Presentation on theme: "Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 1 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson Design, Implementation, and Verification of Fault-Tolerant."— Presentation transcript:
Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 1 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson Design, Implementation, and Verification of Fault-Tolerant Modular Aerospace Controls Honeywell NCC-1-377 Honeywell MAC (FADEC) –Modular approach –High product assurance, reliability, and safety –Reduced NRE and RE costs Modular certification Reuse - multiple applications TTTech TTA –Architecture hardware and software tools supplier –Architecture-enforced partitioning and transparent fault-tolerance capability SRI Formal Methods (FM) –Formal specification and verification of TTA properties –Formal verification of modular certification concept Objectives –NASA: A case study for the application of Formal Methods in the certification of the fault tolerant modular architecture –Honeywell: A highly reliable and safe system assured by formal verification and certification
Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 2 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson What is MAC? Modular Aerospace Controls (MAC) MAC is a common Honeywell development platform that deploys modular electronics, common development environment and tools, and an open communication protocol The MAC platform was created to enable low-cost development and support of FADEC applications The Next Generation of Aerospace Electronic Systems
Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 3 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson PSM 1 CPM 1 SFM 1 pS PSM 1 CPM 1 IOM 1 SFM 1 IOM 3 IOM 2 pS Today’s MAC Fits a Variety of Applications Uniquely capable –Low cost, harsh environment, fault tolerant Pre-qualification and semi-independent certification Industrial / automotive components & technology Partitioned operating system & application software Dramatic development cost and cycle time reduction Longevity through proactive obsolescence management Increased reliability through volume manufacturing and 6 Facilitates simplified overspeed and uncommanded thrust protection Medium Engine Control PSM 1 CPM 1 IOM 1 IOM 6 IOM 4SFM 3IOM 2 pS IOM 3 IOM 6 IOM 5 pS Large Engine Control RE-USEABLE MODULES Small Engine Control
Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 4 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson MAC Benefits for Redundant Flight Critical Systems Provides Improved Data Flow and Redundancy Management TTP/C Bus Eliminates Bottleneck –Easily re-configurable via TTTech COTS tools Configurable I/O modules plug into bus Redundancy is efficiently managed –Redundant I/O is available on bus without latency –Failures are localized; remainder of system is available Replica Computations between GPMs Serial link bottleneck between channels Custom bus controllers, complex addressing Not easy to accommodate changes Inefficient utilization of redundancy –Data latency issues to be dealt with –Many single failures warrant channel swap or degraded operation
Aviation Safety ProgramSingle Aircraft Accident Prevention April 1. 2003 5 NCC-1-377, Honeywell Tucson NCC-1-377 Accomplishments Design Correctness and Certification Developed approach for Modular Certification supported by formal analysis Presented to Industry and FAA Active participation in RTCA SC- 200/EUROCAE WG-60 “Modular Avionics” by all team members –Honeywell Tucson –Honeywell Labs –SRI International –TTTech –NASA Langley Fault-Tolerant Integrated Modular Avionics Developed modular architecture based on TTP/C Formal Analysis of key fault-tolerance protocols Several Products in Development –Aermacchi M346 Dual-FADEC First delivery 11/02 –F110 MDEC for GE (F16 mid-life upgrade) Kickoff 8/02 –Planned response to Boeing 77 initiative for modular architectures –Expect starts for civil products in 2004
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