
34 Predictive studies What-If Analysis What-If / Checklist Analysis Some scenario-based approaches:What-If AnalysisWhat-If / Checklist AnalysisHazard and Operability (HAZOP) StudyFailure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
35 Hazard and Risk Analysis Basic risk conceptsExperience-based vs predictive approachesQualitative methods (What-If, HAZOP)
37 What-If AnalysisConcept: Conduct thorough, systematic examination by asking questions that begin with “What if...”Usually conducted by a relatively small team (3-5 persons)Process divided up into “segments” (e.g., unitoperations)Review from input to output of processQuestion formulation left up to the team members
38 What-If Analysis Question usually suggests an initiating cause. “What if the raw material is in the wrong concentration?”If so, postulated response develops a scenario.“If the concentration of oxidant was doubled, the reaction could not be controlled and a rapid exotherm would result...”
39 What-If Analysis Answering each “What if …” question: 1 Describe potential consequences and impacts2 If a consequence of concern, assess cause likelihood3 Identify and evaluate intervening safeguards4 Determine adequacy of safeguards5 Develop findings and recommendations (as required)6 Raise new questionsMove to next segment when no more questions are raised.
40 Adequacy of safeguards Determining the adequacy of safeguards is done on a scenario-by-scenario basisScenario risk is a function of:Initiating cause frequencyLoss event impactSafeguards effectivenessIf the scenario risk is found to be too high, safeguards are considered inadequateRisk based on:Qualitative judgmentRisk matrixRisk magnitude
41 What-If ExerciseGet into 4 groups and develop a What-IF analysis for the following three scenarios.List the consequences, safeguards, and recommendations on the What-If worksheet.What-If a chlorine cylinder is dropped from the hoist during cylinder changes?What-If a chlorine main cylinder valve develops a leak while the cylinder is in operation?What-If the pressure reducing valve vent becomes stuck in the open position?
42 1. A chlorine cylinder is dropped from the hoist during cylinder changes? 2. A chlorine main cylinder valve develops a leak while the cylinder is in operation?3. The pressure reducing valve vent becomes stuck in the open position?
44 HAZOP StudyHAZOP study process was developed within the process industriesTeam-based approachNeeds well-defined system parametersUsed as hazard and/or operability study methodSafety issues dominate for existing processOperability issues prevail for new designsMany issues relate to both safety and operability
45 HAZOP Study Assumptions: No incidents when system operates as intended (“normal operation”)Failure scenarios occur when system deviates from intended operation (“abnormal situation”)
46 HAZOP Study Establish review scope Identify study “nodes” Establish Node 1 design/operation intentIdentify Deviation 1 from Node 1 intentIdentify causes, loss events, safeguardsDecide whether action is warrantedRepeat for every node and deviation
47 Study nodesA node is a specific point in a process or procedure where deviations are studied.Typical study nodes:Process vesselTransfer lineStrictly: Wherever a process parameter changesAt end of line (vessel interface)Line may include pump, valves, filter, etc.Procedural step
48 Study nodes Level Pressure (blanketed) Material specifications FuelStorageTankFlow ratePressureTemperatureReactorResidence timeMixingLevelPressure
49 Design/operationalINTENTThe intent describes the design / operational parameters defining normal operation.FunctionsLimitsCompositionsProcedural stepsIt answers one of these questions:“What is this part of the process designed to do?”“What is supposed to be done at this point in time?”
50 Design/operational intent A complete design/operational intent includes:Equipment usedAll functions or operations intended to be achieved in this part of the processAll intended locations/destinationsQuantitative limits for all pertinent process parametersIntended stream composition limits
51 Design/operational intent Example:The intent of a storage tank is to:Maintain a working inventory of liquid RM-12 which is supplied by tank (rail) cars from outside suppliers. The node does not include the tank loading systems.
52 HAZOP Guide WordsGuide Words are applied to the design intent to systematically identify deviations from normal operation.NONEMORE OFLESS OFPART OFAS WELL ASREVERSEOTHER THAN
53 HAZOP Guide Words Guide Word Meaning NONE Negation of intent MORE OF Exceed intended upper limitLESS OF Drop below intended lower limitPART OF Achieve part of intentAS WELL AS Something in addition to intentREVERSE Logical opposite of intent occursOTHER THAN Something different from intent
54 Deviations from Intent Do not begin developing deviations until intent is fully described, documented and agreed uponList of deviations can be started as soon as intent is establishedGuide WordsINTENTDeviation
55 DeviationsA deviation is an abnormal situation, outside defined design or operational parameters.HazardsDeviationNo FlowLow TemperatureHigh Pressure (exceed upper limit of normal range)Less Material AddedExcess ImpuritiesTransfer to Wrong TankLoss of Containmentetc.
56 HAZOP Deviations Guide Design Intent Example“Contain the working inventory of liquid RM-12”NO / NONEMORE OFLESS OFContainment lostProcedure step skippedNo [function]No transferNo agitationNo reactionProcedure started too lateProcedure done too longToo much [function]Too much transferredToo much agitationHigh [controlled variable]High reaction rateHigh flow rateHigh pressureHigh temperatureProcedure started too soonProcedure stopped too soonNot enough [function]Not enough transferredNot enough agitationLow [controlled variable]Low reaction rateLow flow rateLow pressureLow temperaturePART OFAS WELL ASREVERSEOTHER THANExtra step performedExtra [function]Transfer from more than one sourceTransfer to more than one destinationExtra [composition]Extra phase presentImpurities; dilutionPart of procedure step skippedPart of [function] achievedPart of [composition]Component missingPhase missingCatalyst deactivatedWrong procedure performedWrong [function] achievedTransfer from wrong sourceTransfer to wrong destinationMaintenance/test/sampling at wrong time/locationSteps done in wrong orderReverse [function]Reverse flowReverse mixing
57 Initiating causes Identify deviation cause(s) Must look backward in time sequenceOnly identify local causes (i.e., in current study node)Most deviations have more than one possible causeGuide WordsINTENTCauseDeviation
58 Loss eventsDetermine cause and deviation consequences, assuming failure of protection safeguardsTake scenario all the way to a loss consequenceConsequences can be anywhere and anytimeGuide WordsINTENTCauseDeviationLoss Event(s)
59 Loss eventsDetermine cause and deviation consequences, assuming failure of protection safeguardsTake scenario all the way to a loss consequenceConsequences can be anywhere and anytimeGuide WordsINTENTGLOBALCONSEQUENCESLOCALCAUSESCauseDeviationLoss Event(s)
60 SafeguardsDocument preventive safeguards that intervene between the specific Cause-Consequence pairNote that different Consequences are possible, depending on safeguard success or failure (e.g., PRV)HazardsImpactsDeviationPreventionMitigationLoss EventRegain controlor shut downMitigatedUnmitigated
61 HAZOP Exercise Work in Groups Fill out the HAZOPS analysis sheet: Using the Tank T-100 example, and the Guide Words, “LEVEL HIGH” and “LEVEL LOW”, list the following:CauseConsequenceSafeguardsFindings/Recommendations
63 HAZOP Study Node 1 T-100 Storage Tank SCOPE: T-100 Storage TankINTENT: Maintain level of Reactant A fuel in T-100 storage tank for transfer to process vesselReview Date:Guide Word, DeviationValueCausesConsequencesSafeguardsFinding/Rec. #CommentsLEVELHigh1. High flow into T Failure of the T-100 level control system. 3. Pumps-101A and B both stop.1. Overflow could cause injury to operator in area.2. Overflow would be contained by secondary containment system.No environmental hazard identified.Inlet valve, level control systems, and pumps are inspected and replaced on a regular maintenance schedule.There is a redundant level control system.Secondary containment system designed to capture 50% overflowIncrease the frequency of maintenance inspections.Test integrity of secondary containment.Low1. Possible damage to Pump, P‑101A, impeller, leading to vibration and leak and personal injury.Inlet valves, level control systems, and pumps are inspected and replaced on a regular maintenance schedule.Pump, P-101A shuts down automatically when level is too low.
65 Hazard and Risk Analysis PHA Team Review The following are common to all PHA team reviews:Team compositionPreparationFirst team review meetingFinal team review meeting
66 PHA Team Composition 5 to 7 team members optimum Team leader (facilitator) – hazard analysis expertiseScribe – responsible for PHA documentationKey members – should have process/engineering expertise, operating and maintenance experienceSupporting members – instruments, electrical, mechanical, explosion hazards, etc.
67 PHA PreparationAt initial scheduling of review and designation as team leader:Become familiar with the plant’s PSM proceduresDetermine exact scope of PHAWith PSM Coordinator, select one or more PHA methods that are appropriate to the complexity of the process(Different techniques can be used for different parts of the process)
68 PHA Preparation ~ 6 weeks before start date of team review: Compile process safety information for process to be studiedObtain procedures for all modes of operationGather other pertinent informationDetermine missing or out-of-date informationMake action plan for updating or developing missing information prior to the start of the team reviews
69 PHA Preparation ~ 4 weeks before expected start date: Confirm final selection of review team membersGive copy of PHA Procedures to scribe; emphasize the necessity for thorough documentationEstimate the number of review-hours needed to complete PHA team review, or check previous estimateEstablish an initial schedule of review sessions, coordinated with shift schedules of team members
70 PHA TimingPlan PHA team review in half-day sessions of 3 to 3½ hours duration.Optimum: 1 session/day, 4 sessions/weekMaximum: 8 sessions/weekSchedule sessions on a long-term planSchedule at set time on set daysPHA team reviews usually take one or two days to get started, then ~ ½ day per typical P&ID, unit operation or short procedure
71 PHA Preparation ~ 2 to 3 weeks before start date: Obtain copies of all incident reports on file related to the process or the highly hazardous materials in the processReserve meeting roomArrange for computer hardware and software to be used, if anyDivide up process into study nodes or segmentsDevelop initial design intent for each study node, with the assistance of other review team members as needed
72 PHA Preparation During the week before the start date: Select and notify one person to give process overviewArrange for walk-around of facility, including any necessary training and PPE
73 First team review meeting 2 Scope and objectivesGo over exact boundaries of system to be studiedExplain purpose for conducting the PHA
74 First team review meeting 3 MethodologyFamiliarize team members with methodology to be usedExplain why selected methodology is appropriate for reviewing this particular process
75 First team review meeting 4 Process safety informationReview what chemical, process, equipment and procedural information is available to the teamEnsure all required information is available before proceeding
76 First team review meeting 5 Process overviewPrearrange for someone to give brief process overview, covering such details as:Process, controlsEquipment, buildingsPersonnel, shift schedulesHazardous materials, process chemistrySafety systems, emergency equipmentProceduresWhat is in general vicinity of processHave plant layout drawings available
77 First team review meeting 6 Unit tourPrearrange for tour through entire facility to be included in team reviewFollow all safety procedures and PPE requirementsHave team members look for items such as:General plant conditionPossible previously unrecognized hazardsHuman factors (valves, labeling, etc.)Traffic and pedestrian patternsActivities on operator rounds (gauges, etc.)Emergency egress routes
78 First team review meeting 7 Review previous incidentsReview all incident and near-miss reports on file for the process being studiedAlso review sister-plant and industry-wide incidents for the type of process being studiedIdentify which incidents had potential for catastrophic on-site or off-site / environmental consequencesMake sure detailed assessment (e.g., HAZOP Study) covers all previous significant incidents
79 First team review meeting 8 Review facility sitingDiscuss issues related to whether buildings intended for occupancy are designed and arranged such that people are adequately protected against major incidentsVarious approaches are possible:API Recommended Practices 752, 753Topical review (e.g., CCPS 2008a page 291)Checklist review (e.g., Appendix F of W.L. Frank and D.K. Whittle, Revalidating Process Hazard Analyses, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2001)
80 First team review meeting 9 Review human factorsDiscuss issues related to designing equipment, operations and work environments so they match human capabilities, limitations and needsHuman factors are associated with:Initiating causes (e.g., operational errors causing process upsets)Preventive safeguards (e.g., operator response to deviations)Mitigative safeguards (e.g., emergency response actions)
81 First team review meeting 9 Review human factors (continued)Various approaches are possible:Ergonomic studiesTopical review of positive and negative human factors (e.g., CCPS 2008a pages )Checklist review (e.g., Appendix G of W.L. Frank and D.K. Whittle, Revalidating Process Hazard Analyses, NY: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2001)
82 First team review meeting 10 Identify and document process hazardsSee earlier module on Hazards and PotentialConsequencesAlso an opportunity to address inherent safety issues
83 First team review meeting To do during the final team review meeting:Ensure entire scope of review has been coveredRead through all findings and recommendations toEnsure each finding and recommendation is understandable to those needing to review and implement themConsolidate similar findingsEnsure all previous significant incidents have beenaddressed in the PHA scenarios
84 PHA ReportGoal: Record the results such that study is understandable, can be easily updated, and supports the team’s decisions.System studiedWhat was doneBy whomWhenFindings and recommendationsPHA worksheetsInformation upon which the PHA was based
85 Report Disposition Draft report prepared by scribe reviewed by all team memberspresented to management, preferably in a face-to-face meetingManagement input considered by review teamFinal reportaccepted by managementkept in permanent PHA file
86 Implementing findings & recommendations What is the most important product of a PHA?1. The PHA report2. A deeper understanding gained of the system3. Findings and recommendations from the study
87 Implementing findings & recommendations What is the most important product of a PHA?1. The PHA report2. A deeper understanding gained of the system3. Findings and recommendations from the study4. The actions taken in response to the findingsand recommendations from the study
88 Implementing findings & recommendations Findings and recommendations are developed throughout team reviewAnalysis of hazards; inherent safety optionsFacility siting reviewHuman factors reviewHAZOP, What-If, etc.Basis for determining whether finding or recommendation is warranted:CHECKLIST REVIEW: Code/standard is violatedPREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: Scenario risk is too high (also if code/standard is violated)
89 Implementing findings & recommendations Wording of findings and recommendations:Be as general as possible in wording of finding, to allow flexibility in how item is resolvedinstead ofDescribing the concern as part of the finding will help ensure the actual concern is addressedUse of words such as these warrants follow-up to ensure the team’s concern was actually addressed:CONSIDER…STUDY…INVESTIGATE…..Install reverse flow protection in Line to prevent backflow of raw material to storageInstall a Cagey Model 21R swing check valve in the inlet flange connection to the reactor
90 PHA risk-control actions Example risk-control actions:Alter physical design or basic process control systemAdd new layer of protection or improve existing layersChange operating methodChange process conditionsChange process materialsModify inspection/test/maintenance frequency or methodReduce likely number of people and/or value of property exposed
91 PHA Action Item Implementation “The employer shall establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions.”- OSHA PSM Standard, 29 CFR (e)(5) and U.S. EPA RMP Rule, 40 CFR 68.67(e)
92 1 - Document findings & recommendations Example form:
93 2 - Present findings & recommendations PHA team Line management1234
94 2 - Present findings & recommendations PHA team Line management1234
95 3 - Line management response For each PHA team finding/recommendation:Suggestions:Use database or spreadsheetFlag imminent and overdue actionsPeriodically report overall status to top management
97 4 - Document final resolution Document how each action item was implemented.
98 Communication of actions Communicate actions taken in response to PHA findings and recommendations.TO WHOM?To operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions
99 Communication of actions HOW?Train through plant training program when neededUse appropriate techniquesVerify understandingOtherwise inform, such as bySafety meetingsBeginning-of-shift communicationsDocument communications
100 Communication of actions WHAT?Physical changesPersonnel or responsibility/accountability updatesOperating / maintenance proceduresEmergency procedures; Emergency Response PlanSafe work practice proceduresControl limits or practices
101 DISCUSSIONWHY?What are two or more reasons why it is important to communicate PHA action items to affected employees?
102 Final word The task of the PHA team is to identify where action is needed,not to redesign the system.
103 Summary of Presentation Defined Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Compared experience versus scenario types of analysisDescribed the use of checklistsGave an example of a What-If analysisGave an example of a HAZOPS analysisDescribed the elements of a PHA teamDiscussed documenting and communicating PHA results