Presentation on theme: "Aristotle’s Theory of Eudaimonia or Happiness. 500 BC200 BC Greek Philosophers (500BC – 200BC) Timeline The Great Three Plato (429 - 347) Socrates (469."— Presentation transcript:
Aristotle’s Theory of Eudaimonia or Happiness
500 BC200 BC Greek Philosophers (500BC – 200BC) Timeline The Great Three Plato ( ) Socrates ( ) Plato, 20, meets Socrates, 60
Some Goods Better than Others
Instrumental and Intrinsic Good Instrumental good =df something good as a means to something else … Having a tan? Good for getting a date Having a date? Good for falling in love Being in love? Good for its own sake (intrinsically), and for happiness (as a means to happiness) Being happy? Good for its own sake, and as a means to …
The Highest Good NOTHING. It seems that happiness is not desired for anything other than itself. It is intrinsically desirable but not instrumentally so. Is that true of anything else? Try out … Honor? Good for its own sake, but also as a means to happiness. Fame? Good for its own sake, but also as a means to happiness. Happiness, then, seems to be the highest good for humans. We desire it for its own sake, but never, seemingly, for anything else. It seems self-sufficient.
Human Nature The Instrumental/Intrinsic good distinction leads us to conclude the good for humans is happiness. There is, however, another method for identifying the good of something that Aristotle employs … He says that the good of a thing is its unique function: the good of the eye is seeing, and it’s a good eye if it sees well the good of a pen is writing, and it’s a good pen if it writes well Aristotle then asks, what is the good of human beings? the good of a human is reason, and it’s a good human if it reasons well. Humans are rational animals (common definition of humans in ancient Greece).
Definition of Happiness We have seen that THE GOOD is happiness (most desired), and THE GOOD is reasoning well (by analogical argument) Aristotle produces his definition of happiness from those 2 lines of reasoning (since happiness and reasoning well must be the same somehow): HAPPINESS = REASONING WELL … or, in Aristotle’s own words: HAPPINESS =df an activity of the soul (reasoning) in conformity with virtue (reasoning well ) so, happiness is NOT a feeling happiness is NOT a condition or state of mind happiness is NOT desire-satisfaction (getting what you want) happiness is NOT something you can receive
Virtue Happiness In Book I, Chapter 13 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle says: Since happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. So, let’s look! …
Intellectual Virtues For Humans this “work” is reason (we are rational animals), composed of theoretical wisdom (sophia) scientific reasoning (episteme, gk; scientia, latin), and intuitive understanding (nous) practical wisdom/practical reason, prudence (phronesis) craft knowledge, skill, art (techne) Note that, though tradition calls these kinds of reasoning ‘virtues’ they are not virtues strictly speaking. Can you see why? All 5 are intellectual “virtues,” NOT moral virtues
Moral Virtues (And One Intellectual Virtue) Aristotle identifies 11 moral virtues, all governed by one intellectual virtue, prudence —good deliberation 1) Courage 2) Temperance 3) Generosity 4) Magnificence (generosity with wealth) 5) Magnanimity (proper pride) 6) Right ambition 7) Good temper 8) Friendliness 9) Truthfulness 10) Wit 11) Justice All except Justice are a “mean” between extremes
How are Moral Virtues Acquired? Virtues are attained or acquired by practice and habit We become just by doing just acts, generous by generous acts, temperate by temperate acts, etc. So, if virtues are attained by practice and habit (we must do just acts to become just, and friendly acts to become friendly, etc.), how do we know what acts are just or friendly in the first place? 1)We learn by observation (look back to slide 3) 2)We ask a virtuous person 3)We use prudence to find the mean, or the right amount of an action, the right time for an action, the right object (immediate and or distant object) for an action, the right manner of acting, etc.
Dispositions, not Habits Moral virtues are not habits ; they are: dispositions to act that are acquired by habituation. purposive dispositions, lying in a mean determined by reason To posses a virtue is to hold a complex mental framework of the right feelings, attitudes, understanding, insight, experience, etc. … to have a multi-track disposition, unlike a simple habit such as being a tea drinker or coffee drinker. For more on multi-track dispositions, see Rosalind Hursthouse on Virtue Ethics:
To Sum Up Moral Virtue A morally virtuous person, then, ideally, Has all eleven moral virtues Each virtue is established by practice and habit, subjecting feelings and actions to reason Each virtue is settled between excess and deficiency by comprehensive understanding, or multi-track assessment
Back to Happiness… If happiness is “an activity of the soul in conformity with virtue,” what virtue is meant, intellectual virtue, or moral virtue? Aristotle’s answer is “both,” but in Book X he says since happiness is virtuous activity, it’s only natural that it be in conformity with the highest virtue the highest virtue (theoretical wisdom) is intellectual, and so 1. happiness is primarily intellectual activity 2. secondarily moral activity Notice, the title of chapter 8, Book X: Moral Activity is Secondary Happiness Question: So, who is happier … Einstein or Bono? _____
Happiness, Again Why is theoretical reason highest? 1)It has little in common with animal nature 2)It is more god-like 3)Practical reason exists for its sake What is so great about the life of contemplation? 1)Its pleasure is enduring (we can enjoy its constant, mild pleasure continuously) 2)Its pleasure is certain (if concepts provide your enjoyment, no one can take your toys away) The last points, Aristotle says, agree with the common view that true happiness is a stable, enduring quality
Happiness as Activity It is wrong to think of Eudaimonia as something different from happiness, as if Aristotle is providing an theory of “human flourishing,” rather than an argument about the real meaning of happiness. That interpretation wouldn’t make sense given these things he says: 1. Happiness is judged after death (NE, I, 7): But we must add [to the definition of happiness as an activity of our highest virtue] ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed or happy. (Life as a story?) –my parenthetical
Happiness as Activity 2. There are 3 kinds of goods: external goods (possessions, prosperity), bodily goods (pleasures, feelings), and the goods of the soul (activities and actions) –NE, I, 8. It is correct … that we identify the end [happiness] with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among the goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. 3. It is not a state of mind (NE, I, 8). For a state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life. (NE, I, 13) …[W]hence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad. (sleep is better to the degree it is inactive ) –my parenthetical
Happiness as Activity 4. We can be made happier after death? This point does not support Aristotle's view that happiness is an activity, but though he suggests the view makes sense, note what he says about it: Ought we, then, to go further and call no man happy so long as he is alive? Must we, in Solon’s phrase, ‘look to the end’? And if we are bound to lay down this rule, is a man really happy after he is dead? Surely this is an utter paradox, especially for us who define happiness as a kind of activity. On the other hand if we deny that a dead man is happy – if Solon’s words mean something else, namely that only when a man is dead can one safely congratulate him on being immune from evil and misfortune –even this admits of some dispute; for it is popularly believed that some good and evil – such as honours and dishonours, and successes and disasters of his children and descendants generally – can happen to a dead man, inasmuch as they can happen to a live one without his being aware of them.
Did Aristotle Mean ‘Happiness’ with ‘Eudaimonia’? Read the Encyclopedia Britannica entry on EudaimoniaEncyclopedia Britannica entry on Eudaimonia The Greek word eudaimonia means literally “the state of having a good indwelling spirit, a good genius”; and “happiness” is not at all an adequate translation of this word. eudaimonia Now, substitute ‘living well’ for happiness in the prior quotes and you see the arguments make no sense, since they then devolve into redundancies. Aristotle seems to be offering an argument for the “real” definition of ‘happiness’; not stipulating his own meaning. The Britannica entry seems to be suggesting Aristotle must be read as talking about something other than happiness, while Aristotle is plainly arguing that we have misunderstood happiness. What do you think?
References Richard Kraut at Northwestern, Evanston, IL: Rosalind Hursthouse at Auckland, New Zealand: Socrates’ image: Plato’s and Aristotle’s images: Einstein’s Image: Bono’s Image: Slide 26 image